Nixon & Kissinger on Indo-Pakistani War and Ceasefire negotiations

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Well, on that protest, I'm getting the papers together.

Didn't they protest?

Yes, it happened.

All right.

We're here.

That's our problem.

Our PR is lousy.

Well, to get a good PR, we would have had to decide, you know, how public we want to be.

I mean, it's a good example of what we were up against until yesterday afternoon.

Because...

They did protest.

No, they didn't.

It's too late now.

They protested.

They just didn't grasp or didn't want to grasp until yesterday afternoon.

Now today, I want to tell you what I've done tentatively, subject to your approval.

Let's go ahead.

They've got this East Pakistan.

They've got the offer of the commander of the Pakistan post in East Pakistan to get his father and so forth.

They were going to run to the Security Council.

and get that done.

We don't want to be in a position where we push the Pakistanis over the cliff.

So I told them to link the ceasefire in the east with the ceasefire in the west.

The ceasefire in the west is down the drain.

I mean, the east is down the drain.

The major problem now has to be to protect the west.

So I've told them that they should link any discussion of ceasefire in the East with ceasefire in the West.

And to use this to wrap the whole business up, I've got Vorontsov coming in at 11.30, and I'm going to tell him that what the Pakistanis did in the East was a result of what we did, which is true.

I'm going to show him that Kennedy, understanding, I'm going to hand him a very tough note to Brezhnev and say, this is it now.

Let's settle the...

let's get a ceasefire now.

That's the best that can be done now.

They'll lose half of their country, but at least they preserve the other half.

The East has gone.

What is the East?

Well, the East has, what the commander in the East has offered, it's a little bit confused.

He's asked the United Nations to arrange an immediate honorable repatriation of his forces.

In other words, turn over to civilian authority.

Right.

and that's in effect all, and a promise that the Indians would eventually withdraw too.

But that's going to happen anyway.

To participate in that is a nice humanitarian effort, but it does not solve the overwhelming problem of the war in the West.

Well, they understand it now, believe me.

See, the point is, our desire is to stay with Pakistan, that's all.

That's right.

That is exactly right.

All right.

Fine.

I want to say that, you know, we're still going to keep those carriers moving.

Everything is moving.

Four Jordanian planes have already moved to Pakistan.

Twenty-two more are coming.

We're talking to the Saudis.

The Turks, we've now found, are willing to give five.

So we're going to keep that moving until there's a settlement.

I wonder, actually, Mr. President, whether we shouldn't cancel the mora, saying the only trouble is, when will you be back?

You'll go straight from Camp David to the Air Force.

We ought to get it ordered before the weekend.

I just canceled the mora.

The only trouble is, then we can't do it before Wednesday.

I think we have too much on our plate today to... Well, this is more important at the moment.

That could be done.

That could be done, actually.

Let's think of the time for that.

Would it be useful to have it done right away?

No.

No, not at this point.

We've got a chance that the Congress is going to get out tomorrow, or maybe over on Tuesday, depending on the vote on the judge.

Next weekend.

Next what?

We shouldn't hit it there before next weekend.

Well, actually, if you meet with Mora and lay it on rent, that's time enough.

Oh, but you won't be here.

There.

Quincy.

I guess we'll be back in a day or so.

But aren't you going to keep it changed from the end?

Well, they've come right now.

We've got to wait out.

I'm able to keep the skin.

I mean, I decided to put a meeting to keep the skin.

This is easy.

You want to watch it?

Yeah.

Let me just fly it out and have a meeting.

Get it done.

Well, I didn't try to make the...

The purpose of the meeting, as I read the background here, is to look at the two clients.

And order one of them.

It'd actually be a little better if Layard were present.

Hey, Packard is a lame duck.

That's right.

All right, let's have a meeting on Wednesday.

And keep his tan.

Yes, of course.

Wherever I am.

Right, okay.

Wherever I am.

Good.

Yeah.

Wherever I am.

Right, and we'll just set it up that way.

That's the way to do it.

They'd come down.

You'd come down.

No problem on that.

No problem.

One day.

No problem at all.

And then we'd order from there.

But I lean to the stronger plan also.

But I want the Cambodian thing.

I don't think I've got a clear truth on that.

I want people to work through the Cambodian thing every day.

And what they're doing, God knows they're not following up there.

I can tell.

I can read these dispatches.

Well, actually, you can tell better than I can.

Well, I can tell.

You have an instinct for these things.

These people are up to it.

I want those done.

It does.

It's done.

Have you told more?

Yeah.

What do you say?

He said it'd be done.

Did he?

Yes.

What time are you going to see the Chinese?

5.30.

What are you going to tell them?

I'm going to tell them everything we did, and I'm going to tell them what forces we're moving in.

Could you say it would be very awful if they could move some forces or threaten to move some forces?

Absolutely.

They'd either threaten or they'd have to move one of the two.

You know what I mean?

We don't want to make a deal with the Russians.

The Chinese will piss off.

Absolutely.

Oh, God.

The Chinese at the present time are kicking the hell out of the Russians about this.

