On June 16, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, Rose Mary Woods, Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, Swaran Singh, Lakshmi Kant Jha, Kenneth B. Keating, Joseph J. Sisco, White House photographer, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 2:58 pm to 3:41 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 523-002 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Can we do an all-day action structure this meeting?
For the end?
The end, yeah, but not for the press.
Right, let's just do an all-day action structure.
Very well.
Yes, sir.
Yeah, that's good.
I don't know.
Never mind that.
You should fix it.
There are reasons not to have to discuss it.
I wanted to ask you about whether you had any further talks with Pat about to see if they were all set for a way to leave there soon.
Well, Pat told, I haven't had any further talks.
She told the usher's office that she would be there and leave there soon.
Um...
I can ask the director if you want.
Nope.
I guess.
I like you.
Richard Henry would like to see you five minutes before the games.
Yeah.
Well, there's nothing we can do.
I was thinking that tonight I have to be with Edward.
And you can come in.
This meeting has to be cut off sharply at 325, 330.
I think I should go over there at 6 o'clock.
That takes you over to the house.
So I have to be there at 6.
So I'll be there.
I think what I'll do is to have a dinner on the porch.
I don't want to go over the tube.
Can you come over at 6.30 and be free tonight?
Come here at 6.30.
Did you have any call on time?
I should tell her that, if I got anything.
Yeah, at 6.30.
Yeah.
At 6.30, I'll be ready.
Then I'll be happy to come back, because I was able to prepare.
And we'll get through 6.30 to finish this up, you know what I mean?
I think it'll be good.
And if that study comes up, you know, it'll be successful.
Okay?
Great.
Something else I can do.
Good.
All right.
Um, I, uh, Phil Califano called me.
Sides he on?
He's on now, sir.
Huh.
Surprised.
Now, this is, this is, uh, the thoughtful people are getting very concerned.
I don't think so.
I don't, I don't, I just can't understand how you're depressing that, can I?
And the one thing we must commit is to get dragged into a debate on the intrinsic merit of the documents, the way you handled it yesterday.
As to whether we were in the war right or wrong.
That's right.
Whether we are opposed to... Opposed to what?
Well, whether we support the particular policies of Johnson... No, no.
No, sir.
That's their motives.
I'm not going to question, or Kennedy.
I'm going to always question Kennedy.
Absolutely.
Look, how many of the first combats that went in there were Kennedys?
36,000?
20,000.
20,000.
He sent them in 63.
That's right.
And, uh... No, he sent them in 61.
I need that figure, sir.
Yeah?
Before I go up to Rochester.
October 61.
I don't know whether they sent 20,000.
Now, on the Indian who is waiting, the basic problem is to give him a combination of both sympathy so that he can go home with Mrs. Candy and great firmness.
Now, I have, in addition to what you will say, but with Cisco there you won't have much of a chance to, I've told Yaya that he had a personal channel through me to you.
I'm just trying to keep them from attacking for three months.
Now, you could say that you are directing...
that $50 million be made available for refugee support after July approved.
Do they know that yet?
No.
This is why it would be very helpful.
Does this go wrong?
No, but it's based on a recommendation from the State Department, from the embassy there.
They'll be delighted.
$50,000?
Yeah, and $20 million...
You will see whether you can get $20 million from other programs this month.
Now, they wanted to take it out of Pakistan.
I've stopped that.
But we can take a little from Turkey and a little from Indonesia and pay it back to them after July 1st.
But if you could get those two figures, then you'll get the credit for it.
And we are concerned.
Well, he'll have a story.
And that we cannot, that you think that overt pressure on Pakistan would have a counterproductive effect, and that you are working with Yahya in your way.
It's a little duplicitous, but these bastards understand that.
I must say I'm not too...
I must say maybe there's a hell of a problem.
The TV is starting to pick it up now.
Oh, it is a hell of a problem.
Well, Mr. President, it's a typical thing.
Also, as I said, the brown toasters, if you read it, you'll see what I mean.
