Nixon & Kissinger on Ronald Reagan and Patronage

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 2 minutes of this recording (about 8% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

We had an interesting cable, we still talk about it.

Oh, yeah.

Well, he started pleading.

He said that you have a real problem with the conservatives, which is no news to you.

He says you're going to wind up without any friends because you can't win the liberals anyway.

And the conservatives are just saying...

very important position in California, you know, he's gone down and so forth and so on and so forth.

Well, so, I said to him, he paid no attention to the polls or anything else.

So I said to him, look, and he, one suggestion he has, which I don't think is bad, he says you are such, you are so good in talking to small groups, if you could get some of these conservative groups in for stack, then a

and give them a little rundown on the international situation.

Well, I really let it happen on the international situation.

I went to the Jordan crisis, the M4A, because Cambodia, Laos, I said, how can you say a liberal doesn't make a difference?

We wouldn't have to move.

We wouldn't have ABM.

We wouldn't have Amchitka.

We wouldn't have had Laos.

We wouldn't have had Chien Puegos.

We wouldn't have...

He said, God, if I had somebody, wouldn't we tell this to these groups?

I said, I told this to them.

That's right.

And we wouldn't have an $80 billion defense budget.

We would have given away the store at Seoul.

And he said, well, he agrees on foreign policy.

It's just not very visible.

He then bled about the UN vote.

I said, well, but I think I shook him.

And then he bled about the State Department.

I said, we are aware of it.

What's the matter?

Did they do something to him?

Well, he just thinks that the country thinks there's still a bunch of

that he's a humane state, some people sort of read.

But that, uh... Well, I think he's a, actually, I think he's a pretty decent guy.

Well, he's a great, uh, negligible.

He's shallow.

He's got no, uh...

He's an actor.

When he kept the line, he does it very well.

He said, help people, I remember, not for what they do, but for what they say.

Can't you find a few good lines?

That's really an actor's approach to foreign policy.

Well, that too.

And he's well, he's mostly sore on the domestic note.

On foreign policy, he says, you're doing the right thing.

But

Domestically, he's complaining about... Well, domestically, he's complaining about two things.

He said he agrees with your recent policies, but what led up to it was harder to distinguish from the liberals.

Secondly, he said, gave me a long story, which I told him to tell Mitchell, that I had nothing, I didn't even know what he was talking about.

About Flanagan's brother handling all the patronage on the West Coast.

Oh, shit.

About the fact that he never gets...

And they're out of here, and... And that you last summer ordered something to Veneman, some project you've got with ACW.

And that hasn't been done yet.

Well, we have.

I mean, are you aware that this is on the swell version?

And he wants a deal that's 50% better than the one we gave Rockefeller, but we can't do that.

We lose Rockefeller.

That's all.

He just did it.

He's really very unreasonable, and we've gone all the way with it.

50% better than Rockefeller's deal.

I believe in Rockefeller at the moment.

This is on AGW.

He didn't tell me what the issue was.

I just listened to his problems, and I told him, yes, we have a

You never get anything done.

What you have to touch the President by is by what he gets done.

Now you tell me what in foreign policy should we have done that we are not doing or what should we not have done?

And he said, well, are you going to give away Taiwan and Beijing?

I said, absolutely not.

We are a problem.

Well.

You know that, but we're not going to do it.

You know that.

We've got to be there for his concerns that over a period of time it will happen.

Over a period of time it will happen.

It's inevitable.

Yeah, but not through any deal we've had.

Hell no.

We've had it because of it.

Well, can you think though of anything you think that, though that, that Reagan certainly forces running in that direction could be sitting right here and conceiving?

No, but it could have happened.

It could have happened.

What would have happened?

If Rockefeller had stayed in, I mean, if Rockefeller had gone in confidently.

That's right.

I don't think he had a chance, but he might just have been able to... That's right.

Can you imagine?

McCall really is a decent guy, a decent guy, but there is no...

It's everything.

He thinks another idea he had was to fire Rogers.

So that the people have a villain.

Oh shit.

And that's the reason.

Unless you get rid of him, you're not going to do any of that.

You can fire Rogers.

And what if Rogers goes out and pisses all over your works?

Rogers is not enough of an issue.

