Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 604 › Conversation 604-006

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Defense Budget and United Nations

Wednesday, October 27, 1971 · 1:32 PM–3:45 PM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Kissinger, Henry A.; Bull, Stephen B.; Butterfield, Alexander P.; Connally, John B.; Ehrlichman, John D.; Haig, Alexander M., Jr.; Shultz, George P.; Weinberger, Caspar W. ("Cap")Conversation604-006 on Tape 604 (tape position 00:12:39–01:04:40)StartWednesday, October 27, 1971 at 1:32 PMEndWednesday, October 27, 1971 at 3:45 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 604-006 ↗

President Nixon and his senior advisors, including H. R. Haldeman, Henry Kissinger, and John Connally, met to discuss defense budget strategies, the political fallout from Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations, and preparations for upcoming foreign diplomacy. Nixon emphasized the need for a leaner, more effective military posture that focuses on strategic procurement rather than broad manpower, while also debating the risks of domestic political opposition and the impact of the defense budget on the economy. The group analyzed the necessity of maintaining a strong defense to bolster negotiating positions with the Soviet Union and China, while also coordinating the administration’s measured public response to the UN vote.

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13:15I talked to Schultz and told him that we couldn't launch a defense thing today and that I was going to.
13:23I said I didn't want him to feel that I was double-crossing him because I had worked with him on the other thing.
13:29Well, I said on reconsideration.
13:33I wanted to raise with you the issue of whether this was a good time to overrule the Defense Department recommendation and whether we shouldn't take one more look at it.
13:42Well, I told them to be on board, and so it is.
13:47First, I want to get a copy of the Express Institute for a second.
13:52And then I want to make it very brief.
13:53And then second, I don't need to hear any more arguments for Schultz and Wagner, because I've heard all their arguments.
13:59I thought it would be well to then ask the only question I want to ask them, and I want to get you in, is to simply say, look here, how much of this can we frankly do as a bookkeeping?
14:15And basically, in other words, authorization
14:19Well, actually, they can do it the other way around more easily.
14:23They can spend Haiti with the 77.5 authorization because they have about $2 billion they can pay.
14:32Well, what I agree with you, I don't mind spending it, too.
14:40What I'm thinking about is being in the arguments against, of course, having a bigger budget.
14:46This is a inflationary impact by our policy to budget more, not money.
14:51So, therefore, you can have a bigger number of people.
14:55The budget becomes unbalanced money.
14:58by all positions, but by sending in what is, in terms of the number, the higher the number sounds, the better it is.
15:14Yeah, well, that's what I think, too.
15:15Well, Schultz is prepared for the fact that I will raise the issue.
15:19You don't even have to raise it, you know, so that, but I will raise it, and it's, you could then say, let's look at it for a week, and come back,
15:28But it's up to you if you want to raise it.
15:30I just want to make it a little easier for you so that you don't have to argue with folks.
15:33Why?
15:33You've had enough arguing with folks.
15:34I don't want to argue with you.
15:35No, but I thought we could say it was fair to that.
15:39But either way, it's fine.
15:41Now, the other thing is that I had forgotten to tell you there were two items I'd like you to do on the parade.
15:45I shall speak to you.
15:48What?
15:48I shall speak to you.
15:54I want you to have, why don't you give this assignment to some trusted person like me.
16:01I want every one of the United Nations to vote with us.
16:09analyze, not understand.
16:16But when you've got countries like Britain and France and so forth, you can't do without anything about that.
16:23I'm referring now to jackass centers that were really, where they shouldn't be able to kick the United States around.
16:28Well, I saw, for example, Botswana land.
16:30But goddamn, those little sons of bitches there.
16:32Newsom, Botswana land has a population of 300,000.
16:35It exists only because they
16:38in its mushy-headedness, is trying to use them against South Africa.
16:41Now, then we should have been able to get it.
16:43All right.
16:43Now, that's my point.
16:45What I want to do now, though, we want to have reward and pleasure.
16:49And I want to go right down the line.
16:50For example, we've got an issue.
16:52Now, I've got a scheme worked out.
16:54I don't want to tell you about it at all, because it's better than the one we've all chosen.
17:01I've written out a scheme on how we did the search acts.
17:07The Japanese will probably be the first beneficiaries.
17:10We're going to do it straight, not the Canadians.
17:12Oh, no, that's good.
17:13And because we want to split them up in all of Latin America.
17:17I thought we were going to do that.
17:19Well, they can advance some of the others, just to give them some advantage over them.
17:25Yeah.
17:26Tell them I'll be the lady in about three, four minutes.
17:29I'll go.
17:39The other thing has to do with reasons of conflict prior to his trip abroad.
17:52And I told him that you and I, or you,
17:57We want him to be in a position to be very important common.
18:15when he's there.
18:15Now, he'll know how to report coming to the monetary side, but if there's anything else politically correct, where he can, you know, they came up with sort of a thing like you made for me.
18:26Now, as you may have heard, I think they, that Sullivan's going with you.
18:29Sullivan.
18:29Bill Sullivan.
18:31Because of the Vietnam side of it, there is, excuse me, going to Vietnam.
18:38Now, Sullivan has no authority in Japan, you see.
18:42No, and he is one of the most ruthless sons of bitches.
18:44Well, then we may raise a question about him, sir.
18:48Well, let's do it right now.
18:50Well, we don't care.
18:50I mean, he was going because of the Vietnam side of things.
18:55Well, he sure as hell wasn't going to go before Connolly went.
18:57What?
18:58He sure as hell wasn't going to go before Connolly went.
19:01Well, let me put it this way, Paul.
19:03I think the reason they do it is that they felt that with Connolly going, they had to have a high-ranking person.
19:10They're right.
