Conversation 624-021

TapeTape 624StartWednesday, November 24, 1971 at 12:27 PMEndWednesday, November 24, 1971 at 1:12 PMTape start time03:54:09Tape end time04:39:23ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Rogers, William P.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOval Office

On November 24, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:27 pm to 1:12 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 624-021 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 624-21

Date: November 24, 1971
Time: 12:27 pm - 1:12 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with William P. Rogers.

     The President's previous meeting with Arthur F. Burns

     John B. Connally's schedule
          -Group of Ten

     Unknown event [?]
         -Henry Luce
         -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson

     The President's schedule
          -Previous visit to Washington Redskins practice session
               -The President’s view
               -Christian A. (“Sonny”) Jurgenson's comments
               -George E. Allen
               -Billy Kilmer
               -Allen's previous telephone call to the President
               -Jurgenson and Kilmer
                      -The President’s view

     Football
          -Roger Staubach
          -Running quarterbacks
               -Kilmer
          -The President's conversation with Allen
                                             35

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                       Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. 10/06)
                                                                    Conv. No. 624-21 (cont.)


                -Predictability of offense

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 12:30 pm.

     India-Pakistan
           -US policy
                -Rogers’s view

An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 12:30 pm.

     Refreshments

The unknown man left at an unknown time before 1:12 pm.

     India-Pakistan
           -US relations with Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
           -Political solution
                 -The President's previous conversation with Sultan Mohammed Khan
                 -Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
           -Rogers’s view
           -US policy
           -Newspaper story
           -India’s military involvement
                 -Statements by India
                       -Compared with North Vietnam
                 -Rogers’s view
                 -Military disposition
           -Yahya Khan's military position
                 -Rogers’s view
           -Edward M. Kennedy statements
           -US policy
                 -US foreign aid to India
                       -Export licenses
                       -Agency for International Development [AID]
                       -Rogers’s view
           -United Nations [UN]
                 -Possible US actions
                 -Indira Gandhi’s position
                       -Compared with Pakistan
                 -Possible Security Council action
                       -Yahya Khan
                                           36

                        NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                   Tape Subject Log
                                     (rev. 10/06)
                                                                      Conv. No. 624-21 (cont.)


                    -Gandhi’s views
                         -UN observers
                    -US policy
              -Gandhi’s letter to the President
                    -Timing
         -Gandhi
              -Previous conversations with the President and Rogers
                    -Congress
                    -Public reaction in America
         -US policy
              -Symbolic efforts
              -The President’s view


**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration: 25s ]


    INDIA-PAKISTAN


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

**************************************************************************


         -US position toward Pakistan
              -US relations with Yahya Khan and Gandhi
                    -The President’s view
                         -India’s role
              -US foreign aid to India
                    -Compared with aid to Pakistan
                         -The President’s view
                               -Congress

    Rhodesian settlement with Britain
        -US policy
              -Alexander Douglas-Home
                                              37

                         NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. 10/06)
                                                              Conv. No. 624-21 (cont.)


                    -Previous meeting with the President

    India-Pakistan
          -US policy
               -Symbolic action
                     -Gandhi
               -Pakistan
          -UN
               -US position
               -Possible Security Council action
                     -Rogers’s view
                     -Gandhi’s cooperation
                     -Yahya Khan
                           -Mujibur Rahman
                     -Gandhi’s view
               -US policy
          -US military aid to India


**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security]
[Duration: 10s ]


    INDIA-PAKISTAN


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

**************************************************************************


               -Export licenses
               -Embargo
               -Economic aid
                    -Refugees
                    -Aid to Pakistan
               -AID
                    -Aid committed to India
                                   38

               NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                           Tape Subject Log
                             (rev. 10/06)
                                                            Conv. No. 624-21 (cont.)


