Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 637 › Conversation 637-003

The India–Pakistan war

December 1971: Nixon and Kissinger on the war in South Asia, a cease-fire, and the administration’s “tilt” toward Pakistan. More famous conversations →

Friday, December 10, 1971 · 8:45 AM–9:42 AM ET · Oval Office · 1 hr 3 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation637-003 on Tape 637 (tape position 00:06:19–01:13:16)StartFriday, December 10, 1971 at 8:45 AMEndFriday, December 10, 1971 at 9:42 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 637-003 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417183021 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the escalating India-Pakistan war, focusing on the administration's "tilt" towards Pakistan and the potential for a ceasefire. They debated strategies for influencing international opinion, including public statements and press outreach, to counter India's perceived aggression and Soviet support. The conversation also touched upon the broader geopolitical implications, particularly concerning the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union's role in South Asia.

Download MP3 · 36.0 MB

On December 10, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:45 am to 9:42 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 637-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 637-3

Date: December 12, 1971
Time: 8:45 am - 9:42 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     India-Pakistan situation
           -Messages
           -Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
                -Leonid I. Brezhnev proposal
                       -Acceptance
                -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
           -Cease-fire
           -US-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                -Possible setback
           -The president's meeting with Vladimir V. Matskevich

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration: 27s ]

     INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

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          -Public relations
               -Press conferences and backgrounders
               -John A. Scali
               -Ronald L. Ziegler
               -Departments
                      -Usefulness
               -George H.W. Bush
                                             3

                        NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                             Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

             -John A. Scali and Ziegler
Show the rest of the log (361 more lines)
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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security]
[Duration: 2m 41s ]

    INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

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        -USSR
             -Military aid to India
                   -Numbers and amounts
             -Scali
             -Ziegler
        -Yahya Khan
             -Alignment with the US
        -Kissinger call to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
             -PRC
                                               4

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                                       Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[National Security]
[Duration: 15s ]

    PRC

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

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                           -Kissinger’s refusal to talk with the PRC
          -PRC-USSR
                -Comparisons
                -Thomas W. Braden article
                     -Kissinger and the President
                           -PRC trip
          -Kissinger’s previous visit with Roy H. Jenkins
                -Jenkins accomplishments
                     -Common Market
          -Braden
                -PRC trip
                -Braden’s opinion
          -Indian ambassador
                -Press campaign
          -East Pakistan
          -The President's possible statement
                -Labeling India as the aggressors
          -Indians
                -Press
                     -Susceptibility to public opinion
                -Rowland Evans
                -USSR support
                                             5

                        NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                              Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

                    -Press
                         -United Nations [UN] vote
                    -Backgrounder
                    -Washington Post

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security]
[Duration: 3s ]

    INDIA

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

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         -The President's statement
               -Kissinger’s disagreement with the President
         -Kissinger’s previous conversation with Bhutto
               -PRC
         -Pakistan refugee situation
               -Proposed action
         -Indian foreign minister
               -Refusal to grant reassurances
                     -Kashmir
         -USSR response
               -Yuli M. Vorontsov
                     -Talk with Kissinger
                          -UN Security Council
         -Press statement from White House
               -UN General Assembly resolution
                     -Results
                          -India’s refusal to accept
               -Kissinger’s meeting at the State Department
                     -Timing
               -East Pakistan
                                         6

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                                    Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

                 -Dacca
           -Contents
                 -Wording of statement
           -Draft
     -Backgrounder
     -Leaders’ meeting
           -Aid to India
     -Purpose of statement
           -PRC
           -USSR
           -Indians
           -American public opinion
                 -American apathy towards India-Pakistan conflict
     -Statement
           -Ziegler
           -William P. Rogers
     -Yahya Khan
     -Gandhi
           -Public apathy
     -Brezhnev
           -Hotline
                 -Great Britain
                 -Contents
                       -Security Council
                       -Joint action with the USSR
                       -Ceasefire
                       -Advantage
                             -Urgency
                             -Public record
     -State Department
     -British
           -Earl of Cromer [George R.S. Baring]
           -Edward R.G. Heath
           -Sir Alexander F. (“Alec”) Douglas-Home
           -USSR Naval presence in the Indian ocean
                 -British concern
           -Kissinger's talk with Cromer
                 -Discussing the President’s options

[Pause]
                                           7

                      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                                Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

