Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 609 › Conversation 609-007

Nixon, Tito & Tambaca on U.S.-Yugoslav relations and Vietnam War

Saturday, October 30, 1971 · 10:05 AM–11:12 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Tito, Josip Broz; Tambaca, Lijana; Akalovsky, Alexander; Bull, Stephen B.; Nixon, Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan); Mosbacher, Emil, Jr. (Bus)Conversation609-007 on Tape 609 (tape position 01:13:23–02:19:51)StartSaturday, October 30, 1971 at 10:05 AMEndSaturday, October 30, 1971 at 11:12 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 609-007 ↗

President Richard Nixon met with Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito to discuss bilateral economic relations, international investment policies, and global foreign policy strategy. Nixon candidly addressed U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China, emphasizing that he sought peace but would maintain American military strength and defense posture. The President also provided a detailed update on the Vietnam War, signaling that the U.S. had made a final, significant peace offer and would be forced to pursue other military options if North Vietnam did not respond or return American prisoners of war by the end of November.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 01:13:23 into the tape and ends around 02:19:51.

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1:13:45Glad to have you here again.
1:13:46Good morning.
1:13:47Good morning.
1:13:47Good morning.
1:13:48Good morning.
1:13:49Good morning.
1:14:17Where is our...
1:16:01You see the mark of this rope is sealed there and there.
1:16:02That's the special mark of the rope.
1:16:03And here it is.
1:16:03I have it made of the tongue of my shoe.
1:17:17Vi har vissit i dag.
1:17:19Og i stedet var det større vissit i dag.
1:17:21Og i stedet var det større vissit i dag.
1:17:32Og i stedet var det større vissit i dag.
1:17:35Og i stedet var det større vissit i dag.
1:17:41Og i stedet var det større vissit i dag.
1:18:46They may be much more difficult to work, to write and communicate when we go to Moscow.
1:18:51Another thing about that is that we have to have a Washington office.
1:19:01The president's people have satisfactory talks with the economic and military.
1:19:05That's a sad thing to me.
1:19:06That's one of the bad ones.
1:19:08It's one of the bad ones.
1:19:11It's not the way.
1:19:17Akko kristallorne, tomo.
1:19:22Gjerne akko akko ea, tomo.
1:19:29Ea, ea, akko ea, akko ea, akko ea, akko ea, akko ea, akko ea, akko ea, akko ea,
1:19:44So we know, I know what it was, I mean, what it was, I'm just here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here, I'm here.
1:20:39We're working on that for what we call a domestic conference.
1:20:47We're for special treatment, but it will come pretty soon.
1:20:54The problem, Mr. President, is not only that
1:21:07With Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan.
1:21:14The U.S. there is a problem.
1:21:18The other countries, no problem.
1:21:23We have to work.
1:21:25We will work something out.
1:21:27Secretary Connolly will be back from Japan in ten days.
1:21:32And we then will have, I think, a recommendation.
1:21:35We care, but we have this very much in mind.
1:21:54Takk.
1:21:54Takk.
1:21:55Takk.
1:21:55Takk.
1:21:56Takk.
1:21:56Takk.
1:21:58Takk.
1:22:00Takk.
1:22:06...over her, the black house.
1:22:14...over her, the black house.
1:22:28...over her, the black house.
1:22:32...over her, the black house.
1:23:08The president knows that there is a difficulty in working out a trading arrangement with a socialist country, because you do not have the private corporations, so the transactions must be...
1:23:27...special account.
1:23:28But Yugoslavia, is it my example?
1:23:32That's right, because Yugoslavia has set up a problem.
1:23:37For example, when I was talking to Chichester, he said, why can't we have the same American investment in Romania as Yugoslavia?
1:23:49I said...
1:23:50Well, the problem is that your system is different.
1:23:56I think the president could influence some of his other Eastern European neighbors in looking at the Yugoslavia and developing along that line.
1:24:11It stands for a greatly increased investment in trade.
1:24:15Hvilke karakteristik har vi her?
1:24:16Nei, vi har inga karakteristik, vi har ingen.
1:24:17Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:19Nei, vi har inga karakteristik, vi har ingen.
