Conversation 543-001

Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

It takes off the fixing of a day except in a negotiating process.

Hell, we've all said that.

Have you seen any other people since last year?

No, I called Clark McGregor and told him I'd be happy to.

It occurred to me that it would be good, if you want me to, to have George Bush down and George and I together.

I could see somebody's... No, no, no, no.

No, no, no, no.

No,

basically the divine group in the house, and the Goldwater group in the Senate.

So I think they're, they've been a pretty responsible part of it.

Open Senate is, isn't that a good piece of content?

I thought we did an actual review of Egypt City.

I don't know whether everybody was sorry for it, but I think I got it.

I've been spoofing him on secret papers, isn't it funny, though?

And that's how we managed to get rid of the story.

We were back off of it for fear they might have said it.

They all knew about it.

The rear bombs and everything.

That's very funny.

He's a funny man.

He's clever.

And I could just see him, you know, just gloating over it.

And, of course, the Pentagon Papers, as far as they're concerned, are pretty...

They're going to be, and we've got to keep them that way, they're going to be one hell of a problem for the Democrats, don't you think so?

They do with those things.

I mean, they involve Teddy and his brother.

I don't know about Teddy's brother, particularly.

They even musky, musky made this speech at the Democratic Convention in 40, 50, 68.

We've got them on.

That's just all gone right now.

Have you seen the poll, I think, that's in Japan?

Yeah, 10 or so.

About your...

73% think President Nixon's trip will be a key to Asian and world peace.

Do you think the President's visit will become a significant key to peace?

Yes.

73% yes, 15% no.

With regard to improvement of relations with China, do you feel apprehensive that China might fall behind America?

Feel apprehensive, 59%.

Don't feel apprehensive, 35%.

Do you think it's necessary for Japan to revise its China policy?

Yes, 71%.

No, 15%.

This is an interesting one.

What do you think about failure to consult with Japan

Could not be helped, 42%.

Japan would suffer with 18%, so that most of them understood that we couldn't solve it.

No way.

You think the United States got the jump on Japan?

Yes.

What position do you think Japan should take in the General Assembly this coming fall?

Drive Taiwan out and admit China 11%.

Admit China, but keep Taiwan in, 74%.

That's what they all want.

I guess it can't happen.

It could.

Well, we can take the position.

It could be a problem.

Uh-huh.

Well, I'll talk to Henry and Clark about this, and we'll, if it seems all right with everybody.

I'm not sure whether Mike will accept this language or not, but I think he will.

He told me he, in fact, one of these things is his handwriting is at a date certain, and he says it's in a negotiating framework.

There really is not much we can think about.

And if you introduce a sort of resolution concurrent with China, it would be very good, I think.

I'll talk to you in a bit.

Listen, A, B, G, Laos, Sierra Leone.

Not one of them is worth seeing.

The four devils, but I think of their countries, you know, now.

A, B, G, Laos, Sierra Leone.

None of them should be coming.

It's just being...

The long list of children pretending to be something different.

You know, it must be a little bit jumpy as to what might happen on this thing.

I am.

Anyway, give us a report quickly.

I hear the governor wants to talk to you about this.

Yeah, I'd like to talk to him right now.

He did this on his own.

It's my idea.

He said it, isn't it?

Oh, Henry, you're euphoric.

No, well, the thing about it is at the same time.

Yeah.

Oh, yeah.

No, but it's our idea to get him to do something.

I asked him on the phone.

I said, we work on something.

When I first saw him, I said to him, Mike, is it not that it's really important here to build, God damn it, the Senate and to keep their support of the president.

We're going to be negotiating a number of deals.

So Bill got to do that.

That's his language, isn't it?

Yeah, sure.

He puts in a jury for fields and

He's agreed to this at a date certain.

He's given me a memo in which he says that the policies seen by the members going into effect within the context of a negotiated agreement, well, this is what we want, so he'll have to agree to change the order, as we talked about.

The other thing is, this is just a memo that he gave me supporting his position.

Now, I haven't shown them this language.

I just tried to soften them up.

But I think we can talk them into this language.

And I think our thing is to know what you've done, actually.

Your verse is two paragraphs.

And this is the Mansfield Amendment.

This is his handwriting.

This is my handwriting.

Now, this pretty much coincides with what we already have.

and I added the words and for, so that it's clear that it's negotiated with for reading C-SPAR and for establishing, so that it's clear that this is all a negotiation, see?

Paragraph one to one, it's a negotiation report.

Coincidence.

Coincidence with the improvement.

Yeah.

It always improves.

No, no, I mean, we were looking this morning when we saw it.

I said that I didn't like the word contention, but I didn't have a good word.

But that's the only condition.

But we have an original phrase on it, too, which makes it contention.

I've taken that on.

I've taken it on.

It's subject to Robin, but he's in.

