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Well, that was nice.

Thank you for seeing me eat meat at the dinners, because we try to get the reference station.

You just, everybody wants to come, like you did, and they want to come.

But I let it usually get to about three each dinner, three on 14.

And so I thought I was going to let the rest of them eat.

So I'm all ready to eat.

Oh, yes.

How are you?

Wonderful.

Nice to see you this morning.

I see that it was wise to leave the weather on a good day.

Oh, look at this.

Well, actually, you were so right, though, when you said, you know, you're much more popular in the rain than in the sun.

And I was there, I was there in the drought, you know, 67, toward the end of it.

And I recall at that time, I was told by the Secretary of Agriculture, or, you know, call him Secretary, Minister, Minister, Minister told me, he said, without the drought, they would be self-sufficient wheat.

And you said last night in your speech, you're now self-sufficient wheat.

Yes, I am.

We had rice, but you see that was at the, there, and at that time you were several million bushels behind.

But that's come out, which is, and he said it's a question of the weather, of the weather.

Have you had any, since 67, no, no droughts?

Oh yes, we had a drought this year.

This year?

This year, yes.

But how could you be self-sufficient then?

Well, because the area, the bottom droughts are growing much more.

I think we just, we just don't have so much.

We're, of course, not working as you are on brain making and all the rest.

Something's going to happen.

We're also working on desalinization and something will happen there and how it's going to change the world.

Don't you know?

Don't come back to me.

This is very exciting.

You know what I mean?

We're working and I naturally work with your people who are all scientists.

But I have put an extra amount, as everybody knows.

I've got in our scientific people, and I came to her after that.

Frankly, because they do it too routinely.

And I said, now, look, we've got this.

And where are the big desalination plants?

And where are the big, you know, we have prototypes.

It's all question of prototypes.

But we have one now going in California and another one in Texas, which may help some.

Let's go to whatever subjects that you would like to comment on.

Yes, I think it would be good if you would give, and this is something that is very important, if you would give the Prime Minister the background with regard to our peaking initiative and so forth.

uh and what is this what do you think is leading to now and then happy with your business there just give the general feel so yeah but also i think and let me talk about the russian wouldn't you like to have something on that too and i want to cover vietnam

Actually, when I was in Israel in July, I tried to give to Mr. Huxler and to the Foreign Minister something about the general capacity without being able to indicate the specific type of moves that we are making.

I've had these two

We had no, we had no illusions that the Chinese are ideologically extremely close to us.

And you have, of course, your own experiences with them, and you know that on those points they're extremely unyielding.

Our general approach has been not to pretend to be

both sides recognize that when the president goes there, that we are not going to emerge with a pretense that we have something settled.

As a matter of fact, may I say one thing?

You should, if this is lawful, you know, do not expect that with a Chinese trip, a humanitarian thing, the United States and China, the People's Republic of China decided that they have very few differences for this sound settlement.

It isn't going to happen that way.

It's the fact of the trip, and we will start a dialogue, a dialogue with regard to what they are doing around, and we thereby become, to a certain extent, rather than, as I was saying last night, rather than being in a position of confronting, in a position of communicating, recognizing this adult difference.

Is that the impression?

No, we have concentrated...

As much as we possibly can, on 500 problems, they can have a number of border issues with a number of connectors, in which we feel, especially with respect to the Soviet Union, that we don't propose to take a decision.

Where are they going to raise those issues?

They are certain, but speaking in the context of this room,

We turn aside on the ground that they had such a complex historical origin.

Well, I suppose it'll be to do about this.

I think it's perfectly, perfectly candid, though, because we slightly say that we were, of course, the U.N. on the bank.

I don't think we can say that we can expect they will not be ready when we're there, because I rather think they might be.

Now, the main point that I'm saying is that with regard to a communique or an agreement, it is our view, and this is very important, we're on a tightrope here, that both the Soviet Union and People's Republic, we see good relations with both.

When I say good, quote, quote.

the relation of both as good as it could be, and not at the expense of any of their neighbors.

On the other hand, we cannot say that these issues may not be raised.

Now, I think that's fair to say.

I think it's pretty safe to say that this Soviet issue will not be, that we will not discuss Soviet-Chinese relations.

Yeah.

We will certainly not raise it.

That is in our position.

That's right.

