Conversation 534-003

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The way it goes, he's going to come at us in the name of Jesus.

So she's going to meet with the parish.

The parish is going to hit very hard.

In fact, this is not an accusation.

We don't want to say it.

Now, I'm going to get rude.

I'm going to get rude.

So, I'm going to get rude.

If there's one more reference to this, one more discussion, the meeting of the charge will be lost.

That's your name?

Yes.

And then we'll see if you fall out there.

Okay.

This was our...

This was our... We just wanted to talk about...

He's going up to testify.

Yeah.

And we just wanted to know how to...

What's the trend?

As long as they're bad at this political condition, they're in good shape.

Sure, it's the same offer.

The thing is, they're not going to use the word overthrow to choose e-government.

You got to stand out.

If we're not going to turn the country over, 17 million people over to the communists against their will, put that down and get those sons of bitches to say it that way.

Do I come true?

We are not going to.

What they are saying is to turn 17 million South Vietnamese over to the communists against their will.

Sure.

But they have a

and do it against their will with the blood of man that would be sure to follow.

Put those words in.

I want them to go out and say, God, they're going to say it right now.

And all these other things.

Let me come to the other points.

I didn't go and start a thing and so forth that is about security of communications in the United States.

But I want to tell you for purposes of some of the progressives, our delegation is going to be greater than very small.

I'm going to take three people.

I'm going to take you, and I'm going to take Rogers.

I may take one assistant for you, and I'm not going to take any assistant for Rogers.

And actually, I'll take my own.

I couldn't agree more.

I'm not going to take any State Department people, and I'm not going to take any others.

I'm just not going to do it.

I'm not going to have Marshall Green.

I have a revoked Marshall Green on Japan.

And I can't do it.

I can't have it go to Japan.

Well, Peterson doesn't need it, so that's the point.

That's right.

I can't afford it there every year.

I just can't believe where it is.

But hell, Henry's.

Anybody else who thinks that's true or something?

I don't know what I would do with Porter.

I'll let Porter go to Israel or to Congo or something like that.

Porter likes it.

It's good in Arab countries.

That's where he wants to go.

Porter's a good man.

He's deep.

Porter's a pro.

He's a pro.

And also maybe he wants to send him to Paris.

Who's going to go to Paris?

That is a brilliant idea.

If this thing breaks on the 12th, it gives you the best excuse in the world.

Porter is a little weak.

But he programs.

Well, this thing, I think this is breaking, Mr. President.

A very small delegation.

The press will be limited.

We will select the press.

That's the one condition.

We have to select the press, Tom.

Because we put us in an impossible position.

And it will be the three networks, the two wires.

And one cool man for the specials.

One.

That's all we're going to take.

Do you understand?

Oh, yes.

This way, we screw the New York Times and we screw the Washington Post.

I'm not going to have the Times and the Post going if we go.

Never.

Do you understand?

Then what I want from them is to limit the facility.

I want facilities limited for the president of the delegation, and we want a very small president.

So that you are not the one who did it.

Henry, listen, let me tell you something.

So we need a thousand press.

Do you think it's going to get a bigger story?

No.

Do you realize that three networks, it'll be so big of those networks, these sons of bitches, we're going to screw the New York Times.

I understand.

I just don't know.

But anybody in the White House staff who ever again, ever again, talk socially or otherwise, I'm here to come along.

I'm here to come along.

Reason is very important.

It has nothing to do with personal things.

But the idea is that we cannot, they say, participate in press conferences.

They should be present and free without a report.

They are never to be talked to alone.

They're never to have a backer because they have broken the rules.

That's the reason for it.

Now, very small delegation.

Now, the only reason I said, Mr. President, that they should, rather than for you to say you'll only take five people, it's a lot better if they can say they can only handle seven.

Now, on the visit to China, a couple of the presidents would like to do, would like to make very business-like.

He's mainly there to talk to the leaders.

Okay.

However, as you know, he has enormous respect for the Chinese people and his trapeze, met the Chinese communities all over the world, probably more than any world figure, and would like to visit one other city other than Beijing.

He could like to go to Shanghai, if that would fit.