It's a goddamn thing that is written to pander to this left-wing press here.
We hope you get out of the anonymity.
What the Christ is he talking about?
The other Germans said Jesus Christ won't.
Get out the right way, you know.
That's right.
Oh, isn't that the same word?
Isn't that anything like keating a would-be or a shrewd or an even shrewder?
Hey, where is the security officer?
What?
Hell, yes.
Even that much?
So if you'd let me skip this.
I don't want to send you more quarters now.
I don't want to see any more.
This is a waste of our time.
This is what we have to do.
We have to keep it from attacking.
.
.
.
.
.
Why don't you look at the physical care box, I suppose.
It's a little bit.
Problems.
Our Prime Minister asked me to convey a very warm greeting, to convey that she really appreciates
I am very happy to be able to speak to you today.
I am very happy to be able to speak to you today.
Well, I appreciate that.
We were all very impressed by your great political victory down there.
I mean, the stability that she needs now, isn't it?
It's much, much better to have had a very successful election like that, to run an average of a lot more than it has cost us in the previous years.
It makes it very well for a young pastor to eat each other.
Yes, he had never lacked confidence, but now he had also the strength to put them in the right direction.
And in fact, she was looking forward to a period when as a result of this victory, she had both peace and opportunity to implement the socio-economic concept of the project, which she won.
But suddenly she discovered that there was a fighting situation not created by India.
It's a sort of deluge to which we are being subjected at this present moment.
And the issues involved are very wide.
And it was in that spirit that, at the time, Mr. Rowe, who you referred to, in short, sought your advice.
And I wish you, Uncle, to continue to convey to your Excellency the latest situation.
At the present moment, as you know, the number has already touched about 6 million.
And they are coming more and more.
And my professor reminded me as we were coming in that every second a new refugee comes.
Every second.
Every second.
So this is the type of situation that we face.
And this has caused a tremendous problem to us.
because they come in an area which is traditionally related both politically as well as economically.
And this is an area where they stand in other parts already in Karnataka.
or political-related economic data.
And if the other 6 million people are added, people will come in a state of anger, frustration, and destitute.
And that adds to the element of instability and the socio-economic tension and problems that are created that are not capable of being reduced to any financial terms or into anything.
And it's in this situation that we seek your advice on how we should achieve that effect.
For instance, perhaps the most important thing in that situation is that the Serbian youth will use this movement of refugees
It overwhelms us in every way that we should start.
Technically, the Commission should create a clear subject matter so that these people can be heard.
These are the objectives of the VR system.
In a situation where the internal affairs are managed in such a manner that they cause such a big external problem, it ceases to be an external problem and it should affect the notice and attention of the international community.
And it's an investment right now that we want support for this approach upon and help to achieve these objectives.
Now how could these objectives be achieved?
We believe that if the very rule of human is the same as human culture, with the break of their mind,
nor if it should be, nor if it can be, or if we give them the security, if we give them the satisfaction, why should anybody be?
Very difficult for anybody to believe.
And secondly then, the condition that they are to be restored should enable these people to return home, where these statements that they are prepared to take will not perhaps create
And for this, obviously, some political settlement is indicated.
You mentioned that you are engaged in this task in your own quiet manner and trying to impress upon them what should be done.
Do you believe that
Return to normalcy is possible only if the military has been trying to solve the situation.
Then those people who have demonstrated the conscience, that they enjoy the conscience of the people,
In the long range, we visualize that unless something is done and done quickly,
This will be a situation which will be in all manner of unstable elements.
The initiation might pass, the bound to pass, the stream will stand and there will be a period of great instability, not only in Pakistan, the majority of Pakistan will also pass.
which is this long-range, radical, dismal picture which is bound to a multitude of necessary political pressures to be modified as is the main source of our worry and concern.
In this very situation, I believe, sir, your faith has been restored, and so has your trust in the people.
You've had that situation there.
In your own interest,
When the land goes on, they have a part of that which is racial jealousy.
After they have tried this method, they have not.
It has created more problems in the land for us.