19:11You can't send Connolly out there with an airboat.
19:14Now, I have told him that we want to give him some confidence that under no circumstances does he have any confidential talks with the Japanese, with my air presence.
19:24Or some of them, Chris.
19:26Oh, I told him, no State Department person or nobody on his own staff, except his own...
19:30But the trouble with Sullivan...
19:32But I will not allow it.
19:35And also, I wonder about Indonesia.
19:36He wouldn't be well.
19:37How about Galbraith?
19:39Is he trustworthy?
19:40I'm not going to...
19:41I want to talk a little with Indonesia about the military side.
19:46I would not have Galbraith, and I wouldn't have Sullivan.
19:48All right, good.
19:50All right, now the other country he goes to, I guess it doesn't matter, Vietnam, Bunker's virtually all right.
19:55Oh, yeah, he has to go to Bunker.
19:56Now, who else does he go to in the country?
20:00That's all.
20:00Well, the ambassador there, it doesn't matter.
20:03I don't think he consists of not having ambassadors in the country.
20:07In fact, that guy's sort of an abrasive at all.
20:14No, he's a weakling, Bunker.
20:16Oh, I know.
20:16He's always in the system of being present.
20:19Yeah.
20:20But I'm sure we don't have so many secrets.
20:22I haven't got to change Meyer.
20:23I haven't got anybody to change him.
20:26But Meyer is, that's true, Meyer leaked it all back to Sting.
20:29And this monetary thing has got to be closely held because we can't even, we can't let him, like Burns, know what we're doing here.
20:36Because Burns is in a different room, not that ours isn't already, but you see, it's a highly secret business.
20:40A highly secret business.
20:45And also, I don't want, I don't want that locomotive to leap back into the goddamn State Department Theater.
20:52See what I mean?
20:54Right.
20:54So, what about that talk with the company?
20:56Do you think we could do that?
20:57Well, I had it scheduled for this afternoon, and I...
21:00But you're going to have a briefing, sir.
21:02Yeah, so I was going to make...
21:05Let me say, after you finish your brief at 4.30 maybe, maybe we'll be sure to call him and then we can do that.
21:13All right, sure.
21:13What is your situation?
21:14I can do it.
21:16All right, but tomorrow would be better.
21:17I'm calling tomorrow.
21:19We have a quadriad.
21:21And he takes off.
21:24He told me he could do it at 3 tomorrow.
21:26Is that when you have the quadriad?
21:33All right, then why don't we do it?
21:35I can adjust my schedule, Mr. President.
21:39Well, then I can do it as well.
21:40I'd rather think that you and I should be together breathing on this thing so that he doesn't get any...
21:46He, of course, has no confidence in the State Department, whatever.
21:51The trouble is Sullivan makes this deceptively tough impression.
21:56Oh, I don't know.
21:56Well, we've got to tell him.
21:57I think we've got to tell him exactly what Sullivan tells people.
22:00He has to tell them he's smart, and he gives the impression there's some matter, and that he must not be taken in by them.
22:09Because under no circumstances, under order, under no circumstances, that as a matter of practice, he is not deceived.
22:15It's a hard order.
22:17He's got to see Malone, and he's got to see Sano, and the Japanese and his people.
22:23Malone, without Sano, and without the ambassador.
22:25Now, I think also that he should have, that both Sahara and Sano should get messages from me.
22:34Absolutely.
22:35We'll have them drafted.
22:38All right.
22:38That sound all right with you?
22:41Fine.
22:41Excellent.
22:43Well, I think we're...
22:44I think we're...
22:47i think that we have the one thing we're on just about is we've done all we can and i think that those they push anymore i don't need to uh i mean of course i'll see if i'm switching but my feeling is as i told the ziggler i said you know what we've done here we've only used a little rhetoric and we didn't talk about the vote you know it's very carefully done we said we just okay we just set up the conduct of some of those who who
23:16to show that they're taking close, frankly, and take seriously that support from the U.S. And the country needs to hear me say that, because the country needs to also
23:31That's what I feel about the U.S. God damn it, I ought to say it.
23:36Well, I don't think it did any, well, it certainly didn't do any damage.
23:40No, no, I mean any damage with the Chinese.
23:42Oh, with the Chinese it was not.
23:44And it does a lot of good with the Chinese.
23:48It does a lot of good.
23:49Henry, they have mistreated me up there twice.
23:51Well, I think that behavior towards you last year was a disgrace.
23:55And to think that these sons of bitches can... Never then.
23:57And they were late.
23:58Never then.
23:58Well, they were late.
23:59The Secretary General didn't treat you at the duel, which was absolutely outrageous, with the argument that he had a lunch for some cartel chief of delegation.
24:11I'm never going again.
24:13I think you'd be wrong to go next year.
24:15Why expose yourself in an election year?
24:18Why expose myself at all?
24:20There's no chips in for us.
24:23You've been up there twice.
24:24They gave you cool reception both times.
24:27You gave excellent speeches.
24:28In fact, they were two of your best speeches on foreign policy.
24:36No, but they overplayed their hands, and they just enjoyed kicking us around publicly.
24:42It was flexible.
24:45You were all nice and set up.
24:50You worked out the time.
24:51Right.
24:51I was proud of you.
24:53Tell the reason.
24:55I'm not going to tell you.
24:59I'm going to argue with you.
25:01I'm going to argue with you.
25:03I'm going to argue with you.
25:08John, I was just talking to Henry about the need for you and I to talk briefly on the political side.
25:26We need a half hour.
25:28And I was wondering, before the Quadrat, maybe in the
25:34What time do you leave tomorrow?
25:367 o'clock tomorrow evening.
25:38Well, we can do it afterwards.
25:39That would be better than not doing it.
25:41Quadrat would be at 3, 430.
25:43How about 430 tomorrow?
25:45430 tomorrow?
25:45No, 430.
25:45Well, you come over here to the Quadrat, and as soon as it finishes, it'll last an hour and a half.
25:54Or we'll try to make the class that long.
25:57We'll spend a half hour with you and half an hour with him.
26:03I thought that would be a lot to make it last.
26:05Because I'll be here as early as I can spend the hour and all that time.
26:09That's good to have something come on later.
26:15Okay.
26:17Sit down.
26:17Sit down.
