On September 9, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Rose Mary Woods, Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, and George P. Shultz met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:05 pm and 6:00 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 568-012 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Yeah, what is the situation?
I don't know.
He said he got the impression that they were going with us tonight.
Huh?
Yeah.
How is he going there?
I can't imagine how I can say it.
He certainly didn't tip our hand.
He was going silent.
He had no commitment whatsoever until 8.30 that night.
We didn't tip our hands when we inquired.
Wow.
Did you learn that?
No, I didn't, but it could be easy to tell.
Hello?
I didn't see you there, so I just wanted to know if you had an appointment.
No, he knows that he's invited to a reception.
Oh.
Yeah, I hope he's invited.
Hello.
Hello?
Hello?
Yeah.
Well, you're still surviving.
You still sound a little, a little, a little buried.
My God, they can't find out what the hell it is.
Good, good, good.
Well, I'm glad to hear that.
Well, good.
It was a keen discussion.
Thank God it was only 25 minutes.
Yes.
No.
Oh, yeah.
Yeah.
Oh, great, yeah.
You, you, well, oh, they don't need even that.
Why don't you just call?
I mean, it would be nice if he did come up, but he'd be lying.
He'd be lying.
No, no, no.
All right, you give him a call from there, would you?
And say that Ben Hayden's going to come up and, for him to come up and, uh, come up if he could so he could be here Saturday about noon.
Yeah.
Okay.
Well, maybe, maybe we can do that so I can get a little rest.
Bunch.
Saturday noon.
Bunch.
Bunch.
Okay.
Panic drug.
Bunch.
What is it?
This is a bigger section of the South Yard.
Yeah.
The president doesn't go to that.
What the hell do I do?
The president does a small reception in the empty room of his box at the intermission for the National Assembly.
So it's all part of the title of the big reception?
Oh, no.
Good.
I don't think he's telling people to go to the small reception.
You see, the problem is we go later.
Today, the captain's got to be there, so I go in before him.
Right.
Do they hear you?
Yeah.
I can't go.
He can leave before you.
He could just leave five minutes before you and go right up and have a seat.
How the hell does he get over there without motorcade and everything?
There's no problem.
We're planning to leave about from 12 to 15 hours.
Anyway.
Here till around 8.30 and actually the thing just began until 8.40.
It's advertised at the end of April, but it will be at the end of September.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
I'll let you know.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
I'll see you at the Capitol.
Hello?
Yeah?
I wondered if, uh, you know, if, uh, if, uh, if we have them, uh, with the size and hardness, uh,
And it should be brief, of course.
Oh, hang on.
I'll get it.
Get it right now.
Oh, OK. All right.
Fine.
Fine.
All right.
Fine.
Fine.
Fine.
715 is for Tennessee, understand?
So we leave at 825, so we could actually go to 830.
You know, we have nothing to give in hands.
I've heard of people who came off a rocket
Second, we lost the state in 68.
Now, what in the name of Christ do we owe Ray Shaffer?
He hasn't done one bad thing.
I mean, these guys are... You treated him...
I don't know if this guy should have done that.
Well, I was concerned about when the economy told me that maybe it was a huge bridge.
And he told me that he'd received a letter two days ago, signed by me, and he's negotiating with the Japanese that he couldn't go above 20% of the re-evaluation he had, or something like that.
Well, now, of course, I was trying to see if I signed a lot of that thing, because I was looking at it.
But that should never have been done without a Peterson check from the economy.
You've got to find it.
And he said, does Beavis know that we got this button down?
I just don't know because, and I was very embarrassed by it.
I mean, and he calmed us down.
He said, I believe that you probably haven't had it.
And I said, I haven't.
But he just said he should have consulted me.
You know what I mean?
I said, I should have known better.
He said, I can go further than that.
See, that's the point.
I just don't know
I know he insults everybody, but I just want to be sure that he's got that all thought out.
Yeah.
Well, let me say that on a thing like that, if that kind of thing were to go ahead, I don't think she'd point that out.
I mean, I said that there's an important, that's a hell of an important thing for him to say.
And I probably just signed it to the Aubrey.
You know, she's in possession of the Japanese.
