Conversation 637-003

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Uh, no, uh...

Uh...

There hasn't been any...

There hasn't really been anything of any significance, uh... because of all these channels that we had to keep going, uh... uh, due to the, uh...

bureaucratic situation we face, there's of course by now the goddamn discommunication and confusion in the messages because they forget what they put in one channel and what they put in the other.

And so so on the one hand

As you know, on Friday, someone at our pressure had agreed, in effect, to accept the president's proposal, but then furthermore, he decided not to, and the Chinese carried on.

I think, frankly, in that case, rather than accept the president's proposal, we'd be just as well off letting Major take its course and let them get a trade.

If they want to accept it, yes, but I think we should stay off it then.

I think if we can, a simple ceasefire is really the best we can, at this moment, get out of it.

I think if this thing emerges, with the United States joining with the Soviet Union in a proposal that we did approve, then it was made three days after it was made, just because of the military defeat.

suffered a very severe setback.

Oh, yeah?

No, no, I...

I was the one who... who pressed it, in fact.

You were the reason.

What you said to the agriculture minister and to what we said to his...

Here we go.

Well, the departments are not very useful.

We've got to use them where we can.

But what I meant is within the White House.

That is, when we can get the department to take off, to carry the hot on something, they want to carry it.

That's for damn sure.

And they ought to do more.

But I meant in the PR side of getting across to well-known.

It's an awfully weak read to say, well, if you put this stuff in a bush, you can use a bush, for example.

Sometimes the department will do very well, as we know.

But I think that here at the White House,

and so forth, and how our point of view is.

Now, the Indians have been just a little bit, they need wires and so forth, but their view is that we're making us look bad.

Now, the report on Giscardi's cabin meeting where she said, she said deliberately that she was going to try to conquer West Pakistan and move their forces to the east of the West.

She cut out the report, for example, regarding the Soviet man of the naval vessels knocked off the Pakistan submarine.

She should have gotten help.

Hey, the hostess says it's very...

Very interesting.

There was so much social recognition.

There hasn't been any call.

I see.

That should get out.

You can't do it, Henry.

You just are talking about it.

Roland Evans has a column today, the giant effect gave him, but still it's, you're right, there's not enough.

It shouldn't have to be.

Well, I think here you've just got to get to the scale of our case.

Call him in.

He likes the talk.

Just tell him.

and let him go over the place.

He's a one-shot source.

I want that out.

I don't think that's the most important part of the game, but it does affect things for reasons that we're aware.

It's rather interesting to note that Mrs. Gundy says that, speaking to any youth group, that they have not rejected

the U.N. General Assembly thing.

You probably didn't see that.

It was in that one of the summaries.

She says, she says, yes, we did not reject the U.N. General Assembly vote.

We have a very serious consideration.

Now, why did she say that?

She said it for obvious reasons, that she thought that there was some world opinion building against her.

Now, where we had gotten that vote to not build that world opinion against the Indians.

You see what I mean?

That's right.

She says she can't go ahead and get away with that.

So I'd like to see this little presence get out.

You know what I've had last night?

Put a paper together.

How much is it for?

For how much?

The word of anything that's on you, like the Indians, it's got to get out.

The fact that they've been condemned and the fact that they have rejected your report.

I refuse to put together what the Soviets received, what this communist world sent to India in the last six years, 739 medium tanks, 176 light tanks, 329

Yeah, if you don't put it out to be reviewed, sorry.

It's not that big of a deal.

You just have to put it out to the whole press corps.

Yeah, that's the way to do it.

Somehow you've got to get it out.

You see, we're...

I mean, this will be on others as well.

The reason is we're not really using people.

We're not bringing them in and telling them enough about them.

So I would bring them in.

It's a very good thing to get out.

It must be more than a column that's got to... Well, now we have Yaya's completed concurrence to our game plan, which is to drop the political track, to go in with a... Yeah, ceasefire.

First to go in with ceasefire and withdraw...

I called Bhutto yesterday evening after we talked just for the record, and I said, I don't want to hear one more word from the Chinese.

We are the ones who've been operating against our public opinion, against our bureaucracy, at the very edge of legality.

And if they want to talk, they should move some troops.

And until they've done something, we don't want to hear one more word.

I'd really like to have...

We go, they don't learn damn, damn like all this.

Henry, you're so right about the Chinese and the Soviet.

Each, for reasons that transcend India and Pakistan, have to have their meetings with us.