-UN
      -Possible response to press questions
            -Rogers and Ronald l. Ziegler
            -Rogers's forthcoming conversations
                  -Indian charge
                  -Unknown Pakistani
                  -Soviet Union
      -India’s public relations
            -Compared with Pakistan
-India’s goals
      -US policy
            -Kissinger’s view
-Gandhi
      -Previous conversations with the President and Rogers
      -The President's previous conversation with Josip Broz Tito
-US policy
      -Symbolic efforts
            -Export licenses
            -Timing
      -Ziegler’s statement
            -The President's previous meeting with Kissinger and Rogers
            -President’s forthcoming meeting with Kissinger and Rogers
            -US commitment to economic aid
      -Military aid to India
            -The President’s view
      -Multilateral aid
            -The President’s view
                  -UN
                  -World Bank
            -Kissinger’s view
                  -India
-Soviet union's policy toward India
      -PRC
      -Financial support
-Indian goals
      -Kissinger’s view
            -Pakistan
            -Bengal
-Nature of relationship
-Yahya Khan
-Bhutto
                                       39

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                               Tape Subject Log
                                 (rev. 10/06)
                                                         Conv. No. 624-21 (cont.)


          -The President’s view
          -Possible policy
                -Mujibur Rahman
          -Wife
                -The President’s view
          -Possible policy
                -Mujibur Rahman
     -Yahya Khan
          -The President’s view
     -Bhutto
          -The President’s view
                -The President's visit in 1967
                -Mohammed Ayub Khan's views
     -Soviet Union's policy
     -US policy
          -The President’s view
          -Public relations
                -Nigerian War
                -UN
          -Achievements
                -Publicity
     -UN
          -Possible action
     -Rogers's schedule

The President's schedule
     -California
     -Football game
           -Nebraska versus Oklahoma

Portugal
     -UN resolution regarding Senegal
          -US position
          -Other nations' positions
               -Great Britain
          -The President’s schedule
               -Forthcoming trip to the Azores

Rogers’s schedule

India-Pakistan
                                               40

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                        Tape Subject Log
                                          (rev. 10/06)
                                                                       Conv. No. 624-21 (cont.)