But if they do not want that, that's fine.

Is that you want really only one city, or would you visit more if they made it available?

Well, I don't want it to be like that.

I think it's better to have a business like this.

Look, Shanghai is the place that the Chinese are being, you know.

I think, Mr. President, your instinct is very wise.

I think if you go dunk it in, if you go dunk it in...

I don't want to tell them that this is a business like that.

I'd like to go to BK and I'd like to see that night because it's enormous, they're interested in it.

Mr. President, actually, they may well want to show you in a lot of cities because it's an unbelievable coup for them.

But I think your instinct is the right one.

No.

Let me say just a few other thoughts and answers as I read this.

As I say, it's a great job if you just tell your staff to get together so that I can see you first.

Now, you've got to put in more than you can have here.

A very real figure.

Now, I want to say it.

The president is Ben Jackson.

This general thing comes through as he being too soft.

It talks about I'm a very reasonable man.

I'm not trying to do this.

I'm trying to have a position where we can have less presence and more permanence and so forth.

That's all nice and so forth and so on.

But I want you to put in that this is the man that did Cambodia.

This is the man that did Laos.

This is the man who will look to our interests and who will protect our interests without regard to political considerations.

I regard political considerations and on Vietnam that we have made an offer.

Now, you can admit it either way.

We like it.

It must be ended.

We've got to have a cool-off before we come to visit.

But if it is a cool-off, we just want you to know that anything we do to Vietnam is not against you.

So that's why.

Anything we do to Vietnam, because we have to move in other directions.

In other words, put the threat very, very sharply.

Let me get this done, Mr. President.

No, no, no, but I... Yeah, but I know I want to get them in your language.

Without regard for political... And I want them to know that anything that we, of course, that we believe in Vietnam should be settled before the present occurs.

But in this period, when we are trying to negotiate, that if we run to...

just sent me the oxen of recalcitrance that the man that ordered Cambodia and the man that ordered Laos will have to protect the interests of Americans.

And he will do so.

And when he does that, he wants to assure you, and we will let you know, that it is not directed against you.

It's only directed against protecting our interests and will not be directed against you.

It will not threaten you in any way.

just as lawlessness did not, just as cannibalism did not.

It's the worst that I've ever seen.

Actually, I want to put in the fact that we give them two reasons to say I'm Vietnam.

One, the fact that we might explain, but two, obviously when you already got in here, I can't take a trip over there.

Vietnam is boiling along.

Now, I think without being obvious about it,

I mean, without saying it in so many words, but you could put it a little more about the necessity for our moving toward the Soviet.

In other words, with regard to the Soviet, we have to realize, I think, that we are seeing detente with the Soviet.

It is not directed against you, but...

Our anchors clash in Europe.

Our anchors clash in the Middle East.

Our anchors can't clash in the Caribbean.

We intend to protect our image, but we are going to cede it.

And our anchors clash, of course, with the competition on arms.

Now, one thing that I did to come out of all this is an agreement with the Chinese on the nuclear arms.

You may not have this in the first visit.

Throw it out as a possibility.

All of you are going to negotiate if you can.

How about an accidental war?

You've got the hotline in there.

Say, look, we don't want to get in and hear about the nuclear.

Why can't we have an agreement with regard to the nuclear?

I mean, the other person has had that prepared for the second.

That's a better use of the word.

Say, just something that we have.

We've got to have a few numbers that we can put in and get it back across to them so they understand the English language.

Yes, sir, I understand it, and it's a very good answer, Michael.

With regard to the communique, unless they insist, it would be better to have a communique that does not have names in it.

I think it's better to leave a little bit more to the imagination at the highest level.

You've got four or five communities, and of course, you have one where it says, I trust this deputy can't stay consistent.

But remember, remember, argue strongly for a good morning and a bad day.

Now, on fire, I don't want to be so forthcoming.

I mean, suggesting that we didn't have Ag New Gold, we didn't have Laird Gold.

And so you've got a lot of strong language on Taiwan.

I want to keep it strong, having in mind the fact that we know they'd have to be tough on Taiwan, but we've got to be tough on Taiwan in order to head up where we're never going to have to end.