You know that.

That's their job.

They have problems.

Now, that doesn't mean that you can just thumb our noses at them all the time.

Actually, strangely enough, I think the Chinese is more precarious than the Soviet because

For the Chinese, I mean, these idiots who say they're doing things to... Brayton has an article today blasting you and me.

Of course, they got the bureaucracy.

It's like Cambodia came nicely out of it again.

Blasting you and me that we are sacrificing India so that you can take a China trip.

The trip as such is a symbol of a policy.

If the Chinese feel they're nice people, well-meaning, but totally irrelevant to their part of the world, they lose whatever's life, whatever incentives they have for that opening to us.

The opening to us gets the Soviets under control.

This is the... Well, they're lying about sacrificing the church.

That's been being...

I saw Roy Jenkins last night, and he mumbled something like this.

I said...

India put itself on the Soviet side.

We didn't drive it.

He's a good man.

He said, after he talked to me, he said, we made one grave mistake, and that was not to put it out three weeks earlier.

He said he completely sees the point now.

And he's an honest guy because he opposed his own party on the common market.

I'm not concerned about rape and arrest and all that kind of stuff.

Who's responsible for jeopardizing and changing things?

What matters there is the fact that it's not God that is serious.

It doesn't make any difference what they all said about it.

I don't worry.

Those baskets are going to do that.

No, I take it that since it's a very juvenile kind of, you know, you're smashed by being waited because they don't like the idea of the trip.

We know that.

Braden has no brain.

Yeah, but he's taking that from somebody else.

Exactly.

That's why it's significant.

That's the only significance it has.

The question is whether or not I should call in because I think we've got to start planning on it.

that are more effective in getting the Indian ambassador this morning.

Now, before knocking on such a tough ploy and calling in and saying, well, Peter, we've been very understanding here.

We know you've been interested in your rather savage press campaign.

And I have no objections to that.

I understand you've got a place.

Let's get one thing very clear.

Now that the East Pakistan thing is somewhat resisted, we're actually resolved.

If we're going to make certain diplomatic moves, I'm not going to tell you what they are, but if this Indian action against the West continues against the overwhelming weight of the world public opinion, then I

We all have to make a public statement, legally, in India, as a sea, as a nation, as a nation aggressive.

Now, that's one way.

Another way to do it is to just do it.

Do it right now.

You see, the thing that I feel is that the Indians are susceptible to this rule of law detention crap.

They're susceptible to it because they have lived on it for so long.

And the guns have not used here.

And the reason is very, very little, very, very little.

And then you can say maybe Rolly Evans has got it.

But as far as the general news is concerned, there's been damn little pointing out in India

either had Soviet support or is continuing this operation far beyond the reason they say brought them in in the first place, that they are now continuing with that first.

And it is this.

There's been hardly anything, believe me, in the press for the effect that the vote in the UN was one that any of them defied.

And that's our fault, haven't we?

We haven't gotten it across.

That's my point.

Now, the point is that we've got to try to get it across.

It's got to be said.

It's got to be said top and bottom.

I mean, you have a background, and that's a little bit... Well, it's sort of the opposite from the way that you have been.

Well, the post, that was just a deliberate lie, but... That's what's right here.

I know.

Nobody else played it that way.

Every other leading paper in the country had it on its front page with it, I think.

But the fact is...

do this sort of operation.

We can talk all about the past.

No, no, I mean...

Right now, we've got to go to...

But it should have been pumped out day in and day out from every spokesman in the government.

It should have been.

It should have been, but we know we have a problem, and we know that for a long time.

But right now, rather than... We have to do the very best we can.

Now, picking up the pieces and doing the best we can from the question in...

What do we do to get out of this?

No, I am a little reluctant to shoot the big gun.

I mean, to have you call in here and have them kick you in, to have him kick you, to have, give that bitch the satisfaction.

If we had the assets, say, Mr. President, if this were the...

If this were the serious situation of 57... Oh, 70...

I'd be in favor of brutalizing the son of a bitch.

But why let him go around and say that he looked you in the eye and, you know, this is the problem?

What I'm trying to get at is this, that the...

It's my intention to make the public sure that the label is an idiot.

Now, if the fight is, will it do any good?

But it might serve the purpose of letting them know in advance

You see, we got to get across the fact that your conversation with Blue and the Chinese was correct in one sense, where they said we started out strong and then got the impression that we'll play with both your houses.

which, of course, is unfortunate.