I remember seeing some of that paper.
Well, Peter's kind of, you know, if he knows what he's supposed to do, he can work to pull it together, as I have denied.
I have not, or I haven't, or I haven't caught his hope in mind.
But how he speaks now is probably a possibility.
We all have a planning problem, I'd say, because of this.
I'm not sure.
I'm just not sure it's about Valentine or anything like that.
You think he is, he says in his paper, he's probably wrong.
Yeah.
That's awesome.
Let's see what...
I'm surprised he would be angry at someone on a man like that, run through on like that.
That would normally be an action folder, which I would normally see, and I don't remember seeing that, but I may.
They couldn't talk about revaluing above 20% or something.
I don't recall comments other than saying he got a memorandum from me to everybody who said in their talks to the Japanese that 20% should be the amount.
Well, first of all, I don't remember signing a memorandum.
I may have signed something.
I just signed those things.
And second, it was one of the added parts I should have agreed to have been told.
But it wasn't because it was not cleared at the time, unfortunately.
No, no.
It was Peterson, just as your gentleman now, recommending that they issue a memorandum and that that memorandum say the following things over a number of rather significant stipulations.
And did they issue it?
They did.
The President approved that that memo be written and issued.
So it was said by then, not by the President?
No, Senator.
All right.
But it's still, you know, it's permitted.
President, I see that's a little different than you signing it, though.
And if it's a...
It's a paper I took over the other day.
It said Henry Burgess, your action on this prior to the meeting is here.
I'm not going to agree with that.
That's what it buys on the 20%.
Without talking to Connolly.
He doesn't know anything about it.
Let him go.
Let him get this.
No, she's gone.
No, I'm telling you, I cracked that one.
This is dead country.
I think that's one.
You must be.
Well, I want, I want Connelly to be set straight.
This is just a, God damn it, I can't have, I can't have Henry Peterson getting us.
You see, on other matters, I don't give a damn about the Japanese.
Both of them just made me smile and say that I'm from Jesus Christ.
I'm a man of value to your son, Peter.
He didn't talk about it, whatever it was.
I need a day to clear this whole mess by death.
That doesn't sound like you would have.
That sounds like someone.
I don't know, but they didn't call me.
That ain't their job.
If they have any idea, I want you to be right.
Maybe I should have called some banger in New York to have the cars.
I don't know who you are.
I don't want to talk to you.
Yeah, it's all set, and we're just hoping to do it.
They wanted to do it while you were in California, and I wouldn't do it until we had Connie present.
She had to come out, and we were going to do it then.
But it's all flat we have.
It's just, it's...
But it's set.
She's set to do it, and I think we've got it set for next Friday or something like that.
We wanted to do a mock when Connolly was with you, though.
Seacracking.
Yeah, maybe that's what we were doing.
This video, I think, did enter our church.
Houston, that's 7-1-1, please.
We have a mock, but it was all pleased with the, uh, you know, just the way it was.
He was very pleased with the speech today.
He said that in his role as Vatican emissary that he now has a lot of contact with American Catholics and Catholic groups and so forth.
I just want you to know that he's seen a tremendous improvement upstairs in your standing in the American Catholic community.
The hierarchy, the lay organizations, and just the folks.
He said, also, he's going to do far better in Massachusetts than any of you down there probably are calculating.
And so there's a great deal of strength.
Then what he was leading up to was he's going to be the speaker at the Al Smith dinner this year.
It was just great and wonderful what he would be doing in the city.
But he might want to come this year, either as the speaker preempting or as a guest just to sit there.
saying that you wouldn't want to do it next year because of the delay of your plane and that you might want to think about coming this year.
I want you to keep it open, you know, and as one or whatever, I just might apologize, but I'm not going to now.
Well, I told them that never the last two times I've been there, I told them never again to count the manhills, bastions, octopuses, right?
We just might fly off.
Well, and let me give the speech.
I think it's better to do that.
I mean, you can still give, you know, a brief remarks.
I think you can have to give a big, uh, scintillating speech.
I thought it was important.
Very strong speech.
You don't want everybody else to know something.
I think we got a little flack here with Connolly that I want to straighten out.
