President Richard Nixon met with Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito to discuss bilateral economic relations, international investment policies, and global foreign policy strategy. Nixon candidly addressed U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China, emphasizing that he sought peace but would maintain American military strength and defense posture. The President also provided a detailed update on the Vietnam War, signaling that the U.S. had made a final, significant peace offer and would be forced to pursue other military options if North Vietnam did not respond or return American prisoners of war by the end of November.
This clip was extracted from the full tape recording by Easy Nixon.
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Position in tape: 01:13:23 – 02:19:51
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609d.mp3
NARA Description
On October 30, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Josip Broz Tito, Lijana Tambaca, Alexander Akalovsky, Stephen B. Bull, Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon, and Emil ("Bus") Mosbacher, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:05 am to 11:12 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 609-007 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 609-7
Date: October 30, 1971
Time: 10:05 am - 11:12 am
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Josip Broz Tito, Lijana Tambaca and Alexander Akalovsky; members of
the press were present at the beginning of this meeting.
Greetings
Photographs
Presentation of gifts by the President
Members of the press left at an unknown time before 10:52 am.
National Press Club
-Tito’s appearance
Joint Communiqué
-Henry A. Kissinger
Talks on bi-lateral assistance
-Import surcharge
-Forthcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
[UNCTAD]
-Lima
-Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan
-John B. Connally's forthcoming recommendation
Blair House
-Tito’s discussions with Maurice H. Stans and US businessman
US-Yugoslav economic relationships
-The President’s view
-Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC]
-The President's conversation with Nicolae Ceausescu
-American investment in Romania
Ceausescu
-The President’s view
-US-Romanian relations
-Tito’s view
Show the rest of the log (137 more lines)
US foreign policy
-Soviet Union, Vietnam
-Discussions
-Confidentiality
-The President’s view
-Yugoslavia independence
-Importance of independent countries
Soviet Union foreign policy
-Ceausescu
-Relations with neighboring countries
-Leonid I. Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin
-Tito
-Relations with the Soviet Union
-Small nations' relationships with US
US foreign policy
-President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
-Small nations
-Eastern bloc
Conv. No. 609- 7(cont.)
Soviet Union
-The President’s view
-Difference with the People's Republic of China [PRC]
-The President's conversation with Ceausescu
-Yugoslavia
-Romanian economy
-Arms negotiations with US
-US defense policy
-Soviet developments
-Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles [ICBM]
-SS-9’s
-Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBM]
-Possible US developments
-Arms spending
US foreign policy
-The President's desire for peace
-Vietnam
-Nixon Doctrine
-Forthcoming trip to China
-Arms negotiation efforts
-US interests in Pacific
-Arms reduction
-The President’s background
-Compared to Tito
-Participation in World War II
-Small nations' interests
-The President’s view
-US military strength
-Views of US Senators
-Possible world criticism
Vietnam
-The President's reductions of US forces
-US casualties
-Troop levels
-Nixon Doctrine
-The President's message to North Vietnamese in 1969
-The President's meeting with Ceausescu, August 1969
-1970 attacks on Cambodia
-The president's October 1970 peace offer
Conv. No. 609- 7(cont.)
-The president's conversation with Andrei A. Gromyko
-1971 South Vietnamese attacks on Laos
-Effect
-US offers to North Vietnam
-Economic assistance
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Deadline
-Views of the President's opponents
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-The President’s view
-Tito’s view
-Future government of South Vietnam
-Forthcoming US offers to North Vietnam
-Elections
-POWs
-Possible US military action
-US options
-Tito’s views
-Possible discussions with Soviet Union and PRC
-(Madame) Nguyen Thi Binh
-US policy
-The President’s view
-Peace
-POWs
-Possible US military action
Stephen B. Bull entered at 10:52 am.
The President's schedule
-Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
Bull left at 10:52 am.
Vietnam
-Tito’s view
-President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union and PRC
-Galileo quote
US foreign relations with Yugoslavia
-Tito’s view
-The President’s view
Conv. No. 609- 7(cont.)
Vietnam
-Tito’s schedule
-US peace offer to North Vietnam
Tito's visit to US
-Success
-Los Angeles
The President's schedule
-World Affairs Council
Mrs. Broz
-Photographs session
Oval Office furnishings
Mrs. Nixon, Mrs. Broz, And Mr. and Mrs. Emil Mosbacher entered at 11:09 am.
