Conversation 521-013

TapeTape 521StartTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 5:13 PMEndTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 6:03 PMTape start time02:42:00Tape end time03:32:43ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Keating, Kenneth B.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  White House photographer;  Sanchez, Manolo;  Butterfield, Alexander P.Recording deviceOval Office

President Nixon met with Ambassador Kenneth Keating and Henry Kissinger to discuss the evolving political climate in India following Indira Gandhi’s decisive election victory, as well as the escalating humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan. The group explored strategies for the President's upcoming meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister, specifically focusing on providing economic assistance to alleviate the refugee burden while avoiding direct entanglement in the internal conflict between India and Pakistan. Additionally, Nixon and Kissinger addressed the national security implications of the leaked Pentagon Papers, expressing deep frustration with the New York Times and the broader intellectual establishment, while reviewing progress on sensitive diplomatic channels with China and the Soviet Union.

India-Pakistan relationsEast Pakistan refugee crisisPentagon PapersIndira GandhiForeign aidDiplomatic leaksUS-China relations

On June 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Kenneth B. Keating, Henry A. Kissinger, White House photographer, Manolo Sanchez, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:13 pm to 6:03 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 521-013 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 521-13

Date: June 15, 1971
Time: 5:13 pm - 6:03 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Kenneth Keating and Henry A. Kissinger; White House photographer
was present at the beginning of the meeting.

     Greetings

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[National Security]
[521-013-w001]
[Duration: 23s]

     Former US ambassadors to India
              -Chester Bowles
                    -The President’s opinion
         -Disposition of embassy
              -Hippies

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     India-US relations
           -Background of situation
           -Meeting with Foreign Minister

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 5:13 pm.

     Refreshments

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 5:41 pm.

     Indian and US relations
          -Status
          -Indira Gandhi election
                -Size of victory
                      -Effect on opposition
                -Effect on relations
                      -Stability
                      -Union Carbide and Remington Rand licence approval
                            -Rationale
                                  -Employment
                                  -Export
                -Keating’s call on Minister of Industrial Development
                      -M.H. Chaudhury

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[National Security]
[521-013-w012]
[Duration: 4s]

     India–US relations
          -Indira Gandhi election
                -Kenneth B. Keating’s telephone call to Minister of Industrial Development
                     -Predecessor
                           -Kenneth B. Keating’s opinion

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     India–US relations
          -Indira Gandhi election
                -Kenneth B. Keating’s telephone call to Minister of Industrial Development
                     -M. H. Chaudhury
                           -Keating’s view
                     -Views of new Minister
                           -Indian resources
                                 -Public and private sectors
                           -Foreign investment
                -Keating contact with Mrs. Gandhi

                      -Cordiality
                            -Rationale
                      -Mahalia Jackson concert
          -Keating cables to Department of State
                -Keating assessment of situation
                -Timing of Cables
                      -East Pakistan
                -Keating assessment
                      -Indian and Pakistan stability
                      -Aid
                             -Keating’s recommendation
                      -Staff contribution
          -President's meeting with Foreign Minister
                -Possible topics

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[National Security]
[521-013-w009]
[Duration: 52s]

     India–US relations
          -President's meeting with Foreign Minister
                -Possible topics
                      -People’s Republic of China [PRC]–Pakistan relations
                            -Mujibur Rahman
                                  -Pro-India and Pro-America
                      -Background
                            -Military action
                            -Election interference
                            -Bengalese

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     India–US relations
          -President's meeting with Foreign Minister
                -Possible topics
                      -Aid

                           -Keating’s conversations
                           -Extent
                                 -Amount
                                 -Increases
                                 -C-130 aircraft
                     -Refugee problem
                           -Need to shift them back to Pakistan
                           -Effect on India
                           -Number
                           -Calcutta's Plight
                           -Continued flight into India
                                 -Pakistan
                                       -Hindus
                           -Impact on population
                           -Genocide
                                 -Extent
                           -Outlawing of Awami League
                                 -East Pakistan
                     -Political settlement in East Pakistan
                           -Effect of Refugees
                                 -Hindus and Muslims
                           -Goals
                                 -Peace
                                 -Reversal of Refugee Flow

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[National Security]
[521-013-w010]
[Duration: 27s]

     India–US relations
          -President's meeting with Foreign Minister
                -Possible topics
                      -Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan
                            -Needs to be pressured
                            -US leverage vs. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]

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     India-US relations
           -President’s meeting with Foreign Minister
                 -Possible topics
                      -Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan
                             -International Monetary Fund [IMF] action
                                   -Peter Cardell (?) role
                                   -Paris meeting
                      -Possibility of political settlement
                             -Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
                             -Keating’s view
                                   -Yahya’s role
                                   -[Unintelligible] role
                             -Awami League role
                             -Keating and Joseph S. Farland (?)
                                   -Changes in Pakistan
                             -President's relationship with Yahya
                 -Timing
                 -Topics
                      -Use of aid to help resolve crisis
                             -Use of aid
                                   -Rationale
                             -John B. Connally
                             -Amounts
                             -Pakistan reaction

      Invitation of Keating to Willy Brandt dinner
           -Keating schedule
                 -John Sherman Cooper party
           -Timing

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at 5:30 pm.