India-Pakistan situation
      -British and French
            -US relations
                  -Singapore
                  -Indian Ocean
            -Cromer
                  -US message to the British
      -UN Security Council
            -State Department
            -Ceasefire and withdrawal
            -UN General Assembly resolution
      -Timing
      -Ceasefire resolution
      -Public statement
            -Purpose and importance
                  -USSR
                  -PRC
                  -Bhutto
                  -American public opinion
            -Rogers
            -Ziegler
            -Cambodia comparison
      -Cromer
            -Call from Kissinger
                  -Importance of discussions with the British
                  -French
                        -Involvement
      -USSR
            -Hotline
            -The President’s meeting with Matskevich
            -Vorontsov
                  -Possible reply from the USSR
      -PRC
      -US fleet
      -USSR tanks and ships
            -India
                  -Lack of response from “liberal” media
                  -US policy
            -Comparisons to current situation
                  -Czechoslovakia
                  -South Africa
                                        8

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                        Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

                    -“Exposure” of liberals
                         -Morality

Vietnam negotiations
     -Meeting
           -William J. Porter
           -Cancellation
                 -Duration
     -USSR
     -North Vietnamese
           -Bombing halt
           -Kissinger's trip to Paris
                 -Peace talks
           -Porter
           -Public statement
           -Paris
           -January 1972 announcement
                 -Sign of strength
                        -Advantages
                 -PRC trip
           -Porter
           -Bombing halt
                 -Henry Cabot Lodge
                 -Unknown person
                 -David K.E. Bruce
     -American public opinion
           -Percentage of support
     -January 1972
           -Two months announcement
                 -Reasoning for delay
                        -Infiltration
     -PRC trip
     -Prisoners of war [POW] issue
     -US troops
           -Numbers
     -Porter's return from Paris
           -Immediacy
           -January announcement
     -North Vietnam
           -Strikes
           -PRC
                                                 9

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                                Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

                      -Kissinger
                           -UN

     India-Pakistan situation
           -PRC, USSR, Indians
                -Effect of Vietnam bombing
                      -Toughness

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
[National Security]
[Duration: 3s ]

     PRC

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5

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           -UN
           -President’s instructions
                 -Deadline

Haig entered at an unknown time after 8:45 am.

           -PRC meeting
               -New York
                    -Timing
                          -Kissinger’s availability
               -Haig’s schedule
                    -Huang Hua

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6
[National Security]
                                            10

                         NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                              Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

[Duration: 13s ]

     PRC

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6

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               -Haig’s schedule
               -Kissinger’s schedule
               -Haig’s schedule
                    -Upcoming meeting with Huang Hua
                           -Timing
               -Kissinger’s schedule
                    -Azores
               -Press release

**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7
[National Security]
[Duration: 4m 18s ]

     INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7

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               -Pakistan
                    -India
                          -USSR
                          -Balance of power
                               -Possible changes
                                               11

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                                                Conv. No. 637-3 (cont.)

                            -Middle East
                            -Indonesia
                            -Japanese
                            -Europeans
                            -US
                                 -Latin America
                -Television
                -Cambodia
                -Laos
           -Kissinger's schedule
           -Azores trip
           -Haig
                -Attendance at PRC meeting

**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 8
[National Security]
[Duration: 5m 55s ]

     INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 8

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Kissinger and Haig left at 9:42 am.

This transcript was made by an AI model listening to the recording (gemini-3.8-flash) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Speaker names are the model's inference from the voices and the participant list. Words and names can still be wrong — verify against the audio and the finding aid before citing.

