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Conversation 630-010

TapeTape 630StartMonday, December 6, 1971 at 3:04 PMEndMonday, December 6, 1971 at 3:08 PMTape start time01:16:16Tape end time01:19:40ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the escalating geopolitical crisis on the Indian subcontinent, specifically focusing on the roles of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Kissinger argued that Soviet aggression in the region threatened to embolden their stance in the Middle East and Vietnam, prompting the President to emphasize the importance of maintaining alignment with Chinese interests at the United Nations. They ultimately weighed the strategic risks and potential benefits of communicating a strong message to the Chinese to deter foreign intervention.

India-Pakistan WarSoviet-American relationsPeople's Republic of ChinaUnited Nations Security CouncilGeopoliticsForeign Policy
AudioNARA Description

On December 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:04 pm to 3:08 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 630-010 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 630-010
Date: December 6, 1971
Time: 3:04 pm - 3:08 pm
Location: Oval Office
Page | 19
White House Tapes of the Nixon Administration, 1971-1973
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, NARA Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 597542
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
[The recording began at an unknown time while the conversation was in progress]
India-Pakistan situation
-Sub-continent
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] and People's Republic of China [PRC]
-1970 position
-Middle East
-Vietnam comparison
-USSR
-Discussions with North Vietnam
-PRC
-Possible embarrassment
-Middle East
-Chances for settlement
-United Nations [UN] position
-PRC
-George H.W. Bush
-Call to Kissinger
-PRC
-Actions
-Security Council
-USSR
-Message
-USSR and PRC
-Possible impact
-Timing
Kissinger left at 3:08 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

It's too early for that.
All right.
But you know what I mean?
We'll play the big game now.
They're going to fart around here.
We're putting an awful lot on the line.
And we can't do that.
There are too many other aliens we have to fight.
We have to live to fight another day.
We don't have enough.
We don't have enough.
The subcontinent as such isn't worth it, Mr. President.
But the Soviets are again edging up to this 1970 position where they think they can sort of play us, while at the same time they're really putting it to us.
This can then be a dress rehearsal for the Middle East and any other area of Vietnam.
I'm not so sure they haven't done the maximum it should to us.
To Sweden and its behavior, for example, I'm not so sure what the Russians are advising them to do, whether they're not telling them to put it to us and embarrass the Chinese.
See, the Chinese have a self-interest in having a pretty easy thing.
One thing we should join for us with the Soviets is the Middle East.
They'll never get it settled without us.
Well, don't worry about it.
But should I send such a message?
We cannot be discouraged, Roberts.
No, I'm not discouraged.
You've taken the position that I thought was essential.
We've followed it as hard as we can.
No, no.
Helen, we've...
But don't let the U.N. position be eroded.
We've brought the stage...
I will not, let us not separate from the Chinese and the UN.
That I will not do.
Don't you agree?
Absolutely.
Well, Bush called me and he said that the Chinese and the UN, who had been very aloof and suspicious of him, now at the Security Council, whenever he comes in, smile at him, nod to him, and sort of tell him he's doing the right thing.
And that's very important.
Also, we keep the Russians honest.
Why not send the Chinese a message to try to think of something you could send to them?
What could we say to them?
Well, we could say, A, we want them to know that the president has sent a very sharp note to Russia.
And secondly...
that if their national interest dictates their taking certain actions, we want them to know that we would not stand for the intervention of any other country.
What do you think?
It's a daring game, but we've always done well with the daring games.
That's right.
It's a daring game, so...
The Russians are going to attack China.
Are you kidding?
Well, they've had a bad trip, I know, this year.
Why now?
This is not a good time to hear them to be in town.
I am not at 72.
Yeah.
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