           -Place for Keating at dinner
                -Timing

Butterfield left at 5:31 pm.

           -Attire
           -Attendance
                 -Government officials

                 -Brandt
           -Businessmen
                 -Eastman Kodak president
                       -Bill Long [?]
                       -Louis Kenneth Eilers
                 -Thomas Gates Jr.
                 -Dow Chemical Chairman [Carl A. Gerstacker]
                 -Companies
                 -Monumental Properties [Joseph Meyerhoff]
                 -National Cash Register [Robert S. Oelman]
                 -National Airlines chairman [Dudley Swim]
                 -Dell E. Webb
                 -Kodak
                       -Eilers
                       -Hierarchy
Indian-US relations
     -The President’s scheduled meeting with Swaran Singh [Indian Foreign Minister]
     -Kissinger
     -Indian population problems
     -Role of democracy
     -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
     -The President’s policies
     -Indian criticism of US
     -US policy
           -Role of stability
                 -Kashmir
           -Collapse of Pakistan
           -US strategy
                  -Support for India
                 -Yahya Khan
           -Congress
                 -Popularity of foreign aid
                 -Feeling for India and Pakistan War
                 -Involvement in Biafra [Nigerian Civil War]
           -US strategy
                 -Rationale
     -Forthcoming meeting with Indian foreign minister
           -US policy
                 -Refugees
           -Method of accomplishment
                 -Avoidance of internal involvement
           -Avoidance of armed conflict

                      -Pressure on Indira Gandhi
                            -Indian Congress
                      -Refugee problem
                            -Danger
           -The President’s forthcoming meeting with India foreign minister
                -Refugee Problem

     Presidential gifts

     Political situation
           -Media attacks on President
                  -New York Times
                  -Washington Post
           -Public opinion
                  -War deaths in Asia
                  -War deaths in Europe
                  -Role of press
           -Effect of escalation on President's reelection
           -Quest for more foreign aid
                  -Yahya’s role

Keating left at 5:41 pm.

     India-US relations
           -Kissinger’s schedule
                 -[David] Kenneth Rush
           -Aid to India and Pakistan
           -Farland
           -Situation in Dacca [East Pakistan]
                  -Counsel General's Rebellion
           -Kissinger’s talk with Indian ambassador
                 -Lakshmi Kant Jha
                 -Contact of President and Ghandi through Indian ambassador
                 -US aid
                 -Keating
                 -Need for time for US to act
                 -President's meeting with foreign minister
                       -Contact with Keating
                       -US position
                             -Sympathy
                             -Delivery of aid
                                  -Pakistan

                     -Keating contact with State Department

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[National Security]
[521-013-w003]
[Duration: 2m 5s]

     India–US relations
          -Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan
               -Role in US–PRC relations
               -Benefits of alternative channel
               -Survivability
                     -Casualties

     US–France relations
         -The President's meeting with Arthur K. Watson
              -Leaking of cable
                     -Role of African desk at Department of State [DOS]
                          -Begin investigation
                          -Arthur K. Watson's role
                          -Department of State [DOS] role
                          -David D. Newsom
                                -Consequences
         -US guarantees to nations expropriating without compensation
         -Leak of cable from Georges J. R. Pompidou
              -Analogy with New York Times leak

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     Pentagon Papers
          -John N. Mitchell action
               -Suit of New York Times
          -Public right to know
               -Possible Congressional action
               -New York Times responsibilities
          -William P. Rogers point in briefing
               -Ronald L. Ziegler

      -Concern of foreign nations
-Need to fight, New York Times
-Naming of Pentagon Papers
       -Robert S. McNamara and Clark M. Clifford
      -John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson papers
      -McNamara
-McNamara reaction to leaks
      -Need to react
            -Effect of McNamara role as World Bank President
            -Dean G. Acheson comment
-Confusion of issue
      -Public's right to know
      -President's role in fight
-Possible Rogers statement
      -Effect on communications with foreign governments
-Effect on President’s relationship with State and Department of Defense [DOD]
-Legal status of publication
      -Temporary restraining order
            -Effect
                  -New York Times reputation
-Public right to know
      -Franklin D. Roosevelt
      -Pearl Harbor information
            -Declassification
-Procedures to declassify
      -Permission required
            -McGeorge Bundy
            -Johnson
-Effect of selective declassification
      -Contingency planning
      -Kissinger’s circulation of memoranda
            -Leak possibilities
-President's role in controlling classified material
      -Opening up of official papers
            -Possible Presidential library
            -President's Vice President papers
-Press
      -Lord Kennan (?) party
            -Guest list
                  -Press personalities
                        -Violation of security
      -British compared with US press

               -New York Times view of publication
               -Focus of New York Times attack
          -New York Times view of publication
               -Presidential responsibility
                       -Johnson
               -Moral compared with immoral war
               -Public right to know
          -Retaliation by President on New York Times
               -Access to White House functions
          -Swedish Prime Minister’s comment
               -Olaf Palme
               -Kissinger’s conversation with Rogers
               -US-Vietnam strategy
                      -Rogers
                      -Recall of ambassador

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[National Security]
[521-013-w006]
[Duration: 22s]

     SWEDEN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6

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     Pentagon Papers
          -Conspiracy theory
               -Leaking of papers
                     -Leslie H. Gelb role
                           -Rand Corporation role
                     -Neil Sheehan
               -Coincidence of events

