Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 622-001
Date: Monday, November 22, 1971 at 3:51 PM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Butterfield, Alexander P.
Recording device: Oval Office
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/622-001

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:07] Well, this is what it seems.
[0:56] You know, I had not thought of it, but just...
[1:32] It was hot today, but it didn't die that day.
[1:51] They didn't say so.
[1:59] Yeah, they did.
[2:08] Remember, she flew back with me that night with the body.
[2:19] as we're talking about the scheduling and so forth.
[2:41] One thing I wanted to see is if either David and Julie might want to go to New York and that's where you're going to be going up there once.
[2:43] Well, uh... Yeah, go ahead.
[2:44] This is David Erwin.
[2:44] One second.
[2:45] Hi, sir.
[2:45] I believe I'll have a check back in a minute.
[2:46] Oh, all right.
[2:46] We're going to have to work on it.
[2:47] Yeah.
[2:47] All right.
[2:47] All right.
[2:47] All right.
[2:48] Uh...
[2:49] I'm meeting the Chinese tomorrow night.
[2:53] So I'm trying to stall off New York, yeah.
[2:56] I said, Rockefeller, things are too complicated, so I'm using the CIA, yeah.
[3:08] Now, we've got a case of almost total insubordination from the State Department.
[3:15] They want to go to Yahya and ask him to release Mooji.
[3:18] Now, we do this in the case of an attack by the Indians on Pakistan.
[3:25] It's going to be considered.
[3:27] This is something that, as you know, we have got to move on, but not at this point.
[3:35] I think the time to move on that, Mr. President, is Yang Yang stepping down the first week in January.
[3:41] He is?
[3:42] Yeah.
[3:42] One could do it with his successor, pretty much.
[3:46] a hell of a lot easier than Lieutenant.
[3:48] Secondly, I don't agree with the Aga Khan on this.
[3:51] As soon as Moojib is released, the Indians will find something else.
[3:55] We've given the Indians a hell of a lot.
[3:57] This is a clear case of military aggression.
[4:00] And above all, the Chinese have just sent us a note.
[4:05] That's one of the few issues on which we are more or less on the same side.
[4:09] We don't have to go as far as China.
[4:12] Well, now what is this that the Indians are downplaying?
[4:17] Well, they're downplaying it to some extent, but we have the numbers of the division.
[4:20] In my view, I have found that that doesn't prove anything.
[4:25] But when I'm in Cincinnati, for example, somebody asks me, when nobody likes the Indians,
[4:32] And I just laid into them, I say, on refugees, we are helping them.
[4:44] We are giving more than half of the aid.
[4:47] What we do not want is a military aggression by them against their neighbor in such a way that the whole country is integrated.
[4:55] What I would recommend, we are meeting again at 8.30 tomorrow morning.
[5:01] First, I'd like to stall off the Security Council resolution until Wednesday so that we can find out what the Chinese are planning.
[5:09] The Security Council resolution?
[5:11] The Security Council meeting.
[5:13] Because the strong probability is that we'd be caught between the Soviets and the Chinese, between the Indians and the Pakistanis.
[5:23] And there's nothing in that lineup.
[5:25] They're going to pass a resolution urging a political accommodation more likely than condemning India.
[5:34] Probably not.
[5:37] But we haven't taken position.
[5:40] Well, I've got a back channel to Yaya saying if he could wait till Wednesday.
[5:50] It would help us, but he has to leave.
[5:52] Well, he's asked for a security comment.
[5:53] Not yet.
[5:55] So that they don't ask for one.
[5:58] Now, those are told their ambassador here, who asked my advice what they should do.
[6:07] They're saying it's war.
[6:09] Yeah, they're saying it's war.
[6:16] It's a naked case of aggression, Mr. President.
[6:18] There's absolutely no...
[6:20] They have been back exactly one week.
[6:25] You cut off arms.
[6:27] You told her we were going to try to move them politically.
[6:31] She doesn't even know yet what the answers to these various proposals are that you made to them.
[6:36] That we said we were going to take out the Xiaoyang.
[6:39] Unilateral withdrawal.
[6:41] So we've done everything that is humanly possible.
[6:52] I think if we, uh...
[6:57] I think if we line up with India and the Soviet Union...
[7:00] I don't worry.
[7:04] What I think we should do is to send a staff note.
[7:08] Well, Packard and Moore said...
[7:13] They asked to see me in my office afterwards.
[7:17] They said it was unbelievable.
[7:20] No.
[7:29] If you want, I'll see you there.
[7:35] Okay, I'll get it done.
[7:36] Now, I slipped up on that, Mr. President.
[7:38] Oh, I have some idea.
[7:43] I hear you were tied up in service.
[7:44] I'm having a meeting with Conley Hall very soon anyway, sir.
[7:49] Yes, sir.
[7:49] You're seeing him this afternoon?
[7:50] Yeah, they're all meeting now on the domestic thing.
[7:52] Oh, I'm having a meeting with Conley in about three minutes, in fact, on the international economic one.
[7:58] I don't know.
[7:58] You may not.
[7:58] Maybe it's in East Georgia somewhere.
[8:00] He's hiding.
[8:07] He's hiding.
[8:35] In my view, this is better.
[8:55] What if I can warn you?
[8:56] Well, if I can warn you, it would be because you didn't even take that in the office when you delivered what you wanted.
[8:58] Act as you please, but think about it.
[8:59] Oh, no.
[8:59] Neither practice.
[9:00] I don't want to.
[9:00] Act as you please.
[9:00] Sir, there's nothing to do, Mr. Chairman, with my use to send a very sharp note to the Indians, reminding them of all that history has done, and saying that repeating what you've said simply will not be understood in this country.
[9:05] Without any threats.
[9:13] And that's what I want to do.
[9:19] So?
[9:19] Point two, we should get a note with the Soviets along the same line.
[9:23] Right.
[9:23] Point three, uh, come over to the two things you're going to be asking me.
[9:26] All right.
[9:27] To find out what they'll do with the Security Council.
[9:29] It may take you to the Security Council, but we have to leave.
[9:45] We don't have to go as far as the Chinese.
[9:47] But I would leave...
[9:47] I would go damn near as far.
[9:48] I understand.
[9:49] I don't like the Indians.
[9:50] We ought to leave pretty close to the Chinese and make it... And I also must remember the Pakistanis have been our friends for this late two days.
[9:53] And that is not... You know, I don't see what we gain by helping out the Indians.
[10:13] Well, how about these notes?
[10:31] You have Army men now.
[10:31] Uh, Tommy, you have to clear those things, uh, because we've got to tell the state, of course, what's happening.
[10:33] No, no, they're coming from the state.
[10:34] Uh, the state is going to have to.
[10:35] Good.
[10:35] You tell them, you tell them the president wants these guns.
[10:36] Okay.
[10:36] Good.
[10:37] And I want them dead.
[10:37] And tell them to get rid of them.
[10:38] If you want to see them, good.
[10:38] You shark them off.
[10:39] Good.
[10:39] Shark them off.
[10:39] Good.
[10:39] Okay.