Cigars
-Cuba
-Canary Islands
Yugoslavia
-Bosnia
The President, et al. left at 11:12 am.
Transcript (AI-generated)
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Good to see you again.
Where is ours?
All right.
All right.
Why don't we go over, sir?
You get this, all right?
You get one for each one.
You see the mark of this rope is sealed there and there.
That's the special mark of the rope.
And here it is.
I have it made of the tongue of my shoe.
I'd like for each of you to have one of those.
Okay, if you were able, Senator, this is for you.
Okay, have a good night, Senator.
Well, this is not.
Oh, yes, it is.
It's very impressive.
Oh, it's soft and everything.
And it's holy.
Yeah.
And it's great.
It's beautiful.
I think you're going to have a very long day.
I don't think so.
Yeah.
I don't think so either now.
I don't think so either now.
I don't think so either now.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Yes, yes.
I went over to Dr. Kissinger's office.
Okay.
Whatever happened.
Very good.
Very good.
Very satisfactory.
No worries.
Thank you.
Thank you.
that they'd be much more difficult to work, to write a communique when we go to Moscow.
The President's people have satisfactory talks to provide on the economic and military .
I'm not going to do that.
I'm not going to do that.
I'm not going to do that.
Oh, yeah.
Oh, the search arms.
The search arms.
That's not a good time.
We are... We are... We are... We are... We are... We are... We are...
We're working, we're working on that for the, for what you call the domestic office.
We're for special treatment, but it will, it will come pretty soon.
See, the problem, Mr. Carson, is not only the
with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
The U.S., there's a problem.
The other countries, no problem.
We have to, but we have to work, we will work something out.
Secretary Connolly will be back from Japan in 10 days, and we then will have, I think, a recommendation.
We care, but we have this very much in mind.
Thank you very much.
Over here, the black house.
Over here, the black house.
Yeah, it's just OPIC to OPIC.
We are working on these laws for...
The President knows that there is a difficulty in working out a trading arrangement with a socialist country because you do not have the private corporations, so the transactions must be
But Yugoslavia, is he my example?
That's right, because Yugoslavia has set up a problem.
Well, for example, when I was with Father Nijitescu, he said, why can't we have the same American investment in Romania as Yugoslavia?
And I said,
Well, the problem is that your system is different.
And you say, right.
I think the president could influence some of his other Eastern European neighbors in looking at the Yugoslavia and developing along that line.
It stands for greatly increased investment in trade.
Which of the characters will be there?
No, you're not going to have to figure it out.
Of course, you're not going to have to worry about it.
Good.
Well, the cusp is a, as we said yesterday, is a tough, strong man.
But he is a, he, he, he needs to understand
the intricacies of the international investment, and the president knows this, and it would be helpful.
We want to help you, Chester, but we can't do it.
Unless he sets it up, there's no way to do that.
It's not hard.
Yeah, that's right.
I think I should say to the President, since we are, just the two of us here, some very frank thoughts about our attitude toward the Soviet Union.
And also I want to tell him our attitude toward finishing Vietnam.
What I say now is just between us.
This is something that I, and Velocity is to make a copy for me and one for the President.
though I don't, and I appreciate it, not being brought down to the floor in that street.
I trust that he's going to do it.
I don't know.
This is... We, first... Let's say...
Thank you for your... Did you try?
Yes.
It's been all right.
Well, first, as the President knows, he's been at more international meetings, as I said in my toast to him, than any living head of state or government.
Or for that matter, any one who's living in Canada.
because there are more countries today than there have been in the past.
And I know that the polite thing to do always is to gloss over on common subjects.
What I say now is said with just strength of feel.
Indicating my
my views about the dangers of the world as I see them.
First, I think the President knows that the United States, while we have many faults, and I would be the first to admit it, and for our faults, but we are not a threat to the independence of any small country in the world.
I believe, not to use Lockheed for example, you can have trade with us,
we can have some aid and there will be no attempt to dominate or threaten your independence.
.