A memorandum was brought over to me by Alex, that apparently is signed by you, and where is it then?
Peterson.
What you and Peterson sent to Connolly and others to say.
It said a number of things about the meetings in the Japanese delegation, but one of them had to do that we would not discuss any figure above 20% in about three days.
It didn't say that.
But whatever it did say, whatever it did say, Collins' point was that
No, no, no.
What we did there, I think he's badly informed by his staff, Mr. President.
What we did is we wanted to make sure that no one else talked about subjects
and that there was responsibility assigned to specific agencies for specific categories of subjects.
What this directive said was that only Secretary Connolly is entitled to raise this issue at all, if he wishes, in this particular range of 15 to 20 percent.
Now, they had two cracks at this.
I read this at a meeting.
to Volcker and asked him whether he objected to this.
I then sent it over to them before it was signed and said, if there are any objections, call me by noon the next day.
And I'm assuming that if there are any objections, if there are no objections, we will then put it out.
And the reason for that was not directed at Treasury.
The reason was primarily to keep State and Peterson
From saying exactly the opposite thing to the gentleman.
Could you do this?
Because it's an extremely important relationship with Congress.
I want you to call Congress on what I called it.
I reached out a lot.
I asked you about it.
Then you said you didn't talk to Volcker.
Volcker said it.
I talked to Volker about it in front of six witnesses on the senior review group.
You talked to Volker, and Volker said that you did that, and that only then did the president agree that it be issued.
That's right.
On the basis of the talk with Volker, you just wanted to be sure that he understood that you had cleared it with Volker.
And that after, now Volker said that the secretary may want to say 25%, and what we said is we don't care what he says.
This is what the consensus is.
It was phrased in a way that didn't direct him.
It said it was entirely in his discretion.
What we wanted to do is to keep anyone from saying anything lower than 15 to 20 percent.
It wasn't supposed to, because the state wanted to settle for 11 percent.
I think Wilbur is trying to throw off the final step.
That's what I think.
Any questions about it?
Because we're getting too many signals like that.
Please, Conway, who apparently falls for this.
I wonder, the one that he cannot get away with is that he could have gotten away with this with Peterson, but he can't do it with Henry, because Conway's got confidence in Henry.
Because he told me about his long talk with you.
And we had a very good talk.
There's one hell of a big thing here that we've got to get to work on right away.
You see, you've got this one.
You've got Burns.
You've got State.
This doesn't mean Rogers, who knows no more about it than I do.
But it means Chris Lies and all that bunch over there, the monetarists and so forth, the people that are always tenting on the other side.
Dan?
But you've got particularly that Burns and State who will be pushing for going back to fix the exchange rate and save the European and all the rest of the countries as possible.
without regard to political effect.
In fact, against our political interests.
You've got on the other hand, you've got Comrie feeling very differently.
He doesn't know what to do, but he feels differently about it.
I feel very differently.
I put it out to him, and he saw immediately the great subtlety of my speech on the international thing today, where on the one hand, I said,
At the end, in order to make everybody feel good, the United States can't live within itself.
We wouldn't compete.
We've got to be a great nation, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
We won't live in the permanent terrible.
But on the other hand,
Because I saw those ambassadors sitting down there.
I said, the United States, after 25 years, is going to look to our own interests.
And, boy, that brought the House down.
That's right.
The House and not the ambassadors.
Oh, yeah.
See what I'm pointing?
Oh, yeah.
You have a situation here where we are going to look to our interests.
Now, Connolly, I told Connolly today, I said, you've got to keep over in control of this on this.
He's going over to Europe.
He's worried about what others are doing and running around.
He feels we need some ambassadors to go around.
He wants to bring Dick Thompson to the deal.
He wants to bring Tom Horner to the deal.
He was glad I made that decision on Latin America for that little, remember that?
Nicaragua.
Oh, uh-huh.
You remember there was a little paper you sent in about whether or not we would split papers or whether we would have, continue to have military forces in line.
Oh yeah, yeah, yeah.
We decided to have them rather than not speak against them.
Exactly, exactly.
The reason I did it is that I just want the people to know.
Exactly.
