Conversation 634-016

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Well, I'll do it, brother.

What are you doing in your spare time?

I've had too much.

Sit down.

I might have to take another call.

I don't know if I've been calling people to congratulate them on the tax bill over there.

Very good.

Did you call them?

No, sir.

I'm dead.

Well, I've got no problem.

I've got a whole service.

And Wilbur, St. Wilbur, Southern Change is too little in Houston.

You can stay at my station sometimes.

I don't know what else happened.

I don't know if something happened.

I wonder.

You know, he said, well, there's this foreign policy and all that bad, and he said something.

I don't know what happened.

So I suspect there's probably been a reaction.

He probably first decided that it really wasn't you who planned for him to think he could be president.

And secondly, he did what he did on the check-off.

Check-off?

They turned on their experience, aren't they?

They are living.

Are they?

That's huge for everyone.

That would be a traitor they'd call him, you know.

So I suspect he's pretty disillusioned.

Aren't you pleased with the tax bill, Paul?

Aren't you?

Mr. President, the greatest thing I think we've done, believe me, everybody in the church, boys are literally saying, boys like John Lowe, who are real, real honest.

He just says it's the best tax bill that's been thrown through that Congress.

He says we got more of what we want, less of what we didn't want, than any bill I've ever seen in my 20 years watching tax bills go through the Congress.

He said, it's by far the best medicine.

So, everybody's ready for you.

I mean, these are the probes he's been trying to do.

Get him, get him.

You've got to hand it to Wilbur, though.

He's been out there.

You've got to make a holiday.

Oh, no question about it.

It's just a bit of a...

The truth of the matter is, they can't get it.

They can't get it against anybody.

Yes.

Yeah.

Now, I asked Wilbur, and I didn't think he should know this, because I believed him, and I told him, I said, well, Wilbur, how's it going to go in the Senate?

He says, well, I think it's going to be all right.

I said, now look, we're going to get papers.

If there's any problem with it, you get a call from the college, because I said, I can't talk to you.

He says, with you, you know, Wilbur, I call one man.

And I said, but I can't call 110.

And he laughed.

He won't call us, but no.

But you know, he loves to know.

He knows he's got the power.

And he knows those senators who are there.

And he knows how to use that power.

You know, he's going to look at this revenue share.

I don't know whether it's a good idea or not.

He's going to give it to us.

I've got to study his proposal, which I haven't done in five years.

It's all good.

We're going to get it.

Well, that's all right.

Basically, it's going to be tight.

They're going to put some on the economy.

Let me tell you, what I had in mind for us to talk about is a real problem that doesn't require a lot of your time and support.

Let me put it this way.

I had fended off everybody on this international agenda.

George Shultz talked to me and told me what he had talked to you about, about his view.

Basically, his view, as I understand it, is what's

Let's give up the surge, aren't we, Chairman, for trade and let everything else float?

Arthur Burns has been getting at me, trying to get at me through New York matters, to the effect that there is no solution to this except for variability.

We've got to go back to some other variability.

My position has been, and I told Jessica, you reflected it too, and then when I think properly, I said, all right, all of these faults,

In Arthur Burns' case, Arthur says you can't make a deal without convertibility.

But he says that because he wants convertibility, and so therefore he says that's the condition for making a deal.

On the other side of the coin, George Schultz says we should make a deal without convertibility.

He doesn't see what he's saying.

I said, now, the one that's got to determine this is John Connolly.

You've got to determine what we have to do to make a deal.

Don't bring it to a soulful course.

But that's our backup position.

And then we move from there to get as much as we can.

Now that's my approach to them.

And that's frankly not my approach at all.

That's my approach to them.

Except for them.

I'm not, I just feel we should have them.

You can't do it.

That's what I told you.

I thought you would do it.

On a goal then, I would like to give a man for a reason.

What a reason.

And that's what I'm talking about.

But I don't think that's the answer.

I think Papa knew that the political standpoint on the first meeting is the most important.

I thought it was true, pretty much.

Very happy to hear this story.

It would be very useful to us in a number of ways.

If we can find a way to make some progress with the French, I would like to do it.

Now, that's the only political thing I'm sure of.

But beyond that, frankly, you and, frankly, Volker, your experts are going to be telling me what they're going to want to do.

We have a position paper for you, Mr. President.

I can outline it to you in three or six minutes.

All right.