26:28I see where...
26:31I see where Goldberg got his arms twisted.
26:37I don't know if you did it.
26:51He's about a foot taller than I am.
26:53And every time he grabs me and pulls me closer, it gets kind of dry, doesn't it?
27:02Doesn't know whether he lifts me up or whether he can twist me.
27:06I think he can twist.
27:15We can make this work.
27:22I don't want to be cited right now.
27:49Now, what I'd like to do is to not go into what the total budget is and all that, but what I'm only interested in is the figure that the Defense Department is asking for and the figure that the
28:22You just need to take a couple minutes to say a word.
28:25You know, so that God's aware of what the choice is.
28:29I'd like to get the other day, where we have had
28:36There are four things going on.
28:40Mark Miller has been talking publicly about a budget of $80 billion plus and encouraging the chiefs, more or less, in that route, of the Ashford Saddle opposition to spend any more gold.
28:53I believe he's talking in terms of outlays, but he just talked about an $80 billion budget.
28:59And so that gives us some real work to do over there.
29:04The second thing that's going on is the traditional joint review involving the secretary's staff and the OFB staff just going through the items.
29:15That's David Packard's process on the defense side.
29:27And third, and it's going on, it's something that David and Henry and I got started after the last meeting, and we had to see each other again.
29:32I can't remember my time, but we were back in August sometime.
29:40And there, we have three staff people taking up significant issues, such as the air defense issue, which is the one that's furthest along, and trying to get a joint decision paper to be on a major policy issue that the decisions on which will sort of underlie what will be under the president.
30:07Because it seemed that the public posture of the defense budget was moving so fast at such a high level relative to what we had thought.
30:16You remember your guidance of last summer was $75 million, although that was, you had specified, was subject to review and so on.
30:26We, in the NSC staff, and the OMB staff, every night,
30:36put a study in place trying to estimate what we thought was a defense outlay number compatible with the foreign policy objectives as you said, as Henry interpreted them to us.
31:03There are processes going on with the number.
31:05The two in-between processes are sort of, they are spinning away on particular issues.
31:10They don't have an outcome.
31:13Although our own OMB NSC defense staff group is fairly well along.
31:21The exercise that Henry and I conducted that was reported to you last week when we discussed this,
31:29sees a content in the neighborhood of 77, 777 and a half billion dollars as a, as compatible with the foreign policy objection.
31:40That's just talking about contents that we
31:45have at the same time an ability through the management of outlays during the year starting now and what we did in the 71 budget to move the actual number that can be put in the budget you set up
32:02We can move the outlays down by a billion and a half to two billion, or we can move them up just by sheer outlay management.
32:12That is not going to affect the content of what is bought or the core structure or anything of that kind.
32:19We can't have an impact on the cosmetics, let's say, of the budget.
32:24We desire to have the budget dip down into the full revenue level
32:31I think the
33:01I think we have, what we have here, how much is that anything else?
33:15How layered have you moved out?
33:32for a bunch of certain reasons.
33:36Now, we're disagreeing on two things here.
33:40Not only, I mean that in a natural sense, we all must be, not only what can we get forgiven in the full point of reference and all that, which is how it's going to affect the economy, but we are also pretty much at our best
34:07And it also will give us a strong market position at the Silicon Valley as we go forward in our response.
34:23Now, on that story, in County Adamsburg, the story of .
34:28So one of the public minds, and having asked that question, he said, as I understand,
34:38is going to be involved in coming back on air defense and some of the obsolete stuff that we're doing.
34:47I think that is the way in which, as we talked about it, we would get down below the defense level.
34:54I think that is the primary way in which we would do it.
34:57I don't think we would help ourselves, Mr. Preston, if we, in order to get to a certain level, maintain forces for which we have no rationale.
35:07I must say, on the trip, having had a chance to do some thinking, and I worked with George on these figures, and they are good figures.
35:22They are all defensible figures.
35:25But as I reflected about the strategic development of the Soviet Union at this moment, of which the facts are going to become more and more known,
35:36as the year goes on.
35:38And some of its aspects, more or even more than the publicized ones, for example, we always used to think that we ran no risks in ADM limitations because it would take them three years to build radars.
35:53And whenever we saw big radar development, we could catch up.
36:09ourselves confronted with a very rapid radar, ABM radar development center.
36:15So whether it's the purpose here in which you have to talk to, whether we shouldn't keep in mind some dictionary, as in also when you see the Chinese, their toughness and sense of purpose.
36:34For all these reasons,
36:37And this is George A. who says, not in accord with what we discussed before, I was wondering whether the President wants to give us another week to look at this again, not in order to restore things which ought to be up and in such a serious sense, but what if you wanted to go into the 80 billion vicinity, whether we could rationally, whether we could do something that would really
37:06be helpful and would particularly help us in these negotiating situations, which we could run into next year.
37:14Let me say this, that just simply having a team does an awful lot of work.
37:18We need to spread it.
37:19We always have a one-to-three services.
37:24So if the Army, who are more stars, and the Air Force, of course, they have...
37:32No, never.
37:34We've got to use the budget process for the purpose of shaping that service model.
37:41It's an irrational, strategic concept.
37:45And air defense is one area, and it's a waste of money.
37:47You know it.
37:48Everybody knows it.
37:50Nobody in the Soviet Union is not going to attack the United States.