But it is a link to an extent, because Pakistan mishandled the refugee situation in the beginning.

It is a plague in both your houses.

But that's true of only East Pakistan.

It is crystal clear that if the military action continues after East Pakistan is ramped up, that that is naked aggression.

Now, that needs to be said.

It doesn't need to be said with a lot of gobbledygook.

Now, uh, now, uh, we, uh...

The Indian foreign minister has refused to give an assurance that they don't have any territorial, uh... Ambitions.

Ambitions.

He said minor rectifications.

That means us up Kashmir.

Yeah.

All that you suggested this morning is that we just wait and see what we hear from the Soviets.

No, my recommendation is... You already talked to Barranzov last night.

You're going to let him know, isn't it?

No, I called Barranzov last night and said that if we don't hear from them this morning, we will go back to the Security Council.

And I have two suggestions of what you might do this morning.

Yes, sir.

Uh...

issue a press statement from the White House, we'll have to change it because this is...

The general tone is that in view of India's refusal to accept the terms of the General Assembly resolution passed by the overwhelming majority of 104 to 10, calling for an immediate ceasefire to withdraw the armed forces, the United States has now decided again to take this grave issue to the Security Council.

I'm meeting them at 11.

Well, I'll check it earlier.

Then we would say having occupied all of East Pakistan.

Virtually all.

Not yet, but that's...

Virtually all of East Pakistan, India's continued military action by India can only be viewed as an armed attack on Pakistan as a whole and increasingly takes on the character... ...defies, at least defendants should defy the overwhelming weight, should continue to defy

the overwhelming weight of world opinion, as expressed by a lengthy body of work in the UN General Assembly.

I mean, have you had that sentence?

Yes.

India's continued advice after the Biden administration,

that India will stand before the whole world as a naked aggression.

I think you've got to get the naked aggression in there.

But it's got to be getting in there hard and tough.

I put it this way.

Look, we're taking just as much heat, just as much heat for using soft words as we did a few years earlier.

Everybody says we're kicking the goddamn Indians around, right?

Absolutely not.

Now, it is a digression crime.

If they defy, that's the point.

Put it on the basis there.

See, then you're getting across two points that the General Assembly has overwhelmingly, overwhelmingly voted to ask for, I put it this way, you don't have another thing in there, which sounds like it was written by some state department law, for example.

I would have a sentence.

The General Assembly on blank, by a vote of blank, on the Security Council, by a vote of 11 to 2, called on ceasefire and withdrawal.

That's not binding.

I know nothing is binding.

The General Assembly, by a vote of blank to blank, called on so-and-so.

Pakistan has accepted...

India has refused.

That's it.

Now, Pakistan has accepted.

India has refused.

India is supportive of the Soviet Union.

Now, that was the next question I wanted to put to you.

India is supportive of the Soviet Union and refused.

We are going to...

Supported only by the Soviet Union.

Only by the Soviet Union.

Supported by the Soviet Union.

We say in other communist countries, we use the word communist for a change.

And, well, that grows to Chinese and Romanians are unsupportive of it.

But actually, supportive of the Soviet Union, that's not now.

Them saying that, yes, that we're going to take it.

Yes, after he, now that he's back in San Francisco, we, they, India continues to defy.

the overwhelming weight of the World Convention and expressed by the vote of the General Assembly.

You see, as reflected by the vote of the General Assembly, India will stand before the world as an aggressor.

See, now that is really what we need to say.

This is contrary to every tradition for which India has served since its birth as a nation.

And we call upon the government of India to join with the government in Pakistan.

and having, and, and, uh, following the, you know, and, and, uh, adhering to the, uh, overwhelming, uh, expression of world vision to have a ceasefire.

See what I mean?

Or something like that.

That's the kind of language that he did in his thing, to get us to that point across.

Yeah, absolutely.

Let me do this immediately.

Well, we're going to

You see what I'm getting at?

No, I know exactly what you're getting at.

And you're quite right.

I asked somebody to draft it last time.

It isn't bad.

It isn't good.

But it doesn't, it isn't that bad.

What I mean is, it's what you would expect them to draft and do of what we've been saying about everything else.

I thought you had a decent, your background was excellent.

And I just thought you taught that to them when I met with those leaders that morning.

You know, some of you got the impression of those leaders that you were having a hand on.