I don't say this to show that we are stinking, but as we look at the world, as I look at the world, our self-interest, and every country must have its own self-interest, is better served by strong, independent countries throughout the world, like Yugoslavia.
Now we realized, I realized that, uh, Tess, who was very close to a very big neighbor of Soviet Union, and you, who are in that sphere, all the way, uh,
have special problems.
Let me say that I do not know French networks even personally.
But there is no question in my heart that the policy of the Soviet Union
because it itself will be one that could, that inevitably will try to bring its neighbors mostly under its influence.
Can I ask you a question?
In the sense of Yugoslavia, Romania, etc.,
A perfect part of our political system in terms of independence is consistent with U.S. interests.
It is totally inconsistent with Soviet interests.
I'm very proud of you and me with Varya.
that they didn't need to be in the House of Representatives.
But on the other hand, the President, speaking honestly, would have to admit that he has been a thorn in the side of the Soviet Union.
Not intending to be, but that's true.
Because he has taken this independent posture.
They don't like it.
Now, the problem that all the countries have, including Yugoslavia, is to have good relations with countries like the United States without going so far
has to, uh, create such a suspicion.
And Moscow, they will, uh, uh, proceed to, uh, uh, use their power to suppress such indefatigableness.
Now, I think the problem that will be discussed with our question in Moscow will be
the attitude of the United States toward basically the Eastern Bloc.
Our position will not be that one liberation that we held as hunger shows that liberation means suicide.
But, on the other hand, the American position, my position, I should say,
is that it is to avoid, to the extent our self-interest will allow, to avoid any kind of understanding from Moscow that would give them any encouragement
uh, to, uh, say, play, throw the wires into the slide, or anything like that.
Now, uh, that's, I don't need to say anything more, but that's what we, what we think is very important.
Yes, I understand.
Thank you.
Uh, I have a business partner, and he's a person I've met before, but I can't say very many, uh, say very little, but I hope he can help.
President thinks he didn't tell you about our last meeting, about what President said and about his thoughts in his reply to the meeting.
and that he could ensure social security in Europe, that there would be a situation that he would be ready to be able to eliminate all drugs.
This place is reduced to a natural level.
I mean, it's in a civil world.
But he can't eliminate all of his own war.
He doesn't get to do that.
Well, I think that's what he may say.
But I think the final analysis, the Soviet leaders must consult their interests, and I do not think they can tolerate the vicious independence within the whole communist bloc.
When you come right down to it, the difference between the Soviet Union and China, in my opinion,
is not so much the fact that they have a big common border, not their difference in nationality.
Those are differences.
But basically, the Soviet Union cannot tolerate some other power as big, if not the one power in the communist world.
I understand this.
I don't criticize it.
I understand it.
Maybe you can ask him, but I feel that no human being can afford to talk about violence or any other violent acts of the communist bloc.
The communist bloc, let's not talk about it, because it is the main problem.
The main problem is that the Soviet Union does not have the right to control the state, to have the right to control the state, to have the right to rule the state,
But the Soviet Union can't deny that they have a great power in our world.
Yes, that's right.
But I think that we need to recognize the fact that the Soviet Union is a great power.
Yes, it's an independent state.
It makes sense for the Soviet Union to stand up.
But in the fact that the independent position of Yugoslavia can at least have its repercussions on the situation within its neighbors,
in other negative countries.
This is one thing for what you already know in the flesh.
The United States only gave the sign.
The corner of the sign.
The corner of the sign.
To the story of the future.
But, after all the political battles, they become the world of the city.
The justice steps lead to this, which is the desire for freedom.
Well, let me say, let me say that, uh, I told your treasurer, I said, you, uh, we have a friend called, uh, both times, and I said, uh, you can't go as far as, you know,
I said, what did you do here?
He said, it's Tom-Tom.
And on the other hand, he couldn't, I suppose, on his dramatic economy, I didn't get away with it.
Now, take care.
Another point I want to make, Mr. President, is that the arms talks with the Soviet are very important in terms of what the United States will do on its defense.
We know that we will get agreement with the Soviet limited offensive and defensive weapons.
If we do not, I will have to make a decision to go forward with a new arms bill, because the Soviet, at the present time, is moving very, very fast on ICBMs, particularly the larger SS-9s.
also on Polaris summaries, we had no right as a nation to attend to their basically parity with the United States.