                -Clark M. Clifford statements
                -New York Times story
                -Veterans

Vietnam War
     -Congressional resolutions
          -Marlow W. Cook and Ted Stevens
               -Clark McGregor
                -Provisions
                     -Release of Prisoners of War [POWs]
                     -US withdrawal
                           Kissinger’s assessment

State dinner
      -President's meeting with Brandt
      -Kissinger attendance
            -Rational
                  -Contact with Brandt
                  -Contact with Egon Bahr
                       -Meeting for the Record
                       -Rush, Egon Bahr, Kissinger meeting
                       -Thursday breakfast

International relations
      -US-PRC contacts
      -US-Soviet Union contacts
            -Effect of New York Times story
      -Image of President's domestic strength
      -Cambodia
      -Laos operation (Lam Son)
      -North Vietnam relations
      -Possible summit with Soviet Union
      -Effect of US-Soviet Union and US-PRC contacts
      -President's meeting with Congressmen and Senators
            -President's initiatives
                  -Berlin agreement
                        -Benefits
                  -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
      -US-PRC contacts
            -Effect on Soviet Union
                  -Rationale for Meeting with Antoliy F. Dobrynin
                        -Rogers role

                                 -SALT

     New York Times story
         -Effect on intellectual establishment
               -Cooks-Stevens legislation
               -Calls to President
         -Joseph McCarthy analogy

     Scheduling
          -H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
          -Kissinger’s schedule
          -President's schedule
          -Tempo of events
          -The President schedule
                -Forthcoming trip to Florida
                      -Kissinger

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[National Security]
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[Duration: 56s]

     Compilation of People’s Republic of China [PRC] material
         -Henry A. Kissinger’s plane ride to California
               -Chou En-lai statements
                     -Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
         -People’s Republic of China [PRC] strategy
               -Concern with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
               -Concern with Taiwan
               -No perceived ill intent towards US

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     Message to Rush
         -Personnel

