Nixon, Kissinger & Hilaly on Opening to China and Pakistan

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Mr. President, we sent, just for your information, we sent a letter in your name, a formal one that doesn't preclude a handwritten letter.

Yeah, I understand.

Just in case he refers to it so that you're aware of it right after we came back.

I expected one at dawn.

Yeah, and I just want you to be aware of that.

Incidentally, Raj has concluded the agreement at just one point, which is up to us to be settled.

And he said if anyone had told him three months ago that such a good agreement was possible, he would have said it was crazy.

We'll never get credit for that, but that was a major achievement.

Now the problem is, now the circus is about to have to get on with it.

Now the circus is no one knows yet, but it's done.

Yeah, yeah.

But it's rather, rather good, Henry.

Oh, yeah.

Oh, it's good.

It's easy.

It's such that you won't get the credit for it if it's approved.

Oh, yeah.

Yeah.

I'll leave you to it.

Who gets the credit?

I agree.

No, no.

I should say, well, say...

Well, we'll work it out.

We can, uh, do that right.

Uh, I mean, uh, I mean, uh, you know the event, and I'm going to present it during the scene, and...

Sit down here, please.

This is Carter, Mr. Conspiry.

I, uh...

I was deeply grateful for the role you played in recent events.

Actually, the role of President Yahya is somewhat known.

But I'm aware of the fact that you were among the three of us in this room.

We're the only ones.

Except for Amory's, and Katie, were the only ones who knew of the first message that you delivered.

Seems like three generations ago, again, it must have been two months ago, that you delivered to him and brought it up to me in my, in the bedroom, and read it to me.

And since then, of course, you've been known as the, and I hate to think that as you're becoming an artist, what impressive is that to us, I didn't send a letter to you.

This is my own importance to be handled with such great discretion and great judgment.

And also realize that there are people who do what they, you know, in the interest of future generations ahead of the consequences next.

And also to have this happen at a time when your country is under, by the way, this is a job that some of our crisis perhaps attackers, I know, I'm sure you realize that we

I personally am trying, as long as we possibly can, to give it, and how we can get it, of course, is a problem.

I told Farley yesterday, oh, that we told him in the background, and to get some of the true facts out in regard to what the government is doing.

It's a huge problem.

And to get some balance into it.

But...

And the major reason, as I say, that I want to see you personally, I want to tell you personally how grateful we are.

You will get credit only in history books, but I want you to know that I know where the credit walks.

I was supposed to

Why did Henry want anybody in my position to expect him to do anything of the importance of this?

It was not merely a question of any preserving secret, but it was a proposition that I should be able to understand.

And bringing about the cessation of this position, I honestly wonder that

and even resented at how difficult the international relations had become, in honor of the fact that the greatest power in the world was not on speaking terms with the largest nation in the world.

At every turn, in every country I have worked in, it had created a conflict.

And because we happened to become friendly to each other and ourselves, made overtures to each other, as long as 12 years ago, and that was misunderstood throughout.

But everybody, including, but all friends and everything.

And then so that was such an obstacle.

Whichever country I was working, conducting relations on behalf of my country, that it was there.

It was an obstacle that I should stop myself.

There's a lot of life.

We'll talk if we put things on some kind of a change, the acting of the bridge and so on.

I did move in this matter long ago.

I picked up the impression that you...

And he was watching us, whether we had the status or the capability to play this part.

And then, of course, he had been, a lot of advisors around him who had sort of sold the idea to him that we should burn up, we would burn up if we interfered in between the three world powers and so on.

So he wouldn't agree, he wouldn't touch it as he kept on telling me more than once.

I can teach one hour in London.

I was an ambassador there.

I remember being at the exhibition too, sir.

On the train to the boot camp, when we were having a talk, your ambassador was, my colleague was, Tom Thompson.

And we were there to ask that he can go spotty.

So there it was, but then I took it up again and there was the same opposition from all foreign offices, people saying that we could be most risky.

They were, to my surprise, they were worried not only that we may not be able to do anything, but they thought the Chinese would communicate.

And I can't tell your version.

We know how to deal with the Chinese.

They want you to put all the cards on the table.

And if you're straightforward, and if you explain to them that we are doing this, would you like us to do it?

It would be good.

We would like to.

We have been talking to the Baltics and the Americans and President Johnson's guys, trying to put in a good word for each other.

But I mean, take the Chinese and you can't do that.

Well, I must say that unless President Yankee and I had agreed,

because the attitude of the advisors around him in the beginning, just before Secretary Rogers came on his visit, wasn't exactly the same.

But by that time, President Jaya accepted my advice, and he knew I had been pressing him for a long time, and he decided he would move to the subject with Secretary Rogers.

So after that, thanks to your encouragement and under your guidance and advice, he came to me.

forward very freely.

But this is what we discovered with the Chinese, and I met them.