Actually, this is just a casual cursory reading.

says we should negotiate for a ceasefire, that we should negotiate for a base withdrawal of prisoners, that we should negotiate for a, negotiate for a things search.

Uh, I don't know if they'll put it all that way.

We can't do that.

That's exactly what you put up.

But we are putting up to an effect.

Now, the only thing I haven't talked to him about is that he had a policy in the United States, and we can't accept that because this is a sense of the Congress.

Is he willing to take this east side?

You'll have to.

I haven't...

I didn't want to break up the language, but I'm convinced from the memo... Bill is not showing the language, which is a very important thing, and I'll let him admit it, but the ceasefire has to begin, or we've got to fight it, because we can't... we cannot withdraw it on these guys here to have their ass shot.

Oh, no.

Well, what I thought I'd do now is give this language to... if we agree on it, to Stennis, and let it come from Stennis, so... and then I can let Stennis talk it over with... Stennis.

You can have it.

I've... You can have it.

If we could get this, and he can...

He will introduce this to Earth Resolution the same day.

Where is it?

And he will impose...

Well, I tried to get him to.

I point out that he wants to support the president.

We don't want this to appear to be lack of support.

Staff, this is C Spire.

Quiet.

I'm kind of late, sir.

Oh, it's good.

The current resolution is...

It's good.

If you can't get anything else, you can get that.

That's great.

To negotiate with the government in North Vietnam for an agency, Spire,

under international supervision by all parties from the United States of America to China, and for establishing the final leg of indisputability for the withdrawal from India to China of all military forces committed by the region to all American prisoners of war, and by the government of Vietnam, the rest of the United States.

Those guys, they're real soldiers.

If we don't have the accounting of the prisons, I don't consider that a group.

No, we can't.

Prisoners, no.

I can't afford Americans missing in action.

I've been held unknown to such government.

We can't get it in a negotiation anymore.

The thing that this does involve, if they change this, is that they have given ground on setting a date.

That's the major lead that will come out of it.

And the second is that they have added a ceasefire, and that's a hell of a joke.

And what the hell else is the argument about?

And the third is it doesn't mean anything, because we've been willing to negotiate this time.

We've negotiated.

That's just what we put in our October 7th speech.

Sure.

And it all ends.

except we said we would withdraw all our forces.

We got that in, but we're not... No, I mean, I've had a chance of looking at that paranoia.

I'm not so...

I was worried about this also when it was happening under the period of panic.

And when it's looking out now, that makes much sense.

I think paranoia is almost inside itself.

Well, I think, Henry, that what this will do, or Mike will also introduce his resolution, is it will be construed as a complete change of climate between the President and Congress.

That's what I was trying to say.

That's what we ought to try to do.

That's what it is.

It's like a resolution.

Don't you think so, Henry?

Oh, yeah.

I think that's a great achievement.

Let's not tell Clark or anybody about that.

Oh, they can copy.

Let me give it back, because Mike just wanted to tell me.

Okay.

Yeah, okay.

Do you copy?

Do you want to?

Uh, no, no.

I don't want to.

Wait a minute.

That's, uh, that's kind of a momentary.

I asked Bill, and he hasn't seen any comments from himself, but, uh, yeah.

Well, we've done our job as well, so you can't invent that with everybody.

But you've done it now.

You did your service today.

How did it go?

Well, you have to ask my director.

My impression is that it went very well.

How many were there?

Ten.

Only ten?

There were all ten of us.

Well, we didn't have a conservative congressman.

We didn't have a conservative congressman, but it was Hansen and Irvin and Spock who contributed conservatively in that sense.

Okay, sir.

These are the tower.

That's true.

Somebody I know is a very conservative guy, but I forget his name.

Curtis?

No, no, no, Curtis.

We had a talk with the leadership.

But anyway, I put it on...

I think it went extremely well.

I haven't given them any of the color of the trip, I think, because I knew that was what they were interested in.

I put it on the basis of...

What is the difference between those agreed summit meetings?

Why is the summit directly starting with the Chinese?

And I mentioned to them that in 1958 I had written an article warning against summits when I didn't know you.

The first time I ever heard from you and the second time was a little note you sent me saying that you essentially agreed with us.

The difference between the King of Eisenhower and Kennedy's son, Mr. Bismarck, and the argument on the impact of them, I say, well, the way they have impacted us, they have already played a heavy part, or they have deleted some of the papers.

negotiations, and that we were confronted with two major communist countries together.

It just didn't make any sense to have negotiations with one and reject negotiations with a weaker one.

And everyone who was present on your congressional leaders' staff saw the comment very well.

They also came to us to say,

Well, actually, we had less black than the bright, if I ever thought we would get one.

You've got the expected black.

A little black from the dark is actually helpful.

We need some.

We want some.

Boy, they were about to leave the Chinese.

Somebody's got to keep them in line.

Did you see the Japanese boat?

No.

Very good.