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NixonWhat's the news reports?
KissingerNo.
KissingerThere hadn't been any. There hadn't really anything been anything beneficial. Because of all these channels that we have to keep going uh due to the uh bureaucratic situation we face, that has produced another goddamned communi- confusion
Kissingerin the messages, because they forget what they put in one channel and what they put in the other. And uh
Kissingerso uh
Kissingeruh so, on the one hand, as you know on Friday, uh Yahya, responding to our pressure, had agreed in effect to uh to accept the Brezhnev proposal. But then he further found,
Kissingersaying that he decided not to and the Chinese turned it off. Now, I think, frankly, in that case, rather than accept the Brezhnev proposal, we'd be just as well off letting nature take its course.
KissingerAnd let them get raped. If they want to accept it, yes, but I think we should stay off it, then. Uh I think if we can A simple ceasefire is really the best we can uh at this moment uh
Kissingerget out of it. I I think if this thing emerges that the United States is joining with the Soviet Union in a proposal which is scissors through, then it was made three days after it was made just because of a military defeat.
KissingerWe would suffer a very severe setback.
NixonOh, yeah.
KissingerNo, no, I I I I was the one who who uh who pressed it in fact. What you said to the Agriculture Minister and to what we said is uh
NixonI think we uh
Nixongot to make more use of our our own our own PR people to get across our side [unintelligible]
NixonFor example, Ziegler can't do this, because he's so he's so our point of view will be confined [unintelligible] press conferences here with backgrounds, et cetera, et cetera. We can't do that. We've got to use We've got to use Scali and Ziegler for more backgrounds. Yeah. And
KissingerAnd the departments.
NixonWell, the departments are not very useful. We got to use them wherever we can, but what I meant is within the White House. But if we can get the department to take on to carry the ball on something, they ought to carry it. That's for damn sure. And they ought they ought to do more. But I meant the PR side of getting it across you well know. Uh it's awfully weak when you to say, "Well, we'll give them this stuff." Now, Bush, you can use a Bush, for example.
NixonSometimes the Department folk will do very well on this, as we know. But I think that here in the White House, that hasn't been done. Scali, Scali, suppose Scali work on some and you just tell him that we're talking to you about this, and use Scali [unintelligible]
NixonPart of the view is how uh the Indians have been uh just loading the wires and so forth with uh with their views that uh make us look bad. Well, for one, she's got to scare me to make her say this. She said it deliberately there in [unintelligible]
Nixonthat we had moved their forces from the east to the west. That out. The report, for example, with regard to the Soviet manning of the naval vessels that knocked off the Pakistan submarine, [unintelligible] out,
Nixonand uh hint that it looks this this is stirring [unintelligible] how much Soviet aggression is being called. Now, you see, that's should get out. You can't do it in your You're just hard pressed [crosstalk] with other things.
KissingerWell, Evans Evans had a column today which I, in effect, gave him, but still it's You're right, there's not enough. It shouldn't have to be me. [crosstalk] No, I think
NixonThat's one column. No, I think here you've just got to get You use Scali more. Just call him in. He likes to talk. You get him told, then let him let him go all over the place. He's a White House source. See? Uh and I I want that out. I don't think that
NixonNow it's only That is the most important part of the game, but it does impact in things, for reasons that we're aware. Did you happen to did you happen to note that that Mrs. Gandhi said that being to a Indian youth group that they had not rejected
Nixonthe uh UN General Assembly day? You probably didn't see that. It was in one of the summaries. He said she said, "We did not reject the UN General Assembly. Oh, we are We have under very serious consideration." Now, why did she say that? She said it for obvious reasons, that she thought that there was still some world opinion building against her.
NixonExcept, however, we are the goddamned fools to not build that [unintelligible] against the Indians. See what I mean? That uh that I I all right. She's uh she's can't go ahead and get away with that at least. So, I'd like to see these these little pressures get out.
KissingerWell, I've had last night put a paper together How much world opinion can impact the Indians. It's got It's got to get out, the fact that they have been condemned and the fact that they have rejected the earlier [unintelligible] has got to be said. Get the word to State that everybody every statement that India has rejected an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly. Well, that has to be said.
KissingerNow, in the field I've had pulled together what the Soviets received, what the Communist world sent to India in the last six years: 739 medium tanks, 176 light tanks, 329
Nixoncarriers. Well, put it out through a European source. No, that they've put to Use Scali. Put that out to the whole press corps. Yeah. That's the way to do it. For somebody you've got to get out. He's eager. Uh he's
NixonI mean this for others as well. The reason is we're not really using people. We're not bringing them in and drawing them enough about it. So, I would bring him in.
NixonIt's very safe to get out. It's very safe to get out.
Kissingercompleted concurrence to our game plan, which is to drop the uh political track, to go in with a uh uh-