1:24:20Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:20Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:21Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:23Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:24Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:27Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:28Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:29Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:30Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:31Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:32Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:32Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:33Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:33Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:34Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:34Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:36Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:36Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:37Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:38Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:38Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:40Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:41Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:41Nei, vi har ingen.
1:24:42Nei, vi har ingen
1:24:44the intricacies of the international investment, and the president knows this, and it would be helpful.
1:24:50We want to help you test it, but we can't do it.
1:24:57Unless he sets it up, there's no way to do that.
1:25:06Yes, that's right.
1:25:09Yes, that's right.
1:25:15I think I should say to the president, since we are, just the two of us here, some very frank thoughts about our attitude toward the Soviet Union.
1:25:43And also I want to tell him our attitude toward finishing Vietnam.
1:25:53What I say now is just between us.
1:25:59This is something that I, and Velocity, is to make a copy for me and one for the President.
1:26:08So I don't, and I appreciate it if it did not be brought down to the floor in that street.
1:26:13I trust that, uh, you see what I mean?
1:26:16Uh, that, that, that, uh, this, uh, we, first, uh, uh, let's say, uh, thank you for you.
1:26:35Did you try?
1:26:36Yes.
1:26:36It's been all right.
1:26:37Well, first, as the president knows, he's been at more international meetings, as I said in my toast to him, than any living head of state or government.
1:26:56Or for that matter, any one who's living in Canada.
1:27:05Because there are more countries today than there have been in the past.
1:27:09And I know that the polite thing to do always is to gloss over on common subjects.
1:27:21What I say now is set with just straight from the book.
1:27:29Indicating my
1:27:35my views about the dangers of the world as I see them.
1:27:53... ... ... ...
1:28:04I think the president knows that the United States, while we have many faults, and I will be the first to admit them, and for our faults, but we are not a threat to the independence of any small country in the world.
1:28:25I believe, not to use Lockheed for example, you can have trade with us,
1:28:33We can have some aid, and there will be no attempt to dominate or threaten your independence.
1:28:59... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1:29:03I don't say this to show that we are stagnant, but as we look at the world, as I look at the world, our self-interest, and every country must have self-interest, is better served by strong, independent countries throughout the world, like you as well.
1:29:28I don't know.
1:29:40Now we realized, I realized that, uh, Tess, who was very close to a very big neighbor of Soviet Union, and you, who are in that sphere, all further away, uh,
1:30:05I have special problems.
1:30:08Let me say that I do not know French networks even personally, but there is no question in my heart that the policy of the Soviet Union
1:30:34Because it itself in this will be one that could, that inevitably will try to bring its neighbors mostly under its influence.
1:30:47Ospatio de Lombok, Lombokia, Lombokia, Lombokia, Lombokia, Lombokia,
1:31:30A perfect part of our political system in terms of independence is consistent with U.S. interests.
1:31:37It is totally inconsistent with Soviet interests.
1:31:53I'm very proud to be with you, Mario.
1:32:01They didn't mean to do that.
1:32:04On the other hand, the president, speaking honestly, would have to admit that he has been a thorn in the side of the Soviet Union.