You know, when I met with the leaders this morning, I was saying, we're going to cut off aid in India.

I didn't know when you were there, the leaders, but I said, we're going to cut off aid in India.

I said, no, we've already cut off aid in India.

Do you have any objections?

They said, hell no.

But anyway, what I'm getting at is, not having said all this, what purpose does this serve?

Should we put out some kind of labeling idea?

The purpose I see that it serves is to put the, well, it deserves to be.

One, it's hollowed out by Chinese friends.

Second, it puts a little bit of heat on the Russians.

Third, it puts some heat on God and man.

it helps us with our own domestic situation here at home.

Only to the extent that we're taking a meeting.

I'm not concerned about it.

I'm just getting through to people that the status

This is getting to the people for the wrong reason.

People don't give a shit whether we are to blame, not to blame, because they don't care if the whole continent of things goes down the cesspool.

That's too bad.

But nevertheless, it is a hurry, so I can assure you, buddy, when you think, well, this is a great pull for our foreign policy, bull does not climb in our people.

It is in substance, but not in propaganda.

Propaganda is important for the four reasons I've just given you today.

And, uh, we've got to start, start him from now on.

What, another thing you can do, which is just a little...

So he won't call us.

We'll have to think about that.

Put him out.

Then he had to write a statement.

All right.

Clear the statement with him and have him think about it.

Is that what you have in mind?

Uh, or to have Ryker start to put it out.

Uh, let's start with this thing.

What's that?

We won't.

I wouldn't mind having Rogers put it out there.

It drives out heart attack.

It has more punch if you put it, if it puts out a little more.

But the advantage of Rogers is they are sticking it all on you.

In fact, they're even, they're sort of oscillating whether to get me involved or keep me out.

I mean, they're either saying, there are two lines of argument being made.

One is that you love Yaya Khan,

And that is the personal peek at Mrs. Candy.

The other one is that you and I were plotting this in order to preserve the China trip.

Those two are going to merge because I've put myself so much, of course, on your side.

I mean, it's ridiculous.

They may not have been touching you with this thing.

No, because, by God, the country doesn't give a shit.

That's the point.

That's what they forget.

They care.

But the country doesn't care about it, Henry.

That is good.

All right, what do you have in mind?

Well, you could put something on the hotline depression.

All right, let's start with the hotline.

What about the hotline depression?

What about the race?

I think the race...

I would say we do a hotline to Brezhnev, which I would like to work on a little more, in which we say we are now going back to the Security Council.

We hope to do it jointly with you.

There is still time to do it jointly, because this may become public, and that should sound conciliatory.

So it should have a few hookers in there.

Well, I would say, if I could, yes, I would say, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, we have not had a response from MSSU and so and so.

I am sending you this message under urgent conditions.

Uh, the, uh, that, uh, we, uh, we are going to take it to the general, uh, you know, to the Security Council again.

Uh, if you should determine, again, to veto it, then, uh, we, uh, we urge you on whatever you want to do then.

See what I mean?

Did I put it that way?

Right?

Got it.

I wouldn't say we are ready to go for C-5, because if they publish that, we'd say we are willing to proceed along the course.

Outline, do you?

We're willing to proceed.

That's very good.

That's great.

Of course, outline.

But we can see here.

Now, what does this mean, going to outline?

They appear to be so anxious that maybe they're not ready to accept it.

And they say, ah, we won't do it.

No.

Well, to be convinced they didn't know that.

To be convinced they didn't know that.

Now, with the British, Mr. President, I think I should talk to Cromer rather than you talk to Heath, and I should get Cromer in and say, now, listen.

I'll do it this morning.

Yes.

You're blowing the whole bloody relationship.

We're going back to the Security Council.

That's right.

And we just... And have I got to say what?

That we...

The President wants to have some really, really, really good talks, and I love these kind of conversations.

I love it.

Mr. Premier, you and the President recall that he's on a mission, and now he's doing a great one, talking about their concern about Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

I said, now you will notice the great Soviet presence in India here.

The kids are now back.

If we continue to let this thing...

Great.

It will be an enormous Soviet presence in the South, and sometimes it is known to the Soviet.

Now, if you want to play that game, or if you want to join together and try to keep that, you know, that play, in other words, the idea that we're, we're really, there's a history that may have been expressed in the Soviet Union.

Oh, yeah, the Soviet Union.

And he said, I'll tell him, from me, I just want to tell you about it.