But it wouldn't make that much of an issue.

They'd say, why are you buying that?

He's an old friend and so forth.

It would reflect, I think, firing Rogers would reflect badly on you.

He has not ever identified himself with any policies, so you're not really...

I mean, you're not throwing anybody into the...

The problem is that he isn't known at all.

That's what that's great, that's what he wants.

Who the hell knows Rogers?

He said at the meeting, he said nobody knows who the hell Rogers is.

Despite all these stories that you and I read,

about Rogers doing this and the stream doing this and that.

The country doesn't know.

The country makes the China policy.

You notice when you walk around.

They know goddamn well we didn't.

They know it.

I mean, all this bullshit that he's like, I was led into it, forced into it, etc.

On the indemnization thing that the Laird did, bullshit.

That's never going to work.

They know you did it.

There's no question.

They know that they're right.

Well, it's enough of that.

I just want to get the people right.

But he's not hostile.

He says he's not, he's repeated again, he's not going to do any opposition.

He's willing to help.

He did the ambassador to the court of St. James last year.

After the election?

Yes.

We bargained for a reason why.

But what does he want?

He can't be in the cabinet.

Well, I don't know.

He doesn't want to be senator in 74.

Pitch wants that.

And the hell of a blow that is if he didn't want to be in it.

But I don't think that...

He'd be a lousy, well... Finch wouldn't be any kind of... No, he is.

But Reagan is not going to...

No, I don't think he wants to run for the Senate.

No governor in a big state will be happy in the Senate.

The Senate is a good job.

It's better than the House, but it's still crappy.

Unless you believe it.

Russell, I'm sure that's good.

Coming back to the other thing, I think...

I think that's right.

I had a colleague, he said, well, you've got to do it.

His comment, he was a rather interesting one.

We see how he's set a comment after this meeting, so you're all set for it.

He's ready to come to charge.

He will now call you and Schultz.

See, I got it so we've all got it.

He knows what I mean.

Now you then, I remember that you hear what I said, that you have a...

But I really convinced him on the Peterson thing, when I told him that Peterson had money.

Pierre Paul Schweitzer.

And Pete shouldn't do that.

He doesn't know enough about it.

Pierre Paul Schweitzer is a smart son of a bitch.

You know, he's against us.

And then we got Pete on the line.

I started hiking and completed the operation.

I told him, I want you to be sure to get it early.

To keep, and shovels to keep.

But when you weren't there at the meeting, I told her early on that I wanted to keep Pete busy as hell, learning to be Secretary of Commerce, and to stay out of their initial non-program.

All right.

Would you tell them that?

Absolutely.

That's your job.

And do what you agree is good from your side.

Oh, yeah.

Now, second, with regard to the second job, let's get this out of the way.

I brought up overnight, Henry, I think it doesn't matter what that second job is.

It's actually a planning job.

I think Flanagan will work with you, Pete Johnson.

Oh, you mean Pete?

Oh, yes.

Because, and let Flanagan do it.

Now, otherwise, you know, they'll want to push that, oh, what's his name?

Allen.

Allen up to him.

And I don't think Allen will work with him.

Allen is such a lightweight.

The other thing that Mitchell was pushing was Jury for the job.

The jury is not big enough for this job.

He doesn't know anything about economics.

On the other hand, I think Peterson could put jury in with Allen, and I see no objection to that.

Flanagan could put.

Sorry, Flanagan could.

So will you put this in mind?

I told Mitchell that I'd submit this.

I don't think it'll get my job playing here.

which will seize right through.

And I said, what we've got to do is to get Henry in charge of this, but Henry will not have any responsibility for it.

Because I don't want you to get bogged down in economics, but I said that economics is so tied to politics, you don't want to do it that way.

But if you tell Flanagan that you want him to take his line from me, he'll do it.

I will.

He's a great fellow.

It's definitely going to turn down my job, and Waller later is probably going to turn down the other jobs.

So we're stuck on the NATO things, I told you.

And this is a little...

You're going to follow up.

I don't know.

Maybe this requires you to go on the next event.

If you don't think we can settle this out.

Now, let me...

Can we take 24 hours with it?

Yeah, except that I told Roger you weren't going to take it.