The President and Henry A. Kissinger left at 6:03 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yeah, I...
Like all of our other Indian ambassadors, he's been brainwashed, completely throw-in.
All right, now let me wear your sandals.
Give me, give me five.
I hope you haven't turned the embassy over to those hippies like your president.
No, right, sure.
Let me have five minutes to just give you a little background.
Then you want to ask me some questions, don't you?
No, uh, no, I think that he can leave the apartment.
He'll sit and cheat himself.
Yeah.
Are you going to beat him?
Yeah, I'll beat him.
I think he ought to come and, uh, go over and see for me to see for him.
Now, he knows what it is.
He knows what it is.
He knows what it is.
He knows what it is.
Unless he gets you to the apartment to... Yeah, he wants to talk to us about it in class.
We don't hardly have ambassadors in.
I'll take some ice tea.
Would you like ice tea?
No, no, booze.
No, coffee.
I'll get you a coffee.
Let me say personally, I'm delighted that you're starting out that way because don't let any of these bastards get you down.
And you're not, that's great.
I don't mean any of these.
And time after time, I've had to stop.
And I've stood up to Vietnam and many other things.
Since this election, and that tremendous majority she got, two, three hundred and fifty
out of 4, out of 520 members.
The next party to her is 27, which is the left-wing candidate.
The next party is the right-wing candidate, 25.
The right, rightist parties were completely wiped out.
And since that time, there has been
evidence of greater stability and a better relationship with us.
Let me give you a chapter and verse of two things.
Remington Rand and Union Carbide have big interests there, Union Carbide very big.
They've been trying for several years to get a license to extend their activities.
All bureaucrats stopped from one ministry to another.
Three weeks after the election, they were called in and said, we're going to approve your license, get going, we need employment, have as much of your product as possible exported, but get going and there will be no delay.
And the presidents of the Indian companies of those two concerns came in to see me because we've been trying to help them.
Just the life and the art of it.
I went to call on the new Minister of Industrial Development, Huck Chalmers, who succeeded my friend Mr. Dennis Singh, the son of a bitch.
And he is a top notch, just top notch.
And I had a conversation with him that I had never had since I'd been an engineer.
He said, now, Mr.
Ambassador,
We have a list, as you know, of things in the public sector.
We have things in the private sector.
We have a big list of things that can be either public or private sector.
And, by the way, he said with a smile, I might point out to you that the percentage of our gross national product in the public sector is about half what yours is in America.
I said, I'm aware of that.
He said, in this 146 items which are in the private sector,
There are some that we can't possibly fix them, for we need foreign investment.
The impression has gotten abroad that we don't want foreign investment.
I want to disabuse your mind in that.
We want, and let me say something else to you.
If you have a business group from America come in there, and they want to...
There is something that isn't on that list.
You come and see me and we'll work it out.
Now, I have never had a conversation like that with any Indian since I've been there.
He's top-notch.
He wants to work with us.
Next, Mrs. Gannon.
Our relations have always been pleasant.
She's never turned me down if I wanted an appointment.
But since then, they're more cordial.
since her election.
Now part of it's because she's got this weight off her mind.
She was trying to run a government with a minority party.
And now she can, if she has the will, can do the things that she thinks ought to be done.
I escorted her to a concert that Mahalia Jackson gave here.
If I had the time, I'd tell you about it.
It was the most fantastic performance.
And she just loved it.
And she couldn't be nicer in her dealings with me.
So I considered that there is a change in the situation.
And I sent two cables to the department.
Henry, the numbers are 5311, New Delhi 5311.
and 6031.
One was sent shortly after the army went in and started the killing in East Park.
You know, it was the result of a lot of thought.
It represents my...
The main idea is to...
I am convinced there is a change in the sub-town.
And India should not be equated with Pakistan.
India is a strong, stable power now, while Pakistan has gone to stiff.
The other one, the second one, had to do with the aid, and my recommendations as to what should be done about aid.
And both of those I stand on as my recommendations, which...
I don't think there's any words or something to echo now.
No, no, no.
They represent in a centered form my views, and they're the consensus of my staff that is silver.
I have wonderful staff there, right?
And they're so loyal, and they're just great.
Now, I presume you're interested in knowing what the foreign minister is going to say to me.
And I can only guess, but I have talked to him.
What does he want to talk about?
I suppose it's sort of a package.
Yes, that's it, because this... What did they want you to do?
Well, this... No.
In the beginning, they were...
just as we were, for a single Pakistan after that election, because this Sheik Mujib Rahman was pro-Indian and pro-American.
He was, they envisioned a different picture in that they were going to be friends with Pakistan.
And then when the army walked in and knocked out the elections,
Of course, they were upset.
There were two reasons they were upset.
That was one.
The other was that they were Bengalis on both sides of the border, and they had family ties and all that.
Now, I went to see him to tell him about the aid they were giving, and it's greater now.
And I think he'll express his appreciation for that.
He should.
I believe he will.
Probably only 17 and a half minutes.
And the bird was 2 1⁄2.
Yes, it was a 2 1⁄2, and I didn't want to know what it is.
And the C1 3rd is.
And the C1 3rd, that's all a new... We're doing quite a look, and he should be eaten.
I believe he'll be great.
He's a very nice fellow.
I don't know that you've met him.
Very kind.
Now...
Beyond that, he will say, as he did to me, that this aid is great, and we appreciate it very much.
But he said the basic problem is to try to get these refugees back into Pakistan.
We cannot stand this drain on India, which, if it lasted for a year, with the present number, would cost $400 million.
Five million.
And add that, it's in a crowded part of India.
That's right.
That's correct.
Five million, and of that, about three of them are in Calcutta.
Calcutta is the size of New York.
It'd be like dumping three million people into New York, except that Calcutta is in much worse shape than New York.
Not too much, but it's worse.