I said, what are the terms?

He said, look, you know, frankly, when I play there, he says, the president wants to work with Britain and Asia.

We've set borders on Singapore.

We support them in the Indian Ocean.

But right now, the whole goddamn house of cards is going to come to a down unless we save what is left of Pakistan.

The only way we can do it is for us to join together at this point and stop the Dutch.

I think Cromer would hear that.

I wanted to get his message out there.

And then I'll come right back.

Yeah.

Now, let me, let's go over again what we're doing and the messages on it.

Sure.

The thing is, we didn't start to say to go back to the Security Council.

And to do it with a ceasefire and withdrawal, and to implement a federal assembly system.

Get it resold if necessary.

Right.

Then be prepared to get the Pakistanis to move to us for a simple ceasefire.

Fine.

That won't happen till tomorrow, but we've got that all lined up.

Oh, ladies and gentlemen, we won't be today.

No, no, it will take two today, probably.

Ten people get the cease.

We have about a week before this thing plays out because they captured their army that fast.

We're going to pack the lines for two weeks, sir.

Two weeks, sir.

Then we try to get the C5 resolution through as it makes sense.

All right, I got all that.

Now, what about... What we do is a public statement.

It's first a public statement along the lines you indicated.

Now, what is the purpose of the public statement?

I'm thinking of the four purposes I mentioned.

Do you think we're all a public statement, or am I talking to a public statement here?

I thought I talked you into a public statement.

No, I didn't.

No, I... We have to do a public statement.

We have to do a public statement.

to entrench the Russians, to scare the Indians, to take a position with the Chinese, mostly with the Chinese.

That's all right.

Yes, that's number one.

That's right.

What they said to me, what they said to Buddha.

I don't think we need it.

And, and,

And then, and to clear up American politics.

And to clear up American politics.

Well, at least taking the peace we are taking on American politics.

And we take it for a good reason.

We won't take it for a good reason.

Let's send our opponents out of India at this time.

People want war.

They don't like it.

So you believe the public statement is in order.

Now you're going to try to get rockers to make a statement.

Is it worth trying to get rockers to make a statement?

It isn't worth it because you're trying to water it down too much.

By the time they get to it, you're playing it.

I mean, we're in a Camp Odia situation.

We've got to go through the goddamn thing on our own.

With whatever, we're keeping the admit fixed to a minimum and take care of the basic situation.

I agree.

You call Cromer.

I'll call Cromer in.

I have other reasons.

Even the British saying, oh, we're talking to the British about things that are...

Very, very important.

Well, I'm just going to tell him.

This is a chance for the U.S. and America and England to get a friendship and go along.

We're going to raise it with them.

But we want to raise the problem with you first.

That's the thing.

We've got a very clear language.

Right.

I've just put it to him very hard.

And if I did it very, do it very hard, it has to end in advance.

Then they seek it out.

Yeah.

All we're doing is to reiterate what I said to the Agriculture Minister when you said that we're on top.

Right?

Is that Tom?

bold if you're pushing yourself into the pot again.

But my view is, if we do nothing, there's a certainty of a disaster.

This way there's a high possibility of one.

But at least we're coming out like man.

And that helps us with the China.

And if it goes down to now, we will have done the best we can.

If we can go down the tube, because we can't get anyone to support us.

But tomorrow, please, we'll be in the Indian Ocean.

And, uh... You see all those Russian tanks and the Russian ships and all the rest lining up with the Indians and not one liberal newspaper man.

And this is of these liberals, 500 million people.

We are to blame for driving 500 million people.

Why are we to blame?

Because we're not letting 500 million people rape 100 million people.

That's the way to keep...

Isn't everybody worried about Danzig and Czechoslovakia and all those little places because...

If South Africa gobbled up, but Sudoland, as we said, well, they have everything in South Africa.

We're on the wrong side, that's right.

Go ahead, Henry.

I've got some ideas on Vietnam.

I've got some scores down.

Take confidence.

One point on Vietnam.

And there's no appeal from this.

I was shocked by that Porter was dancing around.

I know because we did not get any better instructions with regard to this postponement of the meeting and where they, he allowed the other side to say that we were sabotaging the meeting.

Now, the instruction is there is to be no meeting for two weeks.

Thank you.

Well, let's be quite honest with ourselves here with regard to the Russian thing, with regard to this.

You know, there is a difference of view on this, and I may be wrong.