1:32:19Not intending to be, but that's true.
1:32:22Because he has taken this independent posture.
1:32:25They don't like it.
1:32:28Is it that you like it when you can't beat the beat down?
1:32:36The beat down protection doesn't work so precise.
1:32:42Can't you let your head in to the floor?
1:32:44I believe I can't walk in there any longer.
1:32:47Now, the problem that all the countries have, including Yugoslavia, is to have good relations with countries like the United States without going so far.
1:32:58It has to create such a suspicion in Moscow that they will proceed to use their power to suppress such indefensibleness.
1:33:17Dr. Lester, I have an answer for you.
1:33:54the attitude of the United States toward basically the Eastern Bloc, our position will not be that one liberation.
1:34:05We know that as hunger shows, liberation means suicide.
1:34:10But, on the other hand, the American position, my position, I should say,
1:34:21is that it is to avoid, to the extent our self-interest will allow, to avoid any kind of understanding of Moscow that would give them any encouragement
1:34:48To, say, play from the water to the slime.
1:34:51Now, that's, I don't need to say anymore, but that's what we, what we think is very important.
1:35:03Ja, ja, ja, ja.
1:35:07Ja, ja, ja.
1:35:12President thinks he didn't tell you about our last meeting, about what President said and about his thoughts in his reply.
1:35:30He didn't say anything about our last meeting, about our last meeting.
1:35:40and that he could ensure social security in Europe, that there would be a situation that he would be ready to be able to eliminate all drugs.
1:35:57This place is produced on a natural level, and it's in a silver book.
1:36:01He can't eliminate all drugs.
1:36:05He doesn't have a vaccine.
1:36:36But I think the final analysis, the Soviet leaders must consult their interests, and I do not think they can tolerate division and independence within the whole communist bloc.
1:36:57When you come right down to the difference between the Soviet Union and China, in my opinion,
1:37:05It's not so much the fact that they have a big common border, not their difference in nationality.
1:37:15Those are differences.
1:37:17But basically, the Soviet Union cannot tolerate some other power as big, if not the one power in the communist world.
1:37:31I understand this.
1:37:32I don't criticize it, but I understand it.
1:37:37Можна, он то може да праше, бе чути, нивак с овецким салат, не може, с овецким салat.
1:37:40Не може, с овецkим салat.
1:37:43Не може, с овецkим салat.
1:38:05Fertigstjenen i den sojtiske sajt nemozhet den togjerikse drogu javnu silu o moraslo svetu.
1:38:17Da, to er tarsin.
1:38:17No, ja, mislim, da, treba tygget i odrik tog.
1:38:22Da, sojtiske sajt er sletna toga.
1:38:23Da, proste, anjej, nezavisne tygge usvaki.
1:38:26Ipå byrje, se smislo tjelje na modresnika stavolet.
1:39:02and many other native countries did this one dream for what you already know in the flesh, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States, for the United States,
1:39:29Det er jo nisse uniske i det visse.
1:39:31Det er nisse uniske i det visse.
1:39:35Det er nisse uniske i det visse.
1:39:39Det er nisse uniske i det visse.
1:39:42Det er nisse uniske i det visse.
1:39:46Det er nisse uniske i det visse.
1:39:49Det er nisse uniske i det visse.
1:39:59I said, what did you do here?
1:40:02I said, it's Tom-Tom.
1:40:04And, on the other hand, he couldn't, I suppose, on his dramatic economy, I didn't get away with it. ...
1:40:24Ali ka se, mozete, misi, na mozete, unutrat, unutrat, osv.
1:40:32na ekonomisko, unutrat, osv., kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat, kisilat,
1:40:55Another point I want to make, President, is that the arms talks with the Soviets are very important in terms of what the United States will do on its defense.
1:41:18We hold that we will can agree with the Soviet limited offensive and defensive weapons.
1:41:24If we do not, I will have to make a decision to go forward with a new arms bill, because the Soviet, at the present time, is moving very, very fast on ICBMs, particularly the larger SS-9s, and
1:41:54also on Polaris summaries.
1:41:59We had no right as a nation to account to their basically parity with the United States.
1:42:11But on the other hand, we in this country cannot stand by and allow any other case of superiority.
1:42:21Now, I know the president said,