And it's just a horrible problem.
Now, he said they're still coming, at that time, 100,000 a day.
The latest I heard was 150,000 a day, because they're killing the Hindus.
And the thing that, in the beginning, these refugees were about in the proportion of the population, 85% Muslim, 15% Hindus, because when they started the killing,
It was indiscriminate.
Now, who is now having gotten control of the large centers?
It is almost entirely a matter of genocide, killing the Indians.
And the intellectual leaders, the leaders of the country that they want to get rid of, they say, how many of these Awami League people, they killed that and they've outlawed the Awami League that got 98% of the votes, elected 167 out of 169 out of the members of Parliament.
And they arrested him as a traitor, booed him, and they have outlawed the Awami League.
What he's going to plead for, I have heard that even since I left, they have come to the conclusion that because of this horrible refugee problem, this is since I talked to you,
They are for a political settlement of any kind in East Pakistan, which will get the people back.
Now, the Hindus I don't think will go back, but a lot of the Muslims would go back if there was some kind of a political settlement.
And I think he will probably urge a political settlement there.
The thing that, two things, he wants to stop
the refugees coming, which means stop the killing, and two, get the refugees flowing the other way back into Pakistan.
What does he think that we should do?
He thinks, I think he thinks, I think he feels that Russia and the United States
are the only ones that can influence Xiaya to stop the killing.
And he said, in my judgment, the United States has more leverage with him than Russia has.
And the only way is an economic way.
Of course, I understand that there's no plan to just go on business as usual.
with Yannick Canaris here.
After this consortium, at the consortium meeting, the bank and the, this informal meeting that takes place next week, the bank and the International Monetary Fund sent this Peter Cargill up there.
And he's going to make a report on what he's found and what he feels should be done.
And now they're going to consider it back here and
take it up at that time.
No commitments, I believe, are to be made at this parish meeting.
But I suspect we will find that the situation in East Pakistan, which Yahya says is normal or practically normal, is hard and won't be normal in a year.
And what the...
suddenly that he can bring about that, I'm not able to get an idea because this AMIN, A-M-I-N, was the biggest leader next to Moojib.
And he got one or two members of parliament.
And they tried to get him to head it up, but he wouldn't touch it.
He'd get his throats in it.
Now, they have a few, I'm told, a few members of the Awami League, about nine, who are ready to help form government.
But the betterness is so great that I believe, and indeed Joe Farmer does, that the old Pakistan is through.
There will be, they cannot patch this together.
Joe has said that in his case, and I feel it very strongly.
And there's got to be a new pressure.
Now, I am conscious of the special relationship that you have with Yadier, and I respect it, and I don't want it as just leaders and us.
There's been some suggestion that it will be possible
for you to, I don't think this has come to you yet, but it's something you're talking about in practice.
It will be so long before aid to Pakistan in the way of developmental aid will be possible, that a diversion of a certain amount of that to help India with its refugee problems.
It might be possible for you to suggest that to him in this meeting.
And that paper, I don't know if it's reached you yet, but... No, I know about it.
The public told me about it.
That's a scheme that they thought up of taking 25 million dollars out of the pockets of money and give it to India.
I think we just better find the money.
I don't think any.
I don't think any.
I think they had about 80 million for Pakistan.
And it'll be some time before they... Well, they want to take...
They have 70 million for Pakistan.
Well, there are two issues here.
One is whether they can use it.
Whether the Pakistanis could use it if we gave it to them.
The second is how Pakistan will react if we take money from their budget for India.
And sir, I was going to ask you, are you free for dinner tonight?
Are you going out?
No, I'd love to.
I have to.
No, John Cooper is giving a cocktail for me.
And I'll be delighted to ask you what time it is.
Let me see.
Thank you.
Do we have room for one more?
Stanton, Stanton, Stanton people.
Black Tide, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock, 8 o'clock,
in 20 minutes or so, losing it up.
And so if you could arrive about even to 20, 25, no problem.
I know, I know.
And there are some big years.
You used to go to the turbine area.
Yeah, yeah.
The Kodak would be there, the present beast of the Kodak.
Well, it don't work.
You're going to Rochester, right?
Yes, I am.
Of course, that's your old town.
Yeah, it's just, oh, Carl, that's, a lot of these people, they're, you should know that city, Tom Gates.
I'll try to come check on some of these here.
We haven't been in any of that.
We might do a little business on these people.
How about a home testing?
No.
We have a lot of properties.
Who the hell is that?
National cash register.
They might ask.
At least we have the term national heirloom.
Don't ask him.
He don't know.
I don't think I've got any friends here.
I've got, uh, Mr. Frank.
I've got a friend now.
These are all German investors, yes.
I wish this was all right.
Yes.
No.
I appreciate the invitation.
I will be here, and I am ready to go.
There's no doubt it will be good, but this will be better.
I'm sure the talk will be interesting.
And the foreign minister is coming tonight.
And I was going to meet him, but the president takes precedence over my friends.
And they're... Let me ask you to do this before we meet with the foreign minister, if you would.
I'd like to meet with him to have a little talk.
I'll just tell you this.
No, but I mean it so that the one thing that I think the foreign minister should run about, let me say this to him.
I don't want to get us into the wrong impression by Indians.
There are 400 million Indians.
950, 550, 250, there are 60 this morning.
There are.
I don't know why they let anybody reproduce in that country, but they do.
Nevertheless, I know that that country is trying to make it.
We all want to make it.
Basically, with some summits of democracy, private enterprise call, whatever you want.
And I know that moving over from the North, where the Chinese come through, they're trying another way.
It's therefore very much my interest to see that we want to succeed, because there are 550 million people we want to do well with.
And they always gave us a team internationally.
We know that by and large.
But that's irrelevant.
So the weather's taking us to the deep, and we deal with it.