           -US policy

Rogers and Kissinger left at 1:12 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Also, the 2% of the church, that was, you know, it's an interesting thing for me.
When we win them, they don't build a lot, they do as much as when we lose them.
But I suppose that's inevitable.
I want you to think about when the Jets participated that last year, Jacksonville, and so on.
The Jets decided we're going to have to get rid of that.
This is the first snow of the winter.
Well, I had a great time yesterday.
I went out and spent 40, 35, 30 minutes or so out there with the Redskins.
It kind of was a big trip.
They didn't expect me to do that.
I didn't know how to do it.
I had been to a game.
I thought it would get
Well I tell you what I did.
They lined up the offensive team.
Uh, you know, Alan had him run a play, and he had a deep message to you about that.
And he said, in that play, I said, he said, uh, what is the play?
And I said, you can tell her now.
I don't know.
I said, let me call her.
I said, call her.
What do you want to call her?
She said, call her straight.
And I said, it's the way they were written.
Did you watch the game the other day?
Yeah, I did.
I saw it.
I saw it.
I saw it.
I saw it.
I saw it.
Well, the thing that he had, I must say, well, I know quarterbacks aren't supposed to run.
Give me one that can run.
Every time those quarterbacks run, he puts an arduous pressure on those.
It's an extra minute.
It's an extra half.
Look at those quarterbacks in the rest of the state.
They can't stay back.
They've got to come off of it.
That opens up the passing.
My God, the way he ran out in the middle.
Everybody went to him.
I didn't think Avalon had Kilmer running for him.
Kilmer could run because he's strong.
Big response from those jerseys in the first half.
But Kilmer could run.
And his first victory game, he scored.
I had to talk with George about it.
I said, now, George, maybe I don't look any good.
But he's the greatest.
He's done a lot with a lot of old men.
I said, George, I want to hear about your defense.
It makes it great.
I said, it's so unpredictable.
I said, the problem with your offense, particularly with your guts, and I think Baxter heard, he said it's too predictable.
He said, damn it, you've got to do more.
Okay.
Okay.
I'd like to talk a bit about this because we haven't seen each other in a while.
And to be sure that we, there's no misunderstanding.
I don't believe there's any difference of views on anything.
I would just like to express some way my thoughts on it.
First, it seems to me we should engage in maximum diplomatic efforts to do everything we can to cautiously explain both sides to the highest level always so that everyone can look at our record and see that we've done everything we can diplomatically.
Secondly, I think that
that our relationship with Yahya are good and should continue to be good, and we should continue to be very close friends.
Three, I don't think we should try to mastermind a political solution.
I never thought so.
I don't think it's possible, and I think he's coming to the conclusion that something has to be done politically.
Yahya, he's going to have to do it on his own, and we're going to have to complete it.
Now, he is being what he's talking.
As a matter of fact, I'm reporting this to you.
Well, let me say that I think he's going to be forced to do something.
Either that or he's going to get out.
There is a possibility.
Well, there's a possibility he's going to turn over to Buddha, which would not be a good development.
But he's planning to turn over to Buddha.
Well, he says he is, but I'm not so sure.
I have a feeling that if he can pull this out, he may stay in it.
in some capacity, but in any event, I think that the thing we have to face up to is not making decisions.
So this is not to ask you to decide anything, but I think that I know that, from my view, that I think that it's probably going to get worse.
I don't see any solution for it.
So I think our principal objective should be to do what we can to prevent fighting from breaking up.
Just one minute to break me up.
The day I saw the morning papers, the morning report, to what extent are they fighting now?
They had a jet fight, I don't understand.
Does that mean that there's a damn war going on?
Well, the Indians deny still that they had divisions in there.
Yes, yes.
And that doesn't mean that they don't have divisions, but they certainly have brigades, and they've got people in there.
It's like North Vietnam still denying that they're in South Korea.
And the truth is, there's one building they've
The question really is how?
how much are they involved, and how long will I stay, and so forth.
Now, my own judgment is they're going to get more involved.
Secondly, I think we have to place the fact that the IAS position militarily is extremely weak.
He's got 60,000 to 80,000 men in these tanks, and he has a whole lot of military knowledge there.
And it takes a 2,500-mile flight around the edge of the land and so on and so forth so that the logistics is impossible from this standpoint.
And as I say, my own judgment is probably it will get worse and probably we have to make up for the fact it will get worse.
We're not, we're not, we're not really responsible for every war thing.
Well, we're not doing anything.
So, uh, this fellow has quite a, quite a, quite a, quite a, quite a, quite a, quite a, quite a,