Well, that's what I think.

If they would just get the impression that they can wear you down.

Is there any possibility

When can we impose updating Kennedy to get him to take this command?

John, go back in.

I'm about to.

I'm about to make you have a run at that.

Give him take a run and say, okay, we're desperately need you to do.

We're the president's first choice to set it off.

And if they want us to career dive over there and we just need to talk by man and then put in the business about we also need you to work on the economic side.

I don't want some man-in-a-native to do that.

We should go there first.

Man-in-a-native.

That's enough.

With this case, the President would like you to continue the membership in the Cabinet.

You will continue his counsel.

Of course.

Oh, that would be good.

You will continue membership in the Cabinet.

Membership.

And, we want to upgrade the job.

And, with participation in all SC meetings, you have to do a nail.

Good.

Now, just take a crack at the Cabinet.

I'll take it.

Now, one other one I have in mind.

You don't think that, you don't think we could possibly get Dave Packer to

to take Japan for a year and service to his country.

That's right.

Or jail.

He wouldn't take that over that jail.

What do you do with that?

Packard is, I mean, at first, we get some letters talking about Packard's a wonderful man.

Of course, we can't be sure.

I don't know why he doesn't stay the rest of the term, actually, in his job.

His wife's opposition to foreign policies.

I don't know.

What is the problem with Packard?

Well, it used to be opposition to foreign policy, but by God, that shouldn't be diffused by now.

Well, you don't think you want to talk to him?

No, I will want to talk to him.

Try him the rest of the day.

Third, Frank, should we make another run at Scranton?

For Nate or not, that guy is so soft.

That's why I think he had the late sign.

I think Scranton is just too soft.

Packer to be fine, sir.

Kennedy's the best man for this job.

I'll sell it to Kennedy.

I am going to leave in a few minutes.

First to New York and then to Cincinnati.

I'm meeting in New York with this Hedley Donovan group of senior businessmen.

I turned it down.

But then so many of the others did it.

And they came back to me and said, why are you the only McGregor?

They're still talking about the time.

Oh, yeah, that's definite.

Well, my... That is a group of people.

Would you put the... Would you put... At least they can't be getting all the time.

They, your country, need you.

The president.

I don't understand a thing.

You're his first choice.

You have been.

We tried to talk with others, and they just aren't going to talk.

We asked the president.

The president turned him down.

He's turned down special, and he's turned down putting out there.

We just haven't got another man to do this job.

I'll do it.

I'll do it first thing in the morning.

Tomorrow morning.

When would you leave for Miami when you go?

Tomorrow.

Because I'm staying overnight.

Tad wants to give a reception afterwards.

And I'm coming back first thing in the morning.

I'll be here at 9.30.

Well, we might let you come to Miami.

No, no, no.

You come here first.

I'll come to Miami over the weekend if you want.

The other thing is...

And I told him, he said, why don't you fire the bureaucracy?

I said, because there are only so many battles we can fight.

We take on the bureaucracy now.

They're going to lead us to death.

Name me one thing that we have done.

that the bureaucracy made us do.

The bureaucracy has nothing to do with anything.

They've made our life harder.

They've tripped us crazy, but that doesn't affect them.

Kennedy's the first of us.

We're going to try and build a red chart of the head of the chemical bank in New York for Japan.

So I'll wait a bit back until I hear it.

No, no, no.

Try it, Packard.

I said two candidates for that latter day.

You could try him in the morning, but the Kennedy one, try him.

Tell him you want to see him, it's a matter of utmost importance, and he's got to get this man John.

Tell him he doesn't have to thank me or anything.

His wife has lived in Brussels for a year.

I'll get him to take it.

And all that idea.

You want to upgrade the job, you're the captain.

I have to look at the exhibition of the SNSC.

I have to put it this way.

With him, you could say, whenever you are in Washington, you're going to see me.

Exactly.

Put it that way.

Exactly.

Whenever you're here.

Got it.

You'll be at any NSC meeting that concerns NATO.

That's right.

Plus at any NSC meeting when he's in Washington.

That's right.

He continues to be Counselor to the President.

Got it.

What's the latest on that?

Well, we had a message from Chu to Kampanga.