But what I'm getting at is here, that right now, you can be sure that we will play a friendly game in the end.
And particularly, I'd like to deal with the fact that if the government's more stable, that is good.
But the other thing is that
I think we have to realize, too, that it would not be in our interest, maybe there is going to be, maybe there is going to be a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a,
Under those circumstances, what we have to do, again, is to find a way to be just as generous as we can to the candidates.
But also, we do not want to lose some of this man, because it is an open breach of the icon.
It's an open breach and an embarrassment to Jimmy, and that's really the problem.
You can reassure us that this is going to be held for all four of us.
We want to help her as many ways as we can.
We have to agree on this.
We have to agree on all of this.
And let me say that in the open, as far as the Congress is concerned, in the end of the vote, we agree that we're not one god, that's it.
It's not a popular country in this Congress.
No, I know that.
Certainly, I know that.
Right.
And it's even less popular today because the foreign aid is less popular.
That's true.
But in the Congress, there's a strong feeling on this Pakistan-India issue.
The kindness and fairness that I can tell is as involved in the Civil War as we have been in Afghanistan.
But nevertheless, we have got to take up here for reasons that go far beyond Indian-Afghan relations as an organization.
So, we will be very, very considerate in our relationship with the Department of Security.
And we've got, we must not do it in a way, I know Brian is the expert on our position, most of our position is to be all systems of government and it's impossible for refugees, that both of us, not any of you really are, but on the other hand, not to allow the refugee problem to get us involved in the internal political problem.
He says that's our policy too.
He might have, he asked me about this,
And we also must avoid, if possible, any conflict, armed conflict between the two.
And the thing, the Indians, they're pressing Mrs. Gandhi so hard.
And Parliament's known such politicians are.
And up to date, I must say, she's been a solid.
They're pressing her very hard that we can't stand this.
And you just go in and take a little piece out of Pakistan where you can put these refugees.
We can't hold them here until after each war.
And he will probably bring them.
Can I say a political word to you?
Sure.
A politician's word.
One's word.
Yes.
I don't have them.
I don't have these.
No, I don't.
I got a vice presidential pair.
I never had a presidential pair.
Thank you very much.
I appreciate it.
You have so many damn problems with the New York Times and the Washington Post and all these damn papers.
are going after you, Bob.
I wait, from your point of view, to see another one added onto it.
Now, it's true, not too many people care whether five million people die on that, or not.
But, if it was in Europe, it'd be a hell of an uproar.
But, you know how the press
has been writing stuff in this country, and I just... You don't want it to escalate?
I don't want it to escalate.
This is a personal thing from your point of view, because I want to see you see it, and I want to see it in our next president.
One of the things that we can't do...
adding the non-cutting paper, you know, preferably hit some more dough, that's going to talk more than anything else.
Yeah, well, it will.
Because when you stop and say, you say, well, yeah, yeah, I should take them all back.
That's exactly what we do.
Then we've got to give him the dough to be, what would be best, to let him be in his own life.
I don't know what you think.
We've got to put that in there.
That's what I think.
That's what I think.
That's what I think.
Hey, I've got that special Indian diet now.
You take this.
I can eat meat.
I mean, I don't, I'm not going to go to the carnation with your poison or whatever.
No, I'm doing it.
All right.
All right.
I don't know what the French were up to about that.
The most insulting way we can do it.
You got it.
You got it.
Go now.
No, no, no.
We're in a rush, but we can do it.
Indian.
I know how candid you are, Mr. President, but my God, the Sparrow, the Sparrow, I've sent a memorandum that he thinks Pakistan is finished also.
He's got this maniac in Dhaka, the consul general who's in rebellion.
The point is, Mr. President, first of all, I've talked to the Indian ambassador, as I've said to you.
I said, you want to have a direct communication through him with Mrs. Candace.
that we need three or four months to work it out.
We'll find them some money.
We'll gradually move into a position to be helpful, but we've got to do it our way, just to shut them up.
You told him that?
I told him all of that.
We don't tell the Foreign Minister that.
No, you can tell the Foreign Minister that, above all, that in front of Keating, he'll slap it all over.
I'd say we have great sympathy, but they must be restrained.
And we'll try to find some money, but we cannot take it out of the Pakistan budget.
Well, it would be considered such an insult by Yaya that the whole deal would be off.
I will, when I'm
talking to the Chinese, set up a separate channel so that we're not so vulnerable.
I mean, we can't be that way.
Of course, I don't know.
It just may be that the poor son of a bitch can't survive.
Five million is a ten-day-and-a-year-old exaggeration.
Of course, I don't know how many of them they generate.
I didn't see Watson.
And I'm utterly shocked your man was here with me with regard to what happened there.
Now, who the hell believed that cable?
Oh, somebody in the African department.
Can we, I want to, I told this man, I want an investigation on it.
I'll tell you why.
We know we didn't.
And Watson said he did.
No, he didn't have anything came to us.
Watson said he sent something.
Now, if somebody in the African department, can we, can we find out?
Why don't we just fire Newsom?
I must say, incidentally, I am not going to approve that.
I mean, I will not approve, and I told you this, there's a guy here who knows, so you need to worry.
I will not approve any, apart from the French position.
And where expropriation has occurred without adequate compensation, we will approve no American guarantees, period.
I think it's a short-sighted...
I'm not going to do it.
And somebody down there in the afternoon thinks that we've got to help Algeria and the rest.
Screw them.
Not if they have not compensated.
We haven't had, I must say, we haven't had a leak of a document out of my place.
What I meant is we've got a perfect case that's been stated this time.
Because nobody else got the cable.
That's right.
How in the name of God would they do such a thing?
Well, I don't know, sir.
You see, Henry, that's why Mitchell had to sue the Times.
And it has nothing to do with whether the public has a right to know.
If the security procedures aren't any good, then there should be a new law passed.