And I would be so for the coming, until necessary.

Now, you can say we're not trying to irritate you or stuff,

on the United Nations, you say, frankly, we're in a box.

And what do you want us to do?

You do say that, but say a little bit more quickly.

On Vietnam,

The section is too long.

That's not yet good.

Well, it's good.

It's good, but it's not tough enough.

And I will cover that up.

Now, on Japan, here's another thing.

I already put in more fear as to what our end would do that he might turn hard on Vietnam.

I want you to put in more fear of Japan

you've got some in, and recognizing this may still be out, we still get it in.

And the way I would do that is say, now we have to recognize that as we travel through Asia, a number of nations, and in Europe, are concerned about the Japanese.

Now, if the United States removes its prices from Asia, the Japanese will have no choice but to rebuild their military, and they will.

and they can do it very, very quickly.

So you've got in the idea that it's in their interest for us to be there with Japan and the rest.

But I want to point out the fact that fear of Japan, they do fear Japan.

Let me make it clear that in a fairly direct way that we fear Japan too, that Japan is dangerous.

I think we should all let that in.

The Japanese are dangerous.

And in the same vein,

He doesn't put in fear with regard to the Soviets.

Absolutely.

Fear, we don't know what it is.

We know a person.

The one thing he didn't have in there, we had noted that our intelligence shows that the Soviet has more divisions wide up against China than they have against Europe.

The one reason, Mr. President, well, they're undoubtedly going to take what I say.

And I didn't want them to play that with the Soviet ambassador.

but I've got some stuff in there where I'm not exchanging military information.

Well, I just put it in that there are reports in the press that put it that way, not that we Soviet people want.

Reports in the press indicate that the Soviet has, as we were aware of that, just sort of a low-key way, and we also are aware of the fact that in an assault negotiation, the Soviet are against the Arabian because they are concerned about China.

That is it.

I want to build up their fears against Japan.

And I want to build up their fears for what will happen on Vietnam.

Those things are going to move them a hell of a lot more than all the gobbledygook and all the no-quit are being civilized, which also is important.

But that's excellent.

That is excellent for the historical record.

And it might have some effect.

But I'm just telling you that my only inclination is to feel that

that you've got to get down pretty crisply until it's not coming.

But, in other words, I like all that, but I would thin it down a bit so that you can get to the stuff that really comes very soon.

Now, prior to the summit, of course, to any summit, there's going to be action on three fronts.

One, the POWs in China.

One range, as I said.

One opening on the range.

and of course some progress on Vietnam but those are the three things that I think we should aim for if there is going to be something that

We should be able to make up for it.

We've got to have some symbolic progress after the relations with China.

If you would think of anything else, think of something else.

I think the accidental war.

I think the hotline and the accidental war.

The hotline is terrific.

The hotline and the accidental war is terrific because everybody knows, everybody is asking the question, how do we have an arms control agreement with the Soviet, with China outside?

I can simply say that discussions are beginning between the United States and China.

with regard to the limitation of the bureaucrats.

Even that.

Let's start some discussions on that.

We got one going with the Soviet.

Why not let that seem a point?

Try that.

I think that's a very good, very strong thing.

No matter how political this is, before we got this country, we clearly understood it.

We don't care who you have, but we do not think it would be helpful to have it.

It would be misunderstood if this country

Political visitors have kept up to now.

They have up to now.

I'm just simply saying, look, if we're going to go in April, for example, and so before we go, they have musky and hungry and all the rest.

Even though we've announced that, it's not going to be helpful.

up to them.

They look as if they're just playing one against the other.

And I just say that that would not be... You see, this is one of the reasons why I think that putting off the April is not the answer.

I just don't see them hanging on that long.

And with all the pressure in the Congress, where are these guys from?

I think they're going to have to wait.

I think they're going to have to be centered by...

Well, I think, Mr. President, we have now positioned the Russians, I didn't have a chance to tell you, I told him, he said this, he thinks, his own guess is that the answer is yes.

He says Presnes was in Berlin until the 20th, and now he is afraid that the session they had scheduled today of the Politburo is going to be canceled because of the cosmonauts.