But Connolly, Henry, I understand this again, but the real question that we raised, that I think, and I'll let you go, the real question we raised, and this is terribly important, and I said, now tell me, what about Peterson?
Can he do this?
And he said, well, I'm not sure.
He says he may be able to.
He says, I like him.
And he seems to have the right feelings.
He says, oh, show us what's happening.
He's on the conference side.
Show us.
You, if you'd actually, you and I don't like it.
I'm not, Jerry.
The Schultzes of the monetary thing basically, you see, philosophically disagrees with our, I don't give a shit about the philosophy.
Neither does Kahn, neither do you.
But I care a great deal about not getting the United States back in a position where these horrors screw us.
And that is what the state doesn't care about.
They do not care.
The Archer doesn't care.
See, Archer is a central banker.
He wants to endure, he wants to go back to it.
And Archer is going to play a hard game, and I'm not going to let him do it this time.
Now, the real question is, how do we do it within this government?
Commonly, it has to be in the White House.
The state is very, very far off.
And he said, uh, Sam was probably willing to disobey him, and he said he couldn't take it.
He told Sam, he said he can't because he hadn't done it before.
He'd never done it before.
But the state must take over because the state considers this is their right.
The state, on the other hand, does not rest.
He said, and he commented very well, he said, I'm sure Bill Rogers would be loyal to do what you want him to do.
The people in state will not do what you want them to do.
He says, that's the sense of the people in Treasury.
He says, the only reason in Treasury that they do what I do is that I'll talk stronger than Rockington, and he will talk stronger than Rockington.
This really is a case, I'm usually not this meticulous but precise because I don't know enough about this subject in detail.
I wanted to keep precise from raising the 11% for the Japanese, which he had pre-negotiated in Japan.
That was my only concern, and to make sure that since Connolly was going to be the only one who could speak on it, there was no intention at all of restraining him.
There was just, I was afraid if we put in 25%, the state was going to leak it.
And Conley just wants flexibility.
He wants to wind up at around 15 to 20 percent, but he feels he's got to be able to raise 25.
But his point was, I think he had the impression, basically, that I had signed a paper that probably came through here representing the State Department's point of view.
Or Peterson's point of view or something.
I don't think he realized he was around the people.
I have a feeling that some of his people are afraid to take Henry on because they know they can't.
So they're taking Peterson on.
I have a feeling people are getting a bad rap.
Peterson did come up first.
with that figure.
But again, my understanding was that he had discussed it with Volker.
But Volker could have well let him into it.
We had one before.
But I do know...
But I do know...
But I do know that I read the actual statement to Volker before it was published and that I'd send it over to him.
I'll call him after dinner tonight.
I'll call him right now.
I'd like him to really be reassured.
I'll tell him you mentioned it to me, and I just thought... And I guess you can certainly say the President was really quite very distressed about this, because he thought maybe something that he certainly didn't know about.
And you yourself, you called over, you cleared your language, how perverse it was.
to keep the studies in line.
That's right.
We have John Lee and Tom Lee with you at any moment.
Which is a proposal you want to exert to Tom.
Now, look, Mr. Secretary, in the future, wouldn't it be better if I talked to you?
Yeah.
Why don't you just put a right there on that?
Now, my frank opinion, incidentally, this is not, I shouldn't say this, I have come to the reluctant opinion that Peterson cannot do it.
Peterson can give a good briefing, and he's got a sort of interesting mind.
but he doesn't have the detailed application and the toughness.
He sort of fritters himself away on secondary issues, and he gets himself too much involved.
My strategy, for example, I have a lot of trouble with the bureaucracy, but there's no paper of mine around that the bureaucracy can shoot at all of my papers.
So to you, I don't tell them what they think.
But that's important.
Peterson makes himself a combatant in the bureaucratic fight.
And that way they'll kill him.
Nobody really knows.
It goes back to the basic thing.
Peterson is now a staff man.
That's right.
He doesn't think like a staff man.
I don't.
There's some people you just can't change from lineman to sat-man.
I like him as a person.
He is a lineman as a topic, a chief executive lineman.
He's loyal.
And he and I get along well.
He's a good cabinet officer, I think.