And as you must spell it, an app of flooded letters from all over the world congratulating you and congratulating us.

And it's amazing.

When I was walking over to Seungri the other evening, young people stopped me on the street and thought you were making a fake dance.

Young people are very much kids, young people.

Okay, so I went up to the Capitol and four or five young people came over and I speak.

Stars and I, we love you in Tennessee, they said.

Yeah.

Well, I said to Hindley, I thought we should talk a minute about that Chinese representation question.

We're not faced with a decision at the moment, but I think it's well for us to start thinking about it.

Well, it boils down to this.

We, I think it worked out particularly well with the

Chinese because we put it up to them for the first time.

And basically what I said was this, Mr. President.

If we proceed on the best of course, we're going to lose.

And the Albanian resolution will carry.

Communist China will be admitted and you'll be expelled.

And we all agree with that, including your government.

So first you have to ask yourselves, do you want us to continue on that course together, or should we change our policy?

If we change our policy, the thing we have to ask ourselves is, what is practical?

What's the reality of the situation?

The reality is that you cannot retain your membership in the UN, and we are not able to save it for you, unless you're willing to acquiesce, at least,

in giving the Security Council seat to the BRC.

In the absence of that, there aren't enough votes to support your continued membership.

It has nothing to do with what the United States is willing to do or prepared to do, and it has nothing to do with the President's visit.

It all occurred before the announcement of the visit.

It was quite clear in the discussions that I've had with other nations

We do not have the votes to support your membership unless you're willing to give up the Security Council seat.

So you have to let us know what your attitude is on that point.

If your attitude is going to be, under no circumstances will we give up the Security Council seat, we'd rather be expelled and we won't keep our membership unless we have a seat, then you should let us know

Because then we have to ask ourselves whether it's, whether it's wise for our nation to go through the agony of this kind of a fight and have the whole thing and exercise in futility.

That's right.

On the other hand, if you want the, you want to keep your membership, you won't have to publicly announce that you'll give up your Security Council seat, but we'll have to, we'll have to go that direction.

We'll have to say yes

PRC should be a member and the PRC should have a Security Council seat.

And you have to tell us privately that you're prepared to continue your membership if you want us to put up a fight for you.

We can't guarantee that even then we'll win the fight.

It's possible we can't.

We're not sure.

We're going to have to take another canvas.

But we would like to have you know.

So he said to me, well, you're throwing the ball to us.

And I said, no, we're not.

We're consulting with you, his friends, to find out what course we should follow.

And we count very heavily on weighing your views.

Well, we went over the thing.

He's back to his government, of course, and they're under, they've been having very active consultations since.

Other governments, I sent you, I don't know if you saw it or not, the Australian telegram, but I sent a copy to you.

It was very good.

The Australian ambassador gave him the same pitch, only

more effectively, yes.

So what we're doing is waiting to see what their attitude is, but, and there's no way of being certain.

CCK, Shankar Sheikh's son, favors retaining their membership and giving up the seat.

We got a chance, we got a CCK, we called it CCK.

But he doesn't know, apparently, from his advisors, what his father will do.

Now, if they come back with the answer, yes, we're prepared to give up the Security Council seat, but we want to retain our membership, then the tricky thing is, how do we do that without being inconsistent with what you've said?

Because we have to put up a fight, we have to make a good faith effort.

If we do it without cooperating with the Japanese, it's going to be very tough on the Japanese because they've been cooperating with us very closely up to this point and they're very sensitive to any change of attitude on our part.

So they come in every two seconds and ask us to

Are we going to be working together to save Taiwan Sea?

And will you go on a resolution with us to that effect?

And can we work with you?

So that's going to be a tough one, and we've got to keep in mind that we need to keep Japan with us, too.

I think we should think about that.

Now, if, Mr. President, if you should decide, just in this room, that it's better from our standpoint

to just lose to begin with, then we can sort of indicate to the Republican China, go ahead, we just vote on the Albanian resolution.

Yeah, that's what we talked about at the beginning of that.

I don't think it's a good policy.

I know that, but I think it looks too...

It's too cynical.

Cynical.

Well, another thing is this.

Here's a... Let's look at it from the standpoint now of domestic relations, American relations.

There's still a hell of a lot of people in the state who oppose the admission of the Great China and the UN.

There's still a very substantial number.

I understand that.

But...

In terms of this new relationship with China, it looks like we're being pricked as hell.

That we, on the one hand, say we're going to go to Communist China, and on the other hand, we're voting against Communist China coming into the UN.

I wonder if it doesn't just make us look like a situation.

I agree with Bill.

If you remember in April I was sort of attracted by the idea that if we were going to lose anyway, but it was an opposite situation.

I felt as long as we were going to lose, we might as well lose maintaining our principle.

But right now maintaining our principle makes us look tricky.

We are not going to get great credit for maintaining the principle while you're going to Peking, because we can't have the principle that China ought to be excluded from the UN group.