I think that's what we should continue to try to do.
I think the other thing that I want to stress is our ability to affect the course of events is quite limited.
We have a few things we can do.
We're still providing some military equipment, spare parts, and non-legal weapons, and it's very, very easy to get.
Our A program is pretty well committed.
There isn't anything we can do.
and it wouldn't have any effect on the military situation at the moment.
Whether we should take some action that would be symbolic or not, I think is something you won't decide.
I think we could take some action.
For example, I already have told my people administratively not to grant the export of licenses, not to say that.
I just don't trust that.
I just said to the processing officer, just slow down the processing as of yesterday.
Don't grant until we decide what we want to do with it.
Secondly, I have told our aid people, this is about $11 million not committed.
I said, just don't commit it until we see what develops.
But the fact of the matter, without going into all the details,
some of which we don't know.
Some of these things are done by the Congress, some are done by the defense, and so on and so on.
But still, the leverage we have on the Indians is very minimal.
If we take some action against them, which we might decide to do, it would be symbolic rather than substantive.
Now, the other point I want to make
to refer to it briefly is the United Nations.
I do not think, in a better thought, that we should take any action to hate the United Nations.
On the other hand, I think the United Nations will be a very useful organization if things get worse.
Because I have a feeling that Pakistan will come to this conclusion itself.
Whether they get held beyond the U.N., apparently so.
That's why he just has written a letter from which he urged us not to make another U.N. Obviously, he needs to worry about it.
You see, she doesn't need to have a post.
I mean, get all the Russian posts.
They've got the Afro.
This is the security.
You see, what would happen to the security?
I see.
This wouldn't be a general assembly.
No, no, no.
And one more point, the reason India doesn't want it is because she doesn't want any United Nations president.
She doesn't want any Turks.
I understand the position is much more reasonable than India's.
That's why India doesn't want it.
She said she only would keep it out of the Security Council.
I think that should be true.
You know, the United Nations, we have to take it to the United Nations.
But I think what we ought to keep in mind, though, is I think on balance, it'll be the only alternative that Yaya has, and it will be helpful to him.
He wants to get through December, because he's got his plans made to put this new constitution into effect at the end of December, the 1st of January.
If he can keep peace there for a couple of months, then he may feel that he's on the road to a political solution.
What will happen in the United Nations
and the Security Council is that they will, along with other things, will say, why don't we send the United Nations observer team to the area to make a report and so forth.
Now, she'll resist that.
She's already resisted it.
She said she doesn't want the United Nations there.
She doesn't want anybody to look at what we're doing.
The IAEA has the United Nations people in the East Bank, and they need to be prepared for that.
He also is prepared to withdraw his troops from the border if India will do likewise.
So the things that the Security Council would recommend in the way of military action and observers and so forth, I think would all benefit.
The risk, of course, is that India will also bring into the Security Council political questions.
But I think that those are manageable, whereas India will be tremendously embarrassed
Yeah, I think this is one of the things they're considering.
And, of course, in the Security Council, there would be China, Pakistan, the United States, all on those sides that we've got some pretty good leverage.
And what we would do is emphasize keeping the peace, and we would say there's both sides to exercise extreme...
Strange.
We would urge the United Nations to send the observers there to find out what the conditions are.
We would urge Richard Woodgall and others to encourage the very things that the IRS offered.
That's why she resists us.
That's why it's a very strong letter to you.
We're going to keep it up.
That's how you're going to have to do it.
It wasn't yesterday.
It was yesterday.
It was yesterday.
That's right.
I know a few.
It's the same.
It came in on Friday.
What's the date today?
Oh, 24th.
24th.
Yeah, when he sent it to us.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
She must have made that plea.
What I guess today is important.
She made that plea knowing that she was going to order this attack on Pakistan.
I think that's my guess.
She can't.
She can't.
If I had done it over, you know, particularly if we had to technically do it without doing it directly, without a hell of a lot of planning.
So she must have known the order was going to be good for the attack on Pakistan.
You know, the thing I would say, the main point I would like to do, and I'm not aware of this, is that these people that I've been with, I'm sure you might disagree about, the only thing about the symbolism, Bill, that concerns me is that I, in my mind, you also talked to her,