He'd be a good cabinet officer.
Well, we've got lineman.
When?
I think pretty soon.
I think this fall.
Think he's going to do it?
He is already doing it.
He has moved in to take it over.
and he's doing it on a Sub Rosa basis because he hasn't been formally, he says, I haven't made a formal decision to do it and you'll have to ask him to do it once it's said that he will say yes.
I think he will.
I think he wants to do it.
Comstock thinks he wants to do it.
And I think it's a damn good move for us.
I think it would be a good move for him to go out.
And for Peterson to go in.
And what do we do with this damn committee?
We need this committee now.
The problem is who the hell can run it?
But you need somebody with anybody, any staff that says...
He might be able to do it.
See, Flanagan is oriented as a staff man.
And any assistant to the president is going to be unpopular with the bureaucracy.
That doesn't matter.
But he should know what he reserves himself for.
And I use them to get their information.
I don't tell them what I think.
I tell you what I think.
And
All right, so you can put it in the back of your head, I totally agree with Kahn that we've got to set up a small group.
At the present time, it'll be you, Schultz, myself, Kahn.
Now whether we go beyond that, I don't know.
I agree with him.
I don't think we can go beyond that, because every mouth you have is not potentially just wasted time.
It's got to be in the White House, I think, if he agrees with us.
The point is, though, that with Peterson, now you're in a very good position.
You're a Schultz, because he's such a Schultz's man.
And, uh, and Jesus, I don't know.
I think, well, I have the same feeling that Peterson may not be able to hack it as a staff man.
For the reason, as I told you the other day, when he makes, he made this brilliant presentation before the academy.
They're spruced in as they can.
But in the space of an hour, he covered every subject, and nobody came away remembering anything.
I mean, except that, well, there's a hell of a problem, and he did a great job.
He has to prove every time that he knows about everything.
The most important thing to do in any briefing is to just touch lightly on a few, but string in the things that matter.
And I don't think Peterson has that capability.
I think that's surprising because I think it would be fascinating with the idea of just covering up that he should be a good salesman and therefore should, well, he is a good salesman.
But he's not a good conceptual thinker and he doesn't understand the bureaucracy well enough.
That's right.
They're killing him because he writes papers.
Yeah.
For his committee.
That's a terrible mistake.
There are practically no papers of mine around for these various committees.
I get them to write them.
Then I get them rewritten.
And then I write you a memorandum.
I think it's a bad policy for the White House to put itself on the same level
Exactly.
White House is not just another agency that competes with the departments.
The White House is only a staff facility for the president.
It doesn't have any standing of its own.
And the presidential assistants have a responsibility only to the president.
We don't have to convince that you're out with it.
Well, Colley's going to be here when he comes back with a different meeting.
Mr. President, if we have learned anything in these negotiations,
It is that pressure gets you to places, or the potentiality of pressure.
No one has yet done a thing for us because we needed it or because we were nice guys.
So, for example, I told Conrad, to me, the prime example of it, of two prime examples, my wonderful relationship with Stalin.
What's he done for us?
Nothing.
Nothing.
All right.
My fine relationship with him.
What do they do in Rolls-Royce?
They throw this...
My point is, there ain't going to be any more of this kind of unfollowing.
East's constituency is the British electorate, and Sato's constituency is, you know, Chinese as well.
Our client relationship with Yahya and others allows us to do things where their language has their power.
That's right.
That's right.
But it's only where their language is.
A lot of them have done things for you that was somewhat in the interest of whom we do.
Yeah, yeah, it's so good.
But not where they have to pay a heavy price.
Absolutely not.
And what you said today is very sobering, very good.
And you now have the chance, you've got to play poker with us and we're going to play the game once you expect them to play it.
We're not going to compete like that.
You talked about that a little bit, but you didn't say we're going to fight like that.
What I found interesting is McGovern and Church and all the great liberals, they were applauding as much as the others when you said that.
But I thought that the last part was interesting.
Of course, I didn't understand.
I didn't understand.
I had to fix it and spend some time on it.
But that's the part that's so very important.
That's where we really put out what this country has to be.
This country cannot do the current war on itself.
It cannot fail and compete.
