Conversation 594-010

TapeTape 594StartMonday, October 18, 1971 at 12:46 PMEndMonday, October 18, 1971 at 1:15 PMTape start time02:27:02Tape end time02:52:53ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceOval Office

On October 18, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:46 pm to 1:15 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 594-010 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 594-10/595-1

Date: October 18, 1971
Time: 12:46 pm - 1:15 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

     Salutations

     US foreign relations
          -India-Pakistan
                -India
                      -Henry A. Kissinger
                            -Anatolity F. Dobrynin
                            - Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
          -George H. W. Bush
                -Speech at the United Nations [UN]
                      -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                            -UN
                      -William P. Rogers
          -Possible meeting of Haig, Rogers, Bush and the President
                -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                -Executive Office Building [EOB]
                -Rogers
                -Strategy for UN vote on Taiwan
                      -Panama
                      -Greece
                      -Turkey
                      -Use of US ambassadors
                      -Venezuela
                            -Oil
                      -Greece and Turkey
                            -Congress
                                 -Foreign aid
                      -African countries
                      -Adam Malik
                            -White House
                                 -Rogers-Bush position
                      -Ronald L. Ziegler
                            -Planting of question

                                                         Conv. No. 594-10/595-1 (cont.)

                           -The president's position
                                 -Secretary of State
                                 -PRC
                                 -Taiwan
                -Chou En-lai
                -Ziegler
                -Bush
                      -Speech
                -Ziegler
                      -Rogers
                      -Bush
                      -Press conference
                           -The President
                      -Administration position
                      -Rogers
     -Soviet Naval task force
          -Cuba
                -Kissinger
                      -Dobrynin
                      -Aleksei N. Kosygin’s visit to Cuba
     -Kissinger
          -Press
                -Gerard C. Smith
                      -Washington Post
                      -The President’s trip to Moscow
                           -Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
                      -[Forename unknown] Getler
                      -Defense Department
                      -Haldeman
                           -State
                           -Defense

US foreign policy
     -Relationship with media
          -Memorandum from Haig and the President
          -Smith
                -Rogers
                -Ziegler
                -Nobel peace prize
     -Senior Review Group [SRG]
          -Cambodia

                                                       Conv. No. 594-10/595-1 (cont.)

           -US involvement
                 -Press stories
           -Melvin R. Laird
                 -Hill liaison
                 -Senate foreign relations committee
-Administration policy
     -Relationship with media
           -Smith
           -Rogers
           -News summaries
           -Paul H. Nitze
                 -Smith
                       -Defense Department
           -Rogers
-Bush
     -Timing regarding UN votes
     -Richard A. Moore
           -Ireland
                 -John D. Moore
                 -English
                 -Airline issue
                 -John M. Lynch's note
-UN vote
     -Effect in US
     -US membership in UN
     -Administration position
-Kissinger
     -Soviets
-North Vietnam
     -Rice crop
     -Pol
           -Soviets
                 -Deliveries
     -Peking

                                                       Conv. No. 594-10/595-1 (cont.)

**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration: 3s ]

    NORTH VIETNAM

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

**************************************************************************

         -Kissinger
               -Moscow
                    -Paris
                    -Hanoi
         -Letter
               -Dobrynin
                    -Moscow

    Letter
          -Band people
               -Laird

    John B. Connally trip
              -Announcement
                    -Indonesians
                    -Japanese
                          -Ambassador
                          -Okinawa
                          -Eisaku Sato

                                                                Conv. No. 594-10/595-1 (cont.)

**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security]
[Duration: 18s ]

     JAPAN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

**************************************************************************

                            -Purpose of Connally’s visit
                      -Indonesians
                      -Timing
                      -Sato
                -Congress
                      -Conflict with administration
                -Public relations
                -Timing of announcement
                      -Robert H. Finch’s trip
                -Bangkok
                -Indonesia
                -Saigon
                -Philippines
                -Japan
                      -Tokyo
                -Hong Kong