I talked to her and said, I went out there and I said, you know, we've been lots of friends.
But I said, our conversation was around Vietnam and everything.
And I said, there's one thing that's happened in this country that doesn't make any difference, whatever it is, whether it's Nigeria or South Asia or myself as a result of this, the Americans.
That's all.
In any situation where fighting breaks out, that's our attitude.
And I was very strong on that.
Now, I know it can be said that we won't do any good and we don't have any leverage and it's only symbolic and the rest.
But on the other hand, I want you to look into what we could do that is symbolic.
Because I think the other thing is, which I think is very important, looking at the balance there, the Indians are going to win.
And then they're going to lose, too.
But they're going to win without any question.
Pakistan, direction of the centigrade, we, the East and the West, we're going to have to wait down the road.
So it is very much in our interest to get the damn thing cool that we can.
And they were just on the merits.
India doesn't want to rule.
They want Pakistan to disagree.
Despite what she said, that's what she wants.
There's no question about that.
Now, under those circumstances, it seems to me that, clearly apart from the fact that the IAEA has been more decent to us than she has, clearly apart from that, I think that our policy, wherever we can,
definitely be tilted toward Pakistan and not toward India.
I think India is more involved.
Let me put it this way.
If we could get the Congress to get also all that excited about cutting off aid to Pakistan, when it involves a plane travel to Pakistan, it would seem to me the Congress should get twice as excited when it involves cutting off aid to India, when India is engaged in a violent cross-border operation.
Now, my feeling is that very strongly.
I mean, I didn't break the fuel in Congress.
He cut off aid in Pakistan, and I think what the country has in general problems, and the rest of it is for peace, sugar.
It's like the British didn't work out because of that.
That's right.
Let's take it.
Let's support it.
I think you should know that we will back it.
Well, we'll fight out the accuracy.
Oh, yeah.
Well, I want you to know that you have left.
I'm sure you'll notice it.
I told him he was here, that if they made a deal with him, he was one of the advocates.
We were with him.
We wouldn't embarrass him.
Now, so having said that, it seems to me that our whole game has got to do with it.
If you can find something symbolic to do, I think it really has to do with it.
So that she knows that we didn't do the blinds when she was here.
Maybe it doesn't mean
Second, in terms of the merits of the situation, to the extent we can tilt it toward Pakistan, I would prefer to play that.
And that's where the U.N. game comes in.
I would say there that if he feels it's in his interest and if he pushes the U.N. game, that's one thing.
But I could agree more with the proposition that we should
and push the U.N. game, if there's any feeling that it might be to the detriment of Pakistan.
And you feel it's the other way around.
Yeah, we haven't done any of them, Mr. President.
Oh, you understand.
Well, I know we haven't done any yet, but why this?
What if we do not deliver it faster?
We'd be here to go to the United Nations and all that.
I'll throw it to you, Senator.
I thought about that today.
Well, there are two things about the United Nations that I think we should keep in mind.
I think, to my knowledge, that Pakistan will come out better than India.
In the UN?
In the UN, the Security Council.
Because there's nothing you can do by way of trying to work out a political accommodation.
That's something that has to be done inside Pakistan.
There's many things you can do to counsel military restraint.
You can send people there, and you
I've talked to all the UN people out there and they've all been very upset about the lack of cooperation on Mrs. Ghani's part.
But she made, I think, a very bad impression in this country by saying she didn't want the United Nations presence.
So I think, on balance, I think that they would benefit by the Security Council action.
There would be some fallout that would be critical of Yahya not dealing with Mujib.
But I think that would be less important than the
action that the U.N. would take to have a presence in India.
That's what she doesn't want.
She doesn't want to get caught at.
She's denying that these troops are invading Pakistan.
She's denying that they're training the guerrillas and all these other things.
Now, if you had a presence in the United Nations there, you'd have a good answer.
She'll resist it.
She'll resist it strongly.
She's very strongly opposed to it.
So I think, on a balance, it would be helpful if that could be her own judgment.
Whether that leads, it just leads me to this conclusion that we shouldn't do anything to discourage it.
I don't think we should take the lead.
I don't think we should counsel that necessarily.
If it were asked, I think it would be beneficial of that extent.
And I think most people that have studied it will come to that conclusion, will come to that conclusion.
Secondly, I agree fully with the idea that we ought to tilt