We will not raise it.

But it's been our position on all of these problems except that we cannot, as you know, this is our first meeting with the Chinese.

And we really cannot predict what their attitude will be then.

I don't know.

Depends, I guess, on what their problems are from time to time.

I have the feeling that they won't face difficulties because they do want to get out of the isolation in which they've been.

I feel that.

Thank you.

On this other comment, you know their views.

And they don't say more to me than they say classically.

which is a very strong support.

They take the position, as they say, that East Pakistan is an eternal affair, that you have no right to interfere at all.

They said that even privately, too.

They said it's better to drop it.

We want to discuss primarily bilateral issues and those issues where they have policy interventions on us, such as Southeast Asia, and so forth, rather than areas such as South Asia.

And we have made it very clear that we will not negotiate with our third parties, but I don't believe that they are prosecuting

that they feel extremely strongly about the Pakistan issue.

Partly because of the ties up with Pakistan, which you know, as well as I do.

But partly, and that they don't say, because of the president, as I said, for splitting off parts of China.

Very interesting, you see.

You see, we should have a look at that.

They're afraid, in other words, of a part of some partitions of China.

Well, I think that they are afraid that once the principle is established in an outside country, that this might be applied, frankly, to Formosa, or maybe to Tibet.

This is my impression, this they have never said, but the intensity of their feeling goes beyond their few political interests in South Asia.

But, um, if I may say so, they were not given that impression to us.

Yeah, that's right.

Yeah.

That's good to know.

They have been far less provocative than the others in the 90s.

I mean, that's not true.

I thought they were a state less intense this time than July.

Is that right?

They are sensitive to, they're extremely sensitive to Syria.

And their sensitiveness lies in the fact that they know that in these two regions, they have

And we certainly can hear other things which they keep on saying.

You know, we have a lot of infrastructure to protect refugees.

We have solved it.

We have terrorizing.

But they are at this point, they are always afraid.

And why are they afraid?

They know that surely we are not going to invade them.

It is impossible.

But they know that in Tibet, anything can.

They are in a soft spot.

They're not defeated.

But apparently the Chinese people are not flexible enough to assimilate non-harm people.

And they always have this difficulty.

The Chinese are not very good at this.

All over the world they live in poverty.

I have the impression, Henry, from reading your reports, that there are primary concerns, actually.

are except for their our first facility and second Japan.

That is, they're taking the historical look.

They see the Soviet Union as a massive nuclear power.

They see Japan as a massive economic power.

They look upon India, naturally, as a very significant force, but it is far away in terms of, I mean, it's just harder to get at.

I mean, what will they do?

I mean, I think the Japanese thing is one that does concern.

Would you not say that's

Do you know what I mean?

But they also do the North Carolina Department.

Yes.

For example, they're, they're, of course, on our part.

Mr. Kip is a parallel example.

As I was saying, they, they have conflict with Japan.

And we're on our relations there.

It's crazy.

In Japan, it's a feeling of isolation.

We then have a very dangerous position.

We have made it.

One thing we have to make very clear is this.

First of all, the purpose of our policy is to moderate the hostility of the opponent.

And that is true.

But we have no illusion that they will continue to be an opponent.

And we will not give up old friends in order to play games that are important.

What will be the situation, the position of Taiwan?

Well, uh, Taiwan, of course, of course, they must get the president and have to discuss it with the chairman.

It's not that they will say.

Now, will it make a difference after the internship?

I mean, is that what they will do?

I would say, again, here, as I read the Prime Minister, and of course Henry made a very complete record, that was very good, as I read the record, I think that the Chinese can't, like any country, just like your country, any country with a long history, take a long view, rather than a short view, a tactical view,

But I think their view is quite long.

I mean, that they are not...

I have a feeling, for example, that on the UN vote, that it's very interesting.

They were jumping up and down about getting into the UN.

I mean, they thought, well, get it eventually.

And as far as Taiwan is concerned, well, that's a problem.

So they want to be sure that Taiwan is not assimilated by Japan.

I think that's a very correct description.

I do not believe that teaching has any fixed design.

And for any specific matter that they feel that they must do it by force, and the implication of the Prime Minister that perhaps

I think at this point, my precious and more concerned is preventing new obstacles to such a negotiation from arriving.

Sorry, very brutally forcing the issue.

