Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 556 › Conversation 556-001

Nixon, Kissinger & Haldeman on Vietnam negotiations and US-PRC relations

Friday, August 6, 1971 · 9:42 AM–10:00 AM ET · Oval Office · 17 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")Conversation556-001 on Tape 556 (tape position 00:00:28–00:17:31)StartFriday, August 6, 1971 at 9:42 AMEndFriday, August 6, 1971 at 10:00 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 556-001 ↗

President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger and H.R. Haldeman to coordinate high-level foreign policy initiatives, specifically focusing on the status of Vietnam peace negotiations, potential US-China relations, and ongoing diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union. The discussion addressed the political implications of Vietnam POW releases, the management of sensitive communications through unofficial channels, and strategic defense budgetary concerns regarding anti-ballistic missile limitations. Additionally, the participants touched upon Nixon's domestic popularity and the perceived conservative shift in the national mood, which they viewed as favorable for the President's upcoming political prospects.

  • Vietnam negotiations
  • US-PRC relations
  • USSR summitry
  • Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
  • Domestic political sentiment

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This clip was extracted from the full tape recording by Easy Nixon.

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Position in tape: 00:00:28 – 00:17:31

part A, 0:26

556a.mp3
556b.mp3

On August 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:42 am to 10:00 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 556-001 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 556-1

Date: August 6, 1971
Time: 9:42 am - 10:00 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
[The conversation was in progress when the recording began]

     Vietnam negotiations
          -Possible publicity
          -Possible settlement
               -Condition
                     -North Vietnam
                           -Acceptance of Nguyen Van Thieu
               -Timing
                     -Vietnamese election
          -Possible publicity
               -Philip C. Habib
                     -Xuan Thuy
          -David K.E. Bruce
          -Channels
               -Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters

     Pakistan
          -Frank F. Church statement
               -Massacre
          -Public opinion

     Vietnam negotiations
          -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                -Possible release
                     -Timing
                            -Relationship to possible settlement

     US-People's Republic of China [PRC] relations
         -Unknown person
         -Totalitarianism
               -Adolf Hitler
               -Benito Mussolini
               -Communists
               -Pragmatism

                -Francisco Franco
                -Greece
Show the rest of the log (107 more lines)
                -Philosophical opposition compared to diplomatic relations
           -PRC
           -Barry M. Goldwater

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
    -Summit
          -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -Letter
                      -Possible publication
          -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                -Channel
          -Aleksei N. Kosygin

PRC
      -Tricia Nixon Cox and Edward R.F. Cox
            -Possible trip to Peking
      -Possible commerce with US
            -Boeing Corporation

USSR
    -Kissinger's call to Gerard C. Smith
         -[Kama River truck plant contract with Mack Trucks, Inc]
    -Summit

[Pause]

Busing
     -President's position
     -Liberal’s
     -Mood of country
           -Increasing conservatism

President's popularity
     -Visit to New York
            -Reception
     -Forthcoming presidential election
            -Nelson A. Rockefeller's assessment

     US foreign relations
          -Kissinger’s forthcoming briefing
                -Five power concept
                      -Hugh S. Sidey
          -Asia
                -Reassessment of policy
          -Combat [French journal]
                -Foreign commentary
                      -US-Soviet relations
                           -Peking

     National defense
          -Budget
          -Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM] limitations
                -Smith's proposal
                      -USSR reaction
                      -Domestic political reaction
                           -Conservatives
                      -Possible impact on Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 59s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

**********************************************************************

The President talked with an unknown person [H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman?] at an unknown time
between 9:42 am and 10:00 am.

[Conversation No. 556-1A]

     President's schedule
          -Girls Nation meeting
                 -Press coverage
          -News focus
                 -New Hampshire

[End of telephone conversation]

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 28s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

**********************************************************************

     [Pause]

     Vietnam negotiations
          -Habib
                -Leaks
                     -Bureaucracy
          -William P. Rogers
                -Habib
          -Possible publicity
                -Compared to PRC trip announcement
                -Effect on PRC