37:54Not at this time, but they're putting all their eggs in the missile basket.
37:58There's a few bombers coming across the pole.
38:00And so why do we have a lot of, you know, correct?
38:03Absolutely.
38:04And so then that action is much better.
38:07The second thing is regarding
38:31I don't think it's going to influence the Soviet one damn bit to have another army
39:00We're going to get some real added strength to our strategic deal about either the defense or the offensive side, something that we can negotiate with.
39:21That, to me, would make a hell of a lot of sense at this point.
39:28but i i've never seen anything proposed that way nobody's ever proposed building more polaris nobody's ever proposed building more uh
39:48Now what, so how does all this, I don't see how this, I don't see how all this is going to be relevant, Henry, to our heart and decision, and also to the problem.
39:59Now, let me just add one point.
40:01It's miserable in the public's community.
40:08Of course, three years ago, there was no threat at all in the Soviet Union and the United States.
40:17That's not why I'm speaking out loud in other ways.
40:21And they've had television commentators on showing hundreds and hundreds of new holes all over the Soviet Union.
40:28And they're just scared to live in the Jesus side of the people who see these things and say, well, we don't want to change the window.
40:33It's old.
40:33It's something new.
40:34One day we'll wake up and the Soviet will be looking at our homes.
40:38That was on four days ago.
40:39CBS, I mean, we're all wonderful people.
40:45The garbage is on the eastern side.
40:46It's not 100, but it's close to 100.
40:49But whatever it is, whatever it is, that is that you see my fight is we have to confront two different problems.
40:56First, we confront the reality, what we really need.
40:59And that is one thing.
41:01But if what we really need is not enough to give the American people the assurance that they have an adequate defense, and therefore we become vulnerable on the political side, forget it.
41:11It's not enough.
41:13And if what we really need is not enough to give us the proper bargaining position, then it's the same thing.
41:20In these very important talks, and the Chinese, well, the Chinese, yes, that's right, even though they are far away from us from a strategic standpoint, they're quite aware of the fact
41:31That's where the infantry divisions have the same potential.
41:33Oh, I told you I should have had something over there.
41:35It means that we're not getting out of Asia, that's certain.
41:40Those are the things, John, that I'd like.
41:43Assuming that we go this way, the higher the budget.
41:48We run two races.
41:49One is the first of the 60.
41:53Either of you unbalance the budget more.
41:57But we're only talking, basically, about $2-3 million.
42:02That's the number.
42:04Or, we, and if I do this anyway, we have to tax more.
42:11As far as, as far as, as far as the inflation, in fact, $2-3 million, as far as the, and incidentally, you say that all of this may be totally moved, because if you get it down to that state of Congress,
42:26they're very likely to cut it back anyway, despite all the particulars.
42:32We'd go over the arms stocks and so forth.
42:34You see now we have this interesting picture.
42:37Our very good right wing friends are yakking their heads off about our defense function.
42:43Not being central.
42:45We fought the battle for ADM. We fought the battle against the Mansfield Amendment Center, the ones that were involved.
42:54They were nowhere to be seen.
42:56They don't have a chance, but nevertheless, they fight with him.
43:01We have to realize that the general trend in so far as support for defense is down.
43:07That could change, could, I don't know.
43:11Looking at it on the political side, you do have people, at least with a good sense of meaning, Jackson, who could have...
43:22I mean, I was the hardliner, he was the stoplight.
43:26It wasn't true.
43:42or just might be able to scare the Jesus out of people.
43:48Have no mistake, they might.
43:49So, what I'm thinking of is that maybe the present members are hiding a budget number that could be used in domestic opposition.
43:59If there is a whole lot of domestic opposition expressed, that will have a very detrimental effect on the attitudes of the Russians and the Chinese.
44:11because the later Americans, the politicians and so forth, and the Senate said in the United States, if the bear asked for an attack, the bear would.
44:19Right.
44:20Well, that was the case in the late 50s.
44:23Actually, we had a crushing superiority.
44:25Yeah.
44:26And we talked ourselves into a missile gun.
44:30In this, just to ran a picture of the number, we have built up the force structure above
44:40in a sense, what the defense process is carrying.
44:45Since, I think, beefing up the divisions, I'm not mistaken, the Army divisions and the Marine divisions to full strength, it was also the case that the obligational authority, that would be the equivalent of this 77 and a half or so budget,
45:08would be in the Indian category.
45:16Yeah, the off-campus part.
45:17It's not that could be talked about.
45:21If you were to build up, say, the Navy ships to a greater extent, build more ships, that's the kind of thing that tends to build the obligational authority of
45:36Well, I think we should push the alms development.
45:41The alms is the larger boat with larger metal that can operate through the island and therefore makes a larger area of the room.
45:53Basically, we should put both the ocean behind it.
46:05I thought what George and I could do is by the same process by which we came up to this video,
46:32if he agrees, whether we could look at some of these things like strategic programs and see what could be done to emphasize those areas, like arms, that might need some strengthening.
46:47Well, my name is, of course, Mr. Englishman.
46:56It's a major program.
46:58I'm more option for us.
47:01and what the hell they were reacting to.
47:05I guess they were both interested in whatever you were interested in.
47:09Well, it was a very split-up issue.
47:11I never gave it a hell of a howl.
47:13I think one of the reasons why we agreed to get out of it was in terms of what, Adam, if you had got to say with regard to the Navy, the Air Force, the FBI,
47:30I didn't hear one damn word in that presentation, except it was totally selfish, totally...
47:37looking at it very effective in terms of what they needed and so forth, but nothing with regard to strategic planning.
