Nixon, Haldeman & Bull on India-Pakistan conflict and William P. Rogers

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I think he's right.

Henry was in again, too, and he's all cranked up to do a backhander.

I think he'll do a good backhander, and I think he'll create more of a problem by turning him off when the robot doesn't do it.

As Ryan said, he wanted to be coached, but he wanted to do it.

Ron had already talked with him, and I guess somebody else came, or somebody had already talked with him also.

So he was in, and he started in on stuff.

He said, I have to go brief myself to the back founder.

Are you sure the president's in agreement that I should do one?

I said, no, I'm not.

He said, what do you mean, he doesn't want me to do one?

I said, I didn't say that, because Ron had talked before that.

He said, I didn't say that, Henry, but I don't know that he is in favor of me doing it.

He said, well, I think I've got to, because...

We've either got to do it today or in the next couple of days, and the more we let it stew, the more we're going to get into trouble, because those Scotman clusters will never get us straight down.

Back to that.

Okay.

And I asked Ron.

Well, Henry's view is, you know, I threw it all off.

I asked Ron what he thought, because he said, you know, Henry is cranked up about something.

He said, I don't think it's going to get in the way of the

Because it doesn't relate to this.

He's in good shape on the situation, but in bad shape on this general thing, because he has been for a long time.

And Ron said, I have to visit with Roger's talk last night over there.

And after dinner, because Henry was just curious afterwards, he came back over, I guess, with Henry afterwards, and he said he was just wandering around kicking the chairs and stuff like that.

So then when Henry was in, Henry was in my office, I said, well, I still don't understand Henry, what is the problem?

What is it we're dealing with here?

And he said, well, the problem, the problem at the moment is Roger's talk last night.

He said, that was disastrous.

And I said, I don't understand why.

I agree that it was lousy, but I don't see why it was disastrous.

He said, well, it just doesn't fit with what we're trying to do.

I said, well, who the hell's going to know?

There are only 40 people sitting there.

And he says, it'll be on every diplomatic wire today.

Very significant.

Oh, yeah.

He told me that, too.

But then he said, I said, well, I still understand why this creates any greater crisis than we always have.

And he said, well, it's an interesting kind of line of reasoning.

The problem here is that, first he said, I don't have time to explain it to you.

I have to go get ready for the background.

And then he said, well, the problem here is this.

I was able to deal with all these other crises I was seeing, Boivos and some of these other things, because they were single-handed things where I could move in and pull it out, dealing with something unilateral.

But he said, now, on the India-Pakistan question, it's a matter of bringing 30 different factors together, and you have to have help in order to do that.

And it's now clear to me that I can't get that help from the State Department, that instead of getting help, I get undercut.

And that puts me in the position of now realizing that I am not going to be able to negotiate the Mideast, which I am now supposed to be setting up to do, because they'll undercut me on that.

This is an indication that India-Pakistan in itself doesn't matter.

because it'll be a gun in two weeks, it's a bullet, it doesn't make any difference one way or the other anyhow.

Then he said, on the other hand, it's extremely significant because we cannot, for our long-range position with the Soviets, be in the position of letting a Chinese-American friend be clobbered by the Soviet client without our...

Right.

He said, but then he goes back to the other thing.

He says, we just, you know, I'm not going to be able to handle the other thing.

I said, well, have they done specific things that you've given them instructions and that they've done wrong?

He said, yes, all the time.

I said, like what?

Then he cited something about where they had told the Iranians that we weren't going to, I don't know, where the Iranians were going to provide our visitors.

Yeah.

We're trying to do something where it's violating the law.

And then he says, Roger, he said, how do you know they undercut you on this?

And he said, I've got a cable of cruising.

And they said, well, what did you tell them then?

Did you go to Rogers and say we have a problem?

He said, yeah.

And then Rogers says it was a mistake.

We'll undo it.

He said, it's too late.

All they needed was one more signal, and now they're driving.

But that's, it's a complex web of things.

But the trigger was Rogers' last name.

Apparently.

The rocket wasn't very good last night.

Another reason, and probably another trigger though, was that I had to sit down with Barton a little while before he could speak up.

I think that's the problem in turning up this backpacker.

The other thing I think, gentlemen, is that it is true that Ryker should have been better last night after I had laid it out so goddamn cold at the meeting at the new meeting.

to get something handed to them.

You know, he was, basically he sounded weak, though.

I mean, Joe, Bob, don't you agree?

Yes, he wanted to be in peace.

Yeah, I was worried about the people that were gonna be this or that or the other thing.

He sounded like a dog.

He sounded weak.

Especially, even today, you're pretty strong.

I've got an accomplishment, or whatever it is.

Do you have a time set of this thing that stands all the time?

Well, you know, I can show you what it is for you.

Oh, wait a minute.

This is, uh, 315, sir.

4-gram on the side, sir.

Well, we'd love to hear from Peterson.

Peterson, yes, sir.

Well, did you tell him before he comes in that you've delayed the, for instance, 338 to 345?

That he, you know, had his full half hour?

All right, this will have to be a half hour meeting.

Okay, he knows, he can do the background.

Nixon, Haldeman & Bull on India-Pakistan conflict and William P. Rogers

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on December 7, 1971

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