Nixon, Allott & Arends on Military Draft and Mansfield Amendment

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I think so, yes, because Eddie is very active in this, and I don't think we're going to be leaving without Eddie.

He's been very, very helpful, very cooperative, extremely cooperative in everything we've tried to do on that committee, and I'd like to go with him and stay with him.

Well, Gordon has his own, his proposal, which is, I suppose, which, of course, as he knows, we've supported over a period of time.

I guess we have.

I think we have here a very practical question.

Let me say that, as you will see in the next few weeks there,

Not only with the Chinese, but with the Soviets.

There are just a hell of a lot of things going on, shall we say, on the ground at the present time.

And, of course, with our European friends and the Japanese friends and the rest, it's terribly important that we not, you particularly, this week, about your policy, that we not indicate that the United States is throwing up its feet to get the hell out of work.

That's really the problem.

The draft thing, somewhere, according to that, if you would help, I mean, I know it's sort of, the main thing is, you know, it's one of those practical things, is get a bill.

It's just got to happen.

I don't know what, how it can be done.

I realize that I've got to get to the intimacy of it.

I don't know about it, but let me explain my position very briefly, Mr. President.

I've been interested in this matter for a long time.

Even when my son was a lieutenant and then 87 years ago out in San Diego, he took me around to see how these enlisted men had to live.

I think it's a disgrace.

This is the reason I walked into Gates report.

I picked this up by taking it on as a cause and I fought for it and we got it in the Senate bill.

Now we come back

from the conference with less money for the he-ones-twos-threes-and-fours and less money for the oh-ones-and-twos than either the House or the Senate came.

So I can't abandon my own position.

I'm too far out.

I'm completely in support of the draft and I...

There's no question about where I stand on this.

Now, the situation, what can you do to maybe, apart from your position, try to understand

Yes, sir.

Do you see our practice of law?

Yes, sir.

Do you see our

Mansfield has stated to the press that he will make a motion to leave the table.

Gravel and Cranston are just chafing at the bit to make a motion to leave the table.

Gravel wants to get off the duck.

Spiker wants to make a motion to leave the table.

He's come to me and said, can I make it if you don't?

And I have stated that I shall.

I think we've got to resolve this thing some way.

I don't think we're going to get closure.

That's my frank opinion.

Uh, the only way you could get a coach here would be to get Mike Mansfield behind it a hundred percent.

We've had three coaches petitions.

None of them came even near, came even close.

We didn't even get a majority vote, let alone a two-thirds, you know.

And, uh, I just want to, I'm not going to, I'm doing this one reason.

I am going to end this filibuster some way if I can.

According to Mike's book, I may have misjudged it, he may have changed his mind, but before he went to Europe, I got the distinct impression that he would lay his hand on the filibuster for two or three days, he was in courtesy of that, and then eventually he would vote for cloture, because he said, we've got to come to a vote, or I won't vote for the bill.

And if I may intrude on the thing a little bit, I know you're a technical, as I know,

I'm going to have the privilege of working at it for a long, long time.

If it were just the patient alone, just the Gates business, without any international implications of the draft, I'd say, hell, let it go back to Congress.

And let's fight it out with a house on it.

There's no question you're right about the lower ranks needing the advice.

There's no question at all.

Every driver that I ride with, White House driver, I've been working with the Army a little bit lately, and every man I know, some old sergeants, some people who've been there for years, keep asking, we're going to get the tape that rains.

I think it would, some of those understand that we prefer yours than any of the officers'.

The administration had plans, you know, for two phases on that, but that seemed to be a little bit past now.

And I can realize the position you're in, and I'm wondering, as an old statesman that you really are, is it possible for you to make some sort of statement, not give up your ideology on this, but recognizing the effectual conditions of the House

and the international, saying I'm not giving up at all.

Nevertheless, I know that if this thing is tabled or if the conference report is not accepted, we won't have any pay raise.

We won't have any draft.

Therefore, in the interest of the overall good, I'm going to defer.

I'm going to go ahead with it.

I'm going to continue this fight.