1:43:14Dat er i stort, da er i natt veien i nosnoget utgavit at a tål din nevn, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt, kvitt en natt,
1:43:42I agree.
1:43:44I think that you could tell the president to...
1:44:09that there has been a tendency in some parts of the world, because of my action in winding down the war in Vietnam, the Nixon doctrine of helping others to help themselves and free them somewhere back, the move to China, going to China, and our talks with the Soviet and arts competition, that I personally,
1:44:40I'm so concerned about peace that I will make a move for peace even though it weakens our defense to what I think would be a dangerous degree.
1:45:01I must say to the president that that is great, this calculation.
1:45:07The purpose of our, as far as David is concerned, we are a Pacific power.
1:45:13We intend to remain a Pacific power.
1:45:17Not because we have interest in the Pacific.
1:45:24As far as our whole attitude toward national defense is concerned, if others are willing to limit or reduce
1:45:37Their arms, we will.
1:45:39But if we don't, if they don't, then the United States will have to move accordingly.
1:45:46What I'm trying to say is in a very personal way, that's the, when I toasted the president, I pointed out that he was a man of war, leader of war, who's now leader of peace.
1:45:57My background is very different from the president's.
1:46:00I was in a very minor position in the war in the Pacific.
1:46:04But I came out as he did, the hard way.
1:46:08I am devoted to peace.
1:46:09He is devoted to peace.
1:46:10I am devoted to the independence of nations.
1:46:14He is.
1:46:15I respect the right of his country to have a different system than I have.
1:46:20He can be a socialist.
1:46:21I can be a capitalist.
1:46:24But on one thing, it's got to be clearly understood that I am not a soft man.
1:46:33On the contrary, I made these decisions
1:46:38because I think the interests of the United States are served by talks from the Soviets, by talks from the Chinese.
1:46:48But under those circumstances, while I am in this office, are we going to make decisions that may affect peace at any price, particularly at the price of the United States being inferior, or at the price of the United States
1:47:05a high level of the Soviet, on the one hand, or China and the other, southern and on the river, small countries.
1:47:15This is what I feel very strongly about.
1:47:33... ... ... ... ...
1:47:33sot i ronnovo orvare di plebantini, presto e cilutacchini, un'aspo e sestore sensato, sve mutone, da cagia, da un stuputoga, da bil onibili spremi, per caco, da intu, da suttolito te interessire, o poste in origino, da mir, da bibili spremi, da interesso dormira, suttolito te caco, intu, da torre, da suttolito, da torre, da torre, da torre, da torre, da torre,
1:48:02Každomi te oda, každem te svega, sku ti tje, hajde, da svojita tiri tjera zira, i vi gledamo a tako, i kao tako ide, a ostano, zato sku vi gledamo svoje, svoje ide.
1:48:15Oni, on da mi rekkom, stravi si, drafte vi, biorite vratu, ne skanarite miru.
1:48:21Každem, on vratu ima, njevoko dekja vrati, e sva sva sva, sva, sva, sva, sva, sva, sva, sva, sva, sva, sva, sva.
1:48:30ari gjenere d'rougi ste proskid proskid, derti akout, derti oskid okres, derti derti, derti derti, derti derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti, derti,
1:49:01In my belief, in my belief that
1:49:30A weak United States would greatly increase the dangers of war.
1:49:36A strong United States is essential if we are going to be able to play a role for peace.
1:49:42And some of our senators do not agree with this.
1:49:46They say, disarm, and then we will have peace.
1:49:51But when one side weakens, and the other side gains in strength, then that's when the danger of war escalates.
1:50:28The many world leaders of the president that has great influence with the non-aligned world, they will criticize the United States for maintaining its military strength.
1:50:42They may think that this is a threat to peace, but I am convinced that we must, that we continue to be strong until we get an enforceable agreement for limitation of arms.
1:50:57Thank you very much.
1:51:59of a hearing only about the necessity to assist them to pass death and so on and so on.
1:52:12Let me tell the President briefly about where it stands in Vietnam.
1:52:20Now, when I came into office in January of 69,
1:52:29There were 550,000 Americans in Vietnam.
1:52:32Our casualties were 300 a day a week.
1:52:40Lastly, they were seven.