He wants interim convertibility, limited convertibility in order that the IMF can function.

The organization per se.

Now, and I'll explain that in just a minute.

He utterly wants full convertibility after two or three years.

But he basically wants to go back to convertibility.

But he's willing to wait for a couple of years.

After long-term negotiations, he says.

But I'm not even in a position where at least for present negotiations to support what you want.

Yes.

Okay.

Now, George Hughes does not want to give over those at all.

I don't.

Or I could go all the way that way.

I'm going to let me tell you, George.

George said to me yesterday, he said, I think we have already given up.

For whatever it's worth.

He said, let's go again.

That's right.

He was critical of me.

He did not want to give them the book.

He thinks I gave it away.

I told him I didn't give it away.

I said, we made certain assumptions.

His point was not that you gave it away, but his point was that the international community had assumed so much that now we've turned back and looked and said, that's his point.

And I think he's right.

I said, now, I didn't give it away.

I said, the press has indicated that we had given it away.

But I said, what the press indicates and what the facts are are two different things.

I said, I have not foreclosed a single option.

As a matter of fact, in the meeting with the ministers, I said specifically, I said, I don't even have any authority to do it.

I said, this is the one thing that I cannot do.

I said, I have authority to negotiate on anything except this.

I cannot.

agreed to any change to the price of oil.

I said that in a public, not public, but in an executive session.

But I said, we can take certain hypotheses to the department.

And one of those was that we depended about 10%.

Now, on convertibility,

But if I talk to him about it, he doesn't raise the question.

There's a Ryan Javits proposal that he thinks pretty well of.

to the impact that it would give discretion to the president for something of that sort of thing, the gold thing.

Is that your position?

I don't have a position on that bill, but that's all I have.

How do you think that's the best way to handle it, though?

Or is it better to go into the deal, go to the Congress with a...

George has a prayer.

His concern about gold is going to the Congress with a deal we've made with other countries and have the Congress not give us a pop-up.

I don't know if that's right or not.

He made that point.

He wanted to go this week to the Congress to get authority to trade on gold.

And I said, well, I said, George, first of all, we don't want to do that.

I said, I held the threat of the Congress refusing to vote.

And I made a big do out of it.

And I said, the president can't do it to the extent he wants to.

But let's have a foreclosure option.

I said, we can get, before we get down to the point where it can be an embarrassment, we need to make it.

from Kennedy and from Muskie and from Humphrey and from Mills and from the rest of them, that they're willing to do all this gold.

What should we be getting?

They've got to be safe.

Because every communist, every liberal, every separatist communist, Hillary, all the rest of them would be farting.

But this is also a reminder that I have yet to talk to a businessman, to a banker, or to a communist,

including all the former assistant secretaries and secretaries of the treasury that I had in my office yesterday, all of them are friends, let me say it.

They say we cannot go back to convertibility.

But then we're in solid ground.

We're on solid ground.

We're on real solid ground.

Now, the Europeans, John, is there a price for convertibility?

No.

You think not now?

Not in that notion.

I don't mind buying them.

Their price is not now.

They know.

Well, first of all, it's the department who raises the issue with me.

You just said it was the president.

I understand it's a convertibility problem.

But we're not getting one-third of what we have to have in terms of realignment to go back to convertibility.

If you want us to go back to convertibility, we've got to talk about 25% realignment, not 11%.

Because we've got to be sure, before we go back to convertibility, that we will indeed have a balance, and perhaps even a service.

I understand that.

I didn't understand it, but I see your point.

In other words, if they want convertibility, they've got to give us enough to make convertibility possible on our part.

Otherwise, otherwise, we're back in the same place.

We're in deficit again.

They call on us and say we won't go there.

And then you bankrupt into it.

You bankrupt into it.

I've never heard of it before.

I see the point now.

Did that make you totally wrong?

Absolutely.

I said, we can't talk about it.

The minute they get us tied to changing the price of gold, they're all going to come back to get convertibility because they want us to underwrite that section again.

And I won't bore you with the detail, but you won't get into what we want.

Ultimately, out of these two years, I don't know how long it will take, we'll glorify the SDRs so that the SDRs are the standard of measure.

not the dollar, so that the dollar can float up or down, or not float, but we can revalue or devalue in terms of SDRs, just like they do the British pound in terms of dollars.

Now, the British devalued the franc in 1969.

We didn't have to do anything.