I've been ambassador in Russia, I've been ambassador in China, I've been ambassador in the member of the Central Committee, I've been ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and the Swedish-Chinese ambassador in Sweden, then to Pakistan, then in London, and so on.

They seem to have this fixation that if you argue

Make out a case with them and put your cards on the table.

Afterwards, keep them informed that if you want to make any changes or if you feel anything, you're good.

It might be your sense, but they are suspicious about you.

But if you send an message to them and they're like, look, I'm going to do this, it's what I believe, do not misunderstand.

They take it very well.

And they understand it.

But people reach online.

I think they've really got a few...

Yes.

have met him and others have met him and our U.N.

Ambassador Shafiq has been at all the foreign conferences with Jamila.

He's been on the visit of President Banerjee, President Dostoyevsky and Tiago together.

He's been there during all those discussions.

So this is what we found out about these people.

And I think this is particularly important.

The other thing just now, if I may make a very humble suggestion, is now all these things that have come up, the decision about the U.N. and the Chinese city of China, the vote, the procedure, because we're thinking after that, we're going to have the election of the Secretary General, the real Secretary General, most probably.

I don't think this move will prompt a good time.

Now, normally, this question would come up, the Chinese question would come up about November.

But this year, I understand, it's going to be the end of the general debate, which is somewhere in October.

Because the Albanians and others were sponsored.

They want to take the early news.

And the reason being, they wanted to influence the Secretary General.

election, which will come up in a minute.

You know, it will be a great day if you consult with Chagas.

I mean, I don't know what you will do about the decision of Chagas, but assuming that Chagas is likely to be elected, or even assuming that he is not going to be elected, I don't know.

I think that's a good point.

sure that the man becomes a secretary general is not one that is a person on the side of the man, right?

It would be very, very important.

And it makes sense to them, saying that you may have to select a man.

But if you don't want to select, it's the Constitution.

And even if it's Boston, even though, let's say, the MPs want to help you,

Would you like to explain anything?

Would you like to?

The number is going to be a very difficult choice.

As far as I can see, because there is Jacobson, and I think the Arabs are going to oppose him.

I think he's had to.

I know, but they are going to.

They're scared about that.

They'll oppose, and then there is Macron,

of Ethiopia was supposed to be the African others thinking that he's too arrogant or something.

In many cases, they think he wants something.

And I don't think he's still on it.

But he's still on it, I feel, because he's committed a committee and did something against them.

And they made it quite clear he's going to stand there, of course.

And then I don't know, so you'll have some dark horse

then the Chinese shouldn't suspect that you had a hand in this, bringing out the dark force all the time.

Sir, you've got to take this into your mystery.

Excellent suggestion.

We don't have a good candidate.

Sir, do you have a suggestion to all of you?

That I think, no, sir.

I don't know.

In the end, you may have to fall back on this candidate.

Maybe you might jam it there at the end.

I mean, a lot of people would dislike it because it would be going to a Scandinavian for the third time.

But unless, of course, you go...

There is one way, yes, there is one consideration, and that is you want to select a man that would be more appropriate to the Chinese or more approved by the Chinese than anybody else.

Because that's going to be the big thing in the future.

I don't know what is the timing of your trips.

I was telling Henry that May next year will be tempting.

We have a desire, let me say,

As a matter of fact, we were interested in going earlier, but it has to be at a time they want to.

Yeah, that's a question that we haven't had any understanding.

So I hope you talk to them about at what time they want to go.

I've been looking at the end of the process.

And now you've got that man in Ottawa.

I saw a big play this time and it was not good.

I appreciate that.

We know, too, that we can crush your discussion on the big play.

If you can do it on the big play, you let me know that it's good or anything else.

Let me ask you this.

I think we'd better come here.

We, of course, look at this terribly tragic situation and the sub-commitment, and we, as Henry has probably told you, we want to do everything we can to embarrass you.

As a matter of fact, we're trying to hold the Indians alive as well as we can.

to be used are extremely important.

We are not going to tell them what to do.

But would you not agree that that's something we can talk candidly to you about?

You know the American public is kind of interested.

And you also know our Senate.

And no matter what, what I think, you know, they're either, they even objected to this last little shipment that was out there.

It's not the kind that we look forward to, but you can see what could be coming in the future.

So let's, we will do our best to cool it.

with our Indian context, and if you could do your best to give the best possible.

I know you've thought of us before, and you're looking, I mean, of course you are, yes.

That we, that it really, let's just recognize concrete, it's a public arrangement.

It's a public arrangement, not what you do, but it's the appearance.

of, uh, like, um, the refugee community, well, uh, our political men, well, all right, maybe this, perhaps, you know, it's like this, this, I mean, that, uh, it's really not the nature of our, uh, we find, I find that there, there, that there, uh, that it's, it's quite, I think people in the world aren't different.

I know, like, many of us in, in Pakistan, uh, they, in Pakistan,

people that I have met are, and I like this because I'm so not the same way, they're direct and candid and honest.