So the facts that we have, my problem is I just like the Indians god damn much.
I had trouble being even recently with them.
Well, until you've heard that for 25 years, it's only gotten to scale as fast.
So really, when you say, how do we do it?
Well, I have a paper over here this afternoon, which you can take with you, which will suggest several ways we can take action.
One would be right now, we can just run out, so we're not
their sales act, and that would be perfectly consistent with what we did in the case of Magnus.
It doesn't have a real meaning to it.
It doesn't have a symbolism.
On a matter that we got from Kentucky P.M., we actually could embargo everything in the pipeline that got to maybe, well, we may have,
$10 or $15 million worth of pipeline military equipment.
But most, a lot of it is communications equipment.
Some of it is tools for manufacturing ammunition or manufacturing, you know, ammunition.
We could do that.
That's quite a job.
If we acquired everything, that would really be passing judgment.
We didn't do that in the case that I extended to you.
We did not.
We did not grant any new licenses, but we were planning to close the pipeline off.
We could say that we're not going to commit the economic assistance.
It's insignificant.
I think that would be probably not a wise thing to do with the test.
We're going to have to provide help for the refugees anyway.
We've got a lot of money to get into that, $250 billion.
for food and that sort of thing.
What, in the present time, are we doing for Pakistan?
Have we got funding going there?
Oh, yes.
Yeah, we have.
We're still selling economic stuff.
Yeah, yes.
We've got a lot of business in the world.
What is it all going to do?
I guess it is.
Any action on the Pakistan process?
It's going to stop economic development, Mr. President, but the argument is that economic assistance isn't effective.
The cutting off is effective.
It's almost the best argument for economic assistance.
So we can't get out of that.
You know, I just may want to take a harder ride.
And from now on, it gets more difficult.
You know, 318 videos, the bulk of it is committed, and we just can't deal with it.
In addition to that, if we have a way, if we have a treasury signed, if we can drag out, you know, more than 30, then that's no problem.
It's another hundred million dollars.
Well, I see that.
That's why I'm excited about it.
Because maybe the...
But one point I would like to make, Mr. President, in his consideration.
I agree with you on the U.N.
I've been told that he's in this bill.
I think he should have his last movie live.
And it's going to go that way.
You should take the initiative if it comes out.
Well, that's just on the U.N. thing, because I won't be exposed for any questioning on this.
I may have them Tuesday, but it depends on how much of this and other things happen.
You may be exposed to questions.
What do we want to say about this?
Well, I don't think you can sort of take the idea that, I don't think you can take the idea of the U.N.
I think we're very delicate to think that a lot of people that buy a price aren't before the U.N. getting it.
Well, you haven't sent me to Kansas City.
I know.
Well, then that's quite a bunch of bills saying that.
Same thing.
But what I meant is, I think we've got to do nothing about getting any better sort of appears if we're, well, that's... What do you think?
Well, I... What did you say, Steve?
Well, I think we're going to be put to that very soon.
$560 position, Steve.
For the moment, we're watching developments.
We're actively engaged in the activity.
I want to talk to the Indian Charter.
He's trying to see me with some special message now.
And I'll try to see the facts.
We've talked to everybody, and we'll talk to the Russians.
And so we can say we've done all this.
And that kind of activity, we've got a good deal of credit for that already.
We've been very active, and we've
We aren't committed necessarily.
Secondly, it seems to me we can say we're doing this, we're watching the situation, we're consulting with all parties concerned, that we haven't, there's no judgment on that.
We have no decision that we would assume that that's something that each nation will want to consider itself.
The leading impression that that really sucks is Pakistan.
Pakistan makes the first move, and India resists.
They'll gain a good deal.
Yeah.
Because people say that India must be responsible.
India doesn't even want the other nations in.
That's the thing that I can't understand about this country.
She's reading the PR wrong there.
Do you agree, Henry?
Because they resisted the U.N. on refugees and everything else.
Pakistan is somebody's man.
They're not in PR.
That's right.
Everybody doesn't understand what it is.
President, it's not inconceivable that the Indians are trying this one on, because they don't seem yet to have a way to commit to go in deep.
And that's sort of a poor thing to know.
It's a poor thing to know.
So, if we show at this point, not yet at all, but I think you'd have a way to step, I think you'd be wrong to cut away now.
But, if we could deliberate,
People do a number of things, and for one of them, that something's coming.
And if people go to the pestilence, those are all they have done is abandoning my demands to the foundation.
There's a hundred reasons.
I feel we should, it just might have an effect.