They didn't.

No other country in the world did anything, except France.

But they devalued in terms of the dollar.

Now, that's the principle of action that every nation's head, except us,

We can do it because if we move up or down, we move the whole world up and down.

So what we hope to get out of this whole thing is to get a different standard, special drawing rights, so-called, issued from the International Monetary Fund.

But isn't that a burden?

No.

That doesn't require a burden at all.

Oh, I see, I see.

We don't have to talk about that now.

That's two years now.

Well, we should talk about that as a goal.

That's one good thing about these movies.

They've gone over three or four years from now, all three of them.

That's going to work something else out.

But this is not right.

Now let's solve this immediate problem.

That's right.

Now what we have to give, of course, is a surcharge.

That's right.

And they want to get rid of that debt.

That's right.

You have two things.

You have really three things to give.

You have a surcharge.

Correct.

You have gold that you want to give to them.

Then you have limited convertibility if you want to get it.

Now, the limited convertibility is, let me explain that.

Yes, this is the 700 million.

You don't have to agree to give 700 million.

You don't have to talk about anything.

You can say, well, if you all want the International Monetary Fund to work, let's say I will.

We will contribute to a very small amount.

John, let me ask you, what would be the attitude of your assistant secretaries and all the financial experts with regard to that scheme?

Would they invest on a very healthy note?

George seems to have mentioned something.

No, he doesn't.

Well, yes, he thinks it's a move, but you think we could position it in a way so that it's not, doesn't get us pregnant?

Yes.

Is that right?

Yes.

Okay.

I think we can.

But we won't get that.

We won't get that.

We'll talk about donating something so that the fund can operate.

That's what we're talking about.

That's all.

It's a mechanical thing almost.

But it does not take you back to the birth of the $10.

But we can work that out.

But believe me, I'm more interested in protecting this U and the dollar against infertility than anybody, because it ain't gonna work.

That's what I see now.

And also, we'd have other crashes.

We could have it immediately.

Yeah, we could.

See, we've got...

We've got 30, about 50, about 34 billion dollars in other governments' hands.

Governments, not private.

34 billion.

We've got about 12 billion in assets.

So if we go back to convertibility, we can't pay it.

We've got $12 billion to pay $34 billion in debts.

And if we keep running, that's what we're going to do.

We're not going to cure our total balance.

Hey, take a seat.

We're still competing against that people.

Well, if you do this crisis, how many studies will you start to do and say, we won't convert?

We won't go for our dollars.

We won't SDR for our dollars.

We'd be bankrupt in a week.

You cannot go back and convert a billion.

In the environment in which we exist today, no way.

Now, they will give us, for a couple of years, you couldn't even go back to convertibility.

It was a 25% realization because they liked it.

See, they agreed to it, assuming they would.

And three months from now, they can change it again.

And take the advantage away from it.

Get away with it.

We can't.

Because this is the thing that I, boy, I mean.

I said, now, when we go back to fix the change rate, we're not lying about the kid ourselves.

We're going to be hung.

But the rest of you still are going to be free to do whatever you want.

You can either re-file it or you can struggle with the old system.

No question about it.

Every goddamn time there's a crisis, there's a Mark crisis, there's a Frank crisis, they blame the Americans for it.

And then they need to re-file it or de-file it, but we sit here.

And the rest of the world sits.

So that they have had this capacity to unilaterally act, and we have not.

And until we get that, then we ought to be, we ought to have every reason to first act.

So...

But you have to look back and again, to sum up this thing, really, you can trade in surcharge or real life.

You can trade in gold or trade in excesses.

And is there anything that you told me it seems, right?

If you want to make a deal with the population, Henry and I have talked about this at great length.

There are three important elements in this whole thing.

One is Japan, which we deal with pretty much on bilateral basis, both trade and money.

Although Japan wants a multilateral sub.

We can deal with it separately.

Canada, we're probably going to have to deal with it on the basis of funding.

They want to fund it.

See, they want to go back to fixing the chain of commerce.

So regardless of what the other countries do, Canada wants to fund it, which makes it more difficult for us.

So we have to deal with it separately anyway.

The key to the European community is France.

Now, on money, and even on trade matters,

If you want to cut a deal with Pompidou, you can.

You've got all the cards that are available to you.

Now, it'll mean that you're in fact taking a slab with Brandt and Eaton.

Particularly Eaton.

Brandt won't care because Brandt wants to get this thing settled.

He's under great pressure.

And so is your brother.

Why?

They're under pressure because the DMARC has refactored it.

In this floating world, they've got over 13%.

It's 30%.

They, their manufacturers, their industrialists are enraged.

He's 13%.

In fact, 13% above the French economy.

because they stood fairly rapidly.

He's got to be within five or six percentage points of the French flag.

Now, how do you make the deal?

What do you do with the French flag?

You stay with the French.

In effect, without going through all the bargaining, obviously.

All right, Mr. President, you don't want to change the value of the French flag?

Go ahead.

And we know we're not going to get the allowance we want, but we're willing to give and go, provided we can get some trade concessions.

And we'll remove the surcharge if you will stand still for a 10% devaluation of the dollar.

I mean, if you don't want to get into that much specifics, just say if you'll stand still for a substantial evacuation of the dock.

Now, what I hope to come out with is a matter of fact, a matter of fact.

I am hoping that all of these people get into the specifics of the depot.

The only one, the one, however, where it's least likely that I can point it is with Pompidou, because he's supposed to know, well, he is, he knows a hell of a lot about this sort of thing.

Now, if your office member is, is, is Ken Sharpe's name, and we'll give you a picture with, with as much as we get, as much as we get to this sort of thing, it's my opinion, and we'll have a plate right here when we get to this sort of thing.

I'll try to arrange it.

that he and I will talk.

And I said, when we get to this, I said, well, now, it's a very complicated matter.

How about calling in Secretary Conway and Mr. Houston?

I mean, we talked about it.

Now, you see, I wouldn't have Rogers and all that, but just you and me.

How would that be?

And then we just, because...

and Pompidou and whatever part of the crowd would be able to know two more about it than I would.

And on the other hand, we get you and Indy, and the other part, you just sit there.

I'd like to see the deal made with the French.

I really would.

If you can make it with the French, we can make it with the rest of the world, in my judgment.

But you don't.

I see.

Well, is there any indication that the French might come that far?

There is.

What kind of things can they trade with us, John?

They can trade with us.

They've agreed on that.

For us to be back in the dollars, I can add on five.

They've already agreed to that.

Yeah, they've talked, they've agreed on that.

No question of what they'll do then.

So you've got to be aware of that.

If we're going to be back in the dollars, let's get all we can get out of it.

No, it's just changing the price of gold.

So let's get the maximum realignment we can get.

I threw out as a hypothetical question.

And the French didn't say much.

The British said, oh, we couldn't do that.

We'd have to devalue the pound.

But I'm not sure they would.

They're going to say, and it's going to say, we'll fight.

And I don't.

So what we need to do is we need to agree that we can devalue the dollar in terms of the price of gold by 10%.

Of course, if we could raise the price to 35 dollars, we can raise 10% to 38,000.

That's right, but that's something that Frank is quite interested in.

Absolutely.

Absolutely is the goal.

Now, he may say, well, I can't.

Then if we devalue by 10%, you stay still.

You don't come down with us.

You don't devalue us, Frank.

So, in fact, we're putting a 10% difference between us and Frank.

Now, he's agreed to five and a half.

Now, maybe he won't go again.

So what do you think?

We may have some.

We ought to come below 8.

If he won't go... That's right.

If he won't go 7, maybe he'll go 9, maybe he'll go 8.

With prior certainty, he'll go 7, 7 1⁄2.

So we're talking about a 7 1⁄2 today.

That's right.

So we're talking... Now, that's all we have to do.

We stand still.

But for that, and then in addition, you say, now look, we're not getting the real amount we need.

We need $13 billion.

We want to take $9 billion.

We know it's not enough.

So we've got to have, now if you want me to give you more, if you want me to take the political risk of devaluing the dollar in terms of parts of silver, I've got to have something for the political standpoint.

You're walking off with everything.

You're walking off maintaining the franc.

You're walking off with getting search orders removed.

I've got to have some trade concessions.

And you get a magnification.

This is what the trade is.

You get a 10% grain storage commitment for two years.

You get an agreement to stay still and not increase their farm prices as a result of realignment.

You get an agreement.

And Germany will give you this.

And I'm going to agree to back and back with the Germans.

But he is saying overall that I've got to have some concessions in the trade area, particularly in the agriculture area.

See, if you get the gold edition, you get the surcharge removed, I take all the political risk for that, but I'm not going to give you convertibility, and I've got to have something on trade.

Just that simple.

And I think he can make the deal with it.

Now, some of you may, we've had to hassle and haggle over these trade issues and agricultural issues, but if you get him to agree in principle that we can work it out, just after that meeting, John, after the Pompidou meeting, I didn't mean it, we haven't, we don't have time to get him to the Pompidou meeting on September 15th or the 14th, if I remember correctly.

what the hell we say indicates that we have agreed in principle on something or other.

Jesus Christ, that can have the best effect on the balance of the model.

It'll have an enormous effect.

Now, when did your game begin?

17th and 18th.

Well, think about it.

You need to grab where you need to be.

Where do you need to be?

Here in Washington.

17th and 18th.

You go to 10th, here in Washington.

17th and 18th.

And here, let's just take...

That's what they were saying.

See, if we go down in the French state even, then the Germans can go, in fact, up 14.

And that's about where they are right now.

Well, that'll put them only five points above the French.

See, we're here.

I remember the first year, we were down nine.

The Germans were better with us, but five.

So there were five.

Then I think we can get the Japanese to go up at least four.

And they ought to be five.

They're up now already.

Well, they're up about 11 now.

Already?

That's right.

Well, this will put them...

a total of 18, so we're down 9.

And they're up 9, which would make a real amount of 18%.

Now, if they was over 50, I know, Jacksons, I know they's over 50, so we're talking about getting them up.

But it's a relative matter, Mr. President.

If they were at 4 or 5 points to demark, they're going to be easier to trade with.

And if the demark is not over 5% points above the French franc, they've got no problems.

So if we didn't go down 9,

Or even eight.

We've got eights there.

If we don't have eight, Frank said, see, eight-five would go down to eleven-five.

That would make 13 percent.

That's right.

What if he was so tired at the time that he did that?

For you to talk to him this time.

I was going to see if this deal was going to come.

We did it.

Now, I don't, in this instance,

I would strongly recommend that we talk to Henry, that we go to his office,

through another source.

He does not like the Peace Guard this time.

Good.

I see.

They're competitors.

It's our, it's my firm opinion that the Peace Guard this time, there's no question, he's running for president.

There's jealousy between the Peace Guard this time and Pompey.

Oh, he wants to be the next president.

That's correct.

Oh, well, that helps.

So, now, we can go through, I see, Henry may have some ideas, but I would say that probably the best man I know

Uh, with DeAndre Myers.

And just DeAndre, you go to France.

Now, Henry may have a much better choice than Pompidou.

But this ought to be cut with Pompidou, Mr. President.

I see not the other ball playing at your point.

Because in my opinion, President Pompidou is going to kill him.

He's not going to listen to these cuts.

But I think, you know, if we're going to open up the deal with that example, the explorers are very, I guess, confidential.

And if it's not possible, they don't want to look up the discussions that way.

So when we leave there, we said, well, we talked about it.

This was not called for that purpose.

We made some progress at our level, but the two process didn't get the detail on the market.

Not the 18th, assuming that we did not make a deal with the French, but with the 18th.

We'll try to do precisely the same thing there.

But he started saying, on two occasions that we all wrote about, call Eric to try to get some instructions.

And it's our feeling that Pompey did it because of his need, which he would not give him any authority to do it in that place.

Now, I think the Japanese will come prepared to do business.

That's exactly what I know.

I'm going to wait to hear the poll that he's going to make.

Within reason.

Uh, it's the free truth.

The government will be tired of doing this.

That's the key to the whole point.

That key you're facing, no question about it.

We've got to make a deal with the French.

So, yes, you know, and you can try to help us.

But we all tell them that the way that I would do it was send it to the son of Greg Meyer, whoever it is.

I'd send it over there and say, would the idea go as politically almost impossible, the president, and so forth, and then give up.

And then he figures he's got to have a lot before he gets up.

Isn't that really the way to do it?

Yes, sir.

Now, maybe it's Bob Murphy.

He's scared to death.

He's scared to death that this thing ain't going to jail.

So he'd be trying to sell these.

But as I said, there may be another better man.

I just don't know who.

I mean, Marco Henry, I understand.

Arthur Dean, I understand.

He's had many contacts.

He's the smartest of all.

He's an old man, but he's a hell of a good negotiator.

Most of those New York lawyers are pretty good at that sort of thing.

Yeah.

But you need somebody that has some armory.

We know conceiving, of course.

You know, you know who could do it.

Henry.

Well, this is a horrible suggestion, but if you get ahead of the instructions, you know, you can go over it, and he's so gotten at me just sitting without a word that he allowed Henry to be there.

If you don't mind going, you may be fine.

Oh, I don't really care.

It just goes over him.

You know what I mean?

To have a discussion or some damn thing on various matters.

But you have to have some possibility.

You have to have somebody that knows what the Pompidou Trust is coming directly from you.

I'll tell you what, I watch parties and see if you know somebody.

But I think that really this gets down more

to a deed of mouth of really negotiating on a high political level.

The real question is to understanding that, oh, if you say half a percent here and two percent here, it's the deed, not something else.

He knows he's coming to you to strike a deal that you get him out and you meet him in the age of war.

That's what you have to do.

I have no problem with that.

He really is.

It's not going to make Ron happy.

He's got a big body.

It makes him happy to tell us that he's happy to tell us that there's a period.

Yes, I talked to him.

He said, I have a period.

Well, there is his vehicle, but he doesn't worry about the period.

And that was it, you know.

He's been the most adamant, the most awesome, the pure man.

Every one of these meetings, he's far worse than the French.

He's running, he's the lead dog of the French.

He's been running it very long.

All right.

No doubt about it.

And if he ever said anything, when he says it, I think he said, well, I don't know.

We thought you were, you were a complete freeloader.

I was a freeloader.

You know very well the key to the settlement.

That's it.

And you've indicated that to many people.

You were going to follow Frank, so we thought we had no choice but to do it.

Just put it right back to him.

Talking about a Canadian side, it's important, but it is important that

You've got to look at the second deal.

We have to.

Yes, I think we have.

Who's going to work on that?

Well, we've got to work on that.

We're working at the proper time.

We have to agree, probably with the Canadians, that they need to continue to float, provided they follow us on the commercialization and float issues discussions.

Sideless, sideless, helpless, hard-working boy.

You made that kid very strong.

They were, I'm sure, the best of the kids.

We made that, as you noticed, he was extremely sensitive.

But I must say, I've never seen that son of a bitch, Trudeau, say anything good about us before, but he was very good at it.

He was a teacher.

I wonder what he told you.

He said, well, we're trying to employ a kid.

Look at him.

He pointed out, for example, John, that we owe 95% of their own researches that we, 85% of their own, etc., etc., etc.

And he said,

He said, do we feel that this should be a permanent relationship between our two countries, that we should have a permanent imbalance of trade and so forth and so on.

I said, on the contrary, you can't survive.

No Canadian politician can survive under that kind of philosophy.

We, of course, do not take that.

We believe Canada has a right to its own destiny.

You must see it.

We expect you to.

We understand totally this.

I said that.

On the other hand, we've got a sea coward in the suit.

That's all I said.

He thought that was news.

It didn't hurt.

It didn't hurt for you to be talking about it because they took it.

Oh, yeah.

They made an example and they stood it.

That's all.

Now, what did they do?

They don't want to know.

They're not going to borrow us, right?

99 to 100.

We're all...

Even Steve Trout now.

So that counts.

The least we have to get out of it are some trading sections, which we can do.

They can take over.

It's in question.

We can get some.

No doubt about it.

Of course, they're a big trade investor.

They are biggest.

They're our biggest in the world.

So we can get some there.

Now, what we have to make them agree to is let their Canadian dollars float up

a free vote, a clean vote, not in a meeting, and made them agree to go up to 100%.

First of all, they should have discussed this with me.

They should have discussed it.

I mean, they agreed, they said whatever, they agreed to let it go.

I said, I said 110%.

You've got to let it go for at least eight years.

And you've got to let it go to the least use of the other detectives.

And I said, you've got to be a hundred and ten dollars.

Wait, what we need is to be a hundred and ten dollars.

That's correct.

And I said, it's got to go to 110.

And you've got each year to do that.

I said, that's the minimum you've got to do.

It's not intervening for a year.

And if it goes to 110 during that period, you will not intervene.

But you can't say, well, that's it at 110.

Well, you'll squirm.

And I might be able to agree to that.

If I don't know why we can come down to 100%, they probably won't be about 7% of both.

So I'm 100% be happy.

And that's all we have to do with them.

We can settle with them, I think, in very short order.

Now, the trade stuff is going to take some time.

We've got all this automotive agreement we're trying to unwind and a lot of details.

And the border crossings, the exemptions on individuals, they've agreed to some of that.

So it's just a question of what we can get out of it.

And I just press until the time comes to close the deal.

But there's no point in hearing the rules.

If you can deal with the French, then I'd like to wrap it up in the 17th and 18th.

If we can't deal with the French, then it seems to me you have no choice.

But to me, you certainly don't.

You've been here before.

Then you've got to see Brock.

Then you've got to see Sala.

And if we can't wind it up with the French, then you ought to go through with all your other meetings.

And then let us have, if we need to,

One more meeting with a group of 10 around the 12th or 15th of January.

And then if I were to wrap it up one more time.

I've laid the framework for that.

I've said it in perfect and in wrong.

I said, now, fellas, let's talk.

Let's talk.

Let's try to settle this thing.

I said, we don't have any more time.

I said, we're running out of time.

I said, the problem is this.

schedule these bilateral meetings.

And I said, frankly, we've got one more chance.

That's all.

I said, if you don't want to settle it now, I don't want to pressure you.

We can have a bilateral meeting.

It's the first that's going to happen anyway.

They weren't called for this purpose.

Some of your people may have withdrawn with authority.

They may have one son over the last one they meet with.

And I said, but we'll have one more meeting to wrap up and see if we can make a deal around the agenda.

But I said, we can't do it then.

We can't do it.

And I said, at that time, we're going to have to announce to the world that we're not having any more meetings.

And we're just going to float through here.

I said, this is a meeting that's entitled to us.

what the rules are, whether they're in a floating world or whether they're in a fixed-rate world.

But they're entitled to know that.

And I said, we can't be there every two weeks, everyone.

Keep the whole world stirred up, and something's going to come out of it that we should have hoped for.

So you were prepared to set the world afloat?

That's right.

They said, well, I've just noticed that we were prepared to float.

They don't want that.

It's over.

We'll go back to fixed rates.

so this is our this is our country's strength and i've said all along we're not hurting we keep the search and uh so we we've got one more chance but if you can set up with the french

And I could all have a glass of champagne and a Christ thing and believe the author of it.

There's no question about it.

And I need people to wrap it up.

Now, it'll make Sato mad probably.

It'll make Braun mad.

It'll make Heath mad.

And to some extent, it'll create problems for you in the future because the intransigent country in this whole video and the one with the fixation is France on gold.

And it's going to create problems for you because they say, well, France is an option, and they got it, and they got what they wanted.

But on the other hand...

That's what choice you can make in terms of the other general.

You can't make a deal without the Franks.

You know, the problem with the Franks always is that you can't be with them all the time.

Well, I was going to say, you know, this will come to y'all when you're in the community.

I didn't.

Y'all will let the Franks call you and say, just say, I couldn't trade with Britain.

I couldn't trade just with Britain.

The Germans told me that they can't deal with us.

They've got to deal with the movement.

That's right.

Well, also, they've all said to the guy that the Franks passed relief on that.

They bought it.

So there's no question.

So you're in the clear right now.

And all right.

But we'll give you a paper on it.

But I would sure agree that some of them will talk, but they all go directly to the pocket.

I get it.

And I see I'm sorry.

You're right.

But I don't think part of our plan is going to really lead to a solution.

Thank you.

When you meet me here, I'll give you a few remarks.

We'll have a paper for you, but I don't want to.

Oh, there's no doubt.

I don't need that.

You'll take your time to get to the paper.

I'll send it to you.

I'd like to study it closer with you.

Yeah, that's a concept.

I have a couple of times.

I mean, I don't have to think of these papers as a gift.

And that's because, you know, you've got about 18 things to remember.

You can be the president.

And then that's it.

Any of the things you like, I'm sure they have more to their reception, especially on a day like this.

They are all for us.

There are a couple of things we're working on.

Peter was there last night, and I was there, and I really understand how long it's going to happen.

But like you say, the AP is for us 1,000%.

Brazil is the future.

I don't know what's up for that place.

He did not ask for a goddamn thing when he was here.

He was quite reasonable in that way.

And of course, we couldn't deal with him as he was the greatest economist on the planet.

We also made a deal that we would stand together against the attempt.

The last time I was with Castro, I said I'm no certain that's what I ever changed the policy toward Castro.

He said that was their policy, so the two of them worked together.

And he said, I said, we also feel that we're going to cause Castro as much trouble as possible through the upgrade groups and so forth.

The way we're going to do it, and this is the problem is,

The United States' hand shows that South America is too much.

So I said, your hand shows that I'm not as big as they are.

But I said, you've got to work with me.

So in Bolivia, several of these other countries, I sort of settled in a region where he, he's working on their technicals all out.

But they'll play roles and sort of be the lead dog and really support me.

So I think we've got a relationship here that might change the future of that place.

Frankly, the fact that he doesn't have to depend on an election is good.

Sure.

And then it just worked out.

He's a pro.

The siren and call for democracy has caused trouble.

It's making the only choice for Marx.

I don't have an urgent description of Brazil, but it seems to me that I have mentioned it as a nurse, but Brazil also grows apparently a lot.

Actually, you don't know the truth.

He says, every year, Brazil grows, grows in an amount larger.

Every year, Brazil grows.

uh, a, uh, a Bolivian.

Every three years, he grows.

Every seven years, he grows in Argentina.

Actually, he's a hundred million now.

In seven years, he's a hundred million.

You know, he's in 50 years.

Forty.

We're hoping that it will spread to the population and also to some of those people who have resources.

You see, the scheme that I've been working on, the scheme, Jonathan, you have, and I want you to, don't get away with this, despite listening to this deal, of us being an arrangement with the resources we have changed in the world.

You know, play the Latin Americans, play the Canadians, play the Southeast Asians, these Canadians, right?

And this is exactly what I think is possible with the President.

No question about it.

But go ahead and do the question.

This has to do with the relative reports from nearly every Congress in the United States now, on the air, that says our growth ratio will be an increase of approximately 100 million dollars in total GDP.

Now, that's the equivalent of the, that's the equivalent of the entire GDP, very quickly.

We grow over that.

We grow over it.

And that's their fault.

I mentioned one of the things, I mentioned one of the things, which hopefully he has a little talk about.

Because you remember the Indonesian ambassador?

When he came to call you, he mentioned something to you.

about the aid support.

I know.

I didn't know what the hell it was.

Well, you mentioned to Keith and I that Trudeau had got it registered.

Here's what it is, man.

Oh, yeah.

The IPTI, which is an international organization, and they meet once a year.

They're meeting in Brussels.

Since we, our people are going over.

Now, this year, Indonesia wants $670 million in aid.

That's their total.

That's what they're going with.

so i don't think everybody agrees that this is a reasonable figure, probably what they need.

We normally have contributed about a third in the United States of their aid outside of the Montevallo Institute.

Last year, we contributed in direct aid, not food, but in direct aid, 125 million.

The year before, it was 126.5 million.

We need to propose that any program of state with track record support is recommending to you that this year it be $100 million.

That we increase our contribution for the following reasons.

First, that we think we can get Japan, the Netherlands, and other countries to increase their Germany because of their basic economic strength.

Also, because they all have great interests.

They have great interests, and they have great economic strength, great reserves.

Secondly, our aid program, total aid program, is going to be cut, if you will, over the Congress.

Third, our contribution is to add

the International Bank, the World Bank.

It's doubled this next year.

What is that?

So we're doing more through the multilateral institutions.

So the IDA's contribution will be increased 10% to 12% for Indonesia.

So we think that even though our percentage decreased, that with the battle of Germany and Japan, with an increase, with an increase in IDA, that they'd still get $670 million.

But they're scared to death.

We normally make our pledge in December.

Most of the other countries don't pledge until March.

They're afraid that if we decrease, the other countries, that they're afraid to even ask for the other one.

I also think they ask for it.

The president wrote you a letter.

The finance minister wrote you two letters.

They're scared to death.

Now, I told you today that if I were you, I think what I'd do is that I had...

He said he would.

I'll take some of them down.

One is Indian.

And give it.

Don't give it to the Indonesian.

Just increase it by 25.

You didn't do what?

You did like...

I'm just saying this in words.

You got his direct appeal.

You just should have given it to him.

Well, it really makes some sense.

That's a question of time.

Oh, I do.

But you know that they're going to be one of the leaders in that part of the world.

Oh.

And they do need help.

And I don't know of a better way.

I'll be back for that.

Be sure.

I'm going to report it.

All right.

Thank you.