I don't think there's ever any serious intention.

Except for what we did last summer.

I doubt it.

But nevertheless, if there was a four-week period, there was, but you can go nowhere to care.

I have no regrets that we have.

It was necessary to make a record and so forth, so we made a record.

But at this point, as far as those talks are concerned, it's ten to them and one for us.

The illusion that they're talking peace at this point is ridiculous.

Or they haven't.

They have sabotaged.

They haven't sabotaged.

They have sabotaged.

Now,

Of course, I've got to put the boy's name to the best of my word on the plan, because I think he's got to move a lot sooner with regard to calling Porter back.

The plan, of course, that we presently have is to go, is to make our public statement shortly after the first of the year.

uh you know our our six months withdrawal whatever the hell we're going to do and it will be that there isn't going to be any more than running over to paris waiting two more months and we've done that enough they're not going to hear from them and so not hearing them that means that we have no choice having told them that we make another two months now this is january we're the weakest that's the whole problem we got here no the two months

No, I think that the advantage of two months in January was not a sign of weakness, but a sign of strength.

They expected a total announcement.

They know they're not negotiating.

They know that we don't expect...

As you remember, our original plan was to go the whole thing then in January, and there's a lot to be said.

The advantage of two months is to get you over the China trip while keeping the things so fast up.

We made it.

My point is, my point is, whatever the situation is, January, quarter's coming home.

cannot continue to be over there with extra.

That is just not making any sense.

That argument has not continued for three years, and we are the ones responsible here.

We didn't call the bombing hall.

They were originally responsible.

But starting January of 69, first with Lodge and Walsh, and then with the rural roads and the rest, we have been silenced.

We don't, we claim to them, and those talks have been nothing, but nothing, believe me.

They haven't helped us a bit in this country.

The talks are harassing this country.

Very bad.

I've told this, and I've found 80% of the people that the talks have been, from our standpoint, I definitely wouldn't be getting it.

80% of the American people.

What I would recommend is to call for a vote.

I would consider very seriously

putting the full record out in January, calling Porter home, and making a two-month announcement.

And that's just to keep the opposition off balance.

The two months is fine.

What I meant is we cannot put it off two months on the basis that we're going to wait on it on the ground floor.

That's the point.

I do it for two months.

If we don't go to the first negotiation, why are we just waiting two months?

Why are we doing two months?

So that we can gauge it.

In terms of the infiltration and the other things.

That's right.

And then right after the China trip, when you're riding out on a lot of other things, I do the rest of it.

Because otherwise... And then after the China trip, though, we just do the rest of it.

And then we do have to do it.

in some way where we got the POW thing in there.

That's when we have to do that.

And you understand, you cannot, that's the clinker in this whole plan.

The clinker in this plan is that down the road, you've still got those POW things.

And I don't think there's no problem there.

At that point, when you're down to, you will be down to 70,000 at that point in the winter.

Yeah.

So 70,000?

You say, well, we'll keep 40,000 here until we get the P.O.W.

discouragement.

That would change the plan.

Yes.

All right, we'll get a plan.

But get your order back.

It is the same.

I agree.

You've got to stop those goddamn fires.

I strongly in favor of that.

Fair to say.

Now, how about sooner than the finish terms?

Order of the house, sir.

No, I'd do it the first week of January.

All right.

For the first 10 days.

Now, that brings me to the second part of the equation.

It may be that we should not validate it.

Your concern is the Chinese, as I understand it.

I don't believe that that is a, if the Chinese respect China,

After all, that is strength.

And I'm inclined to think that if they want to see the anti-U, if they seem to do any place, anywhere, it's like the C-121 and its relationship to the rest.

It makes me think that we're better off to get on a credit basis to get those people to work and get them to band up right now.

Do you understand?

I would wait until while we are screaming at the U.N. about world opinion.

I wouldn't get it confused.

These five days don't make any difference.

All right.

What is your concern about the...

I am concerned about the effect on the Chinese and the Russians and the Indians.

Now, if the Russians and the Chinese and the Indians have a depression, the demand in the White House is tough.

That's the only hope we've got.

You see, we're not drawing enough toughness into the equation.

We look soft every place in the world.

And so my idea is one way we can look somewhat tough in a collateral area is to get that.

See, that's been my argument on the bomb anyway.

I agree.

And for that, I think you do it right now.