47:43So Moe was clever enough to talk a little about that, but it took part of what he was going to do.
47:50He had some sort of fussy thing.
47:52His was actually the trickiest.
47:54That's what I meant.
47:54He made it appear that he was talking about strategy.
47:59The other thing is he doesn't tell us strategy at all.
48:02I mean, it was a sad, sad performance.
48:05And the four chiefs who even left, I mean, the service secretary was, of course, a man.
48:12So if we could have a few more days, say, until early next week for George and... Well, we didn't have the day, but I'd like to know before we... How, how...
48:24Yes, sir, you're... You've got a reaction, so...
48:27I have several reactions to that.
48:32First, as you see now, people, we're making this decision before we get to that point.
48:42It's unfortunate.
48:43Well, it won't be, you know, quite no return, but we will try to change the next week.
48:51Go ahead.
48:52Well, first, I would, I see from the lack of
48:56of information, as you well know, and about the tables.
49:02All I could do is give you general observations.
49:07First is the distinction below 80, below 80, just on the theory that it's 79.95.
49:14It's just less than 80.
49:20But the obligation, I thought, I wouldn't worry too much about it.
49:25I would, as a matter of fact, I would go probably further than anybody here would go with respect to obligational authority, provided it's in the proper areas of increasing the real strategic capability or defense, either offense or defense.
49:43As I recall, there were statements that were about 60% of the cost of military manpower.
49:48That's right.
49:49That's what's so shocking.
49:51I would cut manpower wherever I could, and not destroy any of the services, but I'd cut them as much as I could and put that money into the acquisition of ABMs, Polaris, missiles, or whatever to enhance your strategic capability.
50:12You're looking for it, and you're not going to get it, you're not going to get it back from the Congress before you're meeting with the Russians and the Chinese
50:21But you need to go into this new year with a strong military posture.
50:28And a lean, a lean but an effective military posture seems to be in you.
50:32And I'm not even sure you shouldn't go in, and this will sound paradoxical, but go in recommending we close bases.
50:41Would you have a very substantial vote?
50:43Sounds like me, you see, and I'm elected here.
50:45I'm not at all serious.
50:48depending on what you really are prepared to go for.
50:53But this would be both convincing at home and abroad that you are really going to enhance your capability.
50:57And you have to say that to the world.
50:59You have to say it to the Soviets.
51:01You have to say it to the Chinese.
51:02And more than that, you have to say it to all the lesser developed countries, because you're moving into an era of economic warfare, and it has to be boasting.
51:12by an effective military strength.
51:15Not just manpower, but an effective military strength where they're not afraid to do it economically.
51:23Now, so far as the spending is concerned, I'd again direct it toward procurement, whether it's ABN, whether it's missiles, whether it's new ships or ship modernizations or longer missiles or research development.
51:39I'd do it in the procurement field.
51:43which both revitalizes the jobs and the, and to some extent at least, the defense, the plants of this country in an election year.
51:54And yet it gives you what you want.
51:55I wouldn't do it just to do that, but I'd do it because it gives you what you want.
52:00And I'd cut back on manpower and all the services if I could.
52:05And I think you have to just be, you're gonna have to make the decision in concert with Henry.
52:11And George and Kemp, you're just going to have to make the tough decisions about what you're going to fund and what you're not.
52:16The services are not going to do it.
52:18They're not going to make the choices.
52:20And the Defense Department is not going to make those choices.
52:24So those are just general observations that I have.
52:28But I think we have to go beyond the 75% or 76%.
52:31I wouldn't worry too much about it.
52:32I think we're probably going to have to wind up with new taxes anyway.
52:40And when you talk about $2 or $3 billion, that's peanuts in terms of what you're going to be confronted with for this budget, in terms of social programs, all these other things that we give money to.
52:50And you're going into a ballgame that you know better than I.
52:55But you're opening up whole new vistas of opportunity here, and you have to lead through strength.
53:01You can't lead from a position where you think everybody's going to be a good guy.
53:06Who well knows?
53:08You just cannot do it.
53:09You have to maintain military strength, but you have to do it to credit for fighting.
53:14And that's not going to be just maintaining a lot of riflemen.
53:22All right, let's look at this point.
53:25I think that represents my kind of view, too.
53:29I think that the...
53:38just not leave hanging out there in a way, something that would really raise concern among the people.
53:44But on the other hand, I don't want to go leave the Laird Group, which I fear is, which I think, I suppose, as Secretary of Defense has to say, that, well, just keep the budget high so that we can keep the services happening at home.
53:59We'll reserve the cuts we've made.
54:03And we'll use what we've got at the pace to see whether we can
54:09find some rational programs that would support your policies next year.
54:16I don't think, if the choice were to go back to the $8 million that Laird submitted to you, that wouldn't be worth it.
54:23I think, actually, what we came up with is that you were better off for less money.
54:31But if George and I can work it over,
54:38And we all need to tell the underserved of this if you're considering this.
54:41No, no, no, no.
54:42They'll all be in their hats out as to how they spend the money.
54:46No, I want to...
54:48But you understand, I have a feeling this.
54:50I also want you to... Well, we've kept it.
54:55The intelligence community isn't worth a tinker's damn.
54:59with regard to this thing, but can you take into consideration what the V.C.
55:04American people have been reading for the last 20 years?
55:07Because that comes into this thing, and I don't know maybe how much of this is true and how much it is.
55:15I don't know.
55:16Let me say, when I make the decision,
55:18I'd like to see a couple of pages on what really our analysis of the intelligence is as to what they are doing.