And, uh, whereas the Indians are, are, are more indirect and, uh, and therefore, uh, I'm not saying they're selfish, but, uh, what I mean is that they, but they know the public relations game very, very well.

It's just, I'm just simply suggesting that you, uh, might be a little bit more, uh, indirect, you know?

Yes, I am.

And play the public relations game all the way, because you're getting a bad rap, and you're getting a bad rap, you know what I mean?

But you don't have to give her that.

Oh, yes.

I'm sure you're discussing it.

Yes, I am, Mr. President.

This is Paul, and you can decide whether or not we have any evidence of this or that much when you say it.

uh i think that indian actions are a major factor in keeping the mandatum settlement down yes oh sure the indians are discouraging the people they're they're they're creating rows when i say they are and i understand there are reports that that is the case and uh and uh they uh are courting more refugees to come over and that's it i've said time to say

getting his side of the story printed in the American press, you know, put it out.

And watch this.

And they just won't use it.

They just won't use it.

What's the matter?

Well, they shouldn't.

They shouldn't go to the other side.

It's just for equal time.

It's only fair.

Yeah, you know that.

We ought to, we ought to do this in terms of getting them to talk.

I think Skelly ought to, John Skelly, speaking to a couple of his colleagues, say, well, I'm a patient on my own, and also it's an interesting subject.

Would you ever mention that?

You take the questions.

You can answer the questions.

I think we can do that in the street.

Well, he sees from us where I'm talking.

We'll go to the street and we'll do it for our people.

But I think it wouldn't at all, because I think you all get on.

I think it's being a little bit better.

Now we're getting a few reports that you're soft on the matter.

Yes, yes, yes, it's improving.

Because India is not on discretion to the wind.

She's openly instigating and sending it.

Everybody can go and see.

That's why they think it's coming out.

But the main thing is that if what India can do is prevent India from attacking us, next to this country,

to get a chance to settle this problem.

Obviously, but he needs a little time.

He's got to install the government there.

All he needs is time, and I think sensible people with sensible advice, he will do the right thing in the end.

But if they're going to create an explosion, a crisis every month, and particularly by putting this war

And she is a very difficult lady.

She is an unpredictable and dangerous lady.

That is what is disturbing all of us.

You never know what she's going to do.

Now they're talking openly of attacking us when the boxes are closed.

So that the Chinese, so-called Chinese threat to them says, don't touch Pakistan.

They want to defy that.

She wants to defy that.

But they won't be before the matter.

That will not be.

Yes, but you see, the argument is that if there is coming death today, it will be an invasion.

So what?

The Chinese won't come to you because they won't be able to get back to you.

They did.

They did, but the Indians have got that kind of tragic attitude.

They will make the same mistake, a fair mistake, because they've got that bent of mind to take you to their head.

Well, they're going to have a fight, too, because without all the misery they've got in that country, my God, they need a war like a hole in their head.

I mean, well, we'll do our best.

We've set some very strong hands.

Well, that can't help, sir.

And of course, the main thing is that we also have the idea that this $1,000 billion a year they're getting from the consortium that's going to be put to this.

But that also is a very important thing.

About our abilities, I guess I can mention various.

In talking to the funders, he gave us this stand-by letter

in which we have that, and that seems to go along well.

I talked with Mohan Steele.

I spoke to Kanthi yesterday.

I took him out to lunch.

And he didn't give me the impression.

So I thought I'd just come back, managing director.

And he started the case, I believe, but I didn't.

I'll talk to Kanthi.

I'm happy not to.

That would be ideal.

Yes, but you see,

for one voice, but a pretty strong one.

Last year's commodity aid, this was stopped.

But it was stopped because we were going to devalue and AID did not want

The United States is the only country which has not paid last year's consortium money.

All other countries have paid last year's consortium money.

Not the current year.

Current year we trade along with the other countries.

This is for the October meeting, September, October.

But last year, why should the U.S. be the only country to have...

This is the problem.

Anything that can come, because 60 million of that is already published, 20 million is the public sector.

Now, the East by West, the West by West,

and so on, they give the experience of commodities.

So even if it is native, I wanted what is possible to put into the pipeline on the ground that this is not a new sector.

It is very last year's area.

You talked to President Yadier earlier than he was here.

In fact, that's when we met.

Yes.

What's the time?

Well, thank you.

Well, I'm sorry.

I think we have to draw on it one way or another.

All the time she's been through, all the experience.

Wait, just a minute.

I did.

You did a paperweight here.

We should, you know, we could, if we can.

I must say, it's a, I think it's a...

I think it's a...

.

As a matter of fact, the American president, well, my wife is a victor, and the American president cannot extend the declaration.

Well, we are greatly appreciative of everything, and we'll keep it as close as possible.

Thank you.

Nixon, Kissinger & Hilaly on Opening to China and Pakistan

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Also recorded on July 29, 1971

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Nixon, Kissinger & Hilaly on Opening to China and Pakistan

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on July 29, 1971

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