This conversation was cut off at an unknown time before 1:15 pm; it is continued on Oval 595.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I will.
Thank you.
Oh, my.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Two-thirty, go.
C-A-A, come in.
Now.
uh no sir we still quite nervous about the india pac thing there's very worrisome reports coming out no one thinks that the indians are about to move but henry suggested i called the green today and just crack it very hard on the
Pressure on India and India.
And we will go ahead.
We had a near horror this morning.
Bush gave a speech that was scheduled to be given at 10.30.
We got the text at 10 o'clock and it was laced with presumptuous inferences about
how China has been bad, and we kept them out of the UN.
Now they've turned good, and it's well to bring them into the UN.
He said that he indicated that they had turned good.
That they had moderated their performance.
Well, we got it all straightened out, sir, because Secretary Ryan was very responsive.
I call him a desperationist.
And we've blasted out all these paragraphs of one, I think it's under... Let me suggest a couple of things on that.
I talked to the writers about it.
I think that you, Rogers, Bush, and I should meet and work it out with all of us for a good time.
I would do it.
I would.
Well, listen, I just want to have a meeting with you over at EOB.
Go over to how the hell things stand and what more can be done.
Roger, this morning, when I raised the book, I said, I'll be done as much as we can.
He said, well, I don't want you to have an oral notice and so forth.
He said, well, we don't want you to do too many because we want to be rebutted.
Our little thing doesn't bother me particularly.
I mean, if you, where we think, for example, it's ridiculous for countries like Canada, Greece, Turkey, Venezuela, just to name four, that totally depend on us, for them to be against us on the same thing.
And we, we, this is one place where we can put the pressure on now.
Right.
That's the whole answer.
It's done privately and done in tough times.
That's right.
That's the way we've been doing it.
But even there, I think what we ought to do is say, look, we have leverage points on each of these countries.
and some hints ought to be made and whether it's oil for benzoyl.
Well, sure.
We've got quite a lot of other things.
And with recent turkey, it's going to have a hell of a problem at our Congress.
Every country, every country, every country that votes against the United States on this is going to die.
At the 350th Congress, there are four titles that are going to take it out of that.
Boy, hey, now that should hit every time that happens.
Although the lack of conciseness, that should be drawn up.
This is what's supposed to happen.
Well, we've been here.
Now, one other thing that Roger suggested, and I think it does make sense.
He pointed to a telegram from Malick, in which Malick said that there was a question about the U.S. position in this order or not, the White House position.
was undercutting in order was the Rogers question.
Rogers is aware of how they're necessarily playing this.
And so there's no problem in his part that he accepted.
He believes, and I think he's getting it.
Of course, he's absolutely correct.
Apart from the vote, in terms of our problems with this Congress, there can be no question on that point in this country of yours.
Now, what I would like to do here is for you to get a picture.
I think his line should be, gentlemen, there's no question about the president's position.
We are for the deletion of the, we put a very simple argument, the president, this nation, this country's position, and there's no difference between the president's position and that of the Secretary of State in the United States of America.
We are for, we think, the deletion of mainland China.
We oppose the expulsion of Taiwan, and the president is in full support of that decision.
If he's in full support of that decision,
No, it doesn't.
Our big problem is to keep this from developing into any kind of a duel between you and Joe and I that he's got this.
refund, uh, publicly or that could sound reasonable.
The other hand, uh, we, if Ziegler doesn't, I assume, I do not, I don't intend to have any press conferences until after we've spoken for this reason, but it's, uh, but if Ziegler does this, it seems to me that just, just simply says that there's no, there's, it, it, it starts, it starts to be effective as a difference between Secretary of State and President.
They're totally wrong.
We have one position, Mr. President, one position in this government, and just the name is for the admission of one against the expulsion of the president.
The president is in full support.
That doesn't pose any problem, does it?
No.
The word is full support.
But not any rhetoric then?
That's what we have to be careful of, is personalize it.
That's just what Bush's speech did, unfortunately.
Oh, God, it would have been a humdinger.
And we just exercised large portions of it out, and the secretary called up to me.
He told you?
He told me he didn't call.
Yeah.
Good.
Well, if you work that out, let's say, and tell Ron, I think the best time for him to do it would be at least after the Bush speech.
