Nixon & Haig on Vietnam War and Henry Kissinger

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Well, I guess that's predicted to mean they had no success, huh?

No, I think, if anything, they were a little tougher, which we anticipated.

Let me ask you, what was the date of the announcement?

The date of the announcement, and this I got from double talk.

He had to be very cautious about it.

The indications were that the visits were fine, but he couldn't tell me whether it was the late February or early March date.

And apparently Henry's visit was fine, but he said they didn't...

It was the public fact of them that they didn't want to do as early as we had suggested, which was 20th through 22nd September.

I gathered that it was not settled there, and that...

It's yet to be resolved.

But they were very forthcoming, very warm, and very cordial, so there wasn't any tension involved in this thing at all.

It was really a... Let me give you my own feelings on it.

I don't know if you do know, I have quite a different view about these drawings.

I appreciate these.

He's had them for a long time now.

I don't know that he believes, you know.

I don't believe they can.

I really believe that their purpose really is to serve.

The entire hand has been on that Cambodian louse.

They just thought that I might kick the hell out of them.

The real purpose is to sort of strain this along, and they had to do a little more each time to figure we might do something.

Now, I totally agree with the desirability of trying to wear God-associated helmets.

And you know, here's the point we have to realize now.

Going back over the years, over these discussions that have taken place, we always rationalize better, break down, by saying, well, we had them coming.

Remember, we had them coming last year, and we had more choice.

So we shut it down, and we had them coming again.

He said that the fact that, uh, uh, Sheehan came out, that shut it down.

And now we have him coming again.

In fact, the Chief's election, that shut it down.

I, I'm much more skeptical.

I don't really think we've got him coming.

Well, you've read it.

You, you, you think there has been, Henry's makes progress in, you know, all the items that, uh...

I think it was a real movement, uh, after the Peking was announced.

And, uh,

before it looked like political trouble in Saigon.

I think they definitely did make some movements there.

But not in any fundamental way.

In other words, they brushed aside all the negotiating hogwash and got down to the basic issue, and that was that two had to go.

That's right.

You still got down to the fact, in my view, it all got down to the fact that their condition was

that you go, which has always been what the God damn thing has always been about.

In other words, they want to take over the country.

They were not giving up one inch on that point.

Now, I think, for example, this speech in the government, I'm truly unconcerned with the government, and some of you have gone over and talked to the negotiators, but in any event,

We really got to, we've got to talk Henry off of this now.

He has an idea, which I'm sure he's discussed with you, you know, that he'd like to go, either go to Hanover and have a secret visit, which of course I'm ridiculous.

The other is to have a secret meeting in Russia with the other fellow.

Now, let me tell you.

I have great doubts about this, because such a meeting can't take place if it shows up.

I mean, Henry has made his, and I mean, having made the China move and the other move, we just may have to take the advantage of all the bitter pills we have to swallow and let the goddamn thing, you know, get out.

What do you think?

I don't see anything right now, sir, that would want that.

I do understand one thing, but it's one of my main concerns.

I think for better or worse, the American people want the hell out, sir, and they question it a lot.

The American people want the hell out of it.

There's no way we can stay one day longer than necessary.

That's right, sir.

But the real concern here is, A, how are you going to get the prisoners out?

B, I think a serious unraveling in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam before November would be disastrous.

Because

This we can't have, so we've got to work a solution, and we're buying some time.

And if these guys can't carry it then after what we've given them, so be it.

But I think we've got to get you back here, or God knows where in this country.

How do you do it?

How do you do it out?

Well, I think we've got to ride maybe a shade more on getting out.

I think we can get out.

maybe next summer completely.

It certainly should be before the election time.

We have to have it out of there for that.

That's right.

So we'll ride that to the peak and continue the air.

It's not going to solve last in Cambodia, so although Cambodia is getting a little tougher and a harder problem for them, and this thing may just sort of dry up, but in any event... Cambodians are surprising us even, aren't they?

Yes, they are.

They're just...

Really, I mean, aren't they surprising everybody?

Are they doing rather well?

They're doing quite well.

I think if they ever really get hit, they'll never hold.

But I don't mean by that they're going to totally collapse because they've got their heart in it.

But they're going to get mauled, less so than a year ago by a long shot.

But that I think we can sustain in pretty good shape.

That is the overall security situation, at least well through November.

We've got the combination of the realities of the security and the psychology of the security.

And they're both different, although they're related.

One being the fact that the enemy just can't overtake Saigon, and I think our chances of that are very good right now.

But the other is the psychology as well.

And with this disturbance in Saigon, we could end up with a coup and a communist takeover.

in fairly short order, if we don't keep stability there.

And I think that's quite important.

Because that's something they could think of.

They will attempt to tie it.

About what we're going to do in November, we have in November, by the first of the year,

The negotiating track will be closed if there are any questions or anything else.

Negotiations have been created.

I can put that in at the end, but you'd have to announce your, you know, the action at the end of the combat, the end of the draft case, and so forth, and the final withdrawal within the next so many months and so forth and so on.

But you really ought to be able to withdraw that in the end.