When maybe the Chinese are moving, it will give the Russians a ploy, I think,

I'll do it after this U.N. thing is played out.

If you give the order on Wednesday, we can get it done by Friday.

You're talking about getting it done by Friday?

Yeah.

I've got more news for you here.

Oh.

The Chinese want to meet on an urgent basis.

Meet who?

Because I can't be in New York.

I don't belong to New York.

Oh.

That's the New York Chinese.

That's totally unprecedented.

Indeed.

They're going to move.

No question.

They're going to move.

I have that impression.

The NFL.

To them, the Indians going to the storehouse.

Well, this might have changed our plans.

No, it hasn't changed our plans at all.

Maybe he makes the murders with the hotline thing on.

You'd better go down there.

Or go to New York?

Yeah.

The reason I sent it to you is that you had told Henry that you'd be out of town.

You could see Hayes after he had sent the message.

Right.

I understand what I mean.

It's why they said he wants to see Al rather than you.

Because they said in view of my departure, Lungba wants to meet Hank.

I told him I'm leaving.

All right, fine.

Get out of there.

Well, this afternoon.

We'll be waiting until noon.

I think we ought to trigger this anyway.

This gives them more stars.

What we discussed at press release.

I see.

Hey Peter, how do you read into this and each of them?

What else do you see?

No question.

No, I think you might guarantee that they'll secure the Soviet.

Well, we've got to guarantee that.

We may not be able to do it, but we've got to guarantee it.

If they lie to us, we lie to them.

Well, but we have to think that through.

If the Soviets move against them, then we don't do anything.

We'll be finished.

So what do we do if the Soviets

if the Soviets move against them in these conditions and succeed that will be the final showdown we have to if and if they succeed we'll be finished we'll be through

because no one will then believe it.

Then we'd better call them off.

I think we can't call them off, frankly.

If we call them off, I think our China energy deficit is pretty well down the drain.

But if we let them... And also our struggle with the Russians is very, very seriously jeopardized.

If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese, and if the Indians get away with looking to touch the skies, I mean, what we are now having is this final... We may be looking right on the gun back.

I think the Soviets will back off if we face them.

Well, that's the point.

The reason that I am suggesting that the Chinese move is that they're talking about the Soviet division and border and all that sort of thing.

The Soviets at this point are about to

We've got to trigger this quickly so that we are positioned and not in the tail of the Chinese.

Otherwise, we have no moral basis whatsoever for supporting the Chinese.

Basically, Budo asked the Chinese to move to here.

They're not doing it because of us.

That's what I mean.

I guess, let me just get that straight right away.

Well, who's, why are the Chinese moving?

The Chinese, the Chinese, well, we asked, but that's not the reason they're doing it.

Oh, wait, the way you put it, the way you put it, is, uh, very clear, you said, look, where are you going?

Why don't you track, as a matter of fact, track and move a couple of people?

Well, and I said, if you, and I said, if you, and I said, I said, I said, I said, you'll be, and I said, we will, uh,

We will do what, we will prevent pressures on you or we will pressure other countries.

Now, but it's immaterial who made them do it.

We didn't make them do it.

They are acting for the same reason they jumped out when we approached the Chinese border in Korea.

It's exactly, to them it's exactly the same situation.

But leaving aside now whether we made them do it or not, we did not make them do it.

My

feeling would be the same, Mr. President, if I had not talked to them on Friday.

They don't move that fast.

This has been... Oh, yeah.

This has been building up.

My feeling is, Mr. President, leaving completely aside what we said, if the outcome of this is that Pakistan is swallowed by India, China is destroyed, defeated, humiliated by the Soviet Union, it will be a

change in the real balance of power of such magnitude that the security of the United States for maybe forever, certainly for decades, we will have a guarantee for in the Middle East.

We will have... Now we can really get in on the change.

What do you have?

You've got the Soviet Union.

uh, with, uh, with, uh, 200 million Chinese, 600 million Indians.

The balance of Southeast Asia terrorized Japanese and Moab.

Uh, the Europeans, of course, were stuck out in the United States.

You know, we've had, we've had many parts of Latin America, and, uh, who knows?

Right now, isn't that the story?

This is why, Mr. President, uh, you'll be alone.

And we'll... No, no.

We've been alone before.

The point is, we...

I saw... You remember we sat around here, and we talked about the... We read those... And college programs...

The Chinese...

But what I...

But what we might... Mr. President, I shouldn't stay here.

