Nixon, Rogers & Kissinger on PRC-UN Relations and Diplomatic Timing

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I got 90 minutes to schedule them.

Mr. President, what I wanted to say to you, and I talked about this the other day, I think that the timing of this is particularly unfortunate, and I think it's a serious consideration to the motivation that the Chinese have.

I'm inclined to think it's

to use us in connection with the China vote.

You see, first, they're having serious problems.

Nobody knows what the problems are, but apparently it's some kind of an internal struggle politically in their country.

And secondly, the vote is coming up just about the time Henry would be there.

Now, we are going to have one hell of a fight on our hands to win that.

At the moment, we're behind.

We're going to lose by about two votes.

Did you see the conservative senatorship come out?

and said that if we lose it, they're going to quit the support of the United Nations, they're going to vote against financing and so forth.

So there's a great deal of interest in the outcome, and it'll build up in the next two weeks, three weeks.

I think if Henry was there, the announcement was made, he was there at the time of the vote, everyone would think we were deliberately undercutting our own effort.

There's suspicion that we're not serious about it anyway.

Now we've got the Japanese on board and Australians and New Zealanders and so forth.

So I think it would really be a serious mistake as far as timings.

I talked to Henry about if we could delay it until after the vote, the Chinese representation vote, the announcement, then I think it would be fine.

And Henry suggested we have somebody from the State Farm go with him.

I think that's a good idea and we can work that out mutually.

But I think that the announcement now and Henry's presence there at the time of the vote would be a very, very serious mistake.

But particularly because there's no reason for it.

I mean, if we don't take the trip until February, you still, in November, you've got four months.

You have November, December, January, and February.

So there isn't any real hurry.

And I think that the charge would be made that we'd been used by the Chinese.

And obviously, that's to be expected.

It's not unusual.

But I think we want to be particularly careful that we don't put ourselves in a position so politically at home.

It looks as if we're double-dealing.

And I think we have made a serious effort in the UN, and George Bush is working his tail off.

So I feel that everyone would say that this is undercutting our position.

If we just put it off for a month or three weeks or just until after the vote,

See, that still gives you, as I say, four months.

Yes.

There's a technical problem.

Let me say, I agree with you.

And I've said so to the President this morning.

I think it's bad for the vote.

And the trouble is that it's ambiguous whether they suggest

The government now is doing it after Gromyko was here.

And that's wrong.

It doesn't mean that we announced it.

That's not at all my honor.

With regard to the Chinese, we want to be used with them, except for the fact that right after Gromyko was here, we announced that we were going to have a Russian man on the 12th.

And they'll say, well, that's bad.

But just before that announcement, we told the Chinese that we had a delay.

Is the bomb considered the other possibility of another possible Englishman?

It's the presence of it that's my concern.

So let's see.

I wonder if you could have the announcement.

You just said that you would reach an announcement.

I wonder if you could tell me the time and go ahead.

I mean, that's something that they looked into.

I mean, the announcement seems to me that it's very difficult to, it's very difficult to, right after seeing Gromegold and his own attorneys, you've got to look yourself in the eye.

I'm quite confident that he might be using us.

And we sure don't want that.

On the other hand, all these people are suspicious of each other.

And they're going to see Gromegold's in here and figure, well, he put it off for that reason.

I'm going to put you into that.

That's the... That's the... What do you think causes more trouble, the going or the being there?

Not the announcing or the... Or the being there.

I don't think the announcement will cause that trouble, because...

The announcement, yes.

What we had in mind in the announcement is that all we're going to do there is to take a request, go out, and I had a regular briefing and say that a preparatory to the trip that Dr. Kissinger accompanied by Dwight Chapin and...

who will go to make the arrangements for the trip.

That doesn't bother us.

It's the fact that he is there and he came.

Plus the fact, Mr. President, if there were people that were just making arrangements for the trip as such, advancement would be no problem.

But Henry's presence is going to be looked at as sort of a mini summit.

And he's there four days, so everyone is going to say, well, he isn't there to make arrangements for television or something.

He's there to

talk substance, and it'll look as...

When will the vote take place, sir?

Well, just about the time.

Let me repeat that.

Any time between the 28th and the 1st is what I get from you people.

Well, yeah, it's probably going to start, the debate's probably going to start around the 16th, 17th, something like that, and those will be the good times.

19th to the 28th is what you people thought this morning, sir?

So that if you did it, if you announced it and you said in November, in a few times, they're going to make you agents for the trip, I don't think that would cause any particular trouble.

And I would think that we could, we could say...

I think we've got to let them know that we're staying intelligent and they know perfectly well that if Henry's there at that time, it'll hurt us on the road.

And if he's there and we lose it, that'll be blamed.

His presence even...

I think there is a problem.

And it may be that the other problem also is the delay of announcement.

I think it would be extremely difficult because of this, the bustle of this language is often there.

So if a Soviet announcement, if a Soviet firm date is made before standing for the Second World War, it's not looking good.

There's no interest in that one way or the other.

Do you think that's possible?

What is today?

It's going to be tight, but we could try.