That's when they ought to pay the fees.

Here's Henry's thinking on that, and that's really what's underlying his logic on this.

He thinks we're going to meet their demands, and probably should.

If we do it unilaterally, in other words, negotiating in Paris or elsewhere in an effort to get our prisoners back, there's no policing mechanism.

His feel is that if we meet their requirements, it should be done

in the form of a Soviet-U.S.-Hanoi juncture, where the Soviets get some credit for the deal, and that they would therefore be an inhibiting factor on Hanoi to be sure that the provisions of the agreement were carried out.

No, but what does it mean, their demands?

The demands are going to come, does that mean, or throw it to you, or both?

I suspect the...

has in mind coming up with a formula that gives them increased political participation.

What do you mean?

Well, of course, the whole thing.

Well, you can't make the country do something that's been drained dry.

Unfortunately, unfortunately, now that's the problem.

We've gone to the well too many times in Vietnam now.

We went on November the 3rd.

We went on Cambodia.

We went on Vladivostok.

I can't go up there and say, well, just make another November 3rd speech.

The American people will not respond to that.

Correct.

No question about it.

We've got to get out with some residue of stability.

There'll be 13.

I'm waiting for confirmation right now, so they're down.

But, you know, if we had a bad show, though, it would be right up on the burner again.

Yeah.

And there's another problem that's quite worrisome to me, I'll tell you that.

An army over there is in bad shape.

Art.

Morality.

Discipline.

Attitude of these people.

I don't think it's as bad as it's being portrayed, but it's still bad enough.

It's almost impossible to keep the morale of an army up when it's getting the hell out, isn't it?

Of course it is.

Guys just don't want to be the last to die.

I say we'd be in the 50 category this summer and we would have had a bad time.

We would have had some very tough fighting.

I Corps and II Corps.

This is where our people are.

So I think strategically and historically, since everything has been done, it's going to stand up very, very well.

I think we ought to go very carefully here on where we go from here.

I'll be jumping, so I'm taking the poke, and I'm not sure of that.

How about now that he's broken up the structure?

There are a few places we ought to hit him a bit.

I think we can get away with it now.

Or is it to depredize?

I don't have any idea to depredize China or Russia.

I'm pretty certain of Russia.

Not even China.

If they give us an excuse, which they do pretty regularly, I wouldn't justify it.

It's an A.

30 civilians killed.

That I would be very much prepared to do, and I think we should.

And I don't worry about the Chinese on that.

Well, everybody, they respect it more than they're concerned by it.

If it's too big a thing, then of course

They must be having some problems around, you know.

We hear this all the time.

I don't know how much damage they got.

These floods must be terrible.

Well, the reports we had on them, it was just devastating.

It just really hurt them.

And I was hoping we'd see some signs of that.

I wouldn't know.

It's always a rationalization hope.

What time does Henry get back?

He'll be back at 7.45.

Now, I hope what I got cryptically isn't as precise.

I thought it would be better that you have it even though I couldn't get it right.

When he gets it back, don't forget to pray.

All right.

Fine.

Remember now, let's keep it down.

Let's keep it firm.

You must not get any illusions about it.

Henry tends to be overly optimistic about your work.

because of the tone and this and that and the other.

He's just like I am.

He so desperately wants it to come out all right.

That's right.

He sometimes reads things into it that aren't there.

You know, there's a wiggle here and a blink here and so forth.

Listen, I know these sons of bitches.

And I was rethinking it all the time.

But I remembered my message with Khrushchev and so forth.

They're cold, tough, fast.

And the same guys are doing it year after year.

Yeah, that's right.

We're dealing with the only one in England who doesn't.

Well, originally, yes.

The first story came out with a little gal on Friday night over at the State Department, girl.

And it was carried in Saturday's paper.

On Friday, they called me.

Yes.

No, she got the story from London.

A London observer had it.

A reporter covering the State Department.

Former news day girl is now working for the Post.

and a little Jewish girl that used to be in the White House here from the East End.

Jesus Christ.

And they called State and said, we have this story from Moscow through the London Observer.

But they just had the broad outlines of it.

And I refused to let them do it.

Well, of course not.

So it didn't carry on Saturday.

Yeah.

Then this bastard Schultz started really talking to the people he knows.

That's right.

State or ACTA probably.

Huh?

ACTA.

And I think that's where he got it.

I called State this morning and I said, look at this goddammit.

I know this came out of your department.

He sent American politicians.

Now, who else could they have been?

And they said, well, we think he got it from NATO because we consulted him.

He is such a son of a bitch that I can't even see him again.

No, it isn't all that important.

Thank God.

No, I mean, if you do it at the start of your... We're still waiting for the Soviets to give an okay on that.

But if you start it on Thursday, they still don't know the date.

We're still doing research.

We've got a lot of work to do.

So I hope you stop at the same time.

Sir, we're doing very well.

I'm often concerned about the defense, but I don't know.

I don't know what's in there.

This is a problem with Francis.

You know, I...

Nixon & Haig on Vietnam War and Henry Kissinger

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on September 11, 1971

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