NixonYeah.
KissingerTo go cease—first to go in with a ceasefire and withdrawal. I called Bhutto yesterday evening after we talked just for the record, and I said, "I don't want to hear one more word from the Chinese.
KissingerUh we are the ones who've been operating against our public opinion, against our bureaucracy, uh at the very edge of legality. And if they want to talk they should move some troops, and until they've done something we don't want to hear one more word." And
KissingerI really let him have it.
NixonTalk with them, the Chinese listen. They're They're bullying right now. We've got We've got to learn them, damn them, like everybody else. Henry, you're so right about the Chinese and the Soviets. Each for reasons that transcend India and Pakistan have to have their meetings with us, you know that.
KissingerThat's their goddamned problem.
NixonNow that doesn't mean that uh we can uh just thumb our noses at them all the time.
KissingerActually, strangely enough, I think the Chinese is more precarious than the Soviet, because for the Chinese, I mean, these idiots who say we're doing things
Kissingerto Braden has an article today blasting you and me, of course they got the bureaucracy, it's like Cambodia again, nicely out of it again. Uh blasting you and me that we are sacrificing India so that you can take a China trip.
KissingerUh the trip as such is a symbol of a policy. If the Chinese feel we are nice people, well-meaning, but totally irrelevant to their part of the world,
Kissingerthey lose whatever slight whatever incentive they have for that opening to us. The opening to us gets the Soviets under control. This is the real uh-
NixonWell, the point about sacrificing the trip is the one That's That's been being-
KissingerRoy Jenk- I saw Roy Jenkins last night, and he mumbled something like that. I said, "India put itself on the Soviet side, we didn't drive it there." And he Jenkins,
NixonGreat. Yeah.
Kissingerto his- Yeah, he's a good man. He said, after he talked to me, he said we made one grave mistake, and that was not to put it out 3 weeks earlier. He said he completely sees the point now.
KissingerAnd he's an honest guy, because he didn't He opposed his own party on the Common Market.
NixonYeah, I'm not concerned about Braden, and the rest of them running around about who's responsible for who jeopardize the China trip. What matters there is the fact that is not that is not serious. That isn't doesn't make any difference what they all say about-
KissingerDon't worry about those side issues.
NixonLittle packages are going to be left, and so I take it as simply a very juvenile kind of uh you know, it's smacks, I think, a way because they uh they don't like the idea of the trip, we know that.
KissingerBraden has no brains.
NixonYeah, and he's taking that from somebody else.
KissingerExactly, that's why it's significant. That's That's the only significance it has.
NixonThe question is whether or not I should call in, because I think we've got to start playing a better, a far better game here, the Indian ambassador this morning. Now uh before uh the bombing, I want to say should some ploy to call her and call him in and say, "Look here, we are we've we've been very understanding here.
NixonYou know your you know we know what's you know the pressure your your uh that it's such a press campaign. And uh I have no objections to that. I understand you've got to play it, but let's get one thing very clear:
NixonNow that the East Pakistan thing is to all intents and purposes resolved, that
KissingerYeah.
Nixonthat we are making make certain diplomatic moves, I don't know whether they'll pay off or not, but if this if this if this Indian action against the West continues
Nixonagainst the overwhelming weight of world public opinion, then I will have to make a public statement labeling India as the as naked aggression.
KissingerAs naked aggressor.
NixonNow, that's one way, and another way to do it is just do it and do it right now. You see, the thing that I feel is that they're Indians are susceptible
Nixonto this world public opinion crap. They're susceptible to it because they have lived on it for so long, and uh and they've got that kind of views here, and the reason there's very, very little, very, very damn, Rowland Evans has got it, but
Nixonas far as the general news is concerned, there's been damn little pointing out that India even with Soviet support, or is continuing this operation far beyond
Nixonthe reason they say brought them in in the first place, that they are now continuing for that purpose, that India is aggressive. There's been hardly anything, believe me, in the press to the effect that the vote in the UN was one that India
Nixonuh uh defied. Now, that's our fault, Henry. We haven't gotten it across.
KissingerI could-
NixonThat's my point. Now, my view is that we've we've got to get it across, and we've got to it's got to be said, and it's got to be said tough, and hard. I mean you you had a backgrounder and that was a little blip and the damn The Post played it just the opposite from the way that uh you intended.
KissingerWell, The Post that was just a deliberate lie, but uh-
NixonIt's a great issue.
KissingerI know. Uh nobody else played it that way. Every other leading paper in the country had it on its front page the way that I did, but the fact is the screwed this whole operation uh-
NixonI know, and we can talk all about the past, but the point is-
KissingerNo, no, I mean-
Nixonright now we got to go to the future.
KissingerRight, but it should have been pumped out day in and day out from every spokesman in the government.