So my original reason for it is no longer valid.

Secondly, I did already mention to Joe and I just in passing, you know, there's always voting on the Albanian resolution, which they'll probably carry even if you oppose it.

And he certainly didn't pick that up.

I mean, he didn't say that's the thing we'd prefer most, even.

So I don't think we came with that.

It's just too cynical.

Yeah.

So I think if, if Karmann wants to stay in, we owe them making a fight for it.

Suppose I decide I don't want to.

I think it would be better of making a fight for it than to withdraw, except we might fight less intensely.

Well, do we all agree, I think, I certainly feel that we have to vote for PRC's admission?

You think so?

Yes.

Yes, we have to.

I wish we didn't have to.

But I don't see how we can avoid...

I don't know.

There's no way you can understand.

Well, Mr. President, it seems to me

that in view of the fact that others like the UK and these other European countries are going to vote that way, in view of the trip, we have to do it.

We believe in it, all of us, and I think we have to vote for their admission.

Then I think we have to vote against the expulsion of Taiwan.

And the only question remaining on my mind is whether we make a

But I'm really a hard try, a tough try to win, do everything we can to win it.

On the second issue?

On the second issue, I'm supporting Taiwan.

Tell me this, but will there be an incorporate question?

Well, in order to save Taiwan, we'll have to do it that way.

On the first issue?

Well, that's going to be academic, so it doesn't make any difference.

If we announce we're going to support it, we're going to have more than two-thirds, we're going to have them and all the folks.

So the important question on the admission is really not relevant.

And we'll have to try that.

Now, if we don't succeed on that, we don't have a chance.

I think that it seems to me that the way it starts out, we've got to indicate that we will support the admission.

has been a good member of the United Nations, period.

And we look forward to history.

We oppose the expulsion of Taiwan because Taiwan has been a good member, period.

Right?

There are a lot of other reasons.

I've got a little statement here.

I'll give it to Henry later, but

The crucial question is not that.

I think the crucial question is whether we want to, whether we're prepared to make a real fight or whether we're prepared to relax about it.

We can go through the motions.

If we're going to make a real fight, then we've got to seriously talk to other nations and ask them to support us.

And we have to have... Well, can we make a real fight?

I think we owe them a real fight for one.

I think it's too cynical.

I mean, they will, everyone will know if we don't fight.

And I think the Chinese, they will know.

They don't understand.

They don't like.

I don't like what they said about Vietnam.

No, no, they all know.

They're saying, hey, the way I put it is this.

People say, well, what about yours?

Somebody's asking, what about the statement that we're not going to do this at the expense of our old friends?

I say, they aren't doing anything at the expense of their old friends.

What the hell?

They aren't turning on a lot of our enemies in the world, are they?

What we shouldn't do, in my judgment, is leave.

make a real fight, but we should do it in a way in which we don't elaborate too much on the legal basis for the future.

If we can do it by just .

Well, in other words, what you really need here, though, maybe is to have George, well, of course, use your letter or whatever it is, or statement, but George is

not an integrated big damn legal case for it, just says that the nation shouldn't be expelled, I'm going to fight for it.

Is that your point?

You don't want to... That's actually my point.

I don't... Basically, you don't want to get in a position where the two China things so strongly... Well, I'd like to be in a position where we have made a change in size, but at the same time, Beijing could figure that any time they get two-thirds, they can get rid of Taiwan.

And that...

that that seems to be something they could look forward to in two or three years, maybe even one year.

But I think what I was going to roll over and play there on the basis of one visit, before you talk to them, I'm sure they make it just as true.

I think we have to make a real fight.

Now, we have to realize that the PRC, under those circumstances, if we should win,

will refuse to join.

So we'll have to say to those nations that we're trying to get support from that we still would like to have them vote with us on the expulsion question.

We think it's important that the president has made this step forward.

He's taken a step forward.

And that now is the time to support us.

I mean, we've done more than anybody else, probably, to have a reconciliation with PRC, and we need their support now to help us in Taiwan.

You know, it's an interesting thing.

In that Japanese poll, you read the second page, there was a lot of questions that said, do you favor Brett Johnson's mission?

Yes.

Do you favor Taiwan's expulsion?

No.

So that's a pretty general feeling in Asia.

Japan is not unrepresentative.

And also, I think it's representative of most people in the world.

Taiwan is considered to be a pretty decent bunch of people.

I think it would be... Well, I just can't...

It would make people highly uneasy if the United States, in the space of three months, went to Peking and really just turned on the poor people.

Well, particularly whether we have a different environment.

That's my view.

It's just cold turkey now.

If it had been as a result of this, for example, if as a result of this they said we call off the dogs in Vietnam and so forth, people would understand the cynical motive.

I think too much if it's something we've threatened to drive them to such paroxysms.

I know it just won't stop.

Every day there's another statement.