Dale, you know, you, when I called, I actually had met with her and told her,
You told her, now look here, you're going to catch a call.
I said, I think, I feel that we must not shoot blacks.
Because I also told, well, even that old white tail when he was here, I said, but we must just, I was telling him, why don't you wear a racket?
It was when we were talking at dinner.
I said, he said, that's what I said.
I said, and he...
He was on the Indian side, of course.
I said, well, let's just understand one thing.
I said, I don't know what's going to happen, because if they break out, or even forget, the United States ain't any place.
And I feel that we ought to do something symbolic.
I really feel that I think something symbolic might have an effect, might have an effect on restraining India.
Because if you think of any people, they won't.
I think what we might do is wait until Friday and just announce on Friday that we have suspended the issuing of any further export licenses.
That's what we do.
I think it would be helpful if we build something on this.
particularly to say that this was something in the discussion.
Is that all right?
We've had an hour of discussion in Pakistan, and then I think that we will communicate on Friday.
In other words, we'll have a full conversation and so forth.
But that gives us time to think about, I want to read the paper.
Could you have something that I can put in?
I mean, it's these ultramodern things and options that we can do.
So I want to know if you want to do anything that's useless or anything.
We want to see, that's what I'm getting at.
It's not a technical thing.
But on the other hand, very firm that we want to be helpful.
And I think, I think,
In anything that we say, there should be a very positive statement that the United States' commitment to help refugees, to help hungry people, et cetera, remains.
And that's where I think you could continue with this potential of your appeal to raise the vote back to that end of the breath.
You see, you're beating people there, right?
That's where I'm at.
Yeah, they're kind of military stuff.
Well, I think you could be awfully close.
I wish we had a lawyer who would settle for that.
Oh, I'll tell you one thing.
I do want that.
I mentioned this.
You've raised it for yourself.
I mentioned Henry and your job to work on the health board.
This multilateral aid thing, we have got to get some struggle.
And I think that's a study for the next three months.
I guess, look, every time we turn around and try to fight the U.N. battle, you know,
Bill, we haven't got any stroke at any time.
Well, we are going through the World Bank.
I don't think they would like to go into a confrontation with us.
Who?
The Indians.
If we can catch them early enough.
But now the interesting thing is, how do you both read the Russian thing?
You read the Russian thing totally, and they're acting in a restraining way on India.
Do you believe that?
How do you know?
What do you think?
I think...
They are trying to restrain them, but not very hard.
Twilight, there's some advantage to that deducted Chinese threat.
They want to screw the Chinese.
On the other hand, they just want to call Russia a hell of a lot of money.
I mean, a lot of them, a great deal, because they've got to support India in this war.
And that's what they're not for, are they?
That's why they didn't give it to the other one, the Indian faction.
The Russians didn't do that.
But I think basically the Indians themselves, and it is my opinion of the Indians themselves, that any rational assessment should indicate that there's only one way the political revolution can cover, and it's to us autonomy.
So they know they've got that.
But what they are pressing for is so dramatic a settlement with the East Pakistan situation, that the West Pakistan situation starts unwrapping also.
And what they want is to reduce West Pakistan to something like Afghanistan status.
And that they are the only significant country.
They want to turn East Pakistan into a sort of Bhutan.
And after that, I'm willing to predict all of the amounts against East Pakistan.
Because East Pakistan suffered from neglect from West Pakistan.
And the U.S. has a vested interest in keeping it down.
Because if East Bengal becomes synonymous with driving, then West Bengal is going to be attracted.
So they want to make sure that East Bengal is worse off than West Bengal, or that they have an incentive so the revolution is going to see.
I'm not sure that I think that Henry's right, that I suppose there's a lot of that thinking, but also a lot of it's just this hatred that he just cheered me.
That's the direct thing to happen.
I had to catch him with that old backstabbing.
They hate each other so much that they're totally irrational.
They really are.
You talk to a packer and they can't feel it that way.
They hate each other and are jealous about this.
Well, for the two children, they can't.
And to me, I don't think he is that far.
You know, he isn't that far.
Now, what really would he be suggesting?
God, what might he be?
He's more leftist than... Oh, he's leftist.
No, he's leftist.
But which way did he...
He's an Indian.
He's an Indian.
Some other pro-Chinese...
But in a way, if we can survive in any country, we have less obligations.
Who would want to make a deal with the other fellow?
Would he make a deal with this guy in the chair?
No, no.