But the New York Times doesn't have the right to declassify documents on its own.
Bill made a very good point today, according to Cigar, where he said that he had already had communication from several foreign governments asking questions about their own classified documents.
Oh, goddammit, that's what's involved here.
You can't talk to the United States without having the son of a bitch blabbing in the New York Times.
This is going to be a bloody battle, but it has to be fought.
I guess we've just got to put the whole guy on the internet.
The papers that we refer to, not the McNamara papers, that's on there.
They're the Kennedy-Johnson papers.
Right.
Correct.
Absolutely.
The Kennedy-Johnson papers.
Absolutely.
That's what they are.
That's what they are.
McNamara papers.
McNamara.
Clever.
That's right.
It's the Kennedy-Johnson papers.
I understand that McNamara is climbing walls, T. Soren Reitz.
Well, he ought to say something.
Why doesn't he?
I'll leave.
because it's head of the World Bank.
All right, fine.
Then why doesn't Matt Acheson say something?
Why don't some of the old establishments say something on this?
I really think they should.
I think it's a shocking goddamn thing.
And the way the issue gets confused that these people now say that it is a question of whether the public has a right to know has nothing to do with whether the public has a right to know.
The public has a right to know.
The right to know.
Well, that's got to be fought then.
But you see, my hands are going to be tied with regard to the public statement for the reason that it's not an action.
It's been filed, you see.
What the hell?
And I'm the only one that can get that across.
How are we going to get it across here?
How are we going to fight it?
Well, I understand that there's some idea that Rogers could make a statement.
That'd be good.
Which I think is a good idea.
He's willing.
He might be willing.
Only if this really makes communications with foreign governments impossible.
Well, it's still saying the best of me.
And they have, you know, the court has issued an order.
Yeah, it's temporary, isn't it?
Temporary, that's all they mean.
That means they have a promulgation case.
They'll try the case, and I don't see any court in this country ever going to hold it in New York Times.
But doesn't it mean that they can't publish any more documents?
They can't, no.
They'll squeal like hell about that.
The right to know.
Of course they've got a right to know.
But they have no right to know this event.
For Christ's sake, Roosevelt, they've never declassified Pearl Harbor yet, have they?
To the best of my knowledge, no.
Not really?
No.
No.
You haven't declassified a hell of a lot of stuff either.
Well, mostly there are rules that it's the regular procedures.
Most documents, except top secret documents, are declassified one notch every... Yeah.
Some every three years.
Top secret.
Each document has to be reviewed individually.
Well, a lot have not been declassified.
Most have not.
Well, the minimum is 20 years, 20, 25 years.
Of course, if you declassify, you've got to also have permission.
The individual would follow the other side of the crisis.
This is a terrible thing.
Oh, it makes the process of government impossible.
If every advisor has to worry about what's going to be published in a confidential relationship, they don't know to what question the memorandum is an answer.
I don't like Bundy, but Johnson may have said to him, if I want to start farming, how do I do it?
So Bundy then writes a memo.
I asked this.
I've got a contingency plan.
As I said, I want a plan for a three-day strike, for a seven-day strike, for a 30-day strike.
That's right.
I want to know if you have to hit the dice.
That's right.
Right?
Absolutely.
You're goddamn right.
You've got everything except an earlier plan.
You know that, and I know that.
And then you have a memo in the files from me covering these things.
That's right.
Except I don't make the mistake of sending it back into the bureaucracy.
That's the only... You don't?
No.
Those papers will leave with you, and unless somebody on your staff leaks it, they'll never come out.
Unless you want... You know what I'm going to do?
No.
I've been doing an awful lot of thinking.
I'm not going to set up a library.
I think it's a rather crude custom anyway.
The other thing is that that means that I would just keep all the papers myself.
I decided to open up all acres and so forth.
It's a pretty dangerous business these days.
And I missed my vice presidential crap.
I already gave him an appointment.
I didn't know what he meant.
The vice presidential and all the rest, all my congressional days.
What the hell?
Things are too important.
No book.
People are just going to play a very goddamn hard line.
I'm so disgusted with the press, so utterly disgusted with them.
Aren't you?
Oh, I think the press has been outrageous.
It's the new morality.
But what's even worse, Mr. President, I have a British left-wing friend.
He's a Lord Kennett.
He gave a cocktail party for me once and asked me to put people on the guest list.
I put on the publisher, the editor of the newspaper I know.
He said, that man can't enter my house.
I said, why not?
He said, he's violated a D notice.
Now, you know what a D notice is?
It's when the British government sends around a notice saying certain information shouldn't be printed.
That isn't even classified yet.
That's just not in the national...
It's not violating one of our deadlines.
This is not being out printed before so-and-so or it can't be this and that.
Well, no, except the British can actually suppress things completely that way.
They don't use it often.
In Britain, no paper, not the most scandalous tabloid would have touched this material.
They wouldn't?
Never.
Under no conceivable circumstances.
Everyone agrees that...
Does anybody know, was there not any kind of debate with the staff of the New York Times before they did this horrible thing?
I don't know.
And this really, if our establishment still had high morality, if the editors of the New York Times knew, they would be ostracized all over New York for having done such a shameful thing.
And I suspect if it were another administration, because...
They might do it because this is not an attack on Johnson alone.
Well, they hate him.
It's an attack on the presidency.
What they're saying is every president is a lie.
Well, it's their idea that this war, there are moral wars and immoral wars.
This is an immoral war.
Therefore, they have a responsibility to let the public know everything that's going on.
Well, God damn it.
Listen, I tell you, people don't realize how serious this is.
As far as this, I don't care if it's not of my own interest.
The New York Times is now cut off forever from this White House, as long as I'm here.
The Swedish prime minister has popped off, too.
We've just got the press tickets.
I talked to Bill about it.
He said that this proves that it was a war prepared by deceit, that the American government has undermined democracy