Do you think he said something to them?

I don't know.

They're certainly highly uneasy.

They've had five successive statements.

Why?

Every day this week, either a government or a radio, that they're not going to be pushed around by big powers.

And today, a government statement saying they're relying chiefly on themselves.

And even two statements of this group,

I don't know whether he said anything, but whether he did or not, Hanoi is... Haven't you found Hanoi Radio and the Vietcong?

I'm sorry, I mean...

The way you saw the memo of my conversation with Dabrinian, and I sent it over to you, it was very interesting.

He was quite relaxed, as far as you could tell, but he says that he thought the seven points were serious points for negotiations, and that he thought we shouldn't forget them.

They're coming in to you, or they should be in your reading.

I think they're back here.

He was insisting that he was quite...

way forthright about his comments about the Chinese.

He said, one of the difficulties you may have is you're also eager to get things settled.

He said, are you going to fight the Chinese or not?

A tough deal when he said, Christ, we meet with them every week and we don't make a damn bit of progress.

He said that they're very outgoing.

He said, or we think it's going to be easier than dealing with us, but it's not.

How about your reaction to that?

We luckily don't have a common frontier with them that we try to demarcate.

Yes, that's right.

So our disputes with them are more amenable to solution, I think.

But they are not, Mr. President.

It's one other revolution our conscience chose.

Yes, and the people who marched these 10,000 miles, that long march to Yan'an,

You don't do that unless you have a tremendous amount of history.

And they have a long range of history.

They've been here a long time.

You look at Joe in line, he's been at all of these meetings for the last 25 years.

Every time there's been a big meeting, he's been there.

He joined the Communist Party in 1921 in France.

There didn't exist a Communist Party.

We were recalling the other day at lunch about how many of these meetings he's gone to and who was there.

And he is just about the only one left.

Is that right?

Just about.

He's been at all of them.

Well, I'll proceed on that.

Let me say, Mr. President, that I'm not very much affected usually by conversations, but I must say I was affected by my conversation with the Chinese ambassador and the Japanese ambassador.

The Japanese ambassador normally is inscrutable as hell and not very talkative.

He really was quite eloquent, and he

He had tears in his eyes.

Well, he's got glasses.

He doesn't look like much, but this time... Well, he made a very emotional plea for understanding.

saying that, you know, Asians are different from you Americans.

What you're doing is very rational and logical.

But he said, we're very emotional, and he said, we have a lot of feeling inside us.

And he said, these things come as a shock to us.

And he said, I understand.

But he said, I hope you understand our feelings.

And he said, we're going to be very sensitive now that everything that happens.

He said, not because we mistrust you, but just because we're emotionally uneasy.

He said, we've been through a hell of a lot, you know, since the war, in the war, since then.

And we have felt very close to you and we depend on you and rely on you.

And he said, I hope you understand how we feel.

Our feeling is not critical.

It's not a critical feeling.

It's just a feeling of great uneasiness.

We feel maybe they're losing a friend or having some sort of cool and not quite sure where they stand with us.

This kind of a thing,

You know, as he said, I understand.

It's completely logical.

You couldn't tell us.

We understand why you did it.

We agree.

We said so publicly.

But he said at the same time, when it happens, it sort of wounds us.

And it shouldn't, but it does.

And he said that's the Asian psyche.

And he said, I hope you'll understand it anyway.

And as I say, when he finished, he wasn't crying, but he had tears in his eyes.

Very emotional.

I'll be happy to massage.

Well, I don't think so at the moment.

I think that would appear contrived.

They are coming here, you know, for this joint cabin meeting in September.

So, Yoshiba will be here.

I don't mean Yoshiba.

Fukuda will be here.

I think, Mr. President, you ought to go out of your way to pay attention to Mueller here.

Yes, I hope that we also can keep everybody in our government quiet, but

making critical comments about Japan.

I don't care what we do privately.

They don't care about that.

It can be tough as hell privately, but let's not make any more statements for a while at least about it.

They gotta get off the dime.

I think they're very sensitive to the whole damn thing now.

And after all, when he analyzed it, matter of fact, that's one of the interesting things he said, he said, you know,

I'm sure that some of the people in my government are going to be worried about this.

He said, I'm not sure what their reaction is going to be.

He said, I hope it's sensible and I hope it doesn't affect the negotiations.

He said, that's going to be my recommendation.

But he said, when you think of two, he said, I understand what you're doing.

He said, there really isn't much you can do to us that you want to do.

He said, they don't have much, there isn't much by way of trade that you can get out of them.

At the moment, he said, they're not trapped militarily.

He said they're not a power in the sense that Japan and Germany are.

So he said, there's nothing really for us to be worried about.

Why shouldn't you try to improve your relations with them?

But we said, Japan is the third strongest nation in the world.

Don't doubt about that.

Yes, sir.

And they're going to be at home.