But that, yes, the present salary situation is exactly.

Let me say one thing that I think is very important.

Taiwan, and actually we know all eight of you, but many of our friends, the Japanese, perhaps others, the 18th century country, very suspicious of what we're doing here.

The idea was the United States doing the systematic

Russians, as I will find out in a moment.

They think, well, here we are, we're dealing with the Chinese as a back, and so we'll take a deal with that at any cost.

Now, what we haven't realized is that, as I tried to say in my brief welcome remarks with the Prime Minister, there's a

and I do think this reflects the feelings of a majority of the people in our Congress and in our country.

We do have, as you do have,

a very great dedication to certain principles.

We believe in our principles, as you believe in your principles, and in many ways they're the same.

In other words, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, etc., etc., etc., principles which are antagonistic to

and opposite to, basically, the totalitarian systems, whether they're the right or the left.

Now, as far as the Chinese are concerned, it is a communist system.

It is a very strict and tough communist system.

It is very different.

So, around the, around the mainland of India, all the way from Japan to India, you have a group of nations that are trying to make it progress, etc., through the

either the parliamentary or the democratic or whatever kind of system you call it, uh, naturally, naturally, our, our association with such nations, whether there's a treaty or not is irrelevant.

Uh, it's only relevant in case something comes up and it's called and ordered to be, to have to have.

But our associations with those nations that share

To a closer extent, our political and philosophical ideas will be closer than our associations with nations that are totally our opponents.

Now, the other side of this coin is that here's where we have a very grave problem with our far right in this time.

by the far right, and some Democrats, and there's a lot of Republicans, a lot of my friends, and their problem is that they say, I have nothing to do with these people, because if you have nothing to do with these people, then you're selling your friends down the river, whether it's Japan or Taiwan.

That's right, that's right.

The point that I make is that what we, that ours is, and I can't say this too often, our approach to both the Chinese and Soviet trips is purely pragmatic.

It is not philosophical.

Basically, when we look at your approach, what's based on your approach, you're not alignment.

you can call it philosophical, but social pragmatic, can feel it beyond his mind to become involved in great power politics.

I think that's what was your position.

I know it was your father's position, and I didn't know leaders before that, but is this ever true?

And so, in this instance, our approach to Beijing as a pragmatic, and their approach to us as a pragmatic,

They have no illusions.

Let me say, I think everyone will tell you, they have no illusions about me.

We can talk candidly here.

I am known as a strong and accomplished man.

I don't think I'm a student, but I am a strong and accomplished man.

I am one who knows that if you look over the history of the world, some of the words of the

Europe have been fought between nations that have similar systems of government and similar religions.

I've also known that if you look in the history of the world, there are times when the way to peace

use of the substance of the absence of war may be to find an accommodation with a system which is totally different from yours.

That's really what we're talking about here.

And consequently, our approach here is this.

I look down the road.

I see no danger in the next three, four, five years.

As I said yesterday, I look down the road.

I do not think that anybody who sits in this office at this time

could have lived with himself if he stood by and did not do what he could to open up communication with China.

You see, for the purpose, as Henry says, of moderating, now that doesn't mean, now this is very difficult to say, well, we're going in and moderating them.

They just hit the wall.

The whole point is we are moderating when people talk to us.

And we don't know them.

You're too modern.

You talk to everybody, right?

And that's what we're trying to do at this time.

That's really what it gets down to.

And this is what drives our far right, our extremists on the right and the left don't agree with us.

But we have the same situation in India.

Do you?

Yeah.

The same right and the same left.

They're all fighting against each other.

Both sides.

And, of course, some of our own people, anyway, because during the election, we made some election advances with what is known as the Righteous Communism, political communists.

What they ignore is that by so doing, we finished them off.

I mean, they gained strength.

They didn't gain any good extra seat or influence or anything.

You're practically white now.

Well, they're very weak now.

I'm white now.

I had the advantage of, when I talked to the Prime Minister,

Well, that's how they sent it to me.

I don't have a foreign policy, but if you are lucky, get a domestic policy.

She's a genius.

What did I think of domestic policy?

I remember when I was there in World War II, it's in the 7th or 8th.

The communist group was very vocal and very strong.

So I think if I had it when I was in Whitewood High, if it was when you were in Whitewood High, I think you would reduce their power and their stroke.