1:52:42Seven.
1:52:44And the number of Americans in Vietnam was less than 200,000.
1:52:53Now, there's no accident that this has happened.
1:52:57Take that.
1:53:27I told him that we were going to have to take strong action.
1:53:57I must say, we're being talked about.
1:54:02We're being talked about.
1:54:26Nå, vi ... vi kontentuerte å trådde å negotiere for noen måneder, men ingenting skapte.
1:54:42Så jeg ordet at de utstyrkningene av Nord-Vietnames kvarter i Cambodia, som resultatet av det,
1:54:52Our caches were cut from 300 week to 100 week in summer 1970.
1:55:23Now, late in 1970, in October of 1970, we make another peace talk.
1:55:33And I privately again warned the North Vietnamese that unless they talked, I would have to act on a military front.
1:55:44My brother-in-law was here in October of 1970.
1:55:50I told him what we were going to tell the North Vietnamese.
1:55:57And I had, again, November, December, January, no response from the North Vietnamese except increased infiltration.
1:56:07And that's why I ordered the attacks in Laos.
1:56:11Ondra er det den nareste, 70-te godine, ono godao, Milovo kvonto, kveldukim i hei programenao privatnogo pozorio, ta gruzno nekrumitakit, deri slezowarati, ta slorviti prisidenja, na nabojnog plaku, ide Orovo, Oskarien, pojareko i Drogi, kvart se sreo sni, oktober, 70-te godine, pojegonavdjao 9. december 1971, kveldukim s ljude strane,
1:56:38No, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the,
1:57:05Hei, hei, hei, hei, hei.
1:57:34Now we have made a very forthcoming offer to an archaeologist.
1:57:59We offered to help rebuild their country.
1:58:02You should know they had some very big floods, as well as the military damage.
1:58:10And we offered a withdrawal of forces.
1:58:13On our part, we asked, of course, and this is an absolute condition, a return of our prisoners, 400 prisoners or so,
1:58:27There has been no action on that offer.
1:58:30However, the president should know that we have told him that we must have a reply by the end of this month and the month of November.
1:58:51By the end of the month of November.
1:59:00Ja.
1:59:28I would not entertain circumstances suggesting that the President express any opinion about Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam.
1:59:41I know that the opinion that has to be expressed by those who oppose the American position in Vietnam is that we should get out, and that we should, in the process, break two out also.
1:59:57and turn the country over to an art of the enemy.
2:00:10This we will never do.
2:00:23...i da ostere... ...jurkikentan... ...jurkikentan... ...serare tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme... ...tamme...
2:01:52We have made an offer which would set up a process which would set up a government that would be able to sell Vietnam approval.
2:02:06It is an international supervised assembly.
2:02:10I hope I don't need to go into the details, but...
2:02:55Gjer vi er no prezident is not a demokrasi.
2:03:01Gjer vi er no prezident is not a demokrasi.
2:03:11Gjer vi er no prezident is not a demokrasi.
2:03:17Gjer vi er no prezident is not a demokrasi.
2:03:25Den demokratiske perspektivet, den politiske perspektivet, den politiske perspektivet, den politiske perspektivet, den politiske perspektivet, den politiske perspektivet, den politiske perspektivet,
2:03:51I hope I don't need to go into the details, but I can only say that the offer that we have made privately is very worth coming.
2:04:24and er... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
2:04:50As I have indicated, I consider myself like him to be a man of peace.
2:05:02But like the president, I have to use the power that I have to protect our position.
2:05:17And I, and particularly now with regard to our prisoners of war, if we do not have an agreement to return them by Christmas of this year, I feel at it.
2:05:31Not against Canberra, not against Laos, but North Vietnam.
2:06:15The United States has no choice but to get out.
2:06:28It's a very mistaken idea.
2:06:34We want to get out.
2:06:39We intend to get our prisoners back.
2:06:47They cannot continue to be held hostage, and if the dark Vietnamese will not even possess what is an offer that goes far beyond anything that has been seen in public yet, I have no choice but to act, and I will act.
2:08:10Så det er på næste strada 7 å gå igjennom.
2:08:12Og næste, vi går igjennom igjennom.
2:08:13Og det er på næste strada 7 å gå igjennom.
