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Conversation 630-002

TapeTape 630StartMonday, December 6, 1971 at 12:02 PMEndMonday, December 6, 1971 at 12:06 PMTape start time00:04:10Tape end time00:09:26ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office
AudioNARA Description

On December 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:02 pm to 12:06 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 630-002 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 630-002

Date: December 6, 1971
Time: 12:02 pm - 12:06 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     India-Pakistan situation
           -Iranian military aid
                 -West Pakistan
                 -Mohammed Reza Pahlavi [Shah of Iran]
                       -Back channel
                             -Shah’s message to the President
                       -Press
                       -Aid
                             -Substantial increase following year
                             -Justification
           -Aid cut-off to India
                 -Announcement
                       -Amount
           -Pakistan aid
           -State Department
                 -Indian Ambassador-William P. Rogers' meeting
                 -Delays
           -Aid cut-off announcement
                 -National Security Council [NSC] meeting

                      -Announcement
                           -Timing
                -Rogers
           -Pakistan aid
                -Amount
                -Humanitarian

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 12:02 pm.

     Schedule
          -John B. Connally meeting
               -Photographs
                    -National Broadcasting Company [NBC] film crew
               -Conversation

Bull left at an unknown time before 12:06 am.

     India-Pakistan situation
           -Kissinger's meeting with Yuli M. Vorontsov
                 -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] participation
                        -Note from the President
                             -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                 -Kissinger’s concern
                        -Summer, 1970
                             -Proposed US position
                 -India
                        -Connally

Kissinger left at 12:06 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Could I check one thing with you without a camera?
Yeah, sure.
One is, this military aid to Iran, that Iran might be giving to West Pakistan, the only way we can really do it, it's not legal, the only way we can do it is to tell the Shah to go ahead
through a back channel to go ahead.
He sent you a message saying he's eager to do it as long as we don't, the damn press doesn't know about it and they keep our mouths shut.
So the thing to do is to say to him.
No, he's as interested in that as we.
The only thing to do is to say, go ahead.
We'll have to say we didn't know about it, but we'll cover it as soon as we can.
Sure, how do we cover it?
by giving him some extra aid next year.
Good.
I think it's just I don't know anything about next year.
I won't give it to them.
Let's just put it this way.
As I go to the committees, I think we need a stronger anchor.
And I agree anyway.
And I determine at this moment that aid to Iran should substantially be increased next year.
Good.
That's what I'm putting you right here right away.
go back and say that I am very concerned about seeing the instability and the result of the instability in Pakistan and we've got to strengthen Iran.
Okay?
Right.
On the second point, Mr. President, we are announcing today this $84 million cutoff of aid to India.
It has the great advantage that the category we are cutting, we can cut for both, because there's only 4 million for Pakistan in that particular account.
And I think the only hope we now have, and our state is probably going to go through its procrastination, and the only hope we now have is to go balls out on all of these things.
And to hit early, rather, everything we've done up to now has been three days too late.
I'm not...
You ordered it at the earliest possible moment.
Now, State is actually not opposing it yet.
We were going to do it at noon, and they had the good excuse that the Indian ambassador was with Rogers at noon, and therefore to delay it.
It also shouldn't come out of the NSC meeting as a decision, because that gives it too much importance.
We should do it as a routine announcement around 2 o'clock.
I understand.
At State?
Then I'll tell them at the NSC meeting by 1 and 2 o'clock at State.
Just say, you understand that this decision is being announced at State?
No, I'll just say it.
Is that being announced at the Rogers that raises a question?
Yes, I say, you understand that at State?
Yes, I do.
In both India, too, and Pakistan, too.
Well, just say the $86 million of... No, that doesn't cut it.
Just say you want to cut it.
You know the goddamn Pakistanis know that we're not trying to cut them.
They're not being cut.
And we've studied this very carefully.
It cuts $86.8 million of aid to India.
And the comparable aid to Pakistan is in humanitarian category.
which are not affected by it, so nothing will be cut to Pakistan.
We've prepared a very tough background, a very tough briefing.
Is that it, Mr. President?
Is that it?
Yeah, go ahead.
I told you.
Yeah.
Excuse me, Mr. President, I want the cameras coming in ahead of time before Congress, so they can see me coming in.
Well, uh...
They want him in here.
Well, I don't think they can just take a picture and then they leave.
I've got to talk to him about a couple of things.
We don't want any conversation.
He's been in several.
You probably don't understand.
We've had two or three conversations.
He's been in other meetings, so they don't need conversation.
He comes in and they get to know him.
Two minutes.
Two minutes to show his presence in the office.
Thank you very much.
Yes, sir.
I was up on the road yesterday, and I really regretted I had activated my Soviet participation.
We are sending a note that you dictated today over to President.
I think that we haven't really hit the machine.
My worry is, Mr. President, that every time that we may get into a summer 1970 situation, that we don't show some firmness with them now.
Every time we've been tough with them, they've backed off.
He said, if the Indians fall into the restaurant, that's where he wants them.
Good.
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