You know, and the Russians are kicking the Chinese out, and the Chinese are playing with the Pax.

This is a Russian-Chinese problem.

Mr. President, if we stay strong, even if it comes out badly, we'll have come out well with the Chinese, which is important.

How about getting the French to sell some planes to Pax?

Yeah.

They're already doing it.

All right.

Why not?

I mean, they need some supplies.

Why not the French?

The French, they sold anybody.

Yes, they are selling them now.

In fact, one question I wanted to ask you, which we might as well get some credit for.

The Israelis have come up with a deal, we didn't hear it from them, but from Somoza, by which the French would sell them their 50 Mirages that they owe them via Nicaragua.

and the Nicaraguans say, if we have no objection to it, they'll do it.

Why should we be objective?

I mean, it's something on which we can...

If they get a claim, why should we be objective?

That's my point.

I'm not sure if they get it from other sources.

Well, we might as well get some credit for it.

Get some credit for it.

The pressure the Russians have had.

Sure.

Fine.

Get some credit for it.

Let me say this in a French way.

Can you talk to the French?

I mean, we talk about the United States selling and furnishing arms to Pakistan.

How about getting the French to sell in some instance?

The question of sale is really important.

I can't see you right now, I'm sorry.

I'll let you in the city of Portland.

Well, I'll come in and let's get over with it.

Sure, sure.

If I'm asked whether or not the U.S. would recognize the thing like that, you want me to say that that was true?

No, I don't.

Could we have the category give a flat no?

Well, it is an hypothetical.

Has anybody recognized it?

We have no intention.

You see, that's it.

But we want to keep it.

We may have to eventually.

Just say no at this point.

We'll change our minds.

That's such a privilege.

Be sure to call Conley and tell him that I did approve the 25 million.

I talked to him last night, and he's already been notified.

He'll notify then?

Yeah.

So he'll get the credit for doing that.

Getting some credit is the heart of this conference.

I'm calling the Indonesian ambassador saying that it was a result of your letter, and Conley is going to get the letter from Suharto to you, and Conley is going to get credit.

on the working level with the finance minister saying he had... Conley was all over that, yes.

He told it to me.

I looked it up with Conley last night.

Now, with regard to your meeting with the French, it seems to me, just what I'm thinking of it, is that...

There's no reason for us to come to deal with the French simply to deliberately

to break it off totally in the British.

I think we can handle it all in a way that will, I'm sure the British would much prefer the way that we get there.

But I think what we do, what we have to do, and we've got to do this so it commonly does not get better, is to inform Cromer.

Look here, the Group of Ten meeting is coming up, and so we're going to do our best to do what we can to work out something with the French.

You get my point, right?

And then the French have a chance.

Let me explain.

On the 17th, I understand, on the 17th and 8th.

So, if we're going to make it, what we want to do is to cut the whole deal later.

If we can't get it out of the way, how will the radiation, that radiation is just at the right time to go.

We are not going to break it open, Mr. President.

Well, they have people that they'd rather have than them.

The second point is, I want them to get comfortable on the mountaintop and say, here is the chance for the President of France and the President of the United States to sit down and solve the whole international monetary thing before he meets with the British, before he meets with the Japanese.

France is the lead, but France has got to be reasonable.

I'm saying, Tom, if we don't do it here, we're going to do it later.

You understand?

Very well.

That's what he's got to get through.

He's hidden so that he isn't unreasonable.

That's why I don't want it done at the Arthur Burns level or at the Compton level or anything else.

It's got to be done at a high political level.

And actually, I was interested that Connolly thinks so too.

Connolly thinks so too, but Connolly knows it's political.

That's why he wants this done with the man.

That's why we're reading this report.

Now, coming back to the India-Pakistan thing, there's nothing else we can do.

Oh, I think they're going to crack it now.

Well, the Indians, the Indians will be warned of the Chinese, right?

Well, I'll have to find out.

You do your best.

This should have been done long ago.

The Chinese have not warned the Indians.

Oh, yeah.

They haven't warned them.

They're going to come in.

That's the point.

They've got to warn them.

Christian, all we have to do is move something.

Move there.

Move it in.

You know, most of the trucks fly as in planes.

You know, some say, well, we're not doing a goddamn thing.

You know that.

We're just moving things around, aren't we?

These aliens are cowards, right?

Right.

But with Russian backing, you see the Russians have sent notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries threatening them.

The Russians have played a miserable game.

Well, so do the same thing.

Exactly.

They're tracking them off.

They come in and what?

They'll do something.

They haven't said what they'll do.

But they'll settle now.

After your conversation with Martin Cambridge yesterday, they're going to settle.

What basis can they settle?

The ceasefire in the West, that's all.

That's why.

The ceasefire in the West.

And what will go on on East Pakistan?

What do we do about that?

Why don't you just say that?

No, we... Indian occupation or Bangladesh or what?

What we... Are we going to oppose Bangladesh's recognition?

What's our position?

Well, the best would be...

Does anybody know about these things?

Yes, yes.

The best, not the best, but the best would be...