It must aim for greatness.
And that's, I think, what they need to hear, even more what the public needs and wants to hear.
I think they want to.
I think they'd like to believe that their president and their government is moving them.
But anyway, I didn't want to probably go ahead.
I'll make that call then.
No, that's nothing.
In other words, it's nothing.
I didn't.
I told Bob, and I heard of this, and he said, and Alex told me it was a kiss for Peter's memorandum.
I said, well, I am sure.
I said, and then I gave Alex a little email.
I said, Alex, don't ever let me sign a memorandum or something like that.
And then without telling me before again.
And I cannot see why I sent it, because your name was on the goddamn thing.
But we... You know, you always tell me to look at something that is important.
But this one, uh, I have done really to keep space from screwing everybody else.
And it's not a lot of expense to get on with it.
Yeah.
And I can just say that we, just, just, if I was in that damn shirt with the monkey around Booger's back, and that I signed it because of your recommendation.
Right.
Okay?
No.
What does this mean?
Proof.
Because he's going in there.
Why did the President do this?
Sons of bitches.
Well, he is.
Wait.
The main thing about a candidate besides too strong are you and John are women.
Between the two of you, you've got to contact Compton every day.
Every day.
Hold his hand.
Mainly because others are worrying and not dissenting.
Yeah.
See?
Yeah.
He was certainly pleased with the speech that you said.
And he likes balls up, strong beater traps.
I don't know why people like that.
It's because most people aren't.
They've got to feel someone's doing it for them or they get scared.
You know, I thought the speech was just the right length.
Yeah, 25 minutes, five minutes.
And I, in listening to it, there was no, a lot of times I had a feeling that, you know, there's a whole chunk that could have been left out and it wouldn't have hurt a bit.
This one needed everything that was in it.
Yeah, but it needed what was there.
But there wasn't any empty rhetoric, really, except there was some solid rhetoric, but it was to make a point.
But you had to have a look at it.
No, it was important to stand.
And Lodge was favorable.
He disposed of it across the speech.
Oh, yeah.
You know, you go to Gelsman, and you're like, I'm talking bad.
I don't want to shoot him at the speech.
And he's guilty.
And I would finish.
And I would finish it again.
I would simply say that I'm here.
And you're like, I'm going to finish the gridiron in three minutes.
Yeah.
See, Lodge would build you up.
I don't know why it wouldn't be any problem for you to be there.
His whole point is, he says, this gives me a great chance to really cover what the president's accomplished here in the time, in three years.
And he'll do it, you know, guys.
It feels pretty good.
Do you think we got some support from Washington?
His main point was the capital speech that also you're going to do a lot better in Massachusetts than any of you down there are counting on.
And maybe we will, but better in Massachusetts than W&I.
It is what we're worried about, I don't think.
If we're going to do better in Massachusetts, that means we might carry New York.
Members, not to hear their applause in the place, but to read the press account saying the president was well received, isn't it?
This is the main purpose of this speech, it's a momentum thing.
Now the people of Editorialis can catch up.
This is the one up the Congress again, which he sure as hell did.
Catherine, all they want about what the children didn't say, much of my questions about trying to answer, really didn't make any difference.
It was a cruel reaction.
So let's don't get our staff in pressure to do it again.
Let's create a little debate to build some interest on that, on cutting the free suits.
Some arguing that you shouldn't cut them, some arguing you should.
You know, Tom said he was...
Well, they're not arguing that you shouldn't cut the piece.
They're arguing that you shouldn't have said you were going to cut it.
I don't know.
That's the middle of the game.
Could you use a standard?
Is that?
Yeah, so what?
I think what that is, I wonder.
McGregor's argument
He says the reason Nils is complaining about that is he said it's perfectly clear to me what the president's doing and why you would announce you're cutting the freeze and then consulting with these people, which is you're putting the screws right to Congress.
You're saying, look, God damn it, I'm not going to protect you with this God damn freeze, which I don't believe in, but which I had to do.
I gave you 90 days.
I've got some plans.
Now I want your plans, and then I want action.
And I'm only giving you the rest of the 90 days to get it done.