And then it become a very, a very destructive force.

I think if we play the relationship with Japan properly, this can be a statutory shock to the public and to the realities of post-war affairs.

They've been leaning on us too much on the one hand.

And on the other hand, being totally irresponsible, it's, uh, uh, it's in the economic field, and I think they... Well, after we get open, I'll be sure to say...

I don't think he'll last very long.

I just hope it doesn't turn into anti-Americanism.

I think it's the only thing that could, and we don't want that to happen.

When do they come?

It's in September sometime.

When you say this, what is it?

It's a joint cabinet meeting.

They send five or six of their cabinet officers over here and five or six of ours meet.

We talk about trade and all kinds of common problems.

I was over there a couple of years ago.

Joint cabinet meeting.

And it lasts for two days and we talk about... Today you were over at the... Oh, yes.

They did everything.

They went out of their...

We might do just a little something for them.

Oh, yeah.

That's a good idea.

He gave a luncheon to us.

I have a recommendation over here for luncheon.

I've never heard of a threat there.

And they also inspire compliments.

I like to do it at night, and they'll all feel good.

Good.

Get a few future girls to read it.

Good.

Say, let me ask a couple of minor things.

I've got to go and meet the Indian ambassador shortly.

I assume that these things are being done, but just to be sure that they don't fall between the two.

You've done something about overflights and peripheral flights, haven't you?

Yes.

I mean, I think the point you've made is technically rude, but what we've done is no new flights are authorized that they haven't seen before.

We are having the, whatever this diminishes, that makes the initial recommendation cut out all the flights that aren't essential.

And to the best of my knowledge, there are no old flights.

What about submarine activity in their territorial waters?

Another thing we might keep in mind is that the Republic of China is going to

You ought to be thinking, particularly Chiang Kai-shek, that he's a tough guy.

Unless you read his history, you know he's tough.

He may try to think of things to do to sabotage the visit.

We ought to think of things he might try to do to sabotage the visit and try to warn against them and prevent them from occurring.

Did he?

That's interesting.

You can't tell what he'll try to do.

He said the Soviets did too much to the...

Well, one of the things we've been thinking about is whether the Soviets might try something in the Middle East.

They can't do it very much.

I mean, it seems to me that motivation in Europe should be the other way.

They should move a little faster.

But I think those are a couple of things we have to think about.

We have a Dalai Lama scheduled for this spring sometime.

We ought to postpone that.

I'll take care of that.

I don't think we should have it yet, no.

And I notice that the USIA has a film on Teterbio.

I've got to see that they all shout that.

Bill, one thing we ought to do, but I have not done that.

What's it going to do?

Could you get this Voice of America under control so that it doesn't blow too much broadcasting into the Soviet Union?

I'll do that.

So that they should just report, not your back, but what's happening.

Okay.

I'll get the U.S.A. to shelve this filth a bit.

I assume that on this, on 124, we're not going to take any more steps on trade or anything until we want to hold back anything, it seems to me.

There's a new batch coming up, and I don't see what we're going to do.

Well, I think what we should be thinking about, and I've already started thinking, but I'm working out so that nobody has a memorandum addressed to anybody else.

I've got a group of people

five of them who are experts and say they're not going to have a memo to me and I'm not going to have one to the president or to you or anybody else.

In other words, just get some thoughts on paper.

But I think we ought to be thinking about what might occur, what we might have occur as a result of a trip or achievement.

I think, for example, we've got a lot of

Chinese bank accounts in this country that have frozen.

Now, there's one in the Belgian bank they've been trying to get us to.

Now, if we did a few little things like that, and if they, on their side, could do something afterwards.

Well, we can think of a lot of things.

And I thought that I want to have our people go back and see

whether we had exchanges, student exchanges, and that sort of thing.

In other words, we'd be thinking about things that might result from the visit.

He talked about one thing that I didn't put in the memo.

There were two things he mentioned.

One, he asked my advice about the table tennis team.

I said, frankly, I thought he

and I said if they came to Washington as soon as he saw them, we could probably arrange something in the White House, just for a few minutes.

Second, he indicated some general interest in culture, that they might consider sending this teaching after, although the listening to Chinese music is not something that is easy to bear.

I didn't follow it up because I didn't think it was the time to.

No, but I think we can, as I say, we can be thinking of that type of thing.

If we can end up with six or seven concrete results, even if they're fairly minor in scope, they'll have a tremendous impact on how it's going to be as a result of this trip.

I agree.

I wouldn't...

Did you notice that the Japanese canceled the trip of the senators?

The five senators were going over to Japan, and then they were trying to cancel it.

Japan canceled it.

Why?

I suppose because of the China thing.

These senators had lied and told the others they wanted to go to China at the same time, so Japan canceled the trip.

So that took us off the hood.

I didn't know that.

I didn't lie.

But it must have happened today.