Yes, our power, I think, was the dispenser to keep them divided.

And he said, we have nothing to do with you, because they all combined.

Combined is the power.

Separation, neither of them is right.

Now, what is the situation now in Southeast Asia?

In Southeast Asia?

Well, the situation briefly is this.

Militarily, as far as the United States is concerned, the war is finished.

Our cash flows this week were two.

That's too many.

That's two, rather than 300, which is what's the case when I came in.

The number of Americans we have in Southeast Asia is 184,000 now.

And I'll be making another announcement on the 15th of this month.

And the rate of withdrawal will continue.

There's not any problems left.

One of the most difficult ones is one that I'm sure you will appreciate and understand, and that is that the North Vietnamese have approximately 400 Americans as prisoners, and they totally refuse to discuss it under any context, either look it out

to give back no uh they're they're they are holding them hostage with the idea that that the united states not only will withdraw from asia from south east asia from vietnam which we are doing and will do and they know it but second that we will cover all aid to south vietnam which we will never do and third that we will throw out the president government and put in

another government, which we will never do.

They say they don't say quite as bluntly as that, but that's where my mind comes down to.

Now, under these circumstances, then, we confront a problem.

Now, I do, however, want you to know that the negotiating track is still open.

And I

If I give you a little double talk, I don't want you to be surprised by what happens at this point, but I do want you to know, because I know you, we talked about this in 69, and you remember I said then that we were reaching a point where I would have to act, and after that we went into Cambodia.

And one of the reasons our casualties were two last week rather than 200 is that we did Cambodia last year and Laos this year.

But I didn't have it.

Speaking of the present time, and very confidential separate channels are pursuing a negotiated settlement.

But time is running out.

Obviously, you can see, as the number of people you've got, if you're going to go down the line, if you're going to get out, what's there to negotiate about?

Separate prisoners, and that's that.

We are now in terms of negotiating ceasefire and the return of the prisoners and the American and the final phase-out of the American victory hall.

And of course, their withdrawal we would trust.

But without getting into all the seven points or the nine points or the 14 or whatever it is, at least all of it is on track.

But I can tell you that at the present time, we have made to them

under channels that they know.

But what's that hotel we meet in?

There's just not a majestic hotel.

That's me.

But in other channels, we have made our last and best offer.

It is very good.

It is everything.

Including this channel, a very significant program.

A very significant program.

of helping in economic reconstruction of our Vietnam.

You know, they've had a very difficult time with the floods, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

They get considered.

We will know within the next, perhaps, 60 days.

That's as much time as there are.

That's as long as they can take, because beyond that point, there's no reason for us to continue to talk.

Whether they will talk or whether they're just going to continue to filibuster.

If they discuss it, and if we reach an agreement, that's fine.

That's what we would prefer.

If they do not,

And here's where I do not want you, under any circumstances, to be surprised.

And I don't ask for your support in case this, I hope, does not happen.

But if they do not, then I have no other choice but to take the strongest action possible to get our prisoners back.

Now, uh, you put yourself in the position that I would have if you had 400 of your people.

Some of them, most of them, five years, four to five years.

They are prisoners.

We've had no reports on them.

They won't let the Red Cross in.

They do nothing.

We've offered the release of all the prisoners we've gotten.

As a matter of fact, the South Vietnamese have moved from letting theirs out.

And yet, at a time when the United States has prepared one to get out of South Vietnam,

Totally.

Two, in addition to that, if we're prepared to do that, to help that rebuilding of Vietnam, if under those circumstances they still refuse to talk and refuse to negotiate with regard to the release of our prisoners, I will act.

Now, I do not want to.

It will cause problems here.

But I shall not allow 400 Americans to be held hostage after we have gone the extra mile.

And we will have gone up to that time.

And at this time, the action that we will take, of course, will not be against sub-ballots or air-balloting or air-ballots or air-balloting.

It was never against them.

It was never either.

But it will have anything against North Vietnam.

And that's the way it is.

I hope it works out.

Henry, you're pretty close to these things, is my advice.

Exactly.

All right.

That's exactly the situation, but Cynthia would like to point out that I finished it, and she's the only judge leader who knows that there's anything.

Everybody says, are there private negotiations?

The moment you say there are, then they're no longer private.