That's right.

Well, we've had, after the freshman letter came yesterday, we sent a copy of it to Yahya.

We told him the pros and cons of accepting it.

And now Yahya has come back with a proposal saying ceasefire, negotiations for mutual withdrawal, and negotiations

to settle the political future of race.

And then what will happen on the Bangladesh, Mr. President, is that whatever West Pakistan and these people work out, we will accept.

But we will not be in the front.

If we can get a West Pakistan workshop with the negotiations,

on East Pakistan.

But India will not agree to negotiations on East Pakistan.

But the Russians have already agreed to it.

So what will happen, let's be realistic, what will happen is that the representatives of East Pakistan will demand independence.

And in practice, I think that that is what West Pakistan will then agree to.

But then it won't be us who've done it.

This will solve the problem of, to be recognized, Bangladesh against the leaders of the Pakistan government.

We must never recommend Bangladesh.

That's why the no-hatchers are the right thing.

Until West Pakistan.

But that's the process.

Go ahead.

Go to home.

Do it now.

I want a program to aid West Pakistan, formulate it immediately.

Some sort of a program, you know, after they're there, we cannot let them hang out there by themselves.

I don't think we can do much from a military standpoint, but let's find a way to let others do it.

That's my suggestion from the French.

I want you to talk to the French.

Cold turkey.

We'd like to find a way to help work with the French, can't we?

And get any arms in there.

I'll do my best.

Do you think there's anything else?

No, I don't think we can get, frankly, I don't think we can get through Congress arms sales to West Pakistan.

That's what I mean.

Do you?

No.

All right.

Then what was our answer?

Give them a hell of a lot of economic assistance, correct?

I didn't let them convert it into purchase.

You didn't let them convert it into... Well, that's their... We don't ask the Indians.

We've given the Indians all this economic assistance.

We didn't ask any questions when they made a treaty with the Russians and bought Russian arms.

Have we raised any questions about that?

With the point you made yesterday, we have to continue to switch the Indians, even when this thing is settled.

They can't get these $84 million down the drain.

That's right.

That's gone.

And it's something that already spent $25 million.

Take another $25 million and give it to the PACs.

They've got to for their rehabilitation.

I mean, Jesus Christ, say, Mom, I want all of the war damage.

And that, you know, I want to help to extend that war damage in Karachi and other areas.

See, the reason I'm getting for once of them, Mr. President, at 1130,

I'm going to put before him, I'm going to show him that Kennedy is... Yeah, and say this is what the president is talking about.

Yeah.

No, you can't say no.

This is just... No, we didn't want to offend you.

And we just want to say we're not... Don't...

It ain't that hard for them to say that the president is...

Because, as you know, you must never misjudge this man.

He doesn't come on the table and he doesn't shout.

But when he talks the way he does, I was watching him for three years.

This is the way he means it.

It's just cold, cold.

I put it that way.

I think he got the impression.

Mr. President, I don't know.

This was, if this thing comes out, between you and me, we know that West Pakistan is lost.

If you can save West Pakistan, it will be an unbelievable achievement because West Pakistan has had all its oil supplies destroyed.

They've had no spare parts from us for months.

their army is ground down, and two more weeks of war, and they're finished in the West as much as they are in the East.

So if we can save West Pakistan, it would still be a defeat, but we will have done it.

And the Chinese will know that, and the Russians will know it.

And the Indians will not be happy with it.

I wanted...

I want the Indians, I want also, with this kind of escalation, use it more.

I want a public relations program developed to piss on the Indians.

I mean, that atrocity of the orphanage, for example, I want to piss on them for their responsibility.

We've got to wipe paper out.

We've got to wipe paper, wipe paper, understand?

I don't mean just your grief, but wipe out on us everything that we've done.

I want the Indians blamed for this.

Now that we can't let these goddamn sanctimonious Indians get away with this, they fished on us in Vietnam for five years.

And what do we do?

Here they are, raping and murdering.

They talk about West Texas.

These Indians are pretty vicious when they're in there, aren't they?

Absolutely.

Aren't they killing a lot of these people?

We don't know the facts yet, but I'm sure they're not as stupid as the West, as the Pakistanis.

They don't let the president

idiot Pax had to press all over their place.

Well, the Indians did.

Oh, yes, they brought them in and had pictures of their tanks and all the rest.

Great, great.

Yeah, but they don't let them in where the civilians are.

Well, I know, but they let them in to take a good shot, sir.

The poor men at Pax don't let them in at all.

Yeah, or into the wrong places.

Yeah.

Pax just don't have the subtlety of the Indians.

No, they don't.

They don't lie.

The Indians lie.

Correct.

Right.

Well, he said, how did you even suspect it?

And what gave you this idea?

Oh, that's what you expected him to say.

Oh, yeah.

Nixon & Kissinger on Indo-Pakistani War and Ceasefire negotiations

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Also recorded on December 10, 1971

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Nixon & Kissinger on Indo-Pakistani War and Ceasefire negotiations

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on December 10, 1971

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Cite this conversation