But on the other hand, we in this country cannot stand by and allow any other case of superiority.
Now, I know the president said,
of the world, and I don't ask you to take sides with us, but I wanted to know that if we do not get a deal with the Soviet, on an invitation, then we, the latter, they will have to move up our perspective, and I'm prepared to do so.
... ... ... ... ...
That's why I'm important.
Yes, I agree.
I think that you could tell the president to
that there has been a tendency in some parts of the world, because of my action in winding down the war in Vietnam, the Nixon doctrine of helping others to help themselves and free them somewhere is back.
The move to China, going to China, and our talks with the Soviet and arts competition, that I personally,
I'm so concerned about peace that I will make a move for peace even though it weakens our defense to what I think would be a dangerous degree.
I must say to the President that that is great, this calculation.
The purpose of our, that as far as David is concerned, we are a Pacific power.
We intend to remain a Pacific power.
Not exactly, but because we have interest in the Pacific.
As far as our whole attitude toward national defense is concerned, if others are willing to limit or reduce
their arms, we will.
But if we don't, if they don't, then the United States will have to move accordingly.
What I'm trying to say is in a very personal way, that's the, when I toasted the President, I pointed out that he was a man of war, leader of war, who's now leader of peace.
And my background is very different from the President's.
I was in a very minor position in the war in the Pacific.
But I came out as he did, the hard way.
In fact, I am devoted to peace, he is devoted to peace.
I am devoted to the independence of nations, he is.
I respect the right of his country to have a different system than I have.
He can be a socialist, I can be a capitalist.
But on one thing, it's gotta be clearly understood that I am not a soft man.
On the contrary, I made these decisions
because I think the interests of the United States are served by talks from the Soviets, by talks from the Chinese.
But under those circumstances, while I am in this office, are we going to make decisions that may affect peace at any price, particularly the price of the United States being inferior, or the price of the United States
at a high level with the Soviets on the one hand, or China and the other, southern and on the river, small countries.
This is what I feel very strongly about.
I don't know.
He told me that he wanted me to go to Syria.
He wanted me to go to Syria.
He told me that he wanted me to go to Syria.
He told me that he wanted me to go to Syria.
If you don't want to do it, you can't do it.
If you don't want to do it, you can't do it.
If you don't want to do it, you can't do it.
If you don't want to do it, you can't do it.
In my belief, in my belief that
A weak United States would greatly increase the dangers of war.
A strong United States is essential if we are going to be able to play a role for peace.
And some of our senators do not agree with this.
They say, disarm, then we will have peace.
But when one side weakens and the other side gains the strength, then that's when the danger of war excels.
Now, I think, uh, one thing
The many world leaders that the President has created for us with the non-aligned world, they will criticize the United States for maintaining its military strength.
They may think that this is a threat to peace, but I am convinced that we must, that we continue to be strong until we get an enforceable agreement before they're taking arms.
They're deleting from emergency
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They are tired, you see.
of a hearing only about the necessity to assist them to pass death and so on and so on.
Let me tell the President briefly about where it stands in Vietnam.
Now, when I came into office in January of 69,
There were 550,000 Americans in Vietnam.
Our casualties were 300 a day a week.
Lastly, they were seven.
Seven.
And the number of Americans in Vietnam was less than 200,000.
Now, there's no accident that this has happened.
Take care.
No.
In January of the latest year, 1969, I warned the North Vietnamese, after making a peace offer, that unless they fought, I would have to take strong action to protect American forces.
When I saw Jay Chester in August of 1969, I told him that we were going to have to take strong action.
unless, say, we're being taught.
Wait a minute.
Wait a minute.
We continued to try to negotiate for several months.
Nothing happened.
So I ordered the destruction of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia.
As a result,
Our caches were cut from 300 a week to 100 a week in summer of 1970.
Now, late in 1970, in October of 1970, we made another peace call.
And I privately again warned the North Vietnamese that unless they talked, I would have to act on a military front.
My brother-in-law was here in October of 1970.
I told him what we were going to tell the North Vietnamese.
And I had, again, November, December, January, no response from the North Vietnamese except increased infiltration.
And that's when I ordered the attacks in Laos.