Next year, I'm going to go after these lower ranks, too.

Good evening.

Well, in view of where I am now at the present time, I don't see how I can say this.

I'll say this.

I have not gone to one single member of the Senate and asked him for support at any time on this.

I've taken my position.

The people that have climbed on have climbed on.

But I don't see how I can do that.

Mr. President, I think you of all people

understand this.

I can't understand why the House cannot reappoint Convery.

Well, at least they're just not going to ask for Convery to reappoint.

Isn't it a clear case of...

Well, no, I think because there was so much given in the comments report on the part of the ops, except for this one particular item.

I think there was so much given on our part where we were accepting practically all of the mass deal with language except that one little thing.

And on the end of 28, 27 things we gave up practically in the house.

I mean, we bent over backwards in order to get it drafted.

And I don't think, and frankly, only Simonton and

I think, Gordon, that Eddie Avera's attitude is conditioned by the fact that he remembers five weeks of very intensive effort on the Mansfield Amendment.

And I think he looks at the fact that it's almost October and no conferees are appointed.

You're going to reel in that whole Mansfield thing and we may not have five weeks, we may have ten weeks of controversy and just no possibility of agreement.

As it was, it was extremely difficult dealing with Mike Manstiel and certain others who felt as he was to try and get some language that would be acceptable in the House and wouldn't provoke a filibuster in the Senate.

I think Avery feels, and Stennis I know feels the same way.

I talked to John yesterday afternoon that there is no prospect of going back to conference where that question would be opened up and getting a resolution of it.

I'm encouraged, speaking of Mansfield, by the fact that before the recess, Mr. President, he suggested a 10-hour limitation of debate on the conference report, which I, of course, objected.

But Mike, in talking with me by phone yesterday, indicated that he has the same attitude now as he did before the recess, that he'd like to see the thing come to a final resolution.

I know, Mr. President, that you have a very, very busy morning.

Well, let me say this, Bernie.

You know, I might be the last one here.

I'll put some pressure on some people, but I don't do it because of our old association.

Let me tell you the problem I've got is, and I want you to just weigh it, if you will, weigh it as you determine what your tactics are to tackle the problem.

I just want you to know that I can think of nothing more devastating to our international position over the next

between now and October 15, and to have this thing not go.

We've just got to handle it.

Now, some way or other, if we help together, that's all I want to do.

We've got to get a draft.

That's what it sounds to me.

Now, I haven't got to put the arm on Michael, I can assure you.

I mean, I can do it a different way, because I've got the responsibility on him for putting it down, too.

But I'm not going to, not with you.

You're for the draft.

You just, and I understand that.

But let me say that we really need it.

We've got to have it from an international standpoint.

And I can't tell you why, but there are reasons that are very surprising at this moment that we've got to have it.

Well, facing reality, let me ask this question.

It's a political question.

I know, I agree with your assessment.

I talked with him in Paris twice.

I talked to him twice.

I couldn't hear out.

Yeah, I don't know whether you'll do it or not.

I know what he said before, and I was talking to him.

But you have to say it.

that I was prepared, and I may have said that I would offer a motion to lay it on the table.

If I do not, there are at least three who will come, Heller and Walker, and Mike, as it is possible, who is stated to the administrator, Mr. John Fennigan.

Now, how do you deal with this situation?

I can tell you, sir, the question.

Now, if I both reflect your health,

with the, with Stennis and you, and the rest of the world.

I can't abandon my position.

That's the trouble.

Maybe none of you will respect me if I did.

Oh, gosh, you respect me, you sure do.

Sometimes it's more difficult to change with this state than it could.

But the president talked to Mike this afternoon.

Mike, did you hear the man?

Let me put it this way.

Let me tell you this.

You, you think about it, but you have my total assurance, you have my total assurance, Gordon, that I want exactly the same thing you do.

Total assurance.

When will you get it?

And you've got that from the President straight.

So, stop.

I don't know, I have no idea.

Thank you.

Nixon, Allott & Arends on Military Draft and Mansfield Amendment

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on September 14, 1971

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