Conversation 582-003

TapeTape 582StartThursday, September 30, 1971 at 2:25 PMEndThursday, September 30, 1971 at 2:50 PMTape start time00:07:11Tape end time00:27:21ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On September 30, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 2:25 pm to 2:50 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 582-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 582-3

Date: September 30, 1971
Time: 2:25 pm - 2:50 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     United Nations [UN] vote on the People's Republic of China [PRC] and Taiwan, Republic
           of China [ROC]
          -Kissinger's conversation with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                -Haig’s conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
          -US message
                -Instructions to George H.W. Bush
          -Timing
                -US strategy
          -Kissinger's trip to the PRC
                -Announcement
                      -Dates
                            -UN vote
                      -Public relations effects of announcements
                            -Timing
                      -Haig
                      -Delay
          -US options
          -Vote
                -Effect
          -Status of Taiwan's seat
                -Vote
                      -William P. Rogers
                      -List
                -Kissinger's plans
                      -Trip to the PRC
                            -Possible reaction
          -Bush
                -Action on vote
                      -Possibility of postponement
                            -Support
          -Announcement of Kissinger's PRC visit vis-a-vis UN vote
                -Haig's opinion
                      -Meeting between Kissinger and Haig
                -Negotiations with the PRC about Kissinger's trip
                                          3

                      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                 Tape Subject Log
                                   (rev. 10/06)
                                                                    Conv. No. 582-3 (cont.)


                      -Democrats
                      -Press
                           -Japan
                           -Newsmen
                                  -Handling after James B. (“Scotty”) Reston's visit
                -Rogers
                -US strategy
                      -Congressional session
                           -UN vote
                                  -Time
                           -Vietnam
          -Dates of announcement
                -PRC
                -US
          -Effect on the PRC
                -Agreement
                      -Dates of trip
                      -Date of announcement
     -Administration strategy
          -Credibility
                -Kissinger's handling of foreign relations
     -US public reaction
          -Conservatives
                -US position at the UN
                      -UN Security Council
                           -Possible veto
     -Rogers
          -Presentation of US resolution
     -Outcome of vote
          -US position
                -Relations with foreign diplomats
          -Roll call
          -Bush
          -Rogers
          -Position of US allies

Kissinger's trip to the PRC
     -Date
     -Unknown man
           -Note
     -Negotiation process
                                        4

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                Tape Subject Log
                                  (rev. 10/06)
                                                                     Conv. No. 582-3 (cont.)


          -Duration
          -Complication
    -Opposition
          -Criticism
    -Date of UN vote
    -Choice of dates
          -Reaction by PRC
    -Soviet summit
          -The President's meeting with Andrei A. Gromyko
          -State Department
          -Comparison with preparation for trip to the PRC
          -Rogers
          -Note
                -Paper
    -Influence on UN vote
          -Right-wingers
                -Taiwan seat action
                     -Timing of Kissinger's trip vis-a-vis UN vote
                            -UN debate
                            -UN vote
                            -Dates
                                 -Kissinger's return
    -Objections to Kissinger's trip
    -Announcement of trip
          -Dates
    -Taiwan
          -Outcome of UN vote
                -Effect on the US
                     -Opposition to Kissinger's trip
    -Rogers
    -Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters
    -Timing of trip and UN vote
          -Date of announcement
          -Bush
                -Possible actions
          -Outcome of vote

The President's schedule
     -Meetingswith congressmen, Souvanna Phouma
          -Time
          -Length
                                              5

                             NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. 10/06)
                                                                  Conv. No. 582-3 (cont.)


           -Kissinger's schedule
                -Meeting
                      -Haig
           -Duration of meeting
                -Michael J. Mansfield
                -Vote on bill by Charles H. Percy

     UN vote and Kissinger's trip
         -Rogers
               -Haldeman

     The President's schedule
          -Time
               -Meeting
                      -Haig
                      -Phouma
          -Haig