That's the cause of all the trouble recently.
You ever met his wife?
No, no.
More important, have you ever met his wife?
She is one of the most beautiful women in the world.
I don't think he stays with her.
If Mucci, if that thing can be united, that Buddha will never deal with Mucci because he's afraid that Mucci will aim for the prime ministerial.
If however the things can go, that Buddha was in a better position to let it go than Yahya.
Yahya is the better man for reconciliation.
Yahya is a very reasonable man.
But he's a decent man.
That means that he's given up on these facts.
Because Boutot can't vote for Yagen.
Boutot, sir, Boutot basically has to change.
Because my last report is one of my basic notes from 1967 when I was there.
Is that Masatovich is a total demagogue.
And therefore, being Yagen, given the...
Are you a copy of Jim Rappaport?
He's a pretty good judge of that.
He's just as small.
He's just bad.
Let me say this first.
When you asked me what I thought the rest of them were doing, I think they would like to have a major war avoided.
But I agree that they are not saying the Indians too much.
They want the Indians to do as much as they're doing.
I think they hope that if they have a major war, it can be avoided.
I think to that extent that
I don't want us to get caught in the business where we take the heat.
or a miserable war that we have nothing to do with.
I think it's very important that we do enough, that we appear to be, you know, but I think we've just got to get it across to the American people that we cannot be responsible for every goddamn war in the world.
We aren't responsible for the Nigerian war.
We're not responsible for this war.
The idea that, at this point, refugees in Pakistan are arrested, we couldn't avoid that.
It has another advantage than having to be in the security council, because that doesn't put the United Nations in a distinguished place.
There's very little we can do.
You actually thought very much about how we could, I think we've got to get, I just don't, I sense these political problems.
You know, we're doing well on several fields, but I just don't want this to muddy the water.
How can we avoid getting caught?
Well, the United States, why didn't we avoid the war between India and Pakistan?
The truth of the matter is, if India didn't produce the bullet, that's what we did.
If it wasn't, the Indians see that Pakistan is in a completely weak position.
because the world has been turned against them and they see that there's an opportunity that they'll never get again.
So if any mistake was made, it was to be to other Pakistanis.
I think we have a very aggressive record
What we have in fact done, first for the refugees, secondly for the refugees in East Pakistan, and thirdly in moving things concretely towards the political revolution, we're the only ones in that subject.
We got the military governor in place, with the civilian government.
We got them to admit you as conservatives.
We got them to permit you and each one of you to do.
We introduced this... Did I hear one thing?
Tell us.
I'm not a counter.
That's what I mean.
I anticipate it coming.
Don't you think it will right now?
I think so.
Yeah, I think those things are all fine.
As I say, the only thing that will make a difference and where it breaks out is to put the onus on the Indian.
But that's the way it is.
As the Security Council said, we want to send a team set.
We want to go through with all the forces that need to be used.
And it wouldn't come out that way.
Well, I mean, let's just say that if something develops, Bill, on this major significant house over the weekend,
person to be.
I think I'm going to be in that zone.
But we've got a moment.
Yeah, yeah.
Well, if it's something of major reports, Henry, I think we ought to have a middle file so that we should be able to stop.
But I mean, I plan to meet in California through Tuesday.
I may come back Sunday night, however, if I feel this thing works.
And I'd like to keep cool, but I mean, I'll work on the plane, and I'll give you the requirement not to leave until 2.30 or 4.30 Eastern Standard Time.
Nebraska.
Oh, yeah.
That's one game I want to see on TV.
I'll tell you one other thing.
I did something this morning you may not like, but it's not too late to change it.
We have a damn resolution in the Security Council condemning Portugal for its action in Senegal.
They sent a mission down there from the United Nations to make an investigation.
Portugal refused to cooperate.
The mission came back and sort of condemned Portugal.
But I've recently noticed the resolution of the United Nations is worded in such a way that it would be quite a blow to Portugal.
It will be quite a blow.
We're going to be the only nation
that is going to support Portugal will abstain.
But even Great Britain is going to vote the other way.
But it didn't seem to me that we could do it.
Oh, that's right.
So, well, that's all.
Listen, I think maybe a second thought, you're coming out there probably isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't, isn't,
to the extent you can in terms of trying a different thing, but I just don't want us to be in a position where we are responsible for every war in the rest of the world.
I thought we had nothing to do with it.
Well, this is what we can flip, but it's all right.
Let's have a good time.
I'm sure you're dear colleagues.