We could try to drive away.

I think we have to be careful in our dealing with them.

Not to put ourselves in a position where they always have an advantage.

That's true.

I mean, after all, there are enemies, there's no doubt about that.

And if, you know, the suspicion has been on the part of some of the, of those who oppose us, that we are in a weak negotiating position, that we are so anxious to be certain that the trip takes place, that we'll really be making... Yeah, we should...

I don't avoid that.

You're singing all out here, Bob.

Listen, Bob.

I don't know.

I'm just .

Well, let's think about it.

Let's do a little about it.

Let me see what we can get at.

I know the problem.

Normally, there wouldn't be any problem if the vote was going to come late.

And as a matter of fact, when they raised it in August, you'd be aware of all this stuff, isn't it?

Let me show you that.

When they raised it in August, they were talking about what?

Well, at first, the reason why it isn't so obvious that they were, they had a playing house, yes.

First, they were talking about September.

Then, that's when the men turned to talk about the second week of October.

That was sort of talked about in August in that draft.

No one

picked it up again until these communications, which made it complete, which I showed you, which came in about 10 days ago.

Of course, at that time, you weren't really sure when the, you know, how soon the trip was coming.

Exactly.

At that time, we were still playing with the idea of the trip in December.

Yes.

And therefore, we gave them September.

Yeah, but they haven't come with it any time.

No, they want to do that.

That's right.

Because they, well, they only, but they have to be clear.

Now, what I meant is they have, and I'm clear to think that's something that's to be, to be.

But they would like to pretend that all that's discussed, they have cause and interest to pretend that no substance is discussed.

There's also, well, that could be, if an announcement were made, that has to be heavily, of course.

Well, let's see what we can think of on that one.

I think, well, I think it is going to take a way around it.

I think the problem is aggravated by the time that elapsed between Henry's trip and your trip.

If it turns out to be four months and that's what we're thinking about, then everybody's going to say, why did you go so soon?

It almost looks as if we were suckers for them to do it right at the time that we got the most important issue between us coming to a vote.

If we could justify it on the gun, we had to do it because it's a time factor, but, uh, the...

I got you.

Let's, uh, let's do a little cock-a-jig for us, a little more experiment.

You're going to see the green?

Yeah.

Give me that, uh... Give me the... Yeah.

Yeah.

Uh... Just keep the middle at least angle.

What I meant is, I have a feeling in my talk with them that there are at least two reasons that they're, two things that they want from us.

One is the Chinese, and the second is the Middle East.

They really are worried about the NAMP, which I get.

I mean, in the prior conversation, he talked about the Middle East a great deal.

You know, they're fresh enough, particularly when there's an NAMP circuit.

And I think it's very important that you...

When you say they... What do you mean?

Well, what I meant is... What I meant is that... Well...

I don't want them to think that...

I don't want them to think that we can... We can help solve this problem.

But that is...

But that...

But it's terribly difficult, because I guess we're working with our Israeli friends.

It's terribly difficult.

And it's going to take an awful lot of work to do it.

What do you think, Henry?

I don't know.

I think the way it is now, they really, I think the way it still is now, is to be the Israelis and the Egyptians without tricking into it.

I think it's perfect now.

That's what I mean.

I think we, by Daniel, I mean leave it right there.

I don't want to, I don't want to go any further.

Don't, don't be true.

What I'm getting at is this.

I want them to want something from us.

We must not be in a position to want it there.

I don't think they want us.

I don't think we want theirs.

Well, we sure don't want any guarantee.

You see, the way we've been playing this for the last 20 years, they don't want anything from us.

They like it the way it is.

So I've kept them out.

I haven't asked them for a goddamn thing.

We haven't even wanted to bring them in.

Now, what I've tried to do this time is to give them a little more information without really telling them anything and without asking anything I've been telling them.

We're working this for this cause.

We think it's a good one.

We're the only ones that are doing it.

Both Egypt and Israel have asked us to do it, and we're going to keep working at it.

And we don't want you to work with us.

We don't ask you to do anything.

That's good, that's good.

When I say it, I'm not so sure, Bill, that you're going to just pay some money steadily.

I'm not so sure.

Well, they may be a hell of a lot more worried about the Middle East and their clients.

And for that reason, they may not like things the way they are.

They may not.

That's my point.

So I keep them worried, Bill.

Keep them worried.

That's what I mean.

And finally, on this European conference bizarre view, I would like to suggest to him that any discussions should be with me, that we don't want any other, that it's such, it's got to be such a private matter, and we can't let our allies know that we're seriously considering a conference until I'm set.

No, no, no, no.

If there's any contact on the left, they're going to talk to me or have me send a message.

But my opinion is that the students didn't delay any discussion themselves for a while.

I'm going to say that we do not... Well, you noticed how I was trying to dance off of it because I'd written a brief in the paper.

I think you should tell him that I said, when I used the word preliminary and private, I meant exactly that.

And that means, preliminary and private, that we do not set up a working group in Eric's department.

We don't have it done in any formalized way.

And you just can't help it then.

Exactly.

I don't want that.