Kissinger left at 2:50 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I just don't think it's a good idea.
I wrote out the message of what we would send them tonight.
I think it's easier to tell folks to delay the goddamn thing no matter what it costs.
I mean, supposing they don't follow our game plan.
Supposing they come back and say, all right, come November 15th, but have the announcement on October 30th.
Then the day after the vote, we announce I'm going to China.
I don't know whether that's any better from a public relations point of view.
You can judge that better than I.
We can do it.
Haig and I, we've gone back and forth.
For a selfish reason, I would prefer to delay it so that they can't pick on me.
All right.
Well, it's a judgment call either way.
There's a time to take and a time to leave.
If Taiwan gets kicked out, which in my view is, I think the vote is probably not as close as Bill thinks.
I looked over their list.
I don't think the list is.
Then is it better for me to go after they've been kicked out?
I don't know, but of course they could, of course, put on a show while I'm there.
It makes it look embarrassing with the failures going on.
I think if we all pull together he could do it but
you know, it would take some real enthusiasm on everybody's part, which we won't have, so it's... We've been sitting there for an hour and a half, going back and forth with the President, so we are doing ourselves.
At some point, we lean slightly for doing it, and others, we lean slightly against doing it.
It's...
The Chinese, in their dealings with us, have been very meticulous and precise.
They have kept their promise on no Democrats in there.
They have not given us a hard time in the press.
I mean, they had a blast.
What they said on Japan and so forth wasn't all that critical of us.
Even that didn't outstop, since the rest of the interview, they haven't let in any newsmen.
And these states are ours.
I mean, this isn't Phil's fault that he says they're tricking us, but we tried to move it as early into the congressional session as we could, and we thought that the
U.N. vote would be at the end of November rather than at the end of October.
Well, I thought we were trying to move it into this sort of recession period because we were trying to, frankly, have something to talk about in all this goddamn Congress is out there.
Exactly.
We did not build it.
Realize that point.
I mean, that's the reason we did it.
Of course.
Jesus Christ, we just didn't want to do us any good to have you denounce it at Christmas.
Well, that's exactly the point, Mr. President.
And that's
So this is our date, not their date.
The announcement date is our date, not their date.
Their date for announcement was the 14th.
What concerns Hague and me is the impression this will make on them.
We've couched this in the form of a personal request by you.
Oh yeah, we've done all of that.
Oh no, we've done that, and we have even said that if this isn't possible, I'd be prepared to come at the agreed-upon date.
There is a good chance that they will not agree to the announcement next week under these conditions, and I thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Now?
Then?
Well, no, but that doesn't help us much.
No, I mean, you just couldn't come right now.
But I thought of that this morning.
First of all, no one believes my illnesses anymore.
And second, particularly the lady that's trying to send me and have to get sick from now until the end of the month.
I thought of that first thing this morning.
Well, that's the other way.
That's so they kick Taiwan off.
What happens?
Well, then I think hell will break loose in this country anyway.
Don't you?
I don't know.
I can assume so.
Conservatives will scream.
You'll be asked to veto this thing.
In the security council.
Oh, well, you could make a hell of a fight if you wanted to.
You can make a case that you can't.
But you could also... Let me ask this.
We don't intend to do it, do we?
We don't intend to do it.
We couldn't do that, could we?
No.
And so therefore, we've got to make the case that the drivers are going to make it now, or somebody has to, that legally it can't be done.
That's right.
Correct.
Correct.
Correct.
But we won't do that.
I've never thought so.
That's why I wasn't for the whole scheme to begin with.
I mean, we had no great choice.
I mean, I thought as long as we were going to lose, we were better off losing on the old stand.
But I think we're further behind than they think.
You have to consider that when these diplomats talk to us, they'll try to make it sound as good as possible.
Why annoy us four weeks before the vote?
We may want something, they may want something from us until then.
The question is if their present count is too down.
It will be more than that on the day of the vote.
I wonder how much the argument we're reading about should make this historical.
I have to say, in defense of George and Bill, it will enable some of those who have pretended to us that they're closer to us than they are to use that as an alibi.
I think basically the votes are set now.
I do not think that objectively it affects the votes of anybody.
You know, I know that people will use things for excuses.
I can see some.
Right.
So we are telling them I'm prepared to come on the earlier date if they can do it.
So it's not... We're asking it as a favor.
Yeah, well...
Even like everybody, his first instinct was to do it.
