President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman met to discuss urgent legislative and foreign policy matters, including the ongoing India-Pakistan crisis and a pending continuing resolution for foreign aid. The President expressed frustration with the bureaucracy and Henry Kissinger's emotional state, while evaluating the political risks of US involvement in South Asia and the potential fallout from public and congressional opposition. They also reviewed internal administrative appointments and economic strategies, ultimately coordinating a schedule for further consultations with Kissinger and economic advisors.
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632a.mp3
632b.mp3
NARA Description
On December 8, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:25 am to 10:18 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 632-002 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 632-2
Date: December 8, 1971
Time: 9:25 am - 10:18 am
Location: Oval Office
The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.
Foreign aid
-Continuing resolution
-Clark MacGregor
-Michael J. Mansfield
-Allen J. Ellender
-Hugh Scott
-House leadership
-60 or 90 day resolution
-Compromise
India-Pakistan relations
-Edward M. Kennedy
-Probable course of action
-News summary
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Edmund S. Muskie
-Washington Post article
-White House relations with the State Department
-Policy for India
Office of Economic Opportunity [OEO] legislation
-Veto
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[Personal Returnable]
[632-002-w008]
[Duration: 2s]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 8
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Office of Economic Opportunity [OEO] legislation
Show the rest of the log (315 more lines)
-Veto
-Child care
-“The right thing to do”
-Blacks and child care
India–Pakistan
-Kissinger
-Health
-Staff meeting
-Comments
-Conversation with the President
-United Nations [UN] vote
-Election
-[Arthur] Neville Chamberlain
-“Our Rhineland”
-Possible changes in the future
-Thailand
-Iran
-US policy
-Timing
-Indian intervention
-UN
-Emotion
-Pakistani air force
-Israel
-Bureaucracy
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] and India
-Possible tough stance by US
-People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Haldeman’s previous conversation with Kissinger
-Cambodia
-State Department
-Bureaucracy
-Public position
-News summary
-Marvin L. Kalb
-Public relations
-Democracy compared to dictatorship
-Ronald L. Ziegler's meeting with Kissinger
-Ziegler’s previous meeting with Kissinger
-USSR
-Aid cut-off
-Bangladesh
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[National Security]
[632-002-w002]
[Duration: 5s]
India–Pakistan
-East Pakistan
-Subsequently move into Pakistan
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India–Pakistan
-Public relations
-Kissinger’s view
-Public opinion
-Morality
-Democracy compared to dictatorship
-The President's talks with Kissinger
-Timing
-Ziegler
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[Privacy]
[632-002-w009]
[Duration: 11s]
India–Pakistan
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Emotional
-The President’s comments
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman’s comments
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India–Pakistan
-USSR
-Finland
-Germany
-India
-Intentions
-Vietnam
-Kissinger
-Current developments
-Bureaucracy
-Aid cut-off
-Timing
-USSR
-Kissinger
-Wars
-Foreign policy
-Pakistan
-Concern from Haldeman
-Kissinger’s attitude
-John Kenneth Galbraith dinner
-Cancellation by Kissinger
-Talks with the President
-Timing
-Reasons for canceling dinner
-PRC-USSR initiatives
-Possible scrutiny by the press
-East Pakistan refugees
-Bureaucracy
-William P. Rogers
-Comments
-Changes in Kissinger over the past month
-Foreign policy matters
-Note to USSR
-Vietnam talks
-Kissinger
-Highs and lows
-Vietnam settlement, PRC summit and USSR summit
-Accomplishments for the Administration
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Kissinger's backgrounder
-Evaluation
-Talking papers
-MacGregor
-Charles W. Colson
-[Forename unknown] Cooper
-Expertise
-Kissinger
-State Department
-Neutrality
-The President’s comments to the leaders
-Aid cut-off
-Neutrality
-A question of “non-involvement”
-Possible US actions
-Kissinger
-Health
-Possible causes
-Backgrounder
-Rogers
-Press coverage
The President's schedule
-John B. Connally
-Meeting with Edward R.G. Heath [?]
-Azores
-Florida
-Time magazine interview
-Timing
Congressional adjournment
-William H. Rehnquist appointment
-Birch E. Bayh, Jr.