     President's schedule
          -Trip to Maine

Kissinger left at 10:00 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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We want them to surface in a way embarrassing to us.
I mean, we ought to have the lead in surfacing it.
They start surfacing.
Henry, I am not worried because you've got such a hell of a record.
And I want you to have that record ready to go in a way that just knocks them to Jesus.
Now, the danger isn't that they'll surface.
The danger is, to them, we have the whole thing structured now so that they have to accept you to get a service.
And if they...
It's a very tough decision in the next ten days.
The great temptation is going to be to see to wait.
They have two choices, to wait after the election or to settle now.
Habib called up.
He said, something is going on.
Swatwi has been especially friendly to me today.
Something is going on.
Don't kid me.
Habib know about this?
No.
Only through Bruce Willis.
No.
Is that who he was?
That's what he knows.
and then they let word get to Walters that whether everything should now be shifted to Claythane, I mean into the official channel.
So I sent him a message.
I see church Jews mention of a beating in Europe and a bedding massacre in Pakistan.
They are having one hell of a time.
If I'm sure of one thing, the average American doesn't give a good goddamn about Pakistan.
Why, Henry, what a time they're having if they say that I'm a baby.
Besides the facts, we can't just hold them without them.
The POW released them.
If they're releasing some prisoners next week, then we know they're going to settle the following week.
That's the only motive they could have.
You know what?
What's the matter, Tony?
and so forth that knock you over anymore and they haven't passed.
I am so, it's like I am at the time, I am so fatalistic about all this, you know, the more I think of the China thing.
Carl, I didn't see this.
He said, I haven't bought it in five years.
You know how I really do have a passionate hatred for totalitarianism of any kind.
I hated Hitler.
I mean, I remember.
You must have.
But I hated this son of a bitch mainly because he was such a totalitarian.
Not because of what he did to this group or that group.
I just hated this son of a bitch.
I hated Mussolini for the same reason.
I hated the communists for the same reason.
I really do.
Oh, the U.S.
On the other hand, as an American, we've got to be for those countries that will be our friends now in the military.
Maybe Franco's in the military, at least the son of a bitch, is friendly to the United States and allows something.
The Greeks are in the military.
They're friendly to the United States to get along.
It's a very pragmatic thing.
You don't even hate them.
Absolutely.
And what we are doing with Communist China, as Goldwater understood it, is really to play the weaker of our enemies against the stronger.
But I think how they made us sweat about the summit, and now the Bremen says, does the fact that the president doesn't mention the summit in this letter mean he's lost any interest in it?
No, I just didn't see any.
He doesn't see any particular reason to mention it again, you know, after...
But the letter... Oh, he thought the letter was excellent.
He said the letter was a major contribution because it would... No.
You know, in due time we can do it, but... Well, we have to be careful, but...
But they will now reply, and now you have a direct channel depression, which you haven't had before.
In that direct sense.
So far, when you have written the letter, it's gone to Kosykin.
That's not bad.
Those little blips, you know, that are in the Saunders speculator.
Let all that speculation go.
I think that's great.
We think, yes, in the future.
$100 million worth.
Is it really true?
We'll know in 10 days.
And that would be a huge jewel in our crown.
Oh, yeah.
A huge jewel.
Now, did you call Jerry about the $175 million?
Yeah.
Was he pleased?
Yeah.
Yeah.
And Morris?
No.
Uh, in another.
Let's see now what the reply to the summit is, sir.
We've, we've tripled that stuff out so nicely.
The amor is to come in end of September.
Just take a second while I go through.
No, sure.
We got time.
Yes.
All right.
Mr. President, I believe that the mood in the country is shifting to the right even among the young.
Do you want me to tell you something?
If you would then please let me tell you that you just left the room.
That we got, uh, I don't know, but we got an extremely warm reception in New York.
I saw it on television.
I don't know whether they thought it was very good.
People stood up and cheered.
Oh, not in the theater.
They didn't show it.
They didn't show that, of course.
But outside the theater, they showed an applauding crowd.
Well, Nelson said to me, he says to you may not count, but to me, he wouldn't lie.
He said to me that you, if you'd actually help now, no one could touch you.
And if he believes that, then he'll really put himself behind it, too, which may make a little difference.
You know, one of the things we've done, which I'd like you to use in your background if you can, is this concept of the five-par world.
Now the Asians are reassessing their policy and we have a very delicate road to follow there.
Here's the, you see the intellectual left, Paris journal, combat, here it is this time.
You know what the journal is, I know it very well.
No, this is combat.
No one can deny that Mr. Nixon went substance to his remarks in the Europe negotiation, which was to play the Europe competition.
One now understands why he remains so serene in the face of the B.C.
flag.
You know, the foreigners understand all better now.
But is it, why, are they smarter than we are now?
policy for hundreds of years.
And they can see them and they can understand the major moves.
The man's principal goal was to contain the USSR and arrive at a compromise with the Kremlin.
He's not hesitating to put into a cold sweat those Soviet leaders who now receive the benefits of our attorney who peacefully did not go to Moscow but to UK.
I do want you to do.
Well, that's what I think, Mr. President, whether you add or at least you shouldn't add more.
Now, there's a related issue.
Jerry Smith, in this maniacal way of his, has resurfaced a zero ATM proposal.
And the Russians are playing with it.
I think that is going to hurt us a lot with our domestic opposition on the right.
And I believe that the Russians will finally turn it down and will just delay the signature of the agreement.
So I'm beginning to think we ought to stick with our proposal of a limitation rather than a complete abolition of ABN.
Second, I want to make sure that it does press the load every time I press the load for that zero station and more than any of the other stations.
Is there some reason to change or reset it?

— 2 min 36 s with no transcribed speech —

Well, we didn't, we don't want that damned bureaucracy speaking all over the place.
He knows.
But if he gets under too much pressure, there's a million here and there.
And because I just think that the bombs that you go on there,
It's going to be almost, in a way, it may be even bigger than the sea king, well, it may be as big, but it will still be, it will reinforce the sea king.
It will reinforce the sea king.
Whatever happens, we'll still get out.
  • 556-002 10:00 AM · 31 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at 10:00 am.
  • 556-003 10:00 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:00 am to 10:03 am.
  • 556-020 10:03 AM · 2 min — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:03 am and 10:54 am.
  • 556-004 10:34 AM · 53 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Stephen B. Bull, John B. Connally, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., George H. W. Bush, Rudolph A. Peterson, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:34 am to 11:38 am.
  • 556-005 11:39 AM · 33 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Leslie C. Arends, Gerald R. Ford, Robert P. Griffin, Hugh Scott, William E. Timmons, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:39 am to 12:02 pm.
  • 556-006 12:02 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:02 pm and 12:06 pm.
  • 556-007 12:02 PM · 56 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:02 pm and 12:06 pm.
  • 007-064 12:06 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 12:06 pm.

Conversation 556-001, August 6, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/556-001 (accessed November 2, 2026).