I can tell you there are.

There are.

It's not what I'm answering.

Except for this.

I do think that we gave an indication to Gromego that there was something going on.

He's the owner of Gromego.

I did it.

I said, look, because he said, what are you doing?

And I said, we're trying on every channel.

So he guessed.

But I can tell you that at this point, there is, we have made an offer.

It is being considered.

We will get an answer.

But when the answer comes, then we have to go one way or the other.

If you should, and I'm not saying you should, but if for any reason you want any conversations with a North Vietnamese effort,

We would appreciate it if you could make a deal with us.

Because that might break the channel.

But in other words, there's one way or another, as far as American involvement is concerned in Vietnam, it's coming to an end.

And that irritant in our relations and so forth will keep it over there.

President Rahm, however, is extremely difficult.

I cannot allow those 400 to be held.

That's the key at this point.

But we're moving along.

And as I say, our proposal with regard to reconstruction is a very good one.

And I think it's good for the whole area to stabilize all because it's not just for them.

It's for North Vietnam, for South Vietnam, Cambodian lands.

It's our hope, our hope.

our whole approach here is to have a Southeast Asia, which basically is neutral, and with a chance to move forward, which of course it would be helpful if our kids do, to have that rather than one that is lined up in confrontation one against the other.

In the Chinese attitude, generally they do civilization.

Our impression is that the Chinese will do civilization.

We have this problem, you see.

If it were one alone, how big am I?

There'd be no problem.

But with the two of them, he has got to watch to be sure that it is not caught working with the capitalists, so-called.

You know, you've seen the press releases.

Every time you meet with the Chinese, they say it's a condominium.

That's the Russian.

You meet with the Russians, it's a condominium with the Chinese, and so forth and so on.

All I can say is this, that from Henry's conversations and also from the conversations that I have with the people of which Henry's a president,

and the letters I've had, we've had it in correspondence with Russia, of course, that I would say that the Russians are vitally interested in the bilateral problems that I'd like to mention briefly today, that we're going to discuss with them, and that they realize that this is a peripheral area for them, that they'd like, if they had their drugs, they'd like to get them removed.

from the back on the other hand henry's absolutely correct as they live in their competition with the chinese for world power neither can be caught trying to remove that amount of the present activities however neither will be powerful why let me put it this way there was a time when both the chinese and the russians were competing with each other they didn't even argue that time is gone

trying to take them off.

I think, as a matter of fact, they love the negotiations, would you not say that, in that sense?

Yes.

I think neither of them would put an obstacle in the way of a settlement.

It would probably be, it would be relieved.

Actually, when we go, when we go to Beijing, when we go to Moscow, it would be very helpful to our discussions

and look at it from their standpoint, get those discussions to be riveted on subjects that really involve them, rather than on something like that.

You see, I mean, it's like, for example, we have discussions with you, I mean, so it's too much good to be talking about what's happening in Bolivia, or the revolution in Chile, or something like that.

And I think that's the Russian and the Chinese, they're pretty pragmatic about this.

So I think this is one good thing about the talks.

Now, with regard to the Russians... Lord Chancellor?

Yes, sir.

The United States is working towards one-minded law establishment of a law of diplomatic relations.

In the long run.

That's what we're talking about.

You see, obviously, we have a defense with Taiwan.

We have a treaty with Taiwan.

We recognize Taiwan.

And as long as we do that, there's going to be diplomatic relations in the traditional and conventional sense with China or the People's Republic.

On the other hand,

we will have that kind of relation that will be very, very constructive.

In other words, there will be a dialogue.

But as far as formal diplomatic relations, we do not expect that to be correct, exactly.

We both agree that that's the case.

Now, with regard to the Russians, does this pair also on the whole thing?

I want you to know that before we go to Russia,

We naturally will talk to our European friends and so forth.

That's pretty important.

But the Russian summit is something that many urged that we had at the beginning of our term back in 69.

I held it off.

and I think, Prime Minister, you would agree, I take a different view of summitry, generally.

You get heads of government together, and you sit and talk about this, and unless you know, unless there's something substantive to talk about, it only raises hopes and then dashes them back to Glassboro Conference to help much.

On the other hand, and the Russians also took the same line in 69, saying it's true, and I think he said that.

so that the Russians manually thought that it would be useful to have a meeting at the highest level, was probably the Berlin Settlement.