-Present state of Congress
India-Pakistan relations
-Kissinger
-Rogers
-Congress
-Imagined statements
-USSR
-US actions
-Futility
-Conservatives
-Handling
-Frustration
-Harvard University
-Article
-Possible problems for Kissinger
-Galbraith dinner
-Proposed “homecoming” for Kissinger
-Daniel Patrick Moynihan
-Thomas W. Braden
-Timing
-Galbraith
Foreign policy
-USSR
-Rogers
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Possible talks between the President and the USSR
-Rogers
-PRC
-Talks with Kissinger
-Haig
-Rogers
-Need for someone to broker a deal with PRC and USSR
-Experience
-Kissinger
-Political campaign
-Communiqués
-Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
-Negotiating ability
-Haig
-National Security Council [NSC] staff
-Rogers
-Nelson A. Rockefeller
-Kissinger’s problems
-Concern about talking to Rockefeller
-Staff meeting
-Liberals
-Possible US allegiance
-Pakistan
-India
-Democracies
-Critics of the Administration
-Galbraith dinner
-Harvard University
-Opinion poll
-India
-Democracy
-Aggression
-India
-Peaceful
-Liberals belief
-US public opinion
-MacGregor
-Thoughts about India
-World War II
-Indians
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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
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[National Security]
[632-002-w006]
[Duration: 7s]
Foreign policy
-India
-US public opinion vis-à-vis Indians
**********************************************************************
Foreign policy
-India
-US public opinion
-Galbraith
-Kenneth B. Keating
-Support for India
-Allen S. Drury books
-Critical of India
-USSR
-UN vote of December 7, 1971
-Canadians
-Kissinger
The President’s schedule
-Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with Haldeman
-Politics
-Timing
-Haldeman's call to Kissinger
-President’s forthcoming talk with Kissinger
-Trips
-Unknown person
-Relationship with Haldeman
-Previous conversation with Haldeman
International monetary situation
-George P. Shultz
-Arthur F. Burns
-Peter G. Peterson
-Shultz's talks with John B. Connally
-Economy
-Convertibility
-Connally’s view
-Germany
-Deutsche mark
-France
-Deal with Germany
-Shultz in agreement with Connally
-Convertibility
-Bilateral lifting of the surcharge
-Canada
-Mexico
-Brazil
-Connally’s view
-Previous conversation with Haldeman
-Timing
Appointments
-Council of Economic Advisors [CEA]
-Geoffrey H. Moore
-Herbert Stein and Shultz
-Burns
-Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS]
-Possible confirmation battle
-Harold Goldstein removal
-Moore
-As spokesman
-Unemployment
-Unemployment
-Colson
-CEA
-Shultz
-Moore
-Stein
-Forthcoming meeting with Haldeman
The President's schedule
-Meeting with John D. Ehrlichman and Shultz
-Continuing resolution
-Wrap-up meeting
-Budget
-OEO legislation
-Connally
-Schedule
-International monetary situation
Haldeman left at 10:18 am.
Transcript (AI-generated)
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resolution things.
They were all up on 4 and 8.
And they've got Carpets.
I'm sure they know that that worked out.
They're going to have one.
Well, Mansfield, Ellinger, and Scott are in favor of a 60-day continuing resolution.
They're going to have to meet with the House leadership this morning and tell them we've got to have a 60-day continuing resolution.
The House leadership will say that's not satisfactory because that only carries us to the Lincoln reset.
Therefore, we've got to have a 90-day.
And out of that, we'll get somewhere between a 60-day and a 90-day resolution.
We will not have the resolution today, but we'll have an agreement that there will be one, and we can then go ahead and ride it through.
Now, there's a possibility that won't work.
They're moving on counter-attacking Kennedy on India-Pakistan, but it's...
He's giving signs of violence, but not very much.
And I was reading a new sign.
I think it's a new sign.
Well, Henry's sort of carried it much more strongly than Kennedy's, and said, well, I'm asking you, I'm asking you, I don't want you to hear this.
And Henry said, it's not the story of the Washington Post, but it's been incredibly disturbing.
Well, they tried to make it appear that the White House was, in effect, chastising the State Department for their strong condemnation of India.
Well, Henry was trying to be very clever.
Yo, yo, Joe.
We'll probably get the bill today if they're trying to work out the strategy on the veto.
On that and how we need for dramatizing our positions of the opposition.
Line across.
That's one that could set either way.
It's not going to be done on the position on whether or not you have struck a fatal blow in the hearts of all the mothers in America or whether you've done the right thing.
All the children in America have just got to come out the right way.
Well, it depends on how you look at it.
You're going to start a fatal blow to mothers who want to get rid of their kids.