55:26Because we damn well, even if we have to go into election year and raise taxes substantially, are not going to be an optimization of all of the kind that's sold yet, and that's not going to happen.
55:36What they're doing is extremely worrisome, not yet in terms of numbers, but in terms of the mentality it reveals.
55:43that even while they're talking salt, even while you're going to a summit, I mean, imagine reversing it.
55:49If you pushed new radar developments, built lots of new holes, all the liberals here would be all over you while you're going into salt talks.
55:59So they're all over me anyway.
56:02So in terms of the mentality it reveals, it shows that they have the same disease.
56:08They must be able to translate this either into military or political advantage.
56:13Now, what we might take a look at is what counters we have available to show them that this is being noticed.
56:30And, uh...
56:31I believe that it's true that even if the military outlays go up, say, by a billion,
56:39given our ability to manage these outlets.
56:44With the posture that we talked about and I felt you went along with on the revenue sharing, and with the reasonably tough but not unreasonable posture on the budget, we can bring the total in
57:08within a range that doesn't put you in the posture of needing to go for new taxes for that reason.
57:16That's right.
57:17I think we can still do that.
57:18It's not easy, but we can do that.
57:21So I think that while it may be that you'll want to do some things by way of initiatives that will make it necessary to go for new taxes, I don't think that's forced by
57:39a billion or so on the military, or on the possibility of the domestic budget, given your decision about what to do on some of these presidential decisions.
57:49Okay.
57:49Andrew, let me talk to you before you go to your press conference.
57:55I'll talk to you later.
57:58Yes.
58:10And Ron got a lot of questions about it this morning.
58:19It was almost unavoidable.
58:22My guess is that we won't finish the program until 3.45 or so, so just be available around 3.45 until about 4.30.
58:27And I think we've got to remember...
58:39frankly, you've got to build commonly up, and you've got to use him more and more, because at least the guy will say what he wants.
58:49And he doesn't think that if you compare him to Rodgers, even that, he was, you know, he was complaining about the unconsequential thing, you know.
59:03Well, Connolly doesn't feel that the way to build himself up is to tear down his president.
59:17Connolly stands up.
59:19He knows that the best public relations is to support the administration in which you are.
59:27And if it's tough going, he steps up there.
59:30and defends the tough going.
59:32So I think Connolly may be, you know, for White House staff and so forth, harder to deal with than some others, but he is, from your point of view, the most effective man you have.
59:43It's definitely in this thing here.
59:45If they ask about the U.N. vote, I can't say nothing to answer the president.
59:50That's right.
59:51I will say nothing.
59:53Nothing on that.
59:54If they, in terms of the other thing, the...
1:00:04I would try to have it in a way that nothing comes out of the key.
1:00:09Great cordiality, I would make it very business-like and cool and crisp and so forth.
1:00:17I don't mean none of the original, but I just don't want it to appear that they have the entire work that's kicked out of the air.
1:00:27Like, well, if they had rockets, they would be welcome.
1:00:36I have to say one thing that I find interesting, Mr. President, is I get a lot of phone calls and I was walking to lunch.
1:00:45People came up in the street saying we wish the President well on his trip and so forth.
1:00:50I think the trip is still what has captured the imagination even after this slurry is over.
1:00:56This will pass.
1:00:57I understand this will pass.
1:01:00But you know, you never, you never bucket time with time.
1:01:03You ride with it and then swim off-stream again.
1:01:06For example, Goldwater, I was in the San Francisco City, and he said, I hope everything went well.
1:01:11I hope everything is on track.
1:01:12What I meant is, I think that it's,
1:01:18Don't give our families a chance to say that.
1:01:21But I'll be cool.
1:01:22I know what you're saying.
1:01:24Oh, yeah.
1:01:24So that we don't, that we have good meetings with the church.
1:01:28The plans are going forward on schedule.
1:01:31Another announcement will be made, et cetera, et cetera.
1:01:34I don't know you anything.
1:01:36Oh, I don't know.
1:01:37You can, you might, you might.
1:01:39You're on the record.
1:01:43No, I guess, I was going to say, at least we could offer it, but we couldn't.
1:01:48because we say, well, that we, it wasn't the vote, it was through the conduct, it was apparently.
1:01:57I think if they raise it, I will say, gentlemen, if you read the President's statement carefully, we accept the vote, as the Secretary of State said yesterday.
1:02:11But what is bothersome is that it has turned into personal demonstrations.
1:02:16and against the United States, apart from this particular issue.
1:02:24And that, therefore, makes the President's job of trying to get support from the United Nations and all the national organizations more difficult.
1:02:32As you know, we have had great difficulty in getting that support, increased difficulty in this country, which is true.
1:02:42I think if the question comes up, I will volunteer it.
1:02:46Very likely they may have been raised.
1:02:53Well, they may have been raised according to what you knew of the vote.
1:02:56Well, I'd say I have nothing to add to what the Secretary of State said, that represents the administration's position.
1:03:04And I would back up to the, as I said, I think it's, I think we have got to put, frankly, we've got to put a, because, of course, it was assertion, we've got to put a lot of, frankly, smaller nations
1:03:22Well, I would get these pansies who've been sucking it on Botswana land, for example.
1:03:30Botswana land is nothing.
1:03:32It's a piece of desert.
1:03:35It shouldn't be a state.
1:03:37It's a... Yeah.
1:03:37They're a state.
1:03:38But if they had voted with us...
1:03:43They're a state, I know.
1:03:45They're a state.
1:03:49It wouldn't be one more vote with us.
1:03:53Now, Stan voted with us.
1:03:56Stan voted for Italy instead.
1:04:01Oh, I thought you said Stan.
1:04:02Italy did it instead.
1:04:07I'll talk to you in a minute.
1:04:19When the man of the year meets you, you ought to have your pieces first.
1:04:28Go.