2:08:15Og næste, vi går igjennom igjennom.
2:08:44I think it's important to know what the process is.
2:09:17I want to say again, not to the militias, because I am not a militia, but simply as a matter of fact, that I also have a man who is a great contribution to our nation, and I just really want to be seen just like the president.
2:09:51By any of those we deal with around you, around the world, make your lives more important.
2:09:53And to misjudge the desire for peace for Jesus, we are going to be strong and we are going to protect the people of the United States, and I will do whatever is necessary, take whatever risk is necessary, to take 400 American prisoners back.
2:10:20Sveit er igjen etter fyrir erantoratiske modus.
2:10:21Erantoratiske erantoratiske erantoratiske erantoratiske erantoratiske erantoratiske
2:10:43«Tak borze, frede strata ciolego, ciolego mira, ter ciolego mira, ostrate fregit ciolego spremugitata, i da otavi iedane minolubibili, iedini ste odotoka, koje zatevno, metodin vidami feri prezeste, date oizdolerti, svelja ta minol, sa slavosvice.
2:10:49I da se on, sa svoje strane, fungire, sve, travi koje seg i sluzi lungo, ta spola sleta i spasvice,
2:11:10What I've said is I've tried to stay at the outset, not to get the president to comment, but I want to be perfectly honest with him, so that he knows what to expect, and what not to expect.
2:12:04Тако да, обае христианства, я разумею, тихо проживање.
2:12:05И дивоје порожне мислене, че тихо станат напелене мислене.
2:12:06Но ја сада, в тисто врење, неразамерз наидли ван, но слабо целено, и кое-како било една ниве сна, како је хранит слабо мислене.
2:12:09Я мислене, неразамерз, неразамерзе, чаражить христианство, неразамерз, неразамерз.
2:12:33Ja, man sa da optimista, da vi dinit da veit det.
2:12:37Vi optimista samt, da er iso fri til most.
2:12:43Optimista samt, da er iso fri til most.
2:12:46Vi optimista samt, da er iso fri til most.
2:12:53Vi optimista samt, da er iso fri til most.
2:13:02So he tried to be, to be found.
2:13:04He understood that he wanted to be found.
2:13:06He knew that he could go out at any time, at any cost.
2:13:10Because this would indeed be a form of weakness.
2:13:13That was his name, his death.
2:13:15All that he had, all that he had, all that he had, all that he had, all that he had, all that he had, all that he had,
2:13:28Inaugurendtig, hovudet uta, denne vergoen utra, denne vergoen uta, denne vergoen uta, denne vergoen uta, denne vergoen uta, denne vergoen uta,
2:13:46Selektivt, tarje, profentor, katineros, statu, et moris in moris, et moris, et moris, et moris, et moris, et moris, et moris, et moris, et moris, et moris,
2:14:42It's not the problem, or it's not the idea of the men, or the group of men who are thinking about life.
2:14:47It is the desire of our people to build an end to the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation, or the end of the nation,
2:15:17I understand that completely.
2:15:26And since you're the person who knows, I'm very pragmatic.
2:15:30We are not... We do not insist that other nations have our own government.
2:15:41We do not insist they always vote with us in the United Nations.
2:15:50We understand what they talk.
2:15:52Each consults his interests.
2:15:57We don't have a hand.
2:15:57All we ask is fair treatment.
2:16:00We're not as concerned about what our country does internally.
2:16:03That's its own business.
2:16:05We are very much concerned externally.
2:16:09They treat the United States differently.
2:16:11Hva er det som sker?
2:17:08Well, we have made our last best offer to the United States.
2:17:15By the end of November, we either have to be on the negotiating track, or we have to look at other options.
2:17:26I just want the president to know I don't want him to be surprised by what happens.
2:17:30What is the answer to your question?
2:17:34I don't know.
2:17:35I don't know.
2:17:36Odmårte er deg i doka ennåte.
2:17:40I dag i doka ennåte, na kvile kveld enn takt ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte, kvile kveld ennåte,
2:17:58Well, you made a great hit in our country.
2:18:00All my baseball.
2:18:01Home run.
2:18:01Home run, everybody.
2:18:01Very popular.
2:18:02And when you go to Los Angeles, that's my home town.
2:18:04All my friends will be there.
2:19:11Well, good morning, good morning.
2:19:13Good morning, good morning.
2:19:14Good morning, good morning.
2:19:16It is too much to go over.
2:19:19Good morning, good morning.
2:19:27That's right, cigars.