I told him to let Chu know I was going to see them on the 20th.

And Chu said he didn't think they would do much now because they are so weak.

They probably want to restore their morale and their forces.

And they probably are encouraged by China's admission to the U.N. Just giving you Chu's view before.

Very cold, just for the record, sir.

On October 11th, we made this proposal.

On October 20th, you said we proposed November 1st.

You came back and said November 20th.

We accepted November 20th.

Now we regret that Dr. Ozil makes it impossible.

We are prepared to talk with a personality from Hanoi for a speedy address, end of the war.

That is odd.

I want you to put it in this little practical language.

A meeting with Montague would serve no purpose.

It would serve no purpose at this point.

The President has directed that I should meet only

with Lee Doctoe or some other leader who has authority to act for the purpose of settling the war.

And we would be glad to meet at any time.

However, time is of the essence.

Time is running out for negotiations.

I want you to put that in.

Time is running out for negotiations.

And if we do not hear, if we have no response to this message, we can only assume that you do not want to negotiate it.

Then, on the meeting next week, I believe that, I would like to have, I'd like to have additional instructions to go to Porter to be then called this week.

If he doesn't speak first, he should walk out, or, you know, or just say, well, if you haven't added anything, do I have nothing to say?

Good.

I think he says, I just have nothing to say.

And I think he should hold the meeting that way.

Don't make this centered.

Porter, if I speak once more, come on.

He's instructed me.

There's no deal with this.

It needs to go to setting.

It needs to open up.

He says, I have the opening remarks.

I've presented what you have to offer.

And then to see what they have to offer.

I stand on what I've said previously.

It's over.

If they open with a tirade, he says, well, I'm sorry.

It doesn't add anything to what you said.

It's always going to go down.

When you've got some argument, it's always going to go down.

No meeting.

Yes, he does no meeting.

That's right.

Good.

I suppose Rogers and Laird.

Rogers and Laird.

That's what happened.

No, I don't.

I want you to tell Rogers this.

That they don't let Rogers think that it's a... No.

Don't let Rogers think that it's a ruse.

Just say that you just got a message that Lee Doctova's sick and will not be there.

And that I said you should not go unless he is there.

Right.

And I want you to let Rogers think that the negotiation track is still open.

But take this line from Porter.

Right.

You get my point?

I don't want Rogers to think in front of his driver so they can go over and say, oh, well, that's what I thought.

They don't want him.

But you can just say, Bernie, he's sick.

And then you're not going to go because I said there would be no use, sir.

He's getting insensitive.

How does that sound to you?

Excellent.

I like the idea of a person's toughness at this point.

Now the other thing is, I think we ought to perhaps consider it one of those bond grounds now.

Right now.

I want more.

I don't know if there will be a treaty.

I think a one-day shot at this point, next week might be very much in order.

Let's just take one moment and discuss tomorrow or the next day what they'll harm us into.

If there is a buildup, and if we've got to, I don't want them to think, well, they can pull this goddamn build escape and keep the landing on this thing.

I want them to know there's a mayhem that's behind all of what we're doing here.

I think, frankly, that the real reason is they...

I don't believe in the business.

They are all balanced.

These factors are all balanced.

That's the real reason.

They may be waiting.

They may be waiting for the Congress to destroy us.

This is the point of security.

And the Congress' strategy on technology continuing resolution is only until February 3rd, December 3rd to December 15th.

I think that two major factors are that the foreign aid cutoff gives them the hope that the security systems will be cut.

The second is

You could see how they were building up through this Cornell study and so forth, attacking the bombing.

But now they can't attack it.

I don't want to give the Chinese any excuses, but let's just, or the Russians.

But I think we give them a one-day crack and let us get it.

Let's see what we can do with everything that Fly deals.

Now on the Chinese side, as I understand, you've sent a message to them.

So they can respond to that without the ambassador coming.

So they have to see both of us tomorrow.

They haven't yet.

So I think they're going to turn something around.

No, they're not.

They're not.

No, they've got to go forward with this.

I do think that would be in response to your message.

Nixon & Kissinger on Ronald Reagan and Patronage

AI Summary

Audio

Transcript (AI-generated)

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on November 17, 1971

Cite this conversation