Conversation 547-006

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Well, we didn't want to leave without having a chance to come in.

Well, uh, through that... period of very great importance in the relationship between our faith

And, uh, especially now, I feel very privileged from having witnessed, uh, this great movement, you know, because it's our case today.

Well, uh, I wanted to talk to you, uh, a little about that, to give you, uh, a, a, a message, a, a, a message.

I know it is one of my favorite songs.

I do love those things, but it's a song and a reason.

... ... ... ... ...

I don't know what you said about it.

I told about the black people who had, what do you think of their, how, and then they did a great thing, and you had, you know, a great, and it had this kind of grace.

But as this paper looks at itself, I suppose, as a moral representation, so we just do it.

Are you ready to change the world?

Yes.

I want you to know that I'm going to be writing a book on a note, on a note, personal note, to give you my thoughts that I don't need to convey in the present time.

These aren't going to be very helpful.

It is a massive change.

I mean, whatever happens, the very fact of the President of the United States going to Beijing, which is the largest country in the world population-wise, and, of course, in the heart of Asia, with all the ramifications it has in Asia and Europe, it's because of the change of global pattern,

It raises hopes, but it also raises fears.

And I noted that in one of my news conferences in the past, some Indonesians expressed, I mean, basically, but you know how things were today in the past, they didn't express that, that the United States move would be detrimental to Indonesia in particular if it was accompanied by a stepping up of subversion by the TACOPS.

uh in your country now we all are aware of the terrible uh problem that you had uh which from which your your government now uh representing which was greatly supported by the uh

I think that the thing we really emphasize is that our action here is one that relates to the United States and the name of China.

It is one that should not and must not be interpreted by any of our friends in the world.

as being a derogation of Kenyan land.

We believe that the right of each country goes its own way.

We think Indonesia, as I said to the President this year, and I said when I was there, Indonesia's armed resources, human resources, natural resources, and so forth, and these locations,

is a tremendous force in Asia for constructive development.

That is why, economically, it is so important that we want to help those that we can.

And we, as you know, there are some, I'm very sorry, I don't want to get into your internal situation, except that when the president quoted me about that, I had told him very clearly that if he

We can talk very quickly about the truth.

As far as this is concerned, under no circumstances

If your government feels that the United States can move with any other government, with Chinese people's republic of China, with Japan, with what we do in any way, that would be definitely of the interest of the nation.

My idea is about your country to go back, and I say this very directly, go back to 1953 when I got here.

Thank you.

But I have seen so many.

... ... ... ...

it occurred to me that

very important on a personal basis that the countries in asia who are directly interested in the future of uh china's policy that they uh that they be reassured as to what our who is

Actually, we have no idea as to what is going to happen.

But on the other hand, we are keenly aware of the vital importance of maintaining throughout that part of the world the right of each country to go its own way without interfering with the country.

That's really what it is now.

And it's true.

The way in which we are going to look at the new forces in the area of Soviet Union, China and Japan, will very much depend on the presence, the nature and the credibility of the American presence in the region.

Your question, of course, is in what sense or form Manifest will have a massively massive presence on Manifest itself.

To us, I think, the greatest important is with military support, but also some certainty on the continuation of a massive interest in the aid program in general.

And for you?

Well...

The United States is not an agent for predatory reasons.

Uh, you know, we, uh, we have territorial animations, uh, and this terrible anguish in Vietnam indicates we're not fighting against Vietnam.

So they can do what they want.

But the point is that I can assure you that our continued interest in

in the economic development of the United States, and particularly a country like the United States, which has such great promise, such great promise, and there's no question about that.

And may I say, too, if you didn't ask the question, but I think we also should be quite candid about it, the United States will continue to have a military presence in the nation, now, of course, by a military presence

Again, we are a specific power.

I don't think it would be, frankly, a healthy situation for the United States to just withdraw from San Francisco.

It would be better.

Because I think that's a concern that some of our friends may have there.

I would, well, for example, Thailand, or Malaysia, or Asia,

the Philippines, of course, all the way up to Korea, Thailand, etc., etc.

And the United States decided to come back to Pearl Harbor.

This, of course, is something that we do not contemplate.

What we are really talking about here is, in this move,

essentially to try to end the isolation of 80 or 90 people in the world, because not at the present time, but 10, 15 years from now, if that isolation continues, it could be an enormous thing out in the world.

Are you okay?

I believe it.

No, no, no, no, no problem with that.

Okay, so that's it.

might be important is the way in which you put the withdrawal from Vietnam in some way of a future kind of system.

That would increase, let's say, the confidence of many people in Asia and in the world that America still reserves, for example, leadership roles, which we all know.

Uh, and I may also allay some of the, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh,

Right.

In other words, the idea that what happens to the American position, what does America do after Vietnam?

... ... ... ... ... ...

I think that word is about what the Chinese do.

let me ask you to make it quite direct in other words if i do see the one hand

If you avoid the fact that it's left there, the potential of a danger from the Chinese remains.

You also see, on the other hand, the potential of a danger from Japan.

Yes.

Yes, that's right.

So, probably, it's responsible for all of us to learn about the effects of the British.

Japan does not feel the compulsion to go there.

there is the, I think, the chance that both the superpowers and the small power states, and if the superpowers are not simply a matter for the United States, we in Indonesia must understand the fact better too.

I think we must take in Yukon's religion more than we are inclined to do, and we, I think, the whole country.

So we all have a responsibility, if we want to make possible a structure of world power, of which one is not ours.

And there are many people who think it's unethical that we fail in your future.

But I think history gives us the chance now to work out a system in which we are not going to be unethical.

providing me, you know, the all-in-one.

There are a few issues that have to be fixed early on.

I hope that puts it very well.

Thank you.

Well, you've actually raised questions very much in my mind, too.

Like, for example, again, the maintenance of the American presence in Asia.

People say they're having a full run, and sometimes, and then you do.

That's actually a very, very deep thought.

Well, we didn't get out.

You know, we didn't have economic assistance.

But if we just got out with economic assistance, we saw the position of Japan as part of the nation.

At the present time, you couldn't do a great deal about it, because you would have got the industrial to go to the moon.

And I don't think you would want Japan to go to the moon.

You'd have to be one minute early.

You'd have to go early.

Well, there's a main field, right?

That's right.

And that is why the United States, I reiterate, we are not, in what we are doing, we are not getting out of Asia.

The next doctor, the next minister, many people, the purpose of the next doctor is to get out of Asia.

The purpose of the next doctor is not to get out.

It is to find a viable way for the United States to help our nation.

So, for all of us, we try to help Indonesia, but it's not a credit for a

uh and uh in a role which is um

Uh, but I, I suppose you're reflecting the consensus of the and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and,

Not all, I understand, but the general conservative notion that the actual solution of the Vietnam War is not important anymore.

What is more important is the credibility of the American will to continue peace.

You know, and it's our part of the world.

We don't worry anymore about the credibility of the solution of the Vietnam War.

but how does it affect the ability of the American people?

Not only the American people, I think there is a little doubt about that, you know, but how much leeway will the American people give to the American people if the American people pursue it and continue the American people?

The war that happened in America, one of the reasons is because Japan doesn't have it.

Japan has the time of humanity.

It still looks at the world generally as an area to be in, but what they live in, it's their nation.

They don't have a notion of a universal man in a single world.

We have to help them develop that notion.

I was trying to get this.

Thank you.

You don't usually find a situation where an ambassador is thinking of the whole situation and

uh, sees not just his country, but the area.

And, uh, he's very often a kind of a Jew, a Jewish man.

Uh, but may I, uh, ask you just a very big one problem that, uh, uh, I think is difficult to, uh, but, uh, uh,

Uh, you know,

We haven't seen enough to do a program like this, but I think we are going to propose.

Yes, we are going to propose.

But, you know, we have to expect to use it.

Yes, we do.

Economically, you know, you can argue the case either way.

There is a psychological impact of understanding why such a small amount of money is so important.

It means so much for us.

you know like we are

I don't know.

As far as I believe, you've always got these things.

There's our presidential conference.

There's the...

Well, I think it's like that.

I don't see where you're going.

I don't know what you're saying, but...

.

Well, actually, over two years, three years before I became president, I wrote an article in the report.

And then I first came in.

I talked to Mr. and I began to talk about it.

And then as a matter of fact, as a matter of fact, our first trip around in 1969, I discussed this problem.

with every leader that I've had with my relationship with President Trump.

It's just the idea that if I'm not fit for something like that, the relationship with the United States, with the Soviets, and other powers in response to the relationship with all the pressures, and I would say that President Putin has been very intent with Putin on the West,

I don't know what we were going to do with that.

We could have been really so long and all of our friends would have been pressed for it.

I don't know.

I guess it's probably the best kind of secret.

I don't know.

I think it's a great idea.

And, you know, they have, of course, they have a whole media bureau.

And they're looking down the long road of futures about the Chinese.

And I believe we've just been very candid.

We are.

.

We cannot.

We cannot allow any of the build-up to this visit, nor what happens to this visit, to remain an American bugger for anything.

Now, Mr. President, actually the Japanese have started making feelers for a visit by you to Japan.

All right.

And I'm beginning to think now it's getting to be safe, because who's going to rise now?

The Maoists aren't going to rise.

I found today a Hanoi BIC plane that went from Hanoi to

stuff there for six hours and went from Peking to Moscow.

And they've called all their ambassadors back, or most of their ambassadors back already.

That means some of their top leaders are going to Moscow.

They have had a very brief start in Peking.

They're coming up to Moscow.

And this decision we're asking them to make is just a tremendous thing to them.

Because what they in effect, what we are, it's a curious thing, our proposition comes as close to screwing you in a fair way, but it undercuts a lot of his proposals because we are accepting neutrality without Vietnam limitations on military aid.

On the other hand, it comes awfully close also for them to wreck their structure because it would be the first settlement they've made in which they're not getting a guaranteed share of the power.

makes it a fair proposal in terms of one thing

We've offered 7.5 billion economic aid for all of Indochina for five years.

Two and a half to them.

And then they say...

We are in a public position.

You went on television and said, now, I want to tell you my...

Assistant has had 11 secret meetings with them.

That's going to be almost as much as secret is.

Well, that's what I'm calling it.

Eleven meetings, and say, now let me tell you this.

Five last meetings.

Starting May 31st, we made these proposals.

Everything was acceptable.

The one thing we cannot accept is to make a secret deal to overthrow you.

You haven't settled it.

That's written up very briefly.

We might want to do it in a hell of a hurry.

I don't think we should do it now because nobody's screaming.

But I meant, let's just have the word done.

I'll have it done.

As to what the proposals are.

But of course, they may yet yield the next meeting.

This is so tough for them.

They just weren't ready.

They had the shock.

They had the shock of the peaking announcement.

They had only two weeks to get ready.

They had their prime minister sick.

And they had to make one more college try.

And they saw their goodwill is admittedly relatively subsidiary issues.

But on POWC's fire, they've in effect given us our formulation.

And so if we settle the political issue, we can really settle it in a week.

Yeah.

The next meeting, of course, is decided.

There's no other meeting except for one where you go in and start talking about the political issues and how some get to sell anything and others get all these no political issues.

That's what it's all about.

Exactly.

And the other stuff is actually...

Well, the other stuff is not only negotiable, it is in effect negotiated.

We may need a session or two to wrap up.

And I'm going to send him a cleaned up version of my memo to you just to read and give it right back.

Now we're in a good position.

And he found three guys who, who talked to Beatus, one of whom I know to be a son of a bitch.

Pickering, he screwed us all over the Cambodian existence.

He's not a leaker.

He'll leak to fill himself up.

That's where these guys are all making a mistake with him.

And they think he's kind, but he's neither.

You are a, oh God, a hell of a love child.

No, you're too kind.

Oh, yeah.

Now, if he would fire one or two of these guys, and Matt Laird fires that other fellow...

He would become Secretary of State.

I think it's tenfold.

You should just forget that you never heard it, but... Who would you like to, who would you trust for the ocean, and so on and so on.

And, uh...

And actually I just came out of the trial, and Ted came out of the trial quite well.

Ted was one of the people I wanted to meet.

But Ted, he came out of court the same way, the same legal, legal, legal case.

Bill didn't come around to this in reality.

He wasn't much here, but he looked.

He just said, I mean, he just said, it's not, it's very public money, and it's a,

I've seen all this, the conference and the negotiations and all that sort of thing.

I just don't know.

After all the work, you know, you know you're... Well, go ahead.

What time?

It seems to me that you and I might have a little talk today.

What is your situation today?

I have some appointments in the afternoon.

How about after 1 o'clock?

between one and three.

I was having lunch with D-Nash in order to keep getting yacking around town.

And then how about, well, when will you come?

Just tell me when your lunch is.

It's from one to two, say.

One to two.

Fine.

We get together then maybe at, say, then I don't have anything until four.

Then we say about, like, I don't know, three to four.

Or we say, uh,

Because I think our public record is the first.

If they maintain what they offered of a trade of POWs for a withdrawal deadline, we can pick that up after the elections.

We've got them pretty well outmaneuvered now because I don't think they can get a big publicity campaign started against you before, at the end of September, we can announce.

The reason they can't have me in September and October, Mr. President, early October, is they have their big celebrations from the 2th to the 10th of October.

And then they need from the 20th to the 30th to get ready for it.

Let me ask you this.

What significance do you attach to the meeting of the Canadian leader where they said that in nine months, no main person, we're going to have to do a lot of things before the meeting?

That's public posture.

But we've got to cool our eagerness because the more eager we get, the more...

We're not going to be easy from what I've had to tell.

I don't attest.

You see, a lot of people, for example, say, uh, they're putting...

They say that we're, uh, they say that we have to, well, you know, they say... Well, they say they're putting it to us on Vietnam.

But if you read carefully what they say on Vietnam, they've only asked us to do the things I've already told them we were doing, namely withdrawing our troops.

They've never said we have to overthrow Tu, which is the thing.

that Hanoi is asking us to do.

And, uh... We have to, Mr. President.

I'm sure somebody is walking into Joe in line, saying, what do they mean, when they say they've got a defense treaty with Pomona.

This is going to go on.

uh back and forth what i think i have to get done on my trip when i'm there i've got to get the communicators essentially worked out before you ever leave here right that's right because you don't want to be there and we need to get the agenda worked out i agree and uh so i think and we get a few a lot and it's uh is there or is there anything or whatever there

Well, I have asked that, and he pretty well said he'd review it.

He said that he would see enough time off of good behavior.

But you know, a move of that sort can have dramatic effect, where people are hung up on prisoners.

And you know, anything that could be done there, I mean, I don't know if you have another name, but you're right there.

I put that position on it.

Well, then I go, but... We ought to say what we can do in our part, too.

No, we can't do that.

There's no trade-off there.

They ought to do something in that respect.

That's the least I can do.

When I go over again, the way I left it, they treated me...

I mean, they're much more civilized than the Vietnamese.

Not that the Vietnamese don't treat me very politely.

But they are magnificent.

I mean, they...

When he treated me, he said, I want to welcome you on Chinese.

So that's what I thought.

and I said how much he valued his conversation with you.

I don't believe all of that.

I don't take it seriously, but still, I've never heard a Russian talk that way.

The Russians have no, they have no, no ability to be graceful.

They are such a crude bunch of people, uncivilized.

Yeah, and I... And I told them that you are the only one.

I over...

I exaggerated it.

I said you are the only one who can control it.

That you... they don't need the...

I don't think they'll do it.

They'll be amazed if they didn't.

They won't do that, Mr. President.

I don't see how they can.

Because all the semi-undertakings that I made to him, you in office in the second term, I put them all into, all the important ones I put into the second term, and they know damn well that a Democrat won't be able to go through with it.

I thought of those foreign leaders who said grateful things about the decision.

What do you think I might have been?

I appreciated that.

But indicating, making personal.

I noticed, for example, when I wrote two different things.

I, uh, I wrote a letter to Keith and his assistant and everything.

And, uh, it's actually handwritten notes.

Don't you think I ought to get one off the guy on, uh... Oh, that's perfect.

I forgot that.

Now, don't you think...

I'll tell you what I'd like you to do, maybe, is to bring in the, uh... Bring his ambassador in anyway, so I can thank him.

Hilale.

Yes, sir.

That's right.

And I think you should also, if you would be willing.

Pompidou.

No.

See.

Also, drop a note to Pompidou to thank him for all these other meetings.

And give him a little fill-in on the trip, make him feel good.

And maybe a note to Brampton, the son of a bitch, but it would help.

I was thinking, I know there's several leaders around the world, but if you were a leadership thing, and maybe just thinking about that, there'd be two different levels of notes.

And I was thinking of notes, see, everybody has seen the fact that we've written six minutes, and I kind of checked.

Let us now be in a position to write Sato, Yuma, and write Yusuke.

That's my point.

I think you can write Sato.

I think you can write, uh, they all here.

What do you think?

I think it's excellent.

I'll get it done right quick.

And so forth and so on.

It's very, uh, let's try to styleize it the way he wants to.

But you get there, and I think you made it.

We appreciate it.

And, uh, then put our little beloved as it means seeking relations and the rest of it.

And maybe reassuring them that, somewhat as we do, as we did, that we want to build our energy to save the peace in this part of the world and so forth.

Because I don't want this, I think Kramer's memo does, just to disturb me, only because I know he's a bad person.

I understand that.

I don't want them to think the United States is bugging out the world.

And we must not let this happen.

Absolutely.

We have to figure out how this is really a way to get into the world.

I mean, to that, it's outside.

But it's 90s, outside months, and I don't know which it was.

A man whom I've recommended, if you want people, if you mentioned it, I've answered it a pack of times.

It's like, you borrow it?

Yeah.

To hear it?

Yeah.

They could keep it.

They can take it out.

Yeah.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

You can put him down.

Just put him down.

Don't bring him in.

Don't bring the other guy.

Just put him in the room.

The question just falls down right away.

Here's his partner tonight.

Put him right here at the table in front of the bunch.

All right.