I've been spending a lot of time with her personally.
I feel I want to take care of her, so I'm not sure if we have time to do it.
Yeah.
I know I've got a lot of stuff to do.
Are you feeling better today?
No, worse.
What's the problem today?
The same one.
There's something deep in it, though.
I think he's fatigued.
Well, Flynn felt it over the weekend.
He had the various voices out and so forth and so on.
He is.
He went into quite a tirade in the staff meeting.
I don't know.
He's on this skit.
He called me last night on the phone.
I mean, when he retired, he was, the question was being raised as to, you know, what the position is.
He said, well, we're, he keeps going back to, well, we're safe through the election.
We've got no problems now.
But we, he talks about Chamberlain and this is our Rhineland and all this kind of stuff that we're, we,
have no problem now, but the consequences will be in the next two to three years are going to be dramatic.
And we'll start seeing a little of it, but nothing that will matter before the elections.
He does it in these sort of strange tones, what he quite understands.
Essentially what he comes down to is that Thailand, Iran and so on are going to start drawing the obvious conclusions that we stood by and watched our friend murdered without any help from us.
So he doesn't suggest what we do.
And he says we're on the right side of the immediate issue.
And all that.
And then everybody said, you know, everybody asked the obvious questions.
Well, you know, what should we do?
Well, we should do just what we're doing.
Well, but then, you know, why are you saying what I'm saying?
Well, three months ago, we should have started moving on this.
We should have started screaming about India's intervention.
We should have taken the steps three weeks ago that we're taking today.
They said, do you mean by going to the United Nations?
And he said, no, that's ridiculous because everybody knows that won't accomplish anything.
And, uh,
He got very emotional about how the Pakistani Air Force, he can't criticize them because we won't give them the pins to start their airplanes with, so obviously they can't use them.
And there's an emotional time, this is almost like his Israeli time, that he said, you know, we were...
Wrong not to stifle this to begin with.
It was obvious it was coming.
I go meeting after meeting and I was sabotaged by the bureaucracy over the last three months.
We could have been tough with the Soviets or we could have done it at the end.
He's second guessing on the Soviet side.
Do you have a doubt on that?
No.
Is he outraged?
We've done everything.
Being tough with the Soviets, we could have done this.
We sent messages to the police that we told him to stay out of this.
So then he says any country within reach of the Soviet power will now adjust to the facts of life.
He says it may help us marginally with the Chinese.
Going the other way, but only if it was a concern, maybe, arguably, maybe.
Steve Don, recognizing his own figure.
Now that's what my guess is.
When I came out of the meeting, as far as the conclusion I had, I asked a couple of questions, and it clearly comes through to me that he recognizes that he should have done other things or more things or something.
Not in your work.
No, but he thinks maybe it would have, or something.
And that's the problem.
I think there's a self-healing thing going on in there.
But it's, I think it's wrong to try and do it the wrong way, especially for Egypt, because he sees through, you know, anytime you try to help him out, it's worse than that.
Where he comes to on his position now is he cites this old diplomatic adage, you know, that when you have the margin of maneuver, you don't have the evidence to support the maneuver.
By the time you get the evidence, you no longer have the margin.
And he said, that's why I can't believe this is what he did.
He said the bureaucracy had sabotaged it earlier, but he didn't say that they were now.
He can't see, because State's public line is
Absolutely solid.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
The other position, of course, is that the public relations standpoint is that it looks like with 680 people collected away, Pakistan is a dictatorship.
Well, Ron apparently went on with Henry to his office and he came into my office.
He was concerned.
He said Henry was raving about all those people who cared about his public relations position and, you know,
I think this is what, it's that...
He doesn't seem that bad when you ask him.
He says, we should have done.
He never says what we should do.
That's that sort of rusty remorse.
But he doesn't come in, Bob, also, because he knows.
I know.
He doesn't come in and say, we should have done.
I really don't know.
I don't see it.
So you said there's been a message.
So we did it, right?
Yeah.
We should have told the Indians not to do it.
Well, we could have cut off Asia.
We've been cutting off Asia for a long time.
He goes through the dire predictions now with the Indians.
They're not just trying to establish Bangladesh.
They're going to do that and get control there.
So I think the point that, you know, we're, okay, so we're in a good posture currently on a public basis.
Yes, he says we are.
It's very good.
But then he gets mad that we're concerned about that.
He says we shouldn't be worried about our public posture.
We should be worried about the substance and everything else.
But
We've got a problem because you have to tell India, who has the capability to do it, in terms of the squadron, I understand.
And in the minds of many people, despite all of their yacking about our health and everything,
Six hundred million people are looking.
Sixty people sitting on the winning side.
That's the kind of morality we have these days.
And if it's a democracy, and if they do it right, if they do it wrong, you know, that's what they're saying.
What do you think about the political situation?
And there's nothing you can do with Henry.
Henry spent, Henry was better with the weekend.
You know, he could, I could talk, I could come to all the conferences with him, and I'd get, that was what I was gonna do by cutting this off.
You know, I was pressing all the time.
But I think, I think he's gotten emotional.
He sounds a positive fatigue to me.
When I talk to him at home, I say, you sound fatigued.
Ron said, you know, he goes through these temper tantrums all the time.
Ron sees him.
Sometimes I see him all the time.
But Ron's what it was, and I think he's right.
At this time, he's irrational.
Where before, he's been mad, rationally mad, but emotionally too.
But, you know, he's got a specific point of grievance, and he's mad about it.
On this one, he doesn't make sense.
We may have a...
There's a real problem with that respect, you know what that is.
Well, you just can't blame yourself about something like this.
Terrible, Lance.
I know, I know.
You're rushing it all the way up there.
I know.
We didn't think it was too bad.
It is bad.
This is bad for India to do this.
I don't know what's going to happen.
God doesn't think we can do anything about it.
There's a little difference there.
India doesn't have a plan for a world conquest.
Of course, I guess India does not have a plan for a world conquest.
There are other areas.
Why the hell are we still fighting in Vietnam if we're going to walk to the next world?
It's not true.
We don't have it.
I think you just got to ride through it and basically go have things on a normal key.
It's not a real accident.
It's not a car accident.
It's not a car accident.
It's not a car accident.
It's not a car accident.
It's not a car accident.
It's not a car accident.
He really has the inability to see that he himself, to admit, he knows it, to admit that he himself is ever wrong.
I mean, that was set up, and that set up a whole cast that gave us a bunch of envelopes and this and this and that, and this is, well, it's the bureaucracy that did it.
Now, the bureaucracy's bad, I agree, but the bureaucracy had moved to the, we didn't ask them to do a goddamn thing.
Now, if they had done it three weeks ago, it would have made a difference.
He makes it more frightening, because India cut off aid three weeks ago, and India wouldn't have moved.
I don't think it's getting that.
More frightening.
It's over.
It's over getting that.
That's my view.
I certainly don't know.
Well, he's trying to fly a camel.
He doesn't know a lot.
Very well.
Don't ever let me get away with the fact that I was not from South Triton and tell them all the facts about what you can't do with this.
I didn't do it yet.
I didn't tend to.
It's all real life.
Let me in.
He never missed a bottle of beer.
He's too much.
Hey.
Yep.
I'm going to go right back to Henry, which is the only thing that he's used to not do, but I think he should.
Anyone?
Well, maybe not.
Maybe not part of it.
I'm just going to examine him, because I don't know what we're going to do.
We need to try to find out what the core is.
There may be some way to...
I think the core is that he thinks this is the other thing.
It's just bad, you know, his idea that we don't want to have wars.
Our great foreign policy, we have great successes, and now here's one where we stood for it and succeeded, you know?
Yeah, but we have so much on that table, and this is not going to do so.
Do you want to remember anything, or do you ask?
His own perception is rolling.
Well, I'm a cease to doomsday.
you know, the business of everybody else talking because we didn't come to say it back to Santa Clara.
The thing that concerns me about this is that he, when we finish something, he talks about it.
And he talks to everybody outside, but he reflects.
Well, he wears his attitude, that's right.
And he can get into the, well, you know, he's canceled his Galbraith dinner.
I don't know whether that's, I guess under his present condition, it's good.
But he told me last night he canceled it because, probably not true, he's in a business.
And he's not.
He's an individual, not a senior.
I don't know what it is.
I think it's correct.
What it is, is the algorithm is against him on the idea of practicing that.
He doesn't want to give it to a paper.
Calling the dinner to Halem is for launching the China-Soviet initiatives.
And it's clear to him he wasn't going to be Halem anymore.
He was going to be raked over the coals for, not for what we're talking about.
He would be raked over the coals for what he thinks is wrong in this case, which was not being done.
He'd be raked over the coals for having
Then what do you learn about Indians not being on the side of Indians?
Say, the poor.
These pack refugees.
In this case, there's a cracking bureaucracy.
There is some things in the bureaucracy, but it's way overstated, Bob.
It's way overstated.
Well, there always is.
I mean, we always have a problem with the bureaucracy.
A few things that they aren't going to go as fast as we want and so forth, but it isn't all that self-contained bureaucracy.
Just from my own personal viewpoint, when he has a problem, he usually comes running in emoting about it.
And over the last month, he has not come in saying, they're sabotaging us on India-Pakistan, or we're doing the wrong thing, or we're failing to move.
He always has before.
If there's anything happening, he runs in.
Worries about it.
I don't think he thought we were doing the wrong thing.
He may have thought that we were resigning.
He may have realized, but there was nothing we could do about it.
That's the point.
We track the disorder.
It's overstimulated, you know, he gets overexcited about it all these times, and I'm sure over-depressed about his failures.
Everybody does.
And sees all of these wonderful things that he lives.
You know, he was going through that great line of triumphs we were going to set up, this Chinese, all our dreams of Vietnam settlement, then the China summit, then the Russian settlement.
He said, if we could get any one of the three, we'd be a monumental accomplishment.
We had two of the three.
And the other one probably was never getting one.
All right.
He's never got that.
He doesn't like the word, you see, you know.
I don't either.
I'm not sure.
Yeah, I'm sure.
He's thinking in front of the prisoners, trying to open the nightmare from the land.
That's not good.
Also, he likes to... How do you feel about his background?
I don't think that everybody...
I don't think it's good.
I don't know.
Everybody's told him, you know, it's supposed to work out.
Mm-hmm.
and the need for some backlog support now, and asking for a solid talking paper out of the background, don't you think they're prepared to get it done?
They have a lot that they're going to refine.
I wonder if somebody's going to get it.
Well, that's that's what they're getting more cracks.
Cracks saying five move up with him.
So it's true.
That move on Cooper on that is already made.
Made a good statement that can make a.
Make a more detailed one.
Cooper.
That's the expertise in the area.
I don't Henry's big cake.
It's a big kick on the State Department and on our whole thing.
And he was saying to the State Department, he said, it's no noble thing for us to be declaring neutrality in this.
For us to say, take a hands-off policy and say how it's not, is nothing for us to be proud of.
And the goddamn State Department's running around saying that.
And that's how we've been hearing the President say that to the leaders.
So you can't just hang the State Department.
We said we were not.
We were pursuing a policy of non-involvement.
That's correct.
And I didn't use the word non-involvement.
It's not non-involvement.
I'm going to get into it.
But then I went on to say we would cut off any... We worked that out ourselves at this time.
I would hurt any of them.
I wouldn't hurt a faction.
We'd already cut off any of them.
See, what you're doing, you're never going to get the question off their side.
No, but...
It wasn't a question of neutrality.
It was a question of non-involvement.
Did somebody raise the question, are you arguing that we should be sending troops in, bombers in, or something?
And he didn't respond to that.
It's irrational.
It is.
He's got this thing of being too big for himself.
He says, I'm going to have to draw a band.
I'm going to have to service.
Maybe the state channel and all that sort of thing.
I guess that's the only thing he can do it so far as well.
He does very well.
It may be, this may be, he can't survive it, but
I don't know.
I think he'll get it.
We can do something about it.
We're trying everything.
He knows God can.
Well, we're trying everything, too.
We're not saying anything about turning around.
We're not adopting.
I'm tired, too.
You shouldn't be tired, huh?
You shouldn't be tired.
I don't think so.
Over the weekend, he was.
I asked him about his voice.
He said, no, I guess it's because I barked on the phone so much.
I noticed it again last night.
The voice was bad.
And I thought he had a cold.
I didn't ask you.
I think what it is, it's tension.
Tension makes his voice.
And actually, it's the voice that's driving him.
And that's, that's it.
We're not going to be able to actually sleep on it.
There's a chance that there's something wrong with it.
I agree with you on that.
Thank you.
Uh, Mr. Rogers, I mean, it's a terrible story that they did, you know.
And respect.
So on the other hand, I asked the, you know,
We ought to be happy to the client.
See you guys again tomorrow.
I didn't get it.
Let's party about it, sir.
Do a good day if you want to.
See you.
I have not gotten to him at all, so he doesn't have to have any talking.
No.
We're, we're clear in case there's a clear weekend.
Yeah.
Well, we leave Sunday morning.
Or Sunday midday.
You have nothing on South Friday.
You have nothing today.
You have nothing Saturday.
We want something.
And you're cleared.
Tuesday evening.
And you're cleared to go to Florida then.
Stay, stay cleared.
Well, we have a time magazine thing.
I've got to get it.
I've got to get it signed.
I think the possibility of pushing hard and a big problem is where the body wants to stay with this Rehnquist.
They've got to approach it and it takes a day long to get that into effect.
But they're in a frenzy state now.
They're just flipping everything through and getting it done fast.
So they may get it done fast.
in order to be leading up to the merits of the Indian past.
I'm sure you've thought that.
But here's the thing.
If we had done it, it would have affected this.
Let me put it in a better perspective.
It's like Henry's constant, constant going over and over again, the fact that, well, we've got to...
We've got them coming.
They're clutching, etc., etc., etc.
And then the Congress did this.
Rogers said this.
And this hasn't happened.
They haven't done this and that.
You know, that's, it's all, it's all a thing of the imagination, I'm sure.
Those things, it's just not true.
Now, this instance, this instance, this is a terrible, I think it's a terrible thing.
I, I don't, I didn't mean it.
It's a terrible bastard.
I think you're right.
You're getting whipped and
There isn't a goddamn thing that if we had done it a different way, it would have changed it.
You know, we were very tough on him.
He was determined to go ahead.
But Henry feels that the world, you know, he's sort of like God, and he feels that he's like God.
It ought to be, you know, that things should come out perfectly, and they don't.
And so you lose one family, you find another one.
I don't know, but in this instance, it is not in my view.
We cannot be the price of a...
Yeah.
Maybe not.
It's been clearer to me what he's, what he's disturbed about before, sorry.
You know, been able to, maybe that's part of the problem now, taking the records.
He doesn't know, so that could be, you know, I'm just quite afraid that he has to, that could bother him.
The Harvard thing, there's something there.
He just canceled for that reason.
In this paper called about,
The problem he was going to have after he operated didn't.
It said, you know, the funny thing that happened is they were going to have this great homecoming.
Like, you know, we should remember some of that.
And it's a great peacemaker and stuff on that track.
And then a funny thing happened.
In the end, the water broke out.
Godwin didn't make me disturbing more than any monster.
It could have been.
You realize that he's like Mount Moynihan in Harvard.
Because it probably meant an awful lot to him that he was going back on his triumphal.
When did this happen?
I didn't know about it until last night.
The column ran probably on Monday.
This has been irking him about something that may be more backless than you think it could be.
He says he had told Godwin to leave.
Somebody wrote a story, I forget whether it was a byline columnist, I think it was, I think it was like Tom Brady or somebody, but it may have been just a wire story or something, background story, but it listed the men who were coming and if they were, you know, this was going to be a big thing, but now it changed it.
Gal Ray said, you know, I'm very happy about it.
That may be.
It may be.
He may have thought he had finally bought himself back into his own society, and then all of a sudden, zap, this threw him out of it again, and that may be what's getting to him more than anything else.
Let's look at the real topics.
The real problem is not the term Soviet problem.
I would have never let Rodgers in, but I'd have to do it myself, she said, because I had to, I had to, because I would trust Rodgers on the call.
He said, you know, he'd bring in, you know, I'd have to do it myself.
And it would be hard, tough to do.
I would have to use hate.
I mean, you know, sort of as a, there as an outtaker, sort of watch, you see, that I'd be over, you know,
It's the real, you understand, I've never been to Russia.
Yeah.
Because he's much too superficial.
He couldn't know, boy, boy, he could do it with cheap shots, you know what I mean, do this, do that, the other thing, you know what I'm saying.
The problem with the Chinese is that Henry has had such detailed discussions with them.
Is that all recorded?
Yes.
You can read every word of it.
It takes a lot of work and studying it.
And reading doesn't give you the feel that you have at the academy.
But then all of the Chinese thing is the, with both the Chinese and the Soviet thing, there is a great deal of, well, it is an enormous advantage
Have someone, you know, you have colleagues who can bother and make the deal before you go in and talk to me to the chair.
You know, that's what we will allow.
See, we can't trust Robert.
And he could, oh, I don't think he can do it.
Well, to be perfectly frank, I don't think it's terribly dangerous, because I don't think Henry would get himself out of that tent.
Like, no matter what it costs him to stay in.
Well, let me put it another way.
I'm thinking Henry himself.
I'm thinking about getting him out.
I mean, we really are in a position to get him out.
constantly go through this sort of thing.
You're just kind of fishing out.
That's what I've often said.
What you didn't give is extra.
What you don't give me.
God Almighty.
The shots of the fire and the empty bells.
Jesus came to Christ.
Yeah, although a lot of that stuff he couldn't.
Yeah, he does not bother us now.
He knows who on the staff is doing the backup and stuff.
Yeah, that's true.
And he reuses a lot of people there and takes them out of his back.
And he almost got to go the other way just to start having problems and he can't...
You can't back down with Henry on these problems, but you also really can't afford to put him down.
You've kind of got to deal with the problem.
The trouble is, he proceeds on that assumption, too.
On a problem, in the state of mind, he shouldn't talk to him.
Even Paul, my grandfather, he shouldn't let anyone know how he feels about this sort of thing.
The grandfather taught us people.
That's the problem, Henry.
Remember, I've told you quite often that his son gets reflected, his things are out there, his shit's around.
But remember, it's all over the, all over this town, Henry.
You know that?
Yep.
And he's that person.
And he's that person.
That's right.
And he's...
Well, maybe getting kind of running through it with the staff this morning gets it off his chest, and maybe that was good.
Oh, I don't think he should do it, even with that group of people, because they're unknown.
He says he's trying to justify, through his liberal friends, the fact that he and we are on the right side, and being on the Pakistan side is against India.
And therefore he over, he reads these things and says, well, India is a moral country and it's in Congress and there's 600 million of them and why are we picking the wrong side?
So he overcompensates and then thereby saying, well, there, those bastards are wrong.
And because we believe that what this is is such a terrible pattern for the future.
So we were right all the time.
The critics are wrong.
Some of that is motivating, too.
See, that gets back to the algorithm then.
If you were to survey Harvard opinion, it would be 9% for India.
For the wrong reason, because basically Harvard opinion is not moral.
Harvard opinion is power or envy.
It's fashionable for India because India is big, and it's supposed to be a democracy.
And everybody's supposed to be for India.
India's supposed to be for peace.
So, when India engages in aggression, you turn your back.
Hmm.
It's a phobia.
And he argues against that line very strongly.
That we can turn our back?
No.
Well, it gets the line that India is for peace and that because of the 500 million of them, we should be on their side.
I totally agree.
That's my point.
I totally agree.
But I think the general is over.
He's out.
Henry now comes.
Because everybody else is on that side.
All of his friends are on that side.
He's trying to prove, by God, they're all wrong.
And he's trying to be great for the morals of them.
I'm completely aware of that.
Well, I'm not sure, you know, looking at it in cold turkey for a proposition for public rights in that way, I'm not sure that India is all that popular in the United States.
Well, I was with Steve McGregor when he was speaking.
He said, you know, don't ever get the thought that you've got a strength in this country on the side of India.
He used a historic example.
He said anybody who fought
If the war was in India, we'd be actually horrified if we thought you were going to the defense of India.
Instead of eating the people.
We've got Q-12, the closer you can get, turn around.
Middle American, copy.
American 7, back in the front, India has been...
Only on a grateful birthday, and most of them, the highest sanctimonious about criticizing the United States and voting against us in every journey we had.
And any reader of the Guru books, you know, Guru just slices the Indians to ribbons on them.
Because he, in his novels, he's stuck on the U.N. You know, he's the Indian ambassador.
He's always, good time around, total caricature.
You know, the
Sliding, principal lifts, maneuvering.
Oh, it's bad about a diplomat.
Maybe condemning India, but I don't see somebody condemning India.
Well, the UN vote, in fact, should have condemned India and Russia.
That's not why it's wrong on the side.
We've got Canadians.
You know, Henry, it's a wrap-up of the thing he did.
Even though a lot of Canadian voters and Canadians have been working
I'm not sure it's about politics, but I think it is.
He said he wanted to talk, he wanted to get together with me this week.
Why don't you get together with him before I do?
Maybe, could you, could you do it today?
I'd like to see him again.
So that I can be in, I want to be in a position to talk to him too.
You call him, I'll see what you would like to do.
I can be, I can see him sometimes.
Before we start the long series of trips, it's making fun of me.
I don't know what else to say.
Speaking of the relations with him, I appreciate this part of the story, you know.
As far as any indication of that, no.
He's got a problem, he says so.
Burns and Peterson and all that group, they're all, they just never know what they're up to.
I mean, I don't know the reason, but you know what I mean?
They, some of them... Well, Shultz has been moving on, well, he is, he's got, but directly with the company, he's not up to anything.
Directly to the company, he's been trying to push for the... his concern, and he's got his theory now that this week proves it, that...
What a bad idea it would be to go back to convertibility.
In that the German mark has gone up, and they said it would have to go down to deal with the French.
It shows that we're—and they're buying dollars now, as the dollar goes down.
They've got $50 billion or whatever it is.
They're starting to look around for converting.
He said, that's exactly what we don't want to convert.
And he said that they'll keep buying dollars as long as they think that's to their advantage.
At some point, they'll quit buying dollars and start doing something else.
And the best thing we can do, from our viewpoint, is to stick them with the dollars, not to convert.
So he argues.
makes this hard, but what he wants is a thing.
He has some theory, some idea that you ought to be given the discretion to deal with the convertibility.
And McConnell doesn't agree with him on that.
Then he had the other thing.
He had the idea that if we move this week on bilateral lifting of the surcharge with Canada, Mexico, Brazil,
Based on if you have any Canadians and Brazilians in here to talk, it would be a hell of a coup.
It would be a damn good leverage move and all that, which is his understanding of how it was in favor of building.
And we're going to propose that.
He kind of liked that idea.
But I asked him this morning about it.
He said, apparently, it's too late.
I didn't want to do that.
I didn't want to do that.
We've got a strong opposition from both George and apparently Stein, although I haven't talked directly to Stein, on moving more to the CDA because you're putting a part of it as well, because it's a bad move.
The guy isn't a good man, isn't a good economist.
Very narrow, really be worried with the narrow blinders.
But mainly that he's, you know, 100% are their students.
Totally under average influence.
He's also concerned about her getting into a confirmation battle and putting a new man into the BLS.
Now, his view is that we, by getting Goldstein out and reshaping the rest, that we can avoid him putting the screws on him, or we can, the board is a weak character and a terrible spokesman.
Very bad, incredibly ill speaker.
And the boy played the Darwin in the unemployment as well as he could.
And so I worked that out.
But there is a lot of concern on the coastals.
But Chuck is just adamant.
But there's a pretty good argument for the fact that you're creating a big problem in order to solve a lesser problem.
And that may not be the right thing to do.
Maybe even a little bit of a lesser problem.
Yeah.
Well, I can see the bigger problem that might be created.
You just decided.
I'm not going to get into the damn thing.
I just thought that everybody felt we could do it.
Well, I don't think it makes a difference who's on the CDA.
Of course, that's a word George doesn't agree.
Well, except the guy has a potent platform.
Of course, you can tell him to keep quiet.
Yeah.
All right.
I understand.
You work it out with Smith.
I mean, it's time to show it off.
So see what, I'm not, that's what I've told myself.
It may not be.
I understand.
I understand.
I use Mark every time.
Yeah.
I don't care.
I don't care that much about it.
I know there is a problem regarding this.
Sure.
Okay.
Anything else?
I suggest if you have a little time today, you can tell us on a chat with the others.
What could wrap up some team resolution strategy in the early morning break?
It's very interesting, right?
I'm working out.
I want to see Chuck first, calling this evening, right?
What is your schedule with him, right?
Yeah.
and so forth.
He'd rather wait for tomorrow.
Tomorrow's just as good a day as for me, and today is for me.
You know what I mean?
As soon as he can meet his, the day of tomorrow, I'd like to send some kind of message.
He and I can talk a little about it.
If I can get the position before he, you know, for him to get the time, for him to get the guidance.
Also recorded on December 8, 1971
632-001 9:19 AM · 24 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:19 am to 9:20 am.
632-003 10:18 AM · 37 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:18 am and 10:27 am.
632-004 10:27 AM · 23 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Rose Mary Woods, White House operator, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:27 am to 10:50 am.
016-041 10:28 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 10:28 am.
016-042 10:28 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:28 am and 2:15 pm.
016-043 10:28 AM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:28 am and 10:52 am.
632-005 10:50 AM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:50 am and 10:52 am.
016-044 10:52 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and John B. Connally talked on the telephone from 10:52 am to 10:55 am.
Conversation 632-002, December 8, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/632-002 (accessed November 2, 2026).