What do you expect us to say now?
Do you think it's effective in that manner?
Do you believe that...
what happened to the law, rather than how you see the historical process working down there.
I have a feeling, Mr. President, that there was a very good chance of saving Pakistan.
There will be many central authorities, concentration halls, the Indian Central Authority.
and very few of the economy, mostly in economic pathways, there is a very good chance to close.
Even in the course of the negotiations, all that we know, Mujib and Diwali is the garage of those that were contained in their six-point program in our delegation.
We fought the election on this basis.
and they had the authority to frame the constitution so it could be saved.
Now the chances have become more slender because they have walked upon the stilted cross till now.
The confidence has been very rudely shaken.
So whether the military rulers in Pakistan can still bring back the confidence of those who at the present moment find themselves in an extremely shaken tradition is something about which it's not easy to prophesy, but it's worth trying.
But in this plan, of course, the action continues.
Therefore, it appears that they will be pushing them more and more into a point of position, or the point of no return.
And it appears that that is the essential state to emerge.
But we have a large white veil that is surrounded between the central authority of Pakistan and the religious.
It's for them to adopt any arrangement that we want.
We do not visualize that from our point of view it must be separate from the foundation of the foundation of the universe.
We are not bothered about that.
But we are bothered about the continuance of the condition of incivility.
Continuation of the conditions where people find it necessary to leave their homes and cars.
Continuation of conditions where military rule is pitted against almost united will of 75 million people.
And this type of exchange with the people, the whole scheme of settlement, they will have been in a controllable situation.
And that is something, you see, from our individual eyes, it should be a technical development from our point of view, especially from our point of view, but maybe even from your point of view.
Because this is our desire, kindness to our desire, that we can work together
You don't have a feeling that the situation will be to your interest to have a...
So we have no fixed position on that.
We need to decide about the future in any manner that we can.
pressed at one or the other solution or substantive.
We are interested in observing the mortality rate in reverse-trivial deteriorating situation.
But what is very difficult for us is to walk as silent spectators, all these developments which in the long run we leave with what to our detriment, to the detriment of the people, and do damage to the already unstable condition of that region.
And we are conscious of our responsibilities and even when we are facing this big trouble at the end of these people, when we, when the trouble erupted in Ceylon, we did our best, our hands were in the right spot, we voted in majority there, which was 7th by 8th coming through the extra constitutional week.
Our approach is the same in both areas.
Here we are supporting each other.
Well, first of all, you say that you couldn't find a man more eloquent insofar as bringing this matter to our attention.
And your own ambassador here has talked to our people.
He's a very persuasive man and has let us know what the position is.
And, of course, we have great respect for him.
And on our part, we couldn't have a person who is more vigorous in presenting this point of view that you will describe, but you will describe it more precisely than you actually can from your position, obviously.
But Ambassador Keating, of course, he's an old friend of mine in the House and Senate.
We had a long talk about this yesterday, but we're over all these matters.
Well, you have great expectations for all that he has done.
He's concerned as a junior ambassador.
So I'm keenly aware of the problem.
I'm aware, too, of the nervous agony that it must have caused.
I had not been, well, I just, I was on a bus, but I had not been to a cop.
But I know that part of the subcontinent of the problems of poverty are the people in the cities.
And everything that they would have added to this
However simple their homes may be, they are their homes.
I believe that in Oregon and in all of the other parts of the city, it must be a terrible agony for the country to go through.
We're aware of this, that they also impose upon your country, even big as it is, 600 million people, nevertheless,
I had people, a lot of people, I mean, you can't say.
You can't say.
You can't say.
You can't say.
You can't say.
You can't say.
You can't say.
You can't say.
You can't say.
Yes, yes, yes.
Now, I'm sure you realize, too, that what we can do, what we feel is one thing, and what we can do is another.
We have to do something.
We don't want anybody to think that we have the opposite results from what we want.
No.
Actually, we are, with regard to the government of Pakistan, we, of course, have a problem with our contact with them and our relationship with the president, of course, and certainly with this government.