Then, in the late 1970s, he gave the peace vote, and in the meantime, he planned a private visit to the city of Brno.
He did not forget to inform the citizens that he was going to the city of Orlovo, near the city of Ljubljana, where he met him in October of the 1970s.
Then, in November and December of 1971, in the meantime, on both sides,
The South Vietnamese, of course, conducted the liberation operation and it had the result of
and can then constantly, with an arcane means, to launch their usual offensive.
As a result, instead of a 100-week casualty, we've changed to less than 20-a-week averaging for the past three months.
On the day of the operation, the operation of the house was canceled.
As a result, the operation of the house was canceled.
On the day of the operation, the operation of the house was canceled.
Now, we have made a very forthcoming offer to an archaeologist.
We wanted to help rebuild their country.
You know, they had some very big floods, as well as the military damage.
And we offered a withdrawal of forces.
On our part, we asked, of course, and this is an absolute condition, a return of our prisoners, 400 prisoners or so.
There has been no action on that offer.
However, the president should know that we have told him that we must have a reply by the end of this month, by the month of November, by the end of the month of November.
Yes.
I would not entertain circumstances suggesting that the President express any opinion about Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam.
I know that the opinion that has to be expressed by those who oppose the American position in Vietnam is that we should get out and that we should, in the process, break two out also.
and turn the country over to North Vietnamese.
This we will never do.
and to stop, because they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there, they are there,
And that's what democracy is all about.
And that's what democracy is all about.
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We have made an offer, we have made an offer which would set up a process, uh, which would, uh, uh, set up a meeting of people, some of the abominable crew.
It is an international supervised assembly.
I won't, I don't need to go into the details, but, uh,
I don't have a choice.
I don't have a choice.
I don't have a choice.
I don't have a choice.
I don't have a choice.
I don't have a choice.
What should be done is try to move the government.
We didn't talk about that.
We were trying to have a common government.
We have worked for a different government, not the other way around.
The Democratic Party is being ruled by a Democratic government within the present.
How is this government?
In the eyes of the American Party, it's the same government.
In the eyes of the American Party, it's the same government.
In the eyes of the American Party, it's the same government.
In the eyes of the American Party, it's the same government.
In the eyes of the American Party, it's the same government.
We have made an offer, we have made an offer which would set up a process, uh, which would, uh, uh, set up a government that the people of South Vietnam will approve.
It is an international supervised assembly.
I hope I don't need to go into the details, but, uh, I can only say that the offer that we have made privately is very worth coming.
Now, the thing that I don't want to do is to press you to me.
Mr. President, as I have indicated, I consider myself, like him, to be a man of peace.
But like the President, I have to use the power that I have to protect our position.
And I, and particularly now with regard to our prisoners of war, if we do not have an agreement to return them by Christmas of this year, I feel at, not against Canberra, not against Laos, but North Vietnam.
I am pleased that you have joined me in this meeting.
I am very pleased that you have joined me in this meeting.
I hear that the United States has no choice in Vietnam, but simply now,
It's a very mistaken idea.
We want to get out.
We want to get out.
We want to, on the other hand, we intend to get our prisoners back.
They cannot continue to be held hostage.
And if the North Vietnamese will not even possess what is an offer that goes far beyond anything that has been seen in public yet, I have no choice but to act, and I will act.
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Thank you, sir.
I think the important thing about this is this.
I want to say, again, not to take a witness, because I am not a witness, but simply as a matter of fact, that I also am a man of peace.
I have a great contribution to that, and I just really want to be safe, just like the President.
By any of those we deal with around you and around the world, take your partners more than you can.
And to misjudge the desire for peace for Venus, we are going to be strong and we're going to protect the interests of the United States and I will do whatever is necessary, take whatever risk is necessary to get 400 American prisoners back.
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Also, when a man dies, the man who dies will have the most important responsibility, because he will give you one of the most beautiful and most beautiful things in the world, which is a gift.
However, the most important thing is that he will fulfill your desire and desire to die.
And that he will do everything in his power to forgive you along with your life.
What I've said is I've tried to stay in the outside, not to get the President to comment, but I want to be perfectly honest with him, so that he knows what to expect, and what not to expect, and what not to expect.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
and God's will be with them.
I don't think so.
But I now, at that time, I was alone on the island of Tufan, in the South Sea, but there was a sign that said, I don't know, I don't know if it was the sign that said, I don't know, I don't know if it was the sign that said, I don't know if it was the sign that said, I don't know if it was the sign that said, I don't know if it was the sign that said, I don't know if it was the sign that said, I don't know if it was the sign that said,
that he should be the most submissive person he can be today, they should fear because he bears a lie.
Very good.
Very good.
Thank you, sir.
Obviously, it is a matter of being a fool, having to hang one, to resort to more than anything.
It is always the case, that people try to be the most submissive.
He understands that it is hard for him to go out and then he cries, and then he cries.
Because he is going to need to be at home with his family.
According to his name, he is dead.
All eternity, should he have all efforts exerted in order to find his prostitution, any hour, any time possible.
He knows very well that they are going to China, that they are going to the Soviet Union,
He has been a brilliant man.
He has taught us to talk, and we can't cry today.
What can we do, sir?
We'll see more.
It's true, but...
I think it's a good question, but I think we understand.
Um, Yugoslavia, the years, over 70 years, the energy, you know, as the years have gone, the energy of the...
But they don't have to stay in the community.
that, uh, politically, where I'm in, it's not the, it's not the problem, or it's not the idea of the men, or the group of men, or the people of the body.
It is the desire of our people, the willingness and passion of the nation, of the land, of the people, of the people, of the bodies, who want good relations with the United States of America, and the education we need the nation for many, they want any good response from the nation, with the other, bigger, neighbor, goodness for each
He hasn't any more to say to me.
So we can't give any other point of view that that's true, that that's the one we are dealing with.
And give us a better, put us to our power, give us any other action that we can do, any other action that we can do.
I understand that completely.
And since you're the person who knows, I'm very pragmatic.
We are not...
We do not insist that other nations have our armed recovery.
We do not insist they always vote with us in the United Nations.
We understand that they don't.
Each of us holds his interest.
We don't have a hand, a lead.
All we ask is fair treatment.
We're not so, we're not as concerned about what a country does internally.
That's its own difference.
We are very much concerned if externally they treat the United States differently than they treat somebody else.
I just want to leave one of my son.
I just want to leave one of my son.
I just want to leave one of my son.
I just want to leave one of my son.
I just want to leave one of my son.
I just want to leave one of my son.
I just want to leave one of my son.
Well, we have made our last best offer to an archaeologist.
By the end of the record,
We either have to be on the negotiating track, or we have to look at other options.
I just want the President to know I don't want him to be surprised by what happens.
One of the plans has to be to force them to deny him the moment of control.
That's how you work for him.
Yeah.
But both projects are you don't sign another.
If you don't sign another, then he is going to have to use the technology.
He is going to have to use the technology.
Sure.
Well, you made a great hit in our country.
All my baseball.
Home run.
Home run, everybody.
Very popular.
And when you go to Los Angeles, that's my hometown.
All my friends will be there.
They expect the biggest crowd in history for the World Affairs Council, 2,500, when the President comes.
Is he so very going to ask a question?
He's very good at questions.
They're coming.
Mrs. Brooks will come in here.
And we walk out together and get a picture of the photographer.
This is, uh, maybe fighting for a key.
Yeah, 30.
All right.
Uh, here we go.
Well, good morning.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Good morning.
The best cigars in the world, I have to say, are Cuban.
The best are Cuban.
But the next best are from Canaria, which I use for flamenco.
So you've got something to complain about.
The next best.
The second best.
The second best are Cuban.
The second best are Cuban.
Also recorded on October 30, 1971
609-003 8:54 AM · 1 hr 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), and Charles W. Colson met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:54 am to 9:58 am.
609-004 9:58 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
609-005 9:58 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
609-006 9:58 AM · 26 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
609-008 11:16 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:16 am to 11:19 am.
609-009 11:19 AM · 38 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:19 am and 11:20 am.
609-010 11:20 AM · 49 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:20 am to 11:21 am.
609-011 11:21 AM · 46 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:21 am to 12:07 pm.
Conversation 609-007, October 30, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/609-007 (accessed November 14, 2026).