Also, can I know that if you would say, be with you on a completely quiet basis.

Well, they've been pretty good about that.

Well, that's what I mean.

You can talk now.

Good.

They're pretty good when they deal with you privately.

They're not very good when they deal with everybody else.

Well, as you know, Mr. Armijo was trying to push us from yesterday into the position to say, can I say, if you're more confident.

I didn't say that.

I think that's pretty clear.

Yeah, okay.

All right.

I think it's got a collective mind.

And it's worth your time.

Why don't you, in relation to this, just say that because of your, your, your sense of here, I mean, you could say that we have somehow, that you would like to make the announcement on, that could we, that we have, could you come on the record attempt because of, you could say because of, of, of,

to be here for, or is there a meeting of the chief of state or something that's coming?

Well, the chief of visit is coming, but I've already hooked you up to it.

Would it be easy to leave the country?

I know, I know.

I know, but it's, uh, let me talk to one of my men who's been with me on all

The announcement's no problem.

But I think, if you notice, we've got Bill to agree to that.

The announcement, he'd say we would like to make the announcement on the 5th and go forward.

As a matter of fact, we must do that for the Russian version, too.

The announcement must be made on the 5th.

But we would say that you will be going on the... That you'd like to... Could you set the date for three weeks?

Or just say... You'd like to be there on the 10th?

Huh?

I'll be there on the 10th.

Right.

If you would like to, because of your, you would like to delay your arrival to the 10th, in order to, you can probably think of something, something that sounds really different.

What do you think?

Well, it's not good, but it's...

But he does have a point, doesn't he?

He does have a point.

He's going to lose the vote.

Well, he's actually going to lose the vote, in my judgment.

Yeah, he's going to lose it anyway.

It still makes a difference, but if he loses it, as a result... You're being there now.

If they say...

We're not getting suckered.

No, that argument doesn't mean it.

I understand that argument doesn't mean it.

In fact, they have met every match we've met.

Henry, Bill's point that they're suckering us into this is not correct.

We know that.

You and I know that.

On the other hand, his point that the public appearance does have some validity.

Now, it isn't going to be decisive necessarily.

You can't get the thing done.

I wanted to make sure that I saw that through.

Because we had, we couldn't get out to them anyway.

I didn't think it would happen after the Grim Reaper visit.

In addition, yeah, it would have been a hell of a lot better if it could have, if it's anybody's fault, uh,

Four weeks ago, it would be easy to say we wanted September 13th.

On September 13th, it would be much easier to say we now want it in November.

I've looked at the dates.

The vote on China has never been before Congress to any year in the last eight years.

This is the first year that I am on the agenda.

It never started with it before.

Without these, it'd be sort of like, uh, a way to put it even more generative.

Uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh,

It's embarrassing for you when you're there, too.

Oh, yeah.

Oh, that's fine.

But you're in a bad marketing position.

I frankly think, Henry, that's rather critical.

Do you know what I mean?

The goddamn Bolton and Bush will be making a speech, and you've got to be talking one way or another.

Let me see what I can do.

And one thing, I met with my people who were on a trip with General Haig this morning, and actually they are very optimistic, including my parents, about the domestic situation in Vietnam.

They say the chief threat there comes from us, not from the Vietnamese.

The queue has never been stronger, and hence the country has been really tight under a tight grip.

But they all agree that Berger ought to be pulled out of there.

That he's been the guy who's been pushing Kian.

And he's about due to leave anyway.

And I think that Funkler needs somebody.

There's this excellent man, Whitehouse.

Yeah.

Good.

And we ought to put him in there and get Berger out of here.

Berger's been silenced.

He's going to have to walk him.

Let me see what I can do about this.

I have a feeling we overdo it, Henry.

I think it's at least this.

I think that in terms of our relations, which are not critical, but in terms of the Rogers thing, it's worth trying, in other words, to make a little comment.

And I'm glad that there's no good.

Well, it's not that we won't have an answer.

It will screw everything too fairly well from this point of view, because we won't get an answer.

at the earliest before Monday.

And that means consultation with everybody else when we're going to do a contact.

But, well, well, advance warnings and so forth.

But all of this can be done by the end of the day.

You might have slowed the day of announcement a day.

But we would like to...

What excuse do you think, just off the top of your head, Mike, Mike, I won't give you too many, I'll just say, because I'm just here to get you a plan prepared for the Tito visit, which has taken on a greater significance due to the president visit.

You can say that it was due to this that you,

that I, as the president, would prefer to view.

Well, maybe.

Why don't you say that I would ask you to be here for the Tito visit?

Well, I doubt I was going to be anywhere.

Oh, I see.

Well, maybe I can take a visible trip someday.

Won't be too late if you ask me to see it, yes.

Well, but what would you say next?

What would you do on that?

You don't have to say too fast, because

Nixon, Rogers & Kissinger on PRC-UN Relations and Diplomatic Timing

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

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Also recorded on September 30, 1971

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Nixon, Rogers & Kissinger on PRC-UN Relations and Diplomatic Timing

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on September 30, 1971

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