The Berlin Settlement, of course, was of enormous significance.

It hasn't been played as much as it should, but I remember in my, even my almost three years in office now, Henry's waved me up at least seven times and said, well, we ought to go on the clothes or something, right?

We've had five, six, or seven times.

It was, uh...

It happened on your first European trip.

That's right.

That's right what you said.

That's right.

So therefore, the Berlin Settlement, it was them.

But the Russians thought that was significant.

We made it significant.

Starting from that, then having in mind that we all were here discussing salt, having in mind also that hanging over both of us was the danger of a blow-up, and that we made it.

Let's face it, between the United States and the Soviet Union, a conflict in Central Europe, particularly in Berlin, would certainly lead to war.

Between the United States and the Soviet Union, at the other end of the spectrum, what happens in Southeast Asia is not going to, because it's just too peripheral to them.

They're interested.

We're interested.

But between the United States and the Soviet Union,

In the middle of the whole spectrum is the Mideast.

It could.

It's not certain, but it could.

Because here is the Soviet Union moving into the Banach region with the very significant support, of course, from the UAR and building bases and the rest.

Here we are with our commitment to Israel.

And, by these circumstances, because also the stakes are very great in that area, because geographically we're both close to that area,

Rubbing together there is very dangerous.

You remember that Jordan thing was harrowing.

Very, I mean, we were up.

I mean, how we averted a showdown there will be a nice little historical opinion of Mr. Kissinger, right?

So if he ever writes one.

But my point is, the base, and this, I really appreciate your giving confidence because we do not want to undercut the four of our talks.

And I wrote it.

But division is a subject that we think could be very live at the summit.

The problems of arms limitation, even assuming we get an interim SALT agreement, could be very live at the summit because the SALT agreement deals only with the freeze on offensive and defensive weapons.

There is far much more to be done.

Both the Soviets and us realize, as we were saying yesterday, that if war comes, that there go no winners, only losers, as we were saying.

And leaders are going to get an advantage because we can afford however much defense we need.

And so that they, not as well as we can, but they will have a proper democratic process when they ask for it to happen.

In addition to that, there's an enormous interest in trade.

Trade in the sense that the Soviet economy has been flat for six or seven years.

The Soviet economy needs technological, you know, development that we could be very insistent on, and we, of course, would welcome that.

And then finally there is the problem of Europe.

Now, the question has been raised, and I do want to cover this with you, but on a European security conference, so you know what our position is.

A talk to the effect, and some of our European friends, particularly when it comes to this line, was that we should walk right into a European security conference.

That is not our view.

Our view is not to say no, but our view is to say, well, let's wait and see.

Let's wait to see what will come out of it.

At this time, a European Security Conference would be, what would we call it?

We'd all get together and say, yes, cultural exchange, some visas and this and that.

But the basic problems of Europe, the NATO portions, the Warsaw portions, building a balanced force production, all of these things,

are much too complicated and are too far from any kind of agreement to have a conference at this point.

So our attitude toward the European Security Conference is, first, that the whole Berlin Settlement must be wrapped up, determined, the German Settlement.

Once that is done, then there must be consultation with our European friends, should they be able to consult theirs.

And further down the road, it may be that a European Security Conference could take place

But this is an open question.

We have discussed it a ton of times, even with Rojito and this year.

He strongly, strongly urges it.

But at least he did agree with the proposition that we should not have it simply for conspiring.

And so that's our solution.

The problem here, the problem of...

They do not, they do not assault launchers.

The only between the US and the Soviet Union, as you know, they do not cover European forces.

They do not cover the ground forces in Europe or the tactical forces in Europe, and so forth.

They only cover the ICBMs, the large submarines, and that sort of thing.

And of course, ADMs.

But they can't tell you not.

Then you come to the problem of Europe, and this gets down to NATO, and the war assault back to France.

On this, I would have to say,

that we have done some very, very thorough work on this subject.

But we are still a considerable distance from agreement.

But we're very candid that they are, too.

They're not ready yet to make a deal.

Excuse me, Mr. Hasselblad.

So the European Security Conference angle, the reason I mention this, I think it's going to be very much in the press.

Now, our British friends, I think, take some of our view here.

I mean, he was cautious on what's the German position.

Good.