Because last night they told me that they had invited the Chinese to come too, and the Chinese first turned it down.

Tam told me that.

And then they were trying to arrange a visit to China, and now they have no excuse to do that.

And that was a pretty bad breakthrough.

Bill, uh, let the, uh, it'd be very good, let the, let Fukuda know immediately that the President wants to give a dinner for them when they're here.

I think, I thought, what I meant is rather than waiting for the dinner for the time, I'd let him know that he's got an important step, and oh, he'd help him faster, naturally, or whatever he wanted to do.

If the President would like to give a dinner for the Kevin and for our Kevin, it's good when they're here.

And if it would not be out of the way, ask the ambassador, just to say, for the sake of the board, if maybe they could have come along, too, as a matter of fact.

He's off.

I would say to do that, because you don't know what the intrigue is in the government for who... That's right.

So you don't really know.

Uh, I told Henry, uh, Alex and I, uh, I'm, I'm, I'm so sympathetic with this poor Japanese.

I invited him to play golf with me at Burning Tree with Alex.

I'm sad.

He's so pleased.

I said, I said, yeah, are you tied up?

He said, I'll cancel everything.

I'm sure that they're going to be watching for every little sign.

This will be a nice room right now.

I'm sorry.

I'd like you to dinner.

We'll have a dinner for you.

about our meeting with Larry.

Oh, gotcha.

He's just coming in to report about his trip.

Do you want to listen?

No, thanks.

Have you already had a report on it?

He came to read the report, so I didn't hear it.

Okay.

I'm receiving it at 5.30, so I've got to go to bed right now.

Thank you.

The, uh, that's the reaction we're getting, and I've sent you another memo of the foreign reaction.

And I get a pile of letters every day

in other words, of course, all the wrong people, but absolutely amazing.

I wanted to take the liberty of mentioning one subject to you, which I thought I should give you my judgment, which is going back to the John Ehrlichman as an advancement.

First of all, I like John very much, so it's nothing personal.

My judgment, though, is that if you send the assistant to the president, they don't even know what an advanced man is.

If you send the assistant to the president, it will give all their enemies an opportunity to say there must be some collusion going on because you sent your chief domestic advisor over there.

Following me, there must be something wrong.

My judgment really is, if you want him along,

If he wants to see China, I'd rather make him part of the party.

Oh, I wouldn't say so.

I wouldn't let him go see China.

He'll only go later.

But I really feel... No, I'm not going to have a very big goddamn crowd go along to see China.

It would impress them a hell of a lot more if you sent somebody like Chapin, anyone you trust.

Well, somebody who has to refer back to all the men...

And or may, or Haldeman.

No one suspects Haldeman of having substantive ideas.

But everyone knows he's a technician.

Even though he's too high, it would be a hell of a lot better.

Maybe I'd just send Ron Walker.

Ron Walker would be excellent.

If Walker were there, I might just send him with you then.

The best way to do it would be to send some low-level guy with me, or a walker, no one knows walker, to get a quick impression of what it's like.

Then have that guy come back, check with all the men and youth to get detailed instructions, and then have them go back and do it.

They can handle somebody who isn't known.

I would like to be in a position where your trip isn't locked yet so that I can hold them up a little bit.

Well, I know that we won't go to setting the first time.

I agree with that.

But it wouldn't be good if I had an advanced man, tight man with me who could just walk through the place because I don't know what I'm looking at.

You don't know?

And Walker could sort of... Walker's the best one we've got.

Nobody knows him from Adam.

And I could tell them he wouldn't have to be with me.

He could go and... Don't worry about it.

I'll work that out.

I think that... John has raised the point of going.

I think he's the best man to go.

In many ways, he is.

He doesn't need to go at all.

But I really think it would protect your trip if you didn't look too eager, which is what they will think.

And they also may think it's a diabolical plot.

to undermine there the tridimension by sending a series of high-level guys When when Walter saw the Chinese to give them the second method and said that I was there this Monday he said that he

I had to come back to China to get instructions, but he didn't have the blanket authority to see me.

But if I don't see him this time, he'll certainly have the instructions next time I come back.

Sure.

And I can always write it out and give it to...

But again, Walter said he was treated with explicit courtesy, and they fell all over themselves.

So this is a high-priority decision by them.

Well, I'm glad we decided what we have on Taiwan, even though the old man says he doesn't want us to take the position that we do.

He thought we were going to fight for him.

I think we looked too cynical, if it was.

And as far as what Chiang Kai-shek can do, screw it up.

He really can't do it.

He has a few reasons, but he's got the same reason.

supporters here in this country that he once had.

Now there's still a whole lot of people that are against the admission of Red China.

You talk to McGregor.

This conservative bunch was, it wasn't just that they were tolerant.

They all came up and shook my hand afterwards and said, congratulate the president.

Tremendous.

And they were positive.

Right.

And affirmative about it.

Will you look at that resolution?

It is from a case graphic before we came in, but it's been changed.

No, I'm sorry.

It is.

I don't think this is...

I think we can live with it.

It's a higher thing.

But the two paragraphs switched around.

The damn thing is...

I'll take a look at it.

I just said we can't have any words to that.

That's just the way it's got to be.

I'd like to see the Mansfield put in that other one on the temperance resolutions.

Let me say it on a trying day note, because I'm sure you realize Henry, there's no one who has less illusion.

about this initiative that I have.

But that's why I know exactly, in all this euphoria that Chinese-American relations are, I know why we're doing the China thing.

We're doing the China thing to screw the Russians and help us in Vietnam to keep the Japanese in line and get another ball in the play, and make the way down the road to have some relations with China.

But we're dealing here with the

white-collar communists, basically.

These people, they're communists with clean shirts.

And they are tough.

They are ruthless, clever.

They'll do everything.

And we're going to do exactly the same thing.

It's going to be that way.

I'm totally aware of this whole business of what it is.

I know.

Well, I thought that Mr. President

to 73 meetings with foreign leaders with the press.

Those in terms of starting a general approach, it so happens that he is the best resource we have for dealing with these people.

You made that point.

I made that point.

I said now that tough, unemotional, and precise, precisely the president.

I said most Americans come back

by social occasion.

I said, that can't happen because he doesn't have any social occasion.

He works all the time.

And I said, he's already given instructions that there should be no sightseeing.

I don't think we can get away with that.

But when I've been on trips with him, he's worked from morning till night, so they've got to work with him.

They can't charm him.

of his toast at state dinners.

So whatever they can achieve with this president, it's got to be through work.

It isn't going to be through balala.

And they all smiled and said...

They just got to have confidence in us all.

Yeah.

And basically, they got to have confidence in us in Vietnam.

And all that... More anything about Vietnam, you and I, I know you're busy tonight, but someday, I mean, tomorrow, I'm going to budget all the...

I've got a ruckus over there, unfortunately.

I agreed with him a week ago.

He called me.

He's coming down here?

He's coming down, and so I'm having dinner with him.

I can cancel it if you want me to.

What are you having dinner with him?

I was going to ask dinner with him alone.

Where, uh... Where are we going to have dinner?

I was going to have it at his house.

Is he having other people or not?

Other guests?

I think it was...

I don't know that he was going to have other people.

I just don't know.

I was thinking, I might have said, if you think it's alone, I was thinking of going out and trying to go to this, well, that's where quite a lot of support is needed.

Two or three people.

I said I was going to drive by after birthday and leave at 12.

But, I don't know, he might be free at any time.

I just, I haven't talked to him directly, but...

I was hoping you'd tell me on a static basis.

If I were to bring him in, it would have to be on the basis of static, you know what I mean?

See, why don't you, can you describe that?

I might get a hold on you, not myself.

And frankly, we could have a rocket launcher if we were just going to talk about a little politics.

That's certainly what's going on.

It might be a great deal again.

So why don't I call him and say that my... Are you thinking he wants to talk to me about some other things?

To me?

Well, I don't know.

I have no business with him, basically.

In fact, not at all.

He just said that he was going to be in town to give a speech tomorrow and was actually for dinner tomorrow.

So I agree.

No, I know he's in town because his secretary called

Ann Whitman called my office to find out when I, from here, when I was free.

What is the situation of the, uh, the one thing we need to be very sure of, though, that we often said that the, uh, I told you, Steve, when we got to the room, he said,

And of course if we get lucky and get to Vietnam one too in a month, within this month.

We don't get it this month.

When we make our final announcement in Vietnam.

It is done.

Vietnam is finished.

The day we announce it, as of a certain day, we will be out and Vietnam is finished.

The only problem we have there is if we don't have a negotiation, what the hell do we want the prisoners?

Well, the way we'd handle that, then, is just to split the prisoners out from the rest of it.

You say that at a certain date we will be out to capture the prisoners?

We'd say it's turned out we've tried it.

It's too complicated.

In other words, we would make the same deal then that the Senate wants to make now for four or five months later?

Well, it could be, yeah.

But that gives us that much time in Vietnam.

He says, I've ordered Laird, in case he pitches about it, to pour as much equipment into the Arvin as he can now so that they have one or two years of stockpile.

That's correct.

You're absolutely correct.

I made a survey while I was in Saigon to find out what

about two years of supplies and everything, except ammunition.

And I'm...

I thought we'd better pour that in there.

Sure.

And then we can set some restrictions on her.

I won't do anything but know some good ideas from you.

Yeah.

You know he's in town, don't you?

I'm pretty sure he's in town.

I know Anne Whitman is in town, and she usually wouldn't be in town without him.

Yeah.

Well, if you could just find out...

Yeah, what if he plans to have anybody else for dinner?

Could you just find that out?

I'll tell you that.