The question is how we can discuss this matter in a way that may bring about action that would lead to amelioration of the situation.
how we, or an avoidable way, which might set up, as often as the case, such an interdependent component, which would set up an antagonistic attitude.
I'm not speaking personally, but in the span of those who would look for something to be antagonistic about, it might just upset them all.
I would like to say this to me.
I think the best course of action, I'd like to talk first about what we do, the best course of action, we, as a government, is for us to, if it's for you, to have confidence, as I want you to convey this to the Prime Minister, on a completely
uh, on a regular basis.
Because for it to be publicly talked about, it had exactly the opposite effect, the wrong effect.
You've got to, you must have confidence that, one, I am acutely aware of the problem.
I'm deeply concerned about the problem in the humanitarian context.
And I'm concerned about it because of its foreign policy implications for us to erupt into some armed conflict.
We know that.
Now, therefore,
I will use all expressing standards.
the methods that I can, but I must use them.
I must have, in the way that I think is most effective, in the way, perhaps, that, say, a Jew might never be on it, but the way that any nation might use when we talk to a leader and so forth.
I am aware of the problem.
I shall try to use my influence as effectively as possible to use it for active missions.
We have to do it this way.
The second thing is, of course, looking at the immediate problem.
That is the fact that you need more funds.
various options that we might have.
We have to meet it probably three times, July 1st, just for hearing aids.
And in the end, because we're out of the money that's all spent, there's only 15 days left, we have, out of other key programs,
because that would cause problems for .
We will find .
And then on the day of that, on July 1st, we are going to find $50 million.
So what we're going to do is put a total of $70 million to .
We could be more, but that's as much as we can find.
So we have to take various other commitments that have been made.
So we've got $20 million between now and the 1st of July.
We could do even more on the 1st of July.
that your government can count on.
Isn't that correct, roughly speaking, or is the 20th?
The 20th, yes.
The 20th, yes.
The 20th, yes.
And we've got to look down the road for that.
But on the other hand, I am aware of the fact that this $7 billion we're going to take care of in 6.8 million for how long?
Not long.
It'll help.
On the other hand, I realize that that does not get the long-range problem.
The long-range problem is how do you stop this intro of people?
How maybe do you have them start turning around and start outflow again?
That's what you're going to get out of it.
Uh, I, I, you, you, first of all, you have brought to my attention, the Prime Minister, you and this conversation, your pastor, Pastor Keating, all brought to my attention, and I'm, I'm convinced with seriousness of the problem.
Uh, I, uh,
I will try to find methods that I think will be effective in protecting the standard.
How stop and tell I do that, I don't think it will be effective.
There may be other ways that I could be effective.
But I think we have to, I think there must not be a way that fears that fear
What is happening here is that the United States is inserting itself into basically an internal situation.
And ultimately, that is, we have to, I mean, in the most effective way, by persuading the parties involved to come up with a decision there rather than one that's imposed upon them.
That's at least my belief, knowing the individuals, knowing their sense of language and so forth.
That's the way I will see it this time.
And we will, the results will tell us sort of what we're right about.
And also, after trying that, we're probably going to have to see the situation.
But in the meantime, I think it's just to the extent that we can, that we can keep it as cool as possible.
uh, in terms of, uh, charges and counter charges and all that sort of thing.
Uh, we, uh, you know, we're, you know, you can count on our financial assistance to the extent that we're able.
And, uh, this is, this will, uh, we will find this money for more of the kind of prices that, that we want to get on it.
They, they will accept that.
And second, we will, uh,
on the other side, which is far more time, the governmental side, that would let us, if you will, let us do that in our way, in a way that we think would be more effective.
And that's the way I would like to do it, if that would be your approval, or even if it's a better way.
I really appreciate your assessment and giving us a summary of the complex situation.
It's a short time, but I'm glad to hear what you have said.
And I appreciate this gesture of meeting with scientists, being encouraged,
The Prime Minister has made statements categorically that this is an international responsibility and Pakistan is an international community and we are not.
Secondly, we appreciate the sense of good contribution and share of this burden which is actually there of Pakistan's interior.
I'm aware of that.
I'm aware of the fact that the
The funds are essential to handle the temporary problem.
Do not handle the problem.
I am not suggesting at all that I have any illusions that if we found $700 million to put into this, then that would simply buy the problem away.
The problem is going to
go away only as the deeper causes are resolved.
And I'm aware of that.
How we get at those deeper causes is a very sensitive problem.
As you all know, any foreign minister has to be highly sensitive to how people feel, approaches, and so forth, and how some of our governments can feel about this and how they react, one way to public pressure, another way to private persuasion.
I have always believed in the latter myself in the most effective way, particularly when I know the individuals fairly well.
Well, that is an increase.
Perhaps the whole problem could be divided into two parts.
There are some aspects which could even be publicly said, for instance, the discussion of 50-degree movement, stop the movement, and they are going back over.
The task is to agree to make a statement, and if it is not good enough to agree, sit inside for a change of culture.
And also, you know,
and also the necessity of their returning.
I agree that all the questions as to how the political trends have to be reversed is a matter which perhaps can't be handled more effectively in that manner.
I believe that here we should agree that we must draw in all of the trends so that
We know what is actually happening.
That is very much the effect upon the receiving end.
We are the receiving end.
It's the present moment.
But we are very interested in it.
If we are interested in it, in the political end, it is only to this extent because it's our investment that without that, this movement will not stop and we will not go back.
For instance, Ibar said that he is prepared to take back the refugees, but actually he got more than 2 million more even after that statement.
This is consistent with his statement that he is prepared to take back the refugees when, if on the other hand, in such large numbers they are actually fleeing away from the country.
But this is basically the problem we face.
I don't think anything however certain at this point would be served by any indication that there
The United States putting public pressure on Pakistan.
That I know will be wrong.
If we want to accomplish a goal, something might be accomplished in other directions.
I'm aware of it and I'd like to try it this way.
And we will be sure that we're all totally concerned about it as we can be not being there.
How much did the Germans provide?
How much did the Russians provide?
How about the French?
I looked at a figure today, Mr. President.
I think the Germans were somewhere around 2 million people.
The French were something a little less than that.
It's not about the French and the Germans.
They have just as great an interest as we have.
Here they are making all sorts of big statements and doing very little.
Now, here you get all the French and the Germans, and they're calling for more money.
They're quick to do that.
It's the same with all other countries.
I mean, these countries that talk big and don't help much.
I had no say in that for them.
Several of them, Rob had a big shake the last time when he was here, and so they gave it to him.
The Germans could afford to, if we can afford 70 millions, the Germans would give it to you.
Or 10.
Easy.
Or 15.
People would have to give it to them.
That's right.
People would have to hire it.
So the Germans would have given it to 25.
That's what it ought to be.
Because, you know, we don't believe in this office of talking big and doing nothing.
It's very easy.
Words are cheap.
So, you know, if you've got money, if you've actually got money, and if you're thinking about it, they should put up some more money, not just a few words.
Good to meet you, and I wish you well in Cali.
I've been there many times.
Mr. Keeney tells me things are moving along, a lot of hope.
I remember two years ago, four years ago, 67 was terrible, but they had to use the Secretary of Agriculture.
He said, yes, you have a brain.
He just said, not brain.
He said, we have a brain.
And of all our political services,
And that's when everything else follows.
That's your political stability.
We're working on it.
And as you said to all of us, I think today was that he did see at least a door, still slightly ajar, for political accommodation.
Something less than 15 minutes.
There is no blueprint according to the ministers in Delhi.
We certainly don't have a blueprint.
Some of the U.S. and Pakistanis have really had to work out themselves.
That's why you have to get down to the key questions.
But it is the answer, isn't it?
It is, but I think your position is correct because it is, and again, even you, your take on that position is correct.
Good to see you, Mr. Becky.
How's it going?