On October 27, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander P. Butterfield, John B. Connally, John D. Ehrlichman, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., George P. Shultz, and Caspar W. ("Cap") Weinberger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:32 pm and 3:45 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 604-006 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 604-6

Date: October 27, 1971
Time: Unknown between 1:32 pm and 3:45 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     The President's schedule
          -Henry A. Kissinger

Haldeman left and Kissinger entered at 2:53 pm

     Kissinger's schedule
          -George P. Shultz
                -Defense Department budget
                      -John B. Connally
                      -Caspar W. Weinberger

     Defense Department budget
          -Authorization
               -Appropriation
          -Shultz
               -Preparation for forthcoming meeting

     United Nations [UN] vote on Taiwan expulsion
          -Assignment for Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
               -The President’s instructions
          -Great Britain
          -France

          -Botswana
               -Kissinger’s view
               -South Africa
          -The President’s view
          -Effect on US policy
               -Surtax
                     -Shultz
                     -Connally
                     -Japan
                     -Canada
                     -Latin America
                     -Mexico

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 2:53 pm.

     The President's schedule
          -Connally

Bull left at an unknown time before 3:07 pm.

     UN vote on Taiwan’s expulsion
         -US policy
               -Peter G. Peterson

     Briefing for Connally
           -Okinawa
                 -Kissinger
           -Monetary situation
           -William H. Sullivan
                 -Vietnam
                 -Japan
                 -Kissinger’s view
                 -Participation
                       -Department of State
           -Talks with the Japanese
                 -Charles A. Meyer
                 -Sullivan
                 -State Department
           -Indonesia
                 -Military
                 -Francis J. Galbraith

                -Sullivan
           -Vietnam
                -Ellsworth F. Bunker
           -Thailand
                -Leonard Unger
                      -Kissinger’s view
           -Meyer
                -Role in Japan
                      -Possible replacement
                -Monetary situation
                      -Arthur F. Burns
           -Okinawa
                -State Department
           -Kissinger's schedule
                -Briefing
           -Connally's schedule
                -Quadriad meeting
                -State Department
                      -Sullivan
           -Connally’s foreign trip
                -T.N.J. Suharto
                -Eisaku Sato
                -Sullivan
                -US Ambassador

     UN vote to expel Taiwan
         -White House response
         -George H. W. Bush
         -Ronald L. Ziegler
               -Rhetoric
               -People's Republic of China [PRC]
         -The President's attendance at previous UN session
               -Reception
                     -Secretary General
               -Possible future trip to UN

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at 3:07 pm,

     The President's schedule

John B. Connally, John D. Ehrlichman, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., George P. Shultz, and Caspar W.