So he...

I said I've got to have an answer.

I said we've got to have an answer by the close of business on the 6th.

And if it comes in any later than that, I just want you to know the president has already extended it.

He's got to make other plans.

So in a way now, the best way for us to get off the hook with them is to say,

Anatole, I've told you and told you.

I told you June 10th.

We had an hour on June 30th.

You said that now that we could go visit China as far as Russians are concerned.

If the Russians do not give us a summit, we could go in December or late November or something like that.

Don't you think, Al?

Yes, sir.

And we could tell the Russians.

And Anatole can go home and say, you crazy sons of bitches, you screwed it up.

That's right.

And...

Actually, technically, if we don't get it by the 7th, it doesn't make any difference what they decide.

Yeah.

Al can't get it to me fast enough.

Yeah.

The other point, of course, is this.

If we don't get it there by the 7th, uh... On the other hand... You've got to figure that the Russians, then, because there's a chance that they'll blow... No, they won't blow.

They won't blow.

They'll blow that.

But they'll blow us off.

The risk we run with the Russians.

Well, if they blow salt, they could blow salt, they could jack up the Middle East, and they could start raising hell in the Caribbean.

Now, of course, we can go hard right.

In fact, our major problem in Berlin, as we're coming up with, I know we'll never get credit for it, but

We're coming up with a really superb agreement on that, which is actually an improvement.

Yeah, but, you know, the Russians are making so many concessions now that it's getting tough to...

I've got Russia held until July 20th.

Now, on Taiwan, as I said, don't be quite so forthcoming about it, until necessary.

Taiwan, I think, is very important that...

what comes out of this, assuming this will be published in some time.

It can't appear that we went over there and sold Taiwan down the river.

We've got a traffic act going clear.

I think it's a little bit, too, that, well, we've done this, we've done this in order to prove our good faith to you.

I don't think we should say that.

I think it's very good to say, without saying, we've withdrawn the 7th Fleet, we didn't send the carriers and this and that and the other thing.

That looks too weak.

I'd simply say, all right, here's Taiwan, here's you.

And then he raised my point about what you do.

Well, after all, look, there has been this and that and the other thing.

But I would also not put in your opening and your discussion of Taiwan the straight thing that these troops will not be there forever and that they will be all the way to the front.

Here's what I would say.

I would say the Nixon doctrine, as you know, is aimed at simply providing aid for those who need it themselves.

We do not contemplate a permanent American presence in Taiwan.

And so this is something we can negotiate about.

Something like that.

Don't go so far that it appears that we're ready to throw Cairo down the side and leave it for them to decide.

That's the other thing that disturbs me.

If you say, well, let 800 million and 17 million decide what the hell they're going to do with each other.

Well, the 800 million, they're going to double up the 17 million.

And the cocktail are, you know, like a peanut.

And so we can't quite, but on the Taiwan thing, it's going to be, you're going to end up with nothing there.

But on the other hand, I don't think you need to say quite as much to prove that we're doing all right on time.

That is essential.

I think I put the title in more in terms of, well, and another thing, I don't think, I do not think that it's good to go back and quote what Harry Truman said in 1950 for this year, and I didn't agree with Truman on that.

You know, when Truman said in 1950, we have no interest in promosal, we will not defend promosal, we will not send troops for promosal, and so forth.

Don't praise him for that, Henry.

I don't want that in public.

No, that will go up.

What I mean is, also, talking about our right that we're keeping in line, that's the kind of thing that would ascend right up the wall.

The Taiwan section has got to be terribly written so that it doesn't appear we're knocking down our friends.

But then we can be pretty cold turkey, isn't it?

I don't know why it's all in there, but that Taiwan section is written as if Owen Latimer...

Whoever wrote that wrote it just like Leonard, just the way he would sound.

A disloyal son of a bitch.

And I know him well.

I want him to read that way.

Well, I will make a very short statement on Taiwan.

Good.

Keep a lot of this stuff for revival.

Now, on the places where we meet.

I don't have enough confidence in that country.

I do.

I think London is the best.