Mr. President.

Of course, the mutual force reduction issue there is separate from the European security countries.

But related with that, out of the European security countries, it's hard to find a gender identity, except trade and cultural relations.

The Europeans are very suspicious of the usual force-reduction negotiation.

They're very reluctant.

The British and French are opposed.

The Germans were...

We're slightly better, but they now want us to shift into its greater lunacy.

In fact, they suspect that this is what you want to discuss bilaterally in Moscow.

We told them that we will never do that.

We will not discuss anything in Moscow.

And the Russians are well aware of that.

We'll meet with our friends there.

You can't do that.

On the European security concerns, the Europeans...

speak in a more forthcoming way than the President has done in the conference of this room.

But in practice, they have possibly sanctioned the same policy, that is, we would really, you think the President does, quite frankly, because we don't understand why the Soviet are so interested in it.

Because we can't find any agenda on it.

It would warrant such a big deal that

Well, some believe that basically the Soviets are interested in it because it would, uh, create euphoria in Europe.

Uh, less support for NATO and all that sort of thing.

I can understand that.

Psychologically, right.

But I think basically the European attitude...

substance is essentially the same as alcohol.

Those two are domestic reasons.

They use a slightly different term.

Well, the Italians, for example, are way out in the front for it because they have a difficult domestic culture.

That's true.

The French are...

They're talking about... Well, the Papa do, Gresham, the communicator, you know.

What's the possible type of table for ratification?

Paris, Austria, Mali.

Of course, now the two Germans are discussing implementing measures and that they have applied to us for an overall guarantee.

The guarantee will be relatively easy, we've already agreed to that in principle.

It now looks as if the two Germans will finish their group by the end of December, which means that the foreign baroness to Stuttgart will have the final protocol in January.

then the Germans would submit it to their parliament.

The guess would be that by April it would be ratified.

If that is the case, we can then start turning to the preliminary discussions.

You see, our trip to Moscow was in May, and it has taken place with the President.

And that's right.

And incidentally, for your information, again, we did not agree on the actual date that the trip to Beijing will take place at least two months before the week that's involved our agreement with Israel.

Could we just take two minutes on the amenities?

Sure.

Well, we could spend two years.

But the Middle East, Madam Prime Minister, is the one where all these problems are difficult, and really the one that would be such an agony for all of you in salvation.

But the Middle East is, I must say, extremely, in my opinion,

Now, I say that despite the fact that we have a ceasefire, despite the fact that there are talks and so forth, Sadat, the two of us, the two before and coming, maybe, the other had, you know, right down to Israelis, and we are so far apart.

And I do not see any, in the near future, any immediate hope for progress.

Our position will be to continue to try to mediate, to pull together, and all that sort of thing.

But I would have to be candid when you say that I think the best we can do is to keep the ceasefire going and

in other words, an uneasy truce.

Now, all that's stolen.

I must say, and this again, I said it, I must emphasize with the greatest of your confidence, our Russian friends can help here.

It's basic, you must see, let's face it.

Without Russian support, the UAE would be in pain.

Not now.

Over 50 years, yes, but not now.

Now, I've had certain chances, therefore.

It seems to me that it's not in the Soviet interest to have their clients break this truce and try to head to it again at this point.

On the other hand, it may not be in the Soviet interest to push their clients a bit for a settlement.

Looking on our side, people think, well, we can deliver Israel.

Well, let me tell you, Israel is a very hard country to deliver, as you know.

I mean, they're pretty tough.

Henry, do you want to add to that at all?

No.

Am I suggesting that?

Well, whenever the negotiations always tend to turn to theology, and if they have a maddening characteristic, then obviously they fight about things.

They never concentrate on what can be done now.

They fight about what might be done later, two or three years from now, on the interim settlement.

to the overall settlement, there'd be a better chance of getting it.

And that wouldn't alter the overall settlement.

So whether we're taking care of it or not, once the Israelis move back, whether I'm actually, and I'm speaking of movement, it doesn't seem to me to make an enormous amount of difference whether they go back 30 kilometers or 60 kilometers.

once the principle of a pullback is accepted, because then the Israelis will get used to the proposition that they can't move back without catastrophe.

And right now, there are heavy and complicated formulas which would make it complicated 60, 50.

Do they go to the east side of the passage?