And by the time you called him in, my impression was that he thought not to do it.
He not just sent the note.
He not just sent the note.
But you might want to check it with him personally.
That was at any rate my impression.
Because it takes so long to set these goddamn things up that if any part of it gets unstuck, it's always a two-month negotiation to get it set.
I don't want to have it set that you're so pending for that visit that you'll do anything to sacrifice anything to get it.
Mr. Reedy, this is not something that we even consider at the time.
Oh, no.
No, no.
I'm looking at what enemies can say, not what is true.
The time we proposed it, we did it on the assumption that the vote would be four weeks later.
You see the mess hall there?
The only thing that recommends us is the fact that we get what we have.
sort of a rude thing to do.
And yet if you don't give them the choice of making them come earlier, then they're certain to think that there's something being cooked up.
Oh, I think you were certain.
Right.
It was well due to the summit thing, the way we did it.
Before we go.
Because there's no chance now that the state can play the line.
Oh.
They thought that it was all arranged.
It was all over there.
Discussions and so forth.
Exactly.
And in a little note to you, it was so cool.
We got down on our feet and the impact went on.
Oh, yeah.
And Bill said, and there were three of us,
funny forms of paper they give you.
But that's the note they always use.
It's, we got exactly, we went out and got exactly the same paper they give me.
This would actually influence the vote.
We climb strongly to take this risk and view the fact that we just will not.
But the best of both worlds to have them is to not have Taiwan kicked out this year.
Absolutely.
Because you see, that presents a problem to us.
I don't want to write letters to this country.
You've accepted that the China trip would be gone and missed off, kicking Taiwan out.
But what will hurt you more than that, I think, is if I go to Peking after Taiwan has been kicked out.
Yeah.
You see, under this scheme,
Even if the state does not delay the debate, I will not be there when the vote is going on.
The vote will be about five days later.
After you get back?
The vote will be around the 29th and 30th.
You'll be back?
I'll be back on the 27th.
There might be some objections.
If you're going there after...
I don't know the announcement until it comes earlier.
Well, that's assuming they'll agree to the earlier announcement now.
I'm assuming they'll out early on some dress, but... Let's suppose they're kicked out, and then you... That's what...
I must not believe it.
If you go over there after they...
After they throw out Taiwan, it looks like we're stuck.
Even though we would know before, it looks like we're able to this week.
After they're kicked out, there will be strong pressures on us to just stand the whole time from the right.
And there will be immediate pressures on them to say, those kids should not go over there and talk to them.
And it's been laid in and our friends have been let out.
I think we should tell him we went through it.
Why don't I tell him that I put it to them
to make it later, and they said it's either then or not at all.
No, I don't want him to... No, but then he'll say we...
He'll say we, no.
I don't think we're very confident much.
Let's see what you can say, though.
The truth, that it's your political, that it's our political judgment here.
Well, I think that if they, because of the risk of losing...
But I think you're going after, immediately after the vote will be worse.
And you're going to the portal of hope.
That's right.
And that's where I'm going to go.
And of course, they might even come back.
You gave the best case, which is that we make the announcement next week and I go after the vote.
But supposing they come back and agree, say, to November 10th or 17th, with an announcement day of November 1st.
We lose on the 28th.
On November 1st I announce, now I go.
The peaking, I think that might be the worst.
I don't know.
It has to be the worst.
I think the peaking is that much to say, but he doesn't do it.
I think you heard the question.
We're just fighting ourselves.
Maybe we ought to fight a little harder to try to keep them in.
We're doing everything we can.
We're doing everything.
As you know, Mr. President, I have always thought it was a loser.
We always thought it was a loser.
I'm not saying it.
I finally went along with it because I had no better solution.
I have a meeting of the American people.
So I don't know if they only have that far.
I just haven't got the time.
I'm going to be the son of a bitch to pay it on demand, so he won't vote for it.
With regard to this, I think you just got to take the heat.
I think you just, and I think you told, but don't tell Bill the truth quite so soon.
I wouldn't do it right away.
Maybe all of them should do it.
He takes it more remotely.
It's all just going with you.
Yeah, but, uh, yeah, I'm at home, Tom.
And, uh, he just, uh, well, I don't know.
He could explain it to him easier.
But no, no, no.
I didn't call when you were doing it.
Oh, okay.
I didn't.
I think we have to work to do it this way.
I've got your hand up.
Tell Dave he's got to get a sabbatical at 3.30.
He's got to get his tax out of here in half an hour.
Do you want to have a cup of beer tonight?
It's not essential.
Well, uh...
I gave you the chance of it.
But it's...
I'm not just going to say hop on.