On October 30, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Josip Broz Tito, Lijana Tambaca, Alexander Akalovsky, Stephen B. Bull, Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon, and Emil ("Bus") Mosbacher, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:05 am to 11:12 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 609-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 609-7

Date: October 30, 1971
Time: 10:05 am - 11:12 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Josip Broz Tito, Lijana Tambaca and Alexander Akalovsky; members of
the press were present at the beginning of this meeting.

     Greetings

     Photographs

     Presentation of gifts by the President

Members of the press left at an unknown time before 10:52 am.

     National Press Club
          -Tito’s appearance

     Joint Communiqué
           -Henry A. Kissinger

     Talks on bi-lateral assistance

     -Import surcharge
          -Forthcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
                [UNCTAD]
                -Lima
          -Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan
          -John B. Connally's forthcoming recommendation

Blair House
      -Tito’s discussions with Maurice H. Stans and US businessman

US-Yugoslav economic relationships
    -The President’s view
          -Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC]
    -The President's conversation with Nicolae Ceausescu
          -American investment in Romania
Ceausescu
    -The President’s view
    -US-Romanian relations
    -Tito’s view

US foreign policy
     -Soviet Union, Vietnam
     -Discussions
          -Confidentiality
     -The President’s view
          -Yugoslavia independence
          -Importance of independent countries

Soviet Union foreign policy
     -Ceausescu
     -Relations with neighboring countries
           -Leonid I. Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin
     -Tito
           -Relations with the Soviet Union
     -Small nations' relationships with US

US foreign policy
     -President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
           -Small nations
           -Eastern bloc

                                                                 Conv. No. 609- 7(cont.)

Soviet Union
     -The President’s view
     -Difference with the People's Republic of China [PRC]
     -The President's conversation with Ceausescu
           -Yugoslavia
           -Romanian economy
     -Arms negotiations with US
           -US defense policy
           -Soviet developments
                -Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles [ICBM]
                      -SS-9’s
                -Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBM]
           -Possible US developments
                -Arms spending

US foreign policy
     -The President's desire for peace
          -Vietnam
          -Nixon Doctrine
          -Forthcoming trip to China
          -Arms negotiation efforts
     -US interests in Pacific
     -Arms reduction
     -The President’s background
          -Compared to Tito
                -Participation in World War II
     -Small nations' interests
          -The President’s view
     -US military strength
          -Views of US Senators
          -Possible world criticism

Vietnam
     -The President's reductions of US forces
          -US casualties
          -Troop levels
     -Nixon Doctrine
     -The President's message to North Vietnamese in 1969
          -The President's meeting with Ceausescu, August 1969
     -1970 attacks on Cambodia
     -The president's October 1970 peace offer

                                                                        Conv. No. 609- 7(cont.)

                 -The president's conversation with Andrei A. Gromyko
           -1971 South Vietnamese attacks on Laos
                 -Effect
           -US offers to North Vietnam
                 -Economic assistance
                 -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                 -Deadline
           -Views of the President's opponents
                 -Nguyen Van Thieu
                 -The President’s view
                 -Tito’s view
                       -Future government of South Vietnam
           -Forthcoming US offers to North Vietnam
                 -Elections
                 -POWs
           -Possible US military action
           -US options
           -Tito’s views
                 -Possible discussions with Soviet Union and PRC
                 -(Madame) Nguyen Thi Binh
           -US policy
                 -The President’s view
                 -Peace
                 -POWs
                       -Possible US military action

Stephen B. Bull entered at 10:52 am.

     The President's schedule
          -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon

Bull left at 10:52 am.

     Vietnam
          -Tito’s view
                -President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union and PRC
          -Galileo quote

     US foreign relations with Yugoslavia
          -Tito’s view
          -The President’s view

                                                                    Conv. No. 609- 7(cont.)

     Vietnam
          -Tito’s schedule
          -US peace offer to North Vietnam

     Tito's visit to US
           -Success
           -Los Angeles

     The President's schedule
          -World Affairs Council

     Mrs. Broz
          -Photographs session

     Oval Office furnishings

Mrs. Nixon, Mrs. Broz, And Mr. and Mrs. Emil Mosbacher entered at 11:09 am.

     Cigars
          -Cuba
          -Canary Islands

     Yugoslavia
         -Bosnia

The President, et al. left at 11:12 am.
  • 609-003 8:54 AM · 1 hr 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), and Charles W. Colson met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:54 am to 9:58 am.
  • 609-004 9:58 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
  • 609-005 9:58 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
  • 609-006 9:58 AM · 25 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
  • 609-008 11:16 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:16 am to 11:19 am.
  • 609-009 11:19 AM · 35 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:19 am and 11:20 am.
  • 609-010 11:20 AM · 46 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:20 am to 11:21 am.
  • 609-011 11:21 AM · 46 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:21 am to 12:07 pm.

Conversation 609-007, October 30, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/609-007 (accessed September 30, 2026).