NixonI know it should have been. Should have been, but we know we didn't have our problem. Henry, we've known that for a year. We've went through this time and time before and we're going through it again. But right now, rather than that we we we have to deal with reality and we have to do the very best we can. Now,
Nixonpicking up the pieces and doing the best we can, the question is, what do we do? We've got Mr. We've got to put the heat on India's back.
KissingerMr. President, now I am a little reluctant to shoot the big gun,
KissingerI mean, to have you call India, have them kick you in, to have the Indian ambassador in, to have him kick you to have give that bitch the satisfaction. If we had the assets there, Mr. President, if this were this
NixonWell, then we won't call him in. We'll just make the statement.
KissingerIf if this were the Syria situation of '57, oh, '70, uh I'd be in favor of brutalizing the son of a bitch. But why let him go around and say that he looked you in the eye and uh, you know, this is the problem.
NixonWhat I'm trying to get at is this, that the uh
Nixonuh it's my intention to make a public statement labeling India naked aggression. Now, if the point is, will it do any good? But it might serve the purpose of letting them know in advance.
NixonYou see, we've got to get across the fact that uh the uh the uh uh the uh your your conversation with Bhutto and the Chinese was correct in one sense
Nixonwhere they say we started out strong and then got the impression that both plague on both your houses, which of course is unfortunate. But at this At this, I mean, to an extent, because Pakistan mishandled the refugee situation
KissingerOh, yeah.
Nixonin the beginning, it is a plague on both your houses. But that's true only as to East Pakistan. It is crystal-clear that if that if the military action continues
Nixonafter East Pakistan is wrapped up, that that is naked aggression. Now that needs to be said. It doesn't need to be said in a lot of gobbledygook.
NixonNow uh
KissingerNow uh we uh And remember the Indian foreign minister has refused to give an assurance that they don't have any territorial uh
Nixonambitions.
Kissingerambitions. He said "minor rectifications."
NixonYeah, that means Azad Kashmir.
KissingerYeah.
NixonAll they have deduced, I guess, this morning is that we just wait to see what we hear from the Soviets.
KissingerNow, I, my recommendation is— Did you already call Vorontsov last night? No, you're going to let him know at 9:00.
KissingerNo, I told, no, I told Vorontsov last night and said that if we don't hear from them this morning, we will go back to the Security Council, and I have good suggestions of what you might do this morning.
NixonAll right.
Kissingeris issue a press statement from the White House. We'd have to we'd have to change it, because this isn't [unintelligible]
KissingerThe general tone is that in view of India's refusal to accept the terms of the General Assembly resolution passed by the overwhelming majority of 104 to 10 calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces, the United States has now decided again to take this grave issue to the Security Council.
NixonAll right, fine. Now, can call, have you checked that with State? Who's in State now?
KissingerWell, I'm meeting them at 11:00.
KissingerWell, I could, I'll check it earlier. I think you're talking Get them up earlier. Get them up at 9:00.
KissingerAnd, and we will say, "Having occupied all of East Pakistan"—
NixonAre they, have they occupied it all?
KissingerPractically, virtually all. The Dhaka falling not yet, but that's
Kissingerhaving, having occupied the, you know, virtually all of East Pakistan, India's continued military action action by India
Kissingercan only be viewed as an armed attack on Pakistan as a whole and increasingly takes on the character
NixonAll right. And one sentence: "If India, if India defies, for instance, if India should defy the overwhelming weight,
Nixondefy the, should continue to defy the overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by a 104 to 10 vote of the UN General Assembly,
Nixonand that if India does, so,
KissingerYes.
NixonIndia's India's should continue to defy, after the fact, did continue to defy, that India will stand before the whole world as a naked aggressor. Now, I think you've got to get "naked aggression" in there.
NixonAnd it's gotta be, get in there hard and tough. I think of it, I'd put it this way, look,
Nixonwe're getting just as much heat, just as much heat for using soft words, as we do if we use hard words. Everybody says we're kicking the goddamned Indians around, right? Absolutely, now,
Nixonnow it is naked aggression. If they defy, that's the point. Put it on the basis of that.
NixonSee, then you then you get across two points: that the, that the General Assembly is overwhelmingly has overwhelmingly voted to ask for, for I'd put this, you don't have nothing in there, you sound like a foreign policy statement, Bob.
NixonFor example, I would have in the sentence,
Nixonthe General Assembly on [blank] by a vote of [blank], now, the Security Council, by a vote of 11 to 2, called on cease-fire and withdrawal.
KissingerThat's not binding.
NixonI know nothing is binding. The General Assembly, by a vote of [blank] to [blank], called on a called on on and so-and-so and so-and-so.
NixonPakistan has accepted. India has refused.
KissingerThat's it.
NixonNow, Pakistan has accepted; India has refused. India is supported by the Soviet Union.
KissingerNow, that was the next question I wanted to put to you.
NixonIndia is supported by the Soviet Union, and refused. We are going to—
KissingerSupported only by the Soviet Union.
NixonSupported only by the Soviet Union. Well, some communist countries. Supported only by the Soviet Union
Kissingerand uh and uