On December 9, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:57 pm to 6:34 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 634-019 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
to say about it.
But the point is, if we get this, you see, if we get this offer, if we get Yaya to agree with this proposition, then we can go back to the Russians and settle this.
And we'll be in good graces with the Chinese because we've done it with Yaya.
Concurrence will have squared the circle.
Then after we settle it, we put the Bassets here to the torch of saying that we were playing this game all night.
I think we're going to pull this off.
Well, they will lose East Pakistan.
There's nothing to be done about it.
We all know that.
But the question is how they lose it.
And West Pakistan almost did it.
They think they're going to lose it anyway, don't you think so?
Well, they may be so demented that, well, yes, by now they have to think.
For Christ's sakes.
Uh...
How will it be done?
They'll make an offer for a political settlement with East Pakistan, but that's beyond that point.
The Indians will never accept that.
No, the Russians will.
That's the interesting thing in the President's letter.
The President's letter says the negotiations would start at the point at which they were interrupted on March 25, 1970.
At that point, East Pakistan was part of Pakistan.
And if we could get the Soviets to state that as their idea of a settlement, if we make a joint...
In the letter.
Now, if we, if you and Brezhnev could make a joint declaration, that the way I see this thing evolving, if we get Yaya aboard by tomorrow morning, and the time factor works for us,
There could be a joint appeal by you and Brezhnev along these three lines.
If the Indians reject it, then we go to the United Nations Security Council and get, this time the Soviets have to support us in the Security Council because it's a joint.
So then we've got the Indians at a disadvantage.
And we'll have separated the Soviets from the Indians to some extent.
If the Indians accept it, then what will happen, first of all, it will then save West Pakistan.
For the time being, and if the Indians...
If the Indians are expelled, it will be a ceasefire.
The Indians will stay in East Pakistan.
Well, what will happen then is a negotiation between the East Pakistan leaders and the West Pakistan leaders, which will probably lead to the independence of Bangladesh anyway.
But it will then be done not by us selling out, but by Yaya agreeing to it.
It's a lousy outcome, but we are now talking, Mr. President, of having... East Pakistan, in my opinion, could never be saved.
In my opinion, I don't think it could ever be saved with the way it was going.
I mean, when it's all done, it will...
It's going to be too clumsy for West Pakistan to save it.
And when it's all, if we come out of it that way, Mr. President...
If we can save a strong West Pakistan, we'll have accomplished a lot.
We'll have accomplished a lot, and all the pleaders about India will again have been proved wrong.
Because after that... Well, we never get the Russians to witness on this.
That could be a watershed in relation to the two countries.
That's why Richard Breeden was here, so you could tell him exactly that.
No, no, but it's better for this guy, because he's got to report it to Breeden, who would have argued with you, and...
You know that's when he stopped him.
It would have been harder for the Bremen to stop the Bremen.
So actually, I think, I told Haig, I thought this was one of your finest hours here because anybody else that I know would have said to hell with it.
We have no chance.
We're playing long shots.
Why jeopardize the summit?
And I think you'll have strength in the summit when it's all over.
The Russians could come back with a hard-nosed message.
No.
I don't see how they can.
No.
You know, when you really put it in terms of basically a lawyer arguing a case, I think such a strong case of how much was on the plate, how much they were going to risk at such a small game that they just can't.
I don't see how they could possibly turn it down, but they do.
They aren't going to deal with it.
My every instinct I have tells me they won't turn it down.
I think we ought to get it off right away, depression.
tomorrow morning now, because... You notice an interesting thing, how these people are the same.
This fellow here, who was into that with him, he is a nice guy, and he hasn't changed one thing.
Just think, 12 years ago, he comes into the light of a change, or you should see him, he hasn't changed one thing, he's still got it.
But this fellow went through the same time that Grim Eagle did, about how Gresham was a warm-hearted man, a good man, and so forth.
President has a hell of a lot at stake in this meeting with you, Mr. President.
He wants it to succeed.
The sons of bitches in this country can piss on you as much as they want.
I do.
Outside this country, you are the world leader right now.
I mean, why the hell would Trudeau, who dislikes everything you stand for, who in his style, in his faggy style, is as different from you as two human beings can be?
That's right.
Why does he say it was a fantastic revolutionary concept?
First, because it was, of course, well put, but also because he feels he wants to be identified with the leader of at least a non-communist world.
He was hurting with his identification with Kosygin, and he wanted to be identified with America.
Yeah, but he didn't say this about Kosygin, and he couldn't have, because his domestic opinion wouldn't...
If he had that physique, he'd made a revolution.
Well, that vote in the UN wasn't too bad, too.
That had some reflection of this.
That's right.
I mean, our liberal establishment is intellectually, it's morally corrupt, but it's also intellectually so totally corrupt.
What they're telling you is, in effect, to preside over the right of an ally to which Kennedy has a commitment.
What you are almost certainly going to achieve is the preservation of West Pakistan, which is, it's a tragedy, but...
But we didn't, we didn't urge him to go into East Pakistan the way he did, and we can't be given the impossible.
One thing I want you to do,
I want you to take 20, this is an order, 25 million dollars to come out of the Indian money and go to the Indonesians.
Now, by God, that is to be done.
I want the Indonesians to be with me.
I'm also a country that knows that we're their friends, and I think that will have repercussions right away.
Agreed?
Absolutely.
Can you issue that order?
I'll get it done this month.
Put it out.
Oh, no, no, no, no.
Nope.
He said he would call an Indian ambassador to tell him that.
Now, Irvin was so shaken, he hardly knew what to say.
Give him the instructions.
Give him the talking paper.
The increments are really there.
Or what?
What are you going to do?
I don't know.
What the hell are you going to do?
Oh, no, no.
He'll now carry it out.
God damn it.
It must even be very easy for anybody to tell the Indian ambassador, we will not tolerate acquisition of territory.
Right?
Well, for Christ's sake, you've got to say that much.
No, no, we're in.
What else do they do?
I don't know.
Because we're getting it.
I'll tell you one thing.
I think we'll be over it by this time next week.
I'll tell you one thing.
these kind of people that have to take twice over there before they allow any expired leaks to some of my house or community for a couple of days.
So they'll still come, but they can't help but know that whole establishment over there, how I feel about it.
I mean, I know what they're doing.
I mean, we're reading the hand papers.
I think that over them,
My instinct tells me that this is not going to build into a confrontation.
These Russians are slaughtering all over you.
I thought it was essential.
We will have a well-behaved WSAC meeting tomorrow.
First time in four weeks.
For the first time in four weeks, you're saying?
The others aren't so bad.
I mean, Packer is fine.
Mortar is fine.
Packer is fine.
Helms is fine.
Well, they got the order.
It was about moving that ship.
Oh, no.
We are doing everything that can be done now.
We're right to move the carrier.
We're going to make the move, Christ move the carrier.
In fact, even if there is a settlement for us in there, just to show we can do it and take it out again, then no one can accuse us of anything.
Trying to move the carrier, get the plans over, calling in the ambassador.
I thought it was good to report to this group, but I just told the Russian ministry, you're going to tell them anyway.
No, not this way.
I don't have to tell them.
This is even better.
This way I don't have to poison our relations.
Also, I thought it was the way the letter was taking it down, but it was too bad.
No, it was taking it down.
The point that I made, I said, I know the usual line here in these things.
The diplomatic line is to let the dust settle until you no longer see the grave.
That's not my policy.
I thought, I thought that was powerful.
Hague said it was the most powerful statement he should have made.
It was really strong.
You know, when it's, if it's worked, if it works, it will look inevitable.
for just a moment.
Very hopefully, I'll have an opportunity to talk to you on the 12th, if anybody else can serve as a comment.
I can't, I just can't work it in our office.
Who's suggesting that?
Well, I can partner very, and make it all clear in the morning.
You have to do it at 9 o'clock, about 30 minutes in the afternoon, if you do it at all.
It's really just carrying them out, is what I'm saying.
I can't, I can't work it because I've got, I've just got too many other things on my mind right now.
There's a layer here, you know,
But is there a tournament this weekend?
Yes, there is.
I don't know.
If they retire, they're not going to get dirty.
They'll clean the house.
Goddamn.
I can't do it, no.
I just, sorry.
Is there somebody that could sit there and lean into this group and tell them you've got an $82 million authorization?
They're too goddamn dumb to know that there would be an authorization.
No, McGregor tried that.
They do know that that's right.
Yeah, and McGregor called him.
Huh?
McGregor called Burry and intimated that it would be a stronger budget.
He doesn't believe it.
Now, what they want to be able to do is to be able to say that you listened to them and therefore did it.
They are not really questioning so much what your budget is.
The origin of this, as I understand it, is that Goldwater said to McGregor that he could handle everything in his questions around the country except the defense budget, and that McGregor
that Goldwater thought this of as a means of being able to say to the conservatives that you listened to them and did it.
Congressman, I'm still getting billed out again and again.
These dumb bastards.
I don't worry about them.
For God's sake, they'll never know what you're still getting out of them.
It's really a question of how much eyewash you want to do with them.
There's no substance to it.
Can I read out in 30 minutes?
Yes, sir.
It's just an idea for the...
What do they want to do?
Do they want to talk, is that it?
Or do they want me to talk, or what?
What is the story?
Well, I think what they want to do is to present their case for ten minutes, and that's the way we should set it up.
If you wanted to, you could speak for five minutes about your commitment.
I don't want to get into the numbers.
And I could give them five minutes' worth without adding numbers to it, what we have done to the defense budget.
I mean, what we've done in terms of producing forces, which is what they ought to be interested in.
Well, you said the defense budget is going to increase.
And...
Well, we don't have, we can tell them in good conscience, we don't have an absolutely final figure yet.
But they will be here.
But it will be high.
It will be, it's substantially above what anyone has recommended originally.
Is it?
Well, it is, but after Laird realized you were going up, of course, he went even beyond you.
Well, in terms of authorization, do you think it should be?
No, I think in terms of obligation of authority.
I see.
It's 82 million in terms of that, but in terms of spending, well, that authorization's the same thing, but in terms of spending, it's only about 70,000.
Yeah, but the case I would make to them is that what they ought to be concerned about is that force is not that level.
Well, also, in that 82 million, in the future, the budget's going to be bigger next time.
You can't spend the money now anyway.
Yeah.
But it's a purely political thing.
There's no doubt in the reason for it.
I want to speak in response to that.
Essentially reassuring that we're going to have to do something about it.
It's really amazing that this whole government, there's nobody that can assure them on that.
What the hell is the matter?
Can't Laird reassure them all?
No, the basic problem is, Mr. President, both foreign policy and defense policy.
They don't believe the secretaries?
No.
Jesus Christ.
That's ridiculous.
I can't say it has to be.
We could do it.
I just need to know how much time they really want.
We can't have them come in thinking they're having a half hour and then have to cut them off at the end of a half hour.
I just want an honest answer.
Now, if they come at 9.15, do they know I have an appointment at 10?
Can they finish in 45 minutes?
I'm sure they want you to do that.
I don't see any reason why you can't tell them half an hour, but you know them better than I do.
Probably takes 45 minutes.
Well, I just don't want it to take an hour.
It'll take 45 minutes, sure as hell.
I know these people, they all talk too much.
You get quarter after 9.
9.15.
We'll have to break start at 10.
Say that I make it, find out that I have an appointment at 9, but I'll cut it short and be in there.
It'll be at 9.15 that I...
Well, you have an appointment at 10.
Just pack it and order.
Sure.
So, if we have some order at the end...
Yes, he should say that he's never had a president who's backed him like this.
If you could call Maher and ask him to be there, maybe Patrick would let him.
Well, not back him.
Let's have Maher.
Let's have Maher.
Well, then Maher would say, look, here, we want the president's back, and so why don't you change this force level for the future that he's concerned about?
It's going to be a boring goddamn thing.
It's a bull.
Sorry to crush you.
Let me ask you this could you go over to Paris and
I am part of Connolly.
I know the feeling.
He tells me that Pompidou and Dave Stang do not get along.
He says that this deal is one that we're trying to make.
It's really got to be cut with Pompidou.
He believes that somebody that I trust, that Pompidou trusts,
ought to go over and try to set it up in advance.
Connolly has got it all thought through now.
He said that we could cut the deal with Papa Deuce.
He says he'll make Pete mad, irritate the Germans and the Japanese some, but that it will make it possible for him to wrap the whole goddamn thing up on the meeting of the 18th.
It won't irritate the Germans.
The Germans will love it.
It will irritate the Canadians a little bit.
No, the Canadians don't care.
The only ones that matter, the British will be irritated.
Well, why did they interfere?
Well, because they wanted the glory.
They would like you to come out of their meeting, but I wouldn't give that.
Well, we're going to talk about other things at their meeting.
I wouldn't do that.
And also, the Group of Ten meeting comes up before their meeting, so he's got to go forward with it.
But now, I told you, I said to the economy that probably you were the best one to go over to Steve Moffat, who said, I don't care, Mr. President, here's what...
The way it has to be worked out is to go there and say, we really think that's a price to hold.
And I hammer on some of them.
And if I can give them that and get what we need, it's a pure bargaining proposition at this point.
That's what we're prepared to do.
We're prepared to give them.
You know what I mean?
I'm not going into details.
We give the branch.
We've got to get 80%.
We'll give the price of coal.
We've got to get to the trade concessions.
But we want to have it understood before we get there, you see, that that proposition is one that people look in favor of.
Or I don't want to go down that road, you see.
But I ain't prepared to give him the price of gold if he's prepared to come the other way.
Now, if you can't do it, is there somebody better to do it?
You see, we've got India-Pakistan on our minds and a few other things.
I wonder if, I mean, if you're going there,
There's a Chinese ambassador back there.
He ought to be an opportunity to have a little chat with him on the same occasion.
Oh, yeah.
I love that.
You'd have to leave.
I'm just thinking in terms of this.
I'd have to leave tomorrow night.
Or later Saturday morning.
Then ride with him on Sunday.
Probably tomorrow night.
Ride with him back here...
No, I'll drive to him.
Let him to the air.
It's yours.
I don't know.
If I did it...
If you haven't undercut, how about I break my hair?
Well, the trouble is, there are any number of people who can do the economics better than I.
The great advantage I would have in the economics is that I couldn't yield because I wouldn't understand enough about it.
I don't think it's a question.
I think you can handle it very, very well.
The thing I could do better than Martin Maier
is to explain the politics to him.
That's right, explain on the price of gold we can't give and so forth.
And if he is to die, it's not going to be much of a problem.
The only thing I wonder is, given the shortness of time, whether I improved the situation much.
It would give him 24 more hours to think about it.
Do you think that he will be in a mood to make a deal?
Yes.
Maybe we won't try to prevent it.
But my, incidentally, he doesn't want his man to pay a present because he's a foreign office man.
But he says, if you want to call me in, he'd be delighted.
That's how he put it to Watson.
But he doesn't want to set it up as two and two because he doesn't trust his own man enough.
And I've talked to Connolly about it.
I could present the Truman issue to him in a way that would make him very tempted to settle in.
Is there a way you could talk to him before I see him?
Yes.
And the AIDS owners.
Get back on.
Look, you have a meeting with Caetano.
On Friday night.
On Sunday night when he arrives.
Will he be there then?
He will be there then.
Could you pass a message to Papa Du that I have a confidential communication that I would like for you to pass on to him prior to our meeting the next day?
And then you go call me.
and chat with him and sort of feel this thing out and see whether this deal could cut.
I think that's the best way to do it.
It doesn't give you as much notice.
And you and Connolly can talk about exactly how to present the deal.
That's the best thing.
Yeah, and he'll see you any time of the night.
He'll say that the president, I've sent a message to him, the message from the president to him, I thought that because he has a private communication from me directly on a very personal basis that he would like to discuss with me prior to our meeting, could he see you?
I would appreciate it if you could see him for 30 minutes.
Exactly.
I don't know when he's arriving, but it must be within an hour of you.
well and he doesn't uh no he'll see me it's not i'll see him first thing in the morning so i can i will either see him for breakfast or something like that or i'll see him the night before you know those state people really deserve
During what I said earlier, it's really unconscionable for the President of the United States to pick up the blue sign day after day after day and read out what the State Department bureaucracy is pissing on him.
When do I say that I am elected?
Particularly when I said, now listen, none of you were elected.
I said none of you were elected.
None of you were elected.
I was.
And when you, after all, have an unbelievable record for being right, it isn't that you've been wrong.
I'm not too much.
Well, in foreign policy, we ask ourselves, it sounds conceited, but you haven't made a significant mistake.
What would we do differently?
I know your mom's thinking.
Now, really, the one mistake we made for which we paid a long time is one that they think is a great achievement.
It's not to hit Korea.
Oh!
If we had murdered Korea then...
It would have sent such shockwaves.
It was a terrible mistake.
Do you remember when we sat here and argued with Rogers and Laird and were shaking my tail?
Oh, no.
I should have done it.
I should have gone next.
Yeah, but for a president in his second month to go against his own cabinet.
Knowing them all how they are now, I should have done it.
But when I look back on it now, it's the only thing that I would feel we might do differently today.
But...
As I look over the other things, I don't really think if we could play it all over again, we'd do things so very differently.
I don't see when, what we could have done much differently.
You know, I'll bet you that wire in Moscow is coming around tomorrow.
Oh.
We'll have an answer to that tomorrow.
Saturday morning at the latest.
Well, I was a facilitator.
I said, as far as this deal is concerned, all we ask is to restrain the Indians.
Let's have a ceasefire.
They must have a political settlement.
As a matter of fact, it was his deal that we were talking about.
Well, there were a few hookers in there.
The way you put it, you said, talk to the Army League.
And the way they put it was, it has to start
where it starts on March 25th, which really means free Muchi.
On the other hand, but I would figure, Mr. President, that's not what we get into in the first phase.
In the first phase, we should state a few general principles.
The major thing is to defang the Indians now.
The Pakistanis have lost 80% of their P.O.L.
They've bombed Karachi completely.
The Pakistanis are going to collapse in two weeks.
If we can save West Pakistan, it will be an extraordinary achievement, which is not warranted by the situation.
Because if State plays its usual game, it will send a message to Delhi, it will send a message to Islamabad, all of which plays into the Indian hands, just as our strategy the first week of the operation did.
They then take five days to reply.
The reply will be in conclusion.
You know, another point that the state needs to get pounded into its goddamn head is that we do not determine our policy around here solely on the basis of how many people are on one side.
Well, you made that point.
and whether a country is a democracy or whether it is not a democracy.
That's another point.
We just don't do it that way.
It doesn't make an equal deed.
It's not made good by the form of government that executes the deed.
I mean, you've often said that the most horrible wars in history have been fought between the Christian nations of Western Europe.
Right?
Does that make them right?
Absolutely.
I'll see.
I'll see.
And between...
the governments prior to World War I were all more or less the same, with the exception of the Tsar.
I mean, that German emperor wasn't all that powerful.
I mean, they had a pretty democratic government.
He sort of strutted around and made it look as if he was a powerful... Well...
I hope it works.
I hope it works in the right sense.
I can't, I just can't believe I can hear this being said.
And I must, I think your hunch is right, saying it to this guy was, it was just an accident.
But saying it to him was very important.
He, he could see that I was there, I was, so he was already, but tough as hell.
And he saw that too.
And he said there would be a competition.
And you, you listed all the things you were willing to do.
It was a masterpiece.
It was the subtlety.
And then,
You were, in fact, saying you want to jeopardize European security, Middle East, all of that for what?
And you said there'd be a confrontation.
Also funny enough, we had a treaty with Pakistan, which is they had one with India.
That's where I'll talk to him.
They know damn well how to do it.
And he just assumes we might do something.
Mr. President, if this were a key country to them, they might challenge you.
But why should they run this risk to back you down?
First of all, no one knows you threatened.
No.
I told you, I said I'm not threatened.
And besides, you can do a lot of things.
I mean, if the principle gets established that the stronger country can prevail with the backing of another country, we could unleash the Israelis and kill the Egyptians.
Every time we've played them this way, it's come out all right.
And they know that you've just done too many unpredictable things.
You know, I think this was a great day.
We may lose on it.
We were certain to lose the other way.
We may win this way.
Well, we've tried.
Some people, the Russians cannot ignore this.
They just can't let me.
Oh, no.
Oh, no.
You'll get an answer within five Sunday mornings.
The Russians, I think, the real question is whether they will just lean on the Indians now.
That's what it amounts to.
And anything we get in this connection is money in the bank.
A, in the sense of defeating, of protecting Pakistan.
But even more importantly, it will teach the Indians that there are bigger games than
The Indians know they've got the Pakistanis where they've wanted them.
Sure.
So if we can stop an Indian onslaught on West Pakistan now, the Indians will consider that being thwarted.
You think so?
Oh, yeah.
Well, they're going to be thwarted in another way.
Now, I will not listen to any suggestions of that 80-meter story.
No matter what happens, Mr. President, that is what we have to be sure of.
That, I will not listen to.
Now, these bastards have asked for it.
They're not going to get it.
Now, I think we're going to have to play that game.
They chose Russia.
Now they go, let Russia take them.
That's what I...
Correct.
Absolutely.
What I would do with the Indians, Mr. President, is keep them in the deep freeze until after your election.
After you're elected, they'll come to you hand in hand.
No, no, but then...
I don't think Indian animosity can hurt you if there's no war.
I don't know which American likes Indians.
Except those intellectuals who are against you.
But they're against you anyway.
Well, then, at least get back up after this with me from here.
All right?
And, uh, all right.
Good luck.