and it must withdraw unconditionally from Vietnam.
I told Bill we have to call our ambassador back, and he's going to make a recommendation, something to that effect, tomorrow morning.
But you know, isn't that a hell of a damn thing?
Also, it shows that that's part of the conspiracy.
He wouldn't otherwise pay attention to it if somebody got into it.
Henry, there is a conspiracy.
Do you understand?
I believe it now.
I didn't believe it formally, but I believe it.
There is.
The follow-up is, believe the papers, whether it's Gale or Graham, preparation guy, he's in conspiracy.
Englishman and Sebastian.
Oh, yes.
The whole syndrome, Clifford, the New York Times, the veterans, they don't all happen at once, by accident.
Tomorrow?
Not tomorrow.
Now they've got a new resolution that they're cooking up.
What's it?
Cook-Stevens.
I've got to talk to McGregor about it.
It says that if Hanoi releases all prisoners within 60 days, we will then withdraw nine months after that.
They'll never accept it.
We'll fight it, but Hanoi won't release the prisoners in 60 days.
Well, it's a silly goddamn thing.
If they will release the prisoners...
In other words, we'll withdraw seven months after they release the prisoners.
It's such a cheap little stunt.
Eleven months, huh?
It's a bad deal.
We all should do that.
Jesus Christ, not for them to respond to it.
In the name of God, it's just, well, Henry, we've just got to hope for the best.
Do our level best.
Incidentally, tonight we could get, there isn't a hell of a lot in order to be allowed to talk to Grant about it, because about as much as I want, I don't have much time.
It's intelligence.
It's a big dinner.
There won't be much.
Yeah, but I mean, after dinner, you know,
Like, you're moving the hell out of there.
I mean, after a half hour of talking, you can't even go home.
Oh, yeah.
You know what I mean?
He's tired, isn't he?
I was even debating.
I was going to ask you whether I could skip it.
Skip it.
Skip it.
Because I... You've got more important things to do.
And I...
I won't have a chance to talk to him anyway, not that it makes any difference.
Listen, you'll just be bored to death sitting there with a bunch of jackasses.
And I'm seeing far...
Three times while he's here.
Don't come to the dinner tonight.
Excellent.
Excellent.
If you don't mind, I frankly...
Excellent.
Well, you're seeing him on a more permanent basis.
I'm having three different meetings with Barr, so it's one I have to do for the record so that the State Department gets a record.
Then I'm seeing him with Rush tomorrow for two hours tomorrow afternoon.
Then I'm seeing him for breakfast on Thursday.
Well, Henry, we've got to just make the big play in one way or another.
We've got one in the pocket, but... Well, we've got the Chinese one practically in the pocket, but I think they're going to get something significant out of it, aren't they?
Of course, this cannabis thing here is in your country.
It might affect that.
No.
I think now, Mr. President, there is, after all, the record.
You've weathered almost everything.
What?
You've weathered almost everything up to now.
What else?
Well, when the attacks in Campo, you know, and you've always come back striking out.
So it's... Well, let me tell you, we're going to strike out and argue it now.
By God, if they do this damn thing, we are not going to do it.
That's the only card we've got left, but we've got it.
And they know it.
Well, we've got it.
They know I'll do it.
They know you'll do it, Mr. President.
If you bring this one off this summer, it will be almost unbelievable.
So unbelievable.
Frankly, if we could bring off the Russians and the Chinese, we'll rather the other one are.
It's like I told those congressmen and senators this morning.
I said, look, don't underestimate what I'm doing.
You know, I had to be sound and competent.
But I said, you're underestimating.
You're doing more just like on, and reminding them of that salt thing, because I told you this morning, it was very important.
Those batteries, that takes them.
You look around at the table there, and I don't know what the hell's going on.
Why do you?
You know?
Well, we'll get a Berlin thing this year, I think.
That in itself doesn't mean anything except that they will.
After all, it did create World War nearly three times, and we settled it.
That's right.
And we'll get the salt I also would have to bet on.
We have to handle the Chinese one delicately.
That's the one that could drive the Russians right into a frenzy.
This is why I thought it was good for you to see him today.
It showed the special concern you have.
You threw it in nicely with a true power arrangement.
I told it to Bill.
I didn't tell the conversation.
I just said you took the message and sent it over to Bill.
So he was pleased and...
Because he's mad at the Russians because they dealt on Saul with us.
So he said, oh, it's just a propaganda trick, so he isn't going to push it hard.
Good.
So, uh... Well, he understood that I had to take the message.
Oh, but there was no problem.
No, no problem at all.
Well... You shouldn't get too much busy about this New York Times thing, except for one point.
I mean, I think it is the last straw insofar as the American intellectual establishment.
Mr. President, if McCarthy had said that the liberals are capable of
of getting too crates full of documents of the New York Times, he would have been accused of being a goddamn hysteric and worse.
Well, you don't mind?
Yeah, I do.
I'll see how much...
Come to the bottom of it.
I'll tell you why.
You had a reason, isn't it?
And I told you all the time about this.
At the present time, you and I have had to keep our...
schedules as free as possible or as clear as possible for the big players.
There's too much going on.
I'm keeping my schedule.
I'm going down a lot of times.
You do the same thing.
If, for example, an evening will relax you, do not do it.
If it doesn't, screw it.
That's what my view is.
I can view on this board that you want to come down there and fly.
That's right.
We put the NFC in the first year.
So it was actually no problem.
I was told in Jersey, in case I might not have heard, you were the president, right?
I'm not the president.
I'm spending our days on Chinese tips.
I spent at least five hours on this plan.
Everything that we have, the true and lie, has happened over the last three years.
That guy is a bloody pig.
Of course he's a genius.
There's something here.
There's something going on in there.
I don't think they would do it.
You know the thing that they would do this to the goddamn Russians.
They must be scared to death of them, don't you think?
Oh yeah, or they must be un-deceptive.
They aren't doing it simply because of Taiwan.
See my point?
Why the hell would they, huh?
And they're not doing it to embarrass us, you know.
They could probably all take pictures of him and then push them out, but so what?
But that they don't do.
All right.
No rush to get that bull out of there and reach him.