That would be better.
Well, he's given it.
See, we had 15 minutes.
Well, then why don't you have it?
You could do it.
I just want that done.
And then we can do it, but it looks like we've got a hell of a lot of play anyway.
Well, it's coming to the Senate.
So that Roberts can use it with, see, Roberts and Bush and Al can use it with the various countries.
That's what I want.
I just want something off the record.
All right.
That's not our idea.
Yes, I think it's all right as long as we keep the view out of it as a person, let Ron do it, and just let him... That's all right, but we have one policy.
Yes.
I'm going to avoid press conference like a play until, frankly, after there's both.
So it's important that some direction gets back.
This is the time that we can get out.
So, on the other hand, there's the interest system.
He has to answer the question.
He does in terms of there's no difference between the White House and the administration.
He just picked off the essentials.
This is the administration's position.
There's no difference.
It's whatever.
And avoid going any beyond that.
So if you would handle that, and then if you would just keep your relationship, you could just say, you would talk to the secretary, he's going to make this, and, you know, clear it up to them and say, here's what you plan on having to say.
Or just have him say it and then send it over to him.
You work out what you think he's...
But I didn't get by.
The Soviet task force has swung north now, and they may or may not be going to Cuba.
You know, Henry hit the green very hard on us.
They'll probably fiddle around and
on the edge of propriety, but I think they're conscious of the fact that we're damn sensitive to this.
And, uh...
I mean, for Casper, is he going to Cuba now?
Yes, sir.
You know, I don't know that Henry told you that Kosygin was going to visit there.
Well...
Which they claim is essential, and I think it probably is.
I don't think he remained.
We had some bad press this weekend.
That goddamn Smith line got into the post yesterday about your trip to Moscow under cutting salt.
Well, that line appeared in a Gettler story, and it had a little Defense Department twist to it, so I'm going to talk to Bob about really cracking down on both State and Defense on this issue.
It's disloyal to you.
It's a goddamn incorrect logic to begin with, and it's self-serving to that delegation of ours.
I don't know how to go further.
I think...
Bob's cracked down.
No, no, I'll do it, but I want to be aware in case they come back and bleed.
I'll tell you, but I want you to send a memorandum.
I want you to say the President's concerned about it.
The President doesn't know that this, he believes that this is, and then it'll be, I don't want you to say it'll just be tough as hell.
The President brought you to this, but it's all of my attention, these things.
And then just say what can you do, and this is totally...
Uh, don't you think that's the way to handle it?
So that doesn't occur to you, it's just the NIC setting?
Yes, sir.
Well, I don't think that I feel that way, pal.
Oh, absolutely, and it, uh, you know, it's awfully strange when you get a picture on Thursday from Smith, and on Sunday there's a piece that's running fairly parallel to it.
When you talk to Rodgers, Tom and I were concerned about it, and I think he ought to agree.
At least Smith or I don't have to do it, but I'm going to have to say we're doing it publicly.
I just put it that way.
He's going to keep it.
Well, Santa's a no-go.
We have to keep him.
He's just so concerned he doesn't get to...
He's afraid we're going to make the deal.
Take his glory away as Nobel Peace Prize.
In Christ, he wouldn't even be there if it hadn't been for what was done back here.
Well, it's good when people are fighting for the glory and music.
We have an SRG meeting on Cambodia today.
There's been a lot of bad press stories on the air.
Is that right?
Well, we're planning to get involved up over our years in there, and of course we're not.
At the same time, it's very limited.
Most of these people are using that argumentation so that we don't help these poor people, and we'll get that ironed out today.
We're bringing lads back to help with the fight on the hill because they put a limitation on money and people.
in the Foreign Relations Committee, but I think we can...
I want you to call Rodgers, though, and I just said that I was, that after he left, I had, I had just read my new summary, and I was frankly shocked.
To put it that way, I was really dissatisfied with him, but I really didn't want to put it that way.
I think he's got to keep Smith reached out
You'll do it.
Exactly right.
I think that's a healthy.
I think Paul Mitza helped him, too, with the source.
No, sir, but it's his line.
It's the Smith line flavored a little bit by Defense Department considerations on the offensive systems, which would make Mitza...
crime candidate.
And that's unfair.
He may be totally innocent, but that's also very partisan.
I'm just telling you what I am, that my, my, just say that our reports are, that's a, put it right into our, that's where we can't, we haven't verified it, but I'm just saying it's goddamn, but I want, I want, I want it cracked.