I think London is the best, and I would say our career choice is London, because it's a place where communications are absolutely secure, and where it's a big enough city that it is not going to be.

Now, as far as the confidence country is concerned, I think Warsaw, perhaps.

Well, Warsaw can be for diplomatic.

Yeah, diplomatic.

London is the best.

Paris isn't as good, but, you know, the Parisians will bug you.

You never know.

I can say our first choice is London.

We thought about it.

We would consider various others, but London, because of the communications security and so forth, you have relations with them.

We have relations with them.

Something like that.

Got it.

It would be...

I'm on the...

I would not go in with the Canadians, but Trudeau is a son of a bitch.

That's why I canceled that visit there, Michael.

I would make it again in Canada.

Never, never, never.

I'll never move without that kind of goings-on.

Well, that's all I have.

It's a very good time.

I don't get the...

I got all your notes.

On Taiwan, the one point that I think will hook it a little more to Vietnam, if you approve, is to say that the first units, if we thin it out, to go are the ones that are related to Vietnam.

Also, if that is published, it won't hurt us so much with the North Korean, with the Chinese.

I didn't mean to say that.

I couldn't report that.

I said that's what I talk about.

I talk about Taiwan culture.

Now, look.

If we had worked this out in Salvo with the Vietnam side, we would have mined, you know, their 6,000 forces there for other purposes other than Taiwan.

And actually, they would not then be as needed.

And we'll bend those down as Vietnam goes on.

And then, of course, other steps will be taken as time goes on.

I like your Korean stuff.

I think that's good.

And I'm throwing in the possibility of, you know,

It's just good.

It's kind of what it possibly means, our career.

Yeah.

But what this, how does it go, work out?

Now, on the other thing I want to point out is, when I start disappearing in Pakistan to go up to the Hill Station, the one thing that this New York Times story has done

It's to alert people.

Sure.

And, and, uh... Can you go?

Will the IHOP go with you?

Uh, he won't go with me, but his foreign secretary will go with him.

Why don't you just say your foreign secretary provides a lot of money?

Well, you know what?

Now, the way we've worked it out is that I will not feel very well on Thursday, and it's terribly hot, and we'll get a doctor to give me some pills.

And then Yaya at dinner will suggest that we can work better at the Hill Station, where it's cool, and that his people would be willing to go up to the Hill Station with me.

So then a lot of American embassy personnel will have heard the proposal.

And that's all set.

But I just... We're going to have contingency press guidance subject to your approval, just in case it blows.

Now, on these... Sure, sure, but we have to.

This press conference might blow.

And on the communiques... Just don't let it blow in the New York Times, that's all.

Well, I won't see any press... What I meant is...

I will not... Do not talk to the embassy pressman.

Don't allow the embassy pressman to be present any time.

Well, the embassy, it won't leave out of the embassy because the embassy doesn't know what the hell I'm doing, except Father.

So there's no chance of it being...

He trusts you.

Absolutely.

He's our man.

Mr. President, what we would have done without you... As I look back on the administration, the mistake we've all made, I've made it too on my staff, is to think you could placate these bastards by taking some of them.

Well, we're doing all right now.

We've still got some cards to play.

Look at this.

This is a

I think the evening of July 15th, when you go on television with us.

That's impossible.

But it's conceivable that when I get there, they'll be mean and tough as hell.

In that case, I'll have to be mean and tough.

But we have no indication whatever.

Okay, Mr. Kirsten, you know.

Well, we'll do that.

We can go and try to do it.

And you'll stop at Paris the day after?

I'll stop at Paris, just go to my home.

That's it.

What I mean, Mr. Lee, I'm going to meet her.

Oh, yeah.

All right.

What I have done is... You're going to meet my mom.

That's right.

I have married the...

His nine points with our seven.

And the contentious point that we have to withdraw support from the Chu K'ien government, I said, this is unacceptable, but we will not support any one government.

We will be willing to talk to you about what we are entitled to do with any government that happens to be in power there.

But who is in power is not our problem.

Yes, sir.

All right, I'll see you.

You'll be nothing late, my friend.

Yes, sir.

I'll be your host then.

Dr. Nelson, sir.