Weinberger entered at 3:07 pm.

Butterfield left at an unknown time before 3:40 pm.

     Greetings

     The President's schedule
          -Shultz
               -Quadriad meeting

     Connally
         -Forthcoming foreign trip
         -The President’s conversation with Kissinger
              -Political briefing
         -Quadriad meeting

     UN ambassadors
         -Arthur Goldberg

     Unknown man
         -Kissinger

     Defense Department
          -Budget
               -Ziegler
               -Ehrlichman
               -Melvin R. Laird
               -Defense outlay
               -Joint review
                     -David Packard
               -Kissinger, Packard, Shultz
                     -Air defense system
               -National Security Council [NSC] staff, Office of Management and Budget
                     [OMB] staff
                     -Kissinger
                     -Defense outlay
                     -Foreign policy objectives
               -Laird
               -Projected sum
               -Outlay management
               -Effect on domestic economy

-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
      -Arms control negotiations
-Cuts
      -Air defense systems
-Kissinger’s view
      -Shultz
      -USSR
            -Strategic Concerns
                  -Anti-ballistic Missiles [ABM]
                  -Radar
-PRC
      -Forthcoming visit
-Laird
-Effect
      -Army
      -Air Force
      -The President’s view
            -Air defense system
            -USSR
                  -Aircraft
      -Size of Army and Navy
            -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
-Strategic capabilities
      -Arms control negotiations
      -Missiles
            -Polaris and Minutemen missiles
      -USSR defense activities
      -Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS]
-Popular confidence in defense program
-USSR
-PRC
-Arms talks
-Budget deficits
      -Taxes
      -Inflation
      -Congressional action
-American Conservatives
      -ABM
      -Michael J. Mansfield Amendment
-Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
-John F. Kennedy's allegations of "Missile Gap" in 1960

-Domestic opposition
     -Possible White House strategy
     -Soviets
     -Chinese
-Army and Marine Divisions
-Obligational authority
     -Amounts
-Navy
     -Ships
           -Effect on budget
     -Polaris
     -Undersea Long-range Missile System [ULMS] development
     -USSR
-Kissinger’s role
     -Strategic review
-Budget presentations
     -Navy
     -Air Force
     -Army
     -The President’s view
     -Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
           -Comments on Strategy
                  -Navy modernization
-Schedule
     -Delay in final decision
     -Connally's trip
-Obligational authority
     -Connally’s view
           -Programs
-Costs
     -Manpower
     -Strategic weapons
           -ABM
           -Polaris
     -The President's forthcoming meetings
           -Soviets
           -Chinese
     -Military base closings
-Connally’s view
     -Future
           -Strategic arms

                            -Economic issues
                      -Procurement programs
                            -Effect
                      -Manpower
                -The President’s decision
                      -Kissinger
                      -Shultz
                      -Weinberger
                -Contrast with social programs
                -Laird’s view
                -Kissinger
                      -Shultz
                -Intelligence community
                      -Quality
                            -The President’s view
                -Taxes
                -USSR
                      -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                      -US-USSR Summit
                      -Military construction
                -Military outlays
                -Revenue sharing
                      -Taxes

     Kissinger's schedule
          -Forthcoming press conference
                -Timing

Connally, Ehrlichman, Shultz, Haig, Weinberger left at an unknown time before 3:45 pm.

          -Ziegler
          -Quadriad

     Connally
         -The President’s view
         -William P. Rogers
         -Spiro T. Agnew
         -Support for the President's policies

     UN vote to expel Taiwan
         -Administration's reaction

           -Rogers's statement
                -PRC
           -Kissinger's recent itinerary
                -Well wishers for the President's trip to PRC
           -Barry M. Goldwater, Sr.
                -Conversation with Kissinger
           -Kissinger's forthcoming briefing
                -The President’s previous statement
                -Secretary of State's previous statement
                -Delegate behavior during UN vote
           -US diplomatic relations
                -Botswana
                       -Kissinger’s view
                -Spain
                -Italy
           -Ronald W. Reagan
                -Kissinger's forthcoming telephone call

The President and Kissinger left at 3:45 pm.
  • 603-005 1:10 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:10 pm and 1:13 pm.
  • 603-006 1:10 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:10 pm and 1:13 pm.
  • 603-007 1:13 PM · 20 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Charles W. Colson, unknown person(s), and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:13 pm to 1:32 pm.
  • 604-001 1:32 PM · 2 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:32 pm and 2:53 pm.
  • 604-002 1:32 PM · 50 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:32 pm and 2:53 pm.
  • 604-003 1:32 PM · 43 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:32 pm and 2:53 pm.
  • 604-004 1:32 PM · 38 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:32 pm and 2:53 pm.
  • 604-005 1:32 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:32 pm and 2:53 pm.

Conversation 604-006, October 27, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/604-006 (accessed October 12, 2026).