If he, if he won't crack it, I will, just put it that way, but I will, I intend to do it myself, if he won't crack it, because I don't want to send out a memorandum.
the president on this, but will he crash on that?
Right.
In the meantime, isn't that better, really, than a rocket crash?
I think it is.
And I think he'll do it.
I'm certain he will do it, because it hurts us.
That's what I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
I'm telling you.
George Bush probably might be better out at the end of the week so that we can see one thing, so that we can get a better idea as to what the calendar is and where we are.
Now, unless they feel that
Something needs to be done.
Now, I'd just like to know, when they get down to the closer boats, which, what did you think about Thursday would be, or Thursday Friday would be at the time?
Yes, sir.
I do.
I...
Here's George Cass, a senior here from Cousins.
And also, our next year is just to be down here.
I just talked to Kate Moore, you know, and Tony Irons, and Tom, his brother.
John said that our Irish group has got that business of the Irish group, but the English group has got us on this.
That's what it gets come to.
God damn it.
Of course, we have that silly Irish girl.
That's what they answered with, you know.
And then we were in the store on that airline.
That airline company heard from me.
That's what the lady said as soon as she gave me the note.
It was why she was concerned about small firms on the airline business or something like that.
How do you feel from her end?
Well, if we reopen the airline, then it's worth it.
I think it's worth it.
Let me put it this way.
The best of both worlds, now, is for us to win this war.
And they'll get it next year.
But this year is not a good time to lose this vote.
All hell will break loose now.
Like, where were you?
We survived it.
Hell will break loose in the Congress.
And the country knows about this.
Get out of the U.N.
I can hear it now.
And also, while it irritates the hell out of the Chinese Congress, for us to win this vote, it is a part of the story of me.
No, no, not the winning of the vote.
I don't think we do.
Just so is the way we win this vote.
You see, I find this, we've got to make the effort to win the damn vote.
Well, it would be a tragedy if we lose and somebody could say, well, the White House didn't support it.
That's right.
That's why this statement must be out.
It must be very clear on the record.
I wouldn't be surprised that I don't worry that I'll be in the basement at all, frankly.
They're in trouble.
We have estimates that 50% of their rice crop is gone.
That's the one-time-a-year crop that they really sustain themselves on up north.
It's gone.
They have a requirement.
They're having POL problems from the Soviets.
They're not getting their deliveries.
They're very, very concerned about Peking.
and then making one statement after another.
They have a directive after their people, which is a secret one.
It said that you can be sure that they can not betray us because if this would be the end for all they represent.
So it was an unsure assurance to their people.
I just think they're in hell.
We've got as much leverage working on them now as we've ever had.
There's one thing we've got to be sure that we're coming home.
Everybody knows if you're planning to go to Moscow, you must not do it.
Now it's too high a price to pay, and we're not going to do it.
It doesn't need to be done.
It doesn't need to be done.
And also, you know, we...
We've given about as much as we could ever expect to give, and if that isn't enough, goddammit, we've got the leverage on our side.
We've got the leverage to do the job.
That's right.
I couldn't agree more.
I just think for him, just even...
You know, he comes back, and it comes out like this one had squelched.
I'm not, never, I'll never approve his going to Moscow.
I never will.
He must not do it.
I just want to see the visit.
It's just, it's impossible for it to be seen.
No, I don't think Hanoi wants it.
Huh?
I think they'll put Hanoi in an untenable position.
They don't want it.
They want to go on.
Well, they just got this idea, well, with Moscow, and why don't we get in on that piece back there?
Henry must have put himself up front and center that pretty much, and this is not necessary.
No.
No, I think he's come away from that considerably, sir.
I think he realizes it's a mixed bag.
Is that a letter of reference at all?
Yes, sir.
It's being signed today.
I didn't want to bother you with it.
We've given to Dobrynin a copy of it, unsigned, which he wanted to send back to Moscow over the weekend.
He's delighted with the letter.
Now, I've sent messages, incidentally, to the band people that you asked about last week through Mr. Laird, and they're just delighted and very honored.
How about the Connolly trip announcement?
Is that, what's it say?
We've got one temporary hang-up, and that is the Indonesians have not replied yet.
We sent a flash message.
The Japanese player?
Japanese.
Well, one thing I want you to do is this.
I think you ought to get in on a very quiet basis to the Japanese ambassador and tell him that the President is really concerned.
The flat board over Okinawa.
And that he doesn't, he feels it's very important that this be done in the highest time.