And...

and uh and skip the azure but uh given what's coming up it wouldn't be better for me to stay here right what do you think well

I think that communications are so good.

I bet I would make the decision.

Yeah, I bet I would.

And I was totally getting what we were doing on this.

There's something else that is important.

Just as well, for us not to appear in such an urgent crisis and all that sort of thing.

There's all kinds of factors that when something occurs, you can't be watching it, but I can.

That isn't going to work either.

You see my point?

Al was present at the other meeting.

You better, you call them back.

Set it for about four o'clock.

Well, it shouldn't be after these last hour and a half here while we're doing this.

We've got to get this triggered quickly so that we are positioned.

I mean, this leaves no doubt about what we've got to do.

Right.

Now, let's come back to this gentleman who said they want to see Donald Trump in that movie.

That's what I think.

What they want, what they want to weigh their assurances against, they maybe want something more direct.

The point is, part of the matter is, when I put it in the bar,

In terms of reserves, when I say that the Chinese move is Soviet-friendly, and we start lobbying nuclear weapons, that isn't what happens.

That isn't what happens.

What happens is that we then do have a hotline for the Soviets, and we finally just say now what goes in.

We don't have to lob nuclear weapons.

We have to go on alert.

That's right.

We have to put forces in.

We may have to give them bombing assistance.

We clean up Vietnam.

I mean, at that point, we give an ultimatum to Hanoi.

Blockade Haiphong.

We'll blockade Haiphong.

Now, that will hurt China, too, but we can't worry about that at that point.

But above all, we have to give the Chinese a sense that if they don't threaten them, we cannot, at the first thing, then move against Taiwan, because that would then say the U.S. and China.

I mean, we'll pick up North Vietnam in the process of that.

I mean, North Vietnam will be finished then.

If Russia and China are at war, we can figure out that any problem... We're talking about a lot of gifts.

Russia and China are going to go to war.

I wouldn't add on that, Mr. President.

Well, let me put it this way.

I have always thought that India and Pakistan inevitably would have a war.

And there can always be a war in the Middle East, as far as Russia and China is concerned.

Well, Mr. President, the Russians are not rational on China.

Secondly, if they can get a pretext to wipe out China, then your trip and everything else is an incident.

Your trip in their mind was an incident on the road.

Your trip to them was an incident on the road where they would isolate China and could then turn against China in 73, 74.

Now that was fine with us because it pushed China over on our side.

And we could play, but if they hear our... What are you trying to suggest here?

Are you trying to get the party to think that you're trying to tell the Chinese that we won't back them?

No, I think we have to tell them we will back them.

What do you think, Al?

You think we should tell them that we won't back them?

That's discouraging.

I think they made clear in the PAC chest today three things.

One is they said the Soviets have calmed.

The United States took the Soviets down recently in Cuba and in the Middle East.

Based on that, it's beautiful.

No, they said that's what they took put on.

The Chinese respect you.

How the hell do they know we stood them down in Cuba, for example?

You must have told them that.

Well, I want to know about San Fierro's.

Yeah, I told them that, but... How about the Middle East?

How do they know we stood them down?

Well, because they see what happens.

They are tough customers.

When all their horses are said and done, they know that Syrian tanks pull back unconditionally.

That's right.

Well, that's the assumption you're moving on.

So they feel that if the United States moves on with the Soviets, that will provide the cover of the 88th and the 8th Indians.

And we've got to keep the lines of Soviet Union.

So, the way to do this is if the Soviets move on, you're not doing anything.

Well, I think precisely the same way, John.

We have a terrible domestic problem in the sense that no one can conceive

I'm serious.

They just haven't been postured.

So we've got to ease into that.

We can't just go right into this.

We've got to tell the Soviets today the direction in which we're moving in.

We've got to be up the ante of control without still being a massive failure.

As soon as the Chinese move, we have to tell them that.

We can't tell them before the Chinese move.

It'll look like collusion.

Okay.

All right.

The message should get off.

Okay.

I think the message is the right tone, but if you don't like the tone, tone it down some.

No, I think now we have to strengthen it to present.

Yes.

Oh, the message is heard.

I am at the public service.

No, let me write it and come right back to you.

They have never asked for a ticket with us, and they will not see the second man.

If it were not for the people, the most overriding reason.

Well, first, let me tell you something.

Why don't you move?

In that case, they will... You've already told us that it was a knock.

I'll be here.