And that was McGregor's interpretation of the reasoning for that and why a mills would say it's bad because what you're doing is putting mills on the hook.
Waste of heat is now going to come through.
You're trying to put waste of heat into a unit and have a lot of people freeze.
No, but they've got to get the whole tax proposal stuff done.
It's part of the program.
It's part of the program, yeah.
Now, the previous thing, I think, was probably Schultz's.
I don't care.
I don't care.
I don't care.
Tom said he didn't think he should have done it.
Well, I don't think he was able to help if they hadn't talked to him about it.
The bomb left him in prison.
What's that like?
He didn't have a bomb.
Well, not in Bolivia, but a Nazi.
Well, they tried all day yesterday, they had good proper time, so, but the, but the, the first Sapphire Granite had the announcement of the freeze.
Uh, what else?
I'll find out.
Uh, give a call now and say, what is the situation now?
No, don't raise a problem.
I'm just talking to the director of Stokes, please.
that we just want to get our ducks through this.
We want to be sure that that will cause some of the council consensus that we should announce that.
Is that all?
That's all right, I'll call it a night.
No, I'll call it a night, thank you.
Anyways, that's all.
Okay.
When Crowdy is dying, probably tonight, I'm suggesting you call Mrs. Crowdy, but I don't think you should.
I think you ought to wait until he dies.
What is it, cancer?
Yeah.
That part of his stomach removed in recurrence of a malignancy.
And, uh, close to talk to his son-in-law today, and he's fading fast.
He may not survive the night.
Others are saying he might last another few days, but...
You can't talk to him.
You could only talk to her.
I would do that.
No point doing that now.
I'm not going to do that at all.
I'll get that right then.
But we'll do the usual.
Yeah.
The military man and so forth.
Yeah.
That's a nice thing to do.
It's a very nice thing to do.
That's one of those things that, you know, it's...
Doesn't use you up at all, but uses some of the power that you've got.
Right.
And only helps with a very few people, but it really means something to them.
It's a lot of difference.
And the other congressmen, you know, doesn't get any votes, but it helps a little with the understanding.
Yeah, I do.
I'm sure sorry to hear that.
Thank God we elected that governor.
Yeah.
David, you know, he was a real help.
Why don't we go to a point?
I'll be there in a second.
That's what they think.
Well, not bad, actually.
He's the one we wanted to run instead of Crowdy.
Well, Stanford's got at least a little saying.
All the cronies may have stayed with us longer.
I don't know.
The guard hasn't stayed with us too long.
We had to hold his hands so often.
Once a week.
That's about it.
We can't decide if the night will not be this.
Or get it.
That, uh, it's interesting.
I, thank God, I can
I heard the New York Times is going to run a review tomorrow, apparently, on the mass, where they're going to tear apart this cheap, superficial, overplayed, you know, cannibalism.
They're going to kick it around.
It may or may not be true, but it would be nice if it did.
I'd like to see it get kicked around a little bit on me.
It really wasn't that good.
It has moments, and overall its blend is exactly the opposite.
It's quite spectacular theater, and it is.
But it's got a lot of lousy stuff in it.
It's borrowed a lot of stuff.
It's sort of a combination of West Side Story and Jesus Christ Superstar and Hair.
You know, one thing that's very interesting, whatever reactions in this talk, the major thing, what you say that comes through is not the content, except for the fact that people want to work and that we are going to look after our own social things.
But more of the leadership and delivery, was that what you were reading on, came over.
Those are what we got played back a lot.
That's what I meant.
That's what you said.
Confidence, a feeling, I can't get quite at it, a feeling that he knew he was on the right track and was using his support on that kind of thing.
I must have seen it on TV.
It would be interesting to get the rating on it.
Yeah.
Because a lot of it took so long building it that if anything get delayed, you run the cost up.
When they designed it, it was for, they didn't have jets going into the National Airport.
Now they do, so they had to speak with the jets to fly around.
It's all one thing after another when you have this.
It's all you'll see tonight, though.
It's just an awful lot of waste, and it's not good.
Oh, no, that's 10 o'clock, I guess.
10 o'clock.
10 o'clock.
10 o'clock.
10 o'clock.
Oh, shit!