Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 531 › Conversation 531-027
Nixon & Kissinger on Soviet Union and People's Republic of China
Tuesday, June 29, 1971 · 4:21 PM–4:31 PM ET · Oval Office · 10 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate the delicate logistics and strategic sequencing of potential summits with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. They discussed the diplomatic risks of managing these two major powers simultaneously, specifically aiming to secure a Soviet summit while maintaining the initiative on China through a high-level emissary. The participants emphasized the need for a major July 15 announcement to exert pressure on North Vietnam and agreed to reconvene later in the week to finalize their approach.
- Soviet Union
- People's Republic of China
- Summit diplomacy
- Vietnam War
- Foreign policy
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 2 minutes of this recording (about 23% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.
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Where are you?
I made an appointment with the president.
I have to be on graduation tomorrow morning.
That's why I'm stuck down.
See you at the NSC meeting at 3 o'clock, right?
Got to have that.
I think we may be able to draft the Mideast portion of it, Mr. President.
They don't want that.
I don't think they want to get Fossey over here anymore.
And I don't know whether you want to have a fruitless debate.
I think the best thing that can happen... All right, how about Thursday morning?
Thursday morning is clear.
How about Thursday night?
What do you mean?
About 10 o'clock Thursday night.
All right.
Would you rather do it Thursday?
I think I ought to do it.
Yeah.
No, we ought to think about it.
We ought to be on it.
Well, any time, Mr. President.
No, no, no.
These are all cats and dogs.
I can transfer everything.
We could do it Thursday morning.
If you'd like to do it tomorrow night, I'll cancel the preen and I'll do whatever you say.
What is about George Sondheim?
Well, I thought I'd review the whole situation.
I just saw it for 15 minutes yesterday about the technical side.
I thought I could review this whole situation with him tomorrow and trigger a final response on the summit by next Tuesday.
If we don't get it by then, I'll just go ahead.
And I thought I could do that best in a somewhat...
They really wanted it.
They'd let you know already.
I think they wanted it.
Every indication we have is that they wanted it.
The fact that they told Charlie Bartlett, the fact that they hadn't published those papers, the fact that they
But I can shift the brain into Thursday morning.
I mean, there's no...
Whichever you prefer.
I can do it either time.
Well, if you can do it either time, perhaps it would be best to go ahead with the brain and meet with you Thursday morning.
At 11 o'clock I got something, but otherwise...
So why don't we count on whenever you get in and spend as much time.
By that time, I'll have my papers all together, and I'll go through them with you.
You leave Thursday night.
Right.
And we can meet again late in the day.
Oh, yeah, the rest.
All right, we'll meet Thursday morning, say, at 9 o'clock.
Right.
Yeah.
I'll have Hank sit in if you want.
All right, and then we'll meet again in the afternoon.
Yeah, I guess so.
10 or 9, I have to check.
Well, anyway.
At any rate, let's suppose it will be as late as 5 o'clock.
Right, absolutely.
If we need to.
We may not need to.
We may just want to trust you and I to do the same.
Now, I want you to know, I have canceled, I have sent out instructions that there should be no background, there's no meetings with the press.
Each of these ambassadors that you may run into may tell you that what they want for themselves is a play that we
Boy, honestly, I just want to make that big play.
July 15th, Mr. President, is the big play.
Yeah.
My current thinking is still, if you want to get the answer for Greene, you're going to tell him you've got to have an answer by then.
But my thinking is that you'll be at the punch of our court.
And he's got to form hate for that.
You are leaving here for the West Coast, right?
On the 6th.
I'll be here.
I'll get it until the evening of July 5th.
All right.
So that Haig can get it to me.
Sure.
Oh, I just say we've got to go tonight.
All right.
Evening of July 5th.
Good.
And in the meantime, if he doesn't make a move, then we go.
Then we go this year.
On the whole, Mr. President, I have to... My candid judgment is that the impact on Asia...
of immediately announcing a summit would really be a price we shouldn't pay lightly in terms of impression.
I think it would help if we can afford it.
It would help your path to pass through 72 if you can be seen to have moved deliberately but decisively.
We've been talking about a summit so long that we forget how big it will even appear to send a special emissary to Peking.
But if we don't get a Russian summit, we may decide.
If you feel you need it, nothing is more important.
I agree, Mr. President.
And I'm just putting...
I know the impact is going to be enormous.
Ideally, if we could get the Russian summit, we could string the Chinese one into April.
With a Bruce visit before, and Bruce will play it so low-key that he won't skim the cream off.
In the meantime, though, you realize that others are going to skin the cream off.
They won't wait that long.
I'm just thinking of what we've got to think about, if possible.
But you see, I think if we announce that we've had high-level conversations with the...
I should be the first.
I should be the first.
Unless it's Bruce.
Well, you'll have been the one that opened it.
Yeah, I know.
That's the same thing.
It's the same thing.
The first time an American politician goes there, that's going to be it.
Everything else will be on course.
First of all, we'll have to see what they really have in mind.
If they're very tough, and if it looks as if they're going to play this into humiliation, then it's not in our interest to do it.
I know.
I know.
But we got a message again from Pakistan today.
They've sent a navigator down, and they're going to start flying this weekend to handle it.
Uh, well, I will, uh, well, we can, if we get a Russian summit, then we're in good shape, as I understand it.
I suppose.
Yeah.
Get a Russian summit for September, basically.
Right.
That's what we're talking about.
And then, then we can play the Bruce thing on.
Then we play the Bruce thing.
And we can still say you've accepted the summit in principle.
Yeah.
To discuss the... To prepare the ground and so forth.
And we'll have that phrase about peace in the Pacific and peace in Asia.
And...
We're in that curious, curious time.
We didn't have an election coming up next year.
We have two years.
It wouldn't make any difference.
But we're in a curious time now, and what we do is far, say, is far more important than what we do.
We have to play in the galleries.
It's too bad.
It's the way it is.
We just don't want to get it completely unraveled.
No.
That's because playing without...
Playing the Russian and Chinese thing simultaneously is going to be tricky as hell.
I understand the Vietnamese too.
We need a strong announcement on July 15th to suck the Vietnamese between the eyes.
That will really choke them.
Yes, whatever it is, it will choke them.
You won't tell them, of course, when you see them in the moment.
Not a word.
Not a word.
All right.
I'll see you tomorrow.
Good night, sir.
Good night, sir.
Good night, sir.
You don't think you're going to appear too anxious today, do you?
I'm holding bruise.
I'm holding bruise.
NARA Description
On June 29, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:21 pm to 4:31 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 531-027 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 531-27
Date: June 29, 1971
Time: 4:21 pm - 4:31 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
President's schedule
-Kissinger's appointment for Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] graduation
-National Security Council [NSC]
-Agenda
Kissinger's schedule
-Dobrynin
-Agenda
-Soviet summit
President's schedule
-Possible visit to Soviet Union
-Charles L. Bartlett
-Pentagon Papers
-Kissinger
-Dobrynin
-Kissinger
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Kissinger's schedule
-Backgrounders for press
-Trip
President's schedule
-Possible visit to Soviet Union
-Dobrynin
-Haig
-Ramifications of summit announcement
-Possible visit to People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Effect of announcement
-David K.E. Bruce
-Edmund S. Muskie, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy
-Kissinger's forthcoming visit to Pakistan
-Logistics
-Possible visit to Soviet Union
-Timing
-Bruce's possible assignment to PRC
-Goal
Vietnam
-July 15 announcement
-Effect on North Vietnamese
Kissinger's schedule
-President
-Dobrynin
-Bruce, D. Kenneth Rush
Kissinger left at 4:31 pm.Also recorded on June 29, 1971
- 531-026 4:18 PM · 23 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:18 pm to 4:21 pm.
- 006-025 4:32 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:32 pm and 5:03 pm.
- 531-028 4:32 PM · 1 hr 10 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Manolo Sanchez, White House operator, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Stephen B. Bull, John D. Ehrlichman, Clark MacGregor, Frederic V. Malek, Lawrence M. Higby, Mary Swann, and John N. Mitchell met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:32 pm to 5:50 pm.
- 006-026 5:03 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 5:03 pm to 5:06 pm.
- 006-027 5:06 PM · 7 sec — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:06 pm and 5:35 pm.
- 006-028 5:06 PM · 59 sec — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman and Clark MacGregor talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:06 pm and 5:35 pm.
- 006-029 5:06 PM · 5 sec — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:06 pm and 5:35 pm.
- 006-030 5:06 PM · 53 sec — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman and Frederic V. Malek talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:06 pm and 5:35 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 531-027, June 29, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/531-027 (accessed October 5, 2026).