Do they go to the west side of the passage?

And all in this waste time and in this framework, the President's judgment

to be right, that it will always get hung up on essentially theological points, how you connect the interim settlement to the overall settlement, and so forth.

I don't think that's the major problem now.

UAR and Jordan go along with the...

It used to be the case, but... You're absolutely right, but that has changed now.

UAR has a stroke, and the same stroke in...

But let me say, I don't want to sound too pessimistic.

There is a truce, and I don't think that, frankly, it's in the Soviet interest to have that truce broken.

You'd agree with that, would you?

Well, on the sea side, we can...

I think it's been very rising...

We're not that far along yet.

We're not that far along.

I put in a hypothetical case that both have great influence.

And it may be that we get there in May.

It may be that that could be the critical point.

But in the meantime, I think about all either of us can do is to cool it.

And that's the way I would put it.

And I don't think either can pressure the other too much.

When you're looking at the world generally, though, Prime Minister, and I say this not at all vindicated by people looking at the Secretary of Defense,

In a sense, you know, I was thinking back to 69.

Of course, you've got this terrible agony of your immediate problem.

But looking at the world scene, I have a feeling in some way, it's sort of one of those intuitions that because of the way the historical process is,

I don't want to overstate this, that there is a truce in the Middle East, that we haven't settled for land, that the United States has renounced biological warfare, that we've had the non-proliferation agreement, that we've turned back on October 9 with Japan, that in addition to all that, instead of being in a period, in a position of confrontation with the Soviet in every area that we are negotiating, at least in every area,

instead of being in a position of totally isolated from the Chinese, we're talking to them and looking around the world, despite the fact that we've got some immediate problems in the monetary front, which we will solve in a good time, I can assure you, because we're coming along there, that I think that the chances for us to move to a rather exciting

period of a more peaceful world.

And then, this is the important thing, actually move in that area to begin this confrontation produced between the superpowers, then to divert those enormous energies and talents and so forth to

I feel that that's what we're coming into.

I'm not speaking of next year, two years.

But I'm looking at it and saying, let me look no further than 10 years.

I'm inclined to think that we can look at the world rather hopefully.

Rather hopefully.

Rather hopefully not because of any sentimental idealism.

And I am sentimentalist, and I trust idealistic.

But those pragmatic forces

that tell the Chinese, the Russians, the Americans, the Japanese, you, the Indians, the rest, that, well, let's find ways to get some earthly things out.

That's what it would be like.

And I must say, as I look back to those many years, and I remember so many years ago, in the first half of 1953,

If you realize that 53 men are Prime Minister, if I, anybody, had said that the President of the United States would visit Romania and you would slot in and invite the Romanian President here and the Romanian President here, it's out of your mind.

We've done it.

In a sense, we are, we are in a sense,

proceeding along the philosophy that you have.

Ours is an alliance philosophy.

We do have alliances, and we will all have them.

But on the other hand, ours is one of communicating.

This is what I have tried to introduce into our policy with everybody.

And we want to do that without, of course, having our friends in the world be suspicious of it.

We're not doing it for the purpose of doing our friends in.

We're doing it for the purpose of avoiding

with those who might be our enemies.

And that, I think, is important.

We hope so.

And let me say that we will

As I've often said, you know, sometimes when I thought of the campaign for a candidate, I said, I'll talk for you or catch you, whichever will help you the most.

As far as we're concerned here, we want to be helpful.

We do understand that sometimes we may be rather lonesome and sometimes we may make mistakes almost all the time.

But my feeling is, I think as Henry was telling us a bit more time ago than anybody else, that I see, I do not see our problems.

This was just true when we were talking.

We have seen our problems even after, before and since World War II, in too much of a parochial, day-by-day tactical context.

We have got to see the world, all of us in positions of world leadership, you have to, I have to, in terms of

the whole world, but in terms of part of the world.

So I'm saying, I'm an Asian person, and so, I don't know, I don't know what to say.

I understand, a European person.

But it's, I have a whole world, and I have a government.

And I'm thinking, wow, they're gonna grab me out of here if I can get you down.

We, uh, as you know, we have your mother in the back over here.

We know.

I say yes to that.

We appreciate it.

Of course, I agree.

Oh, I saw the name on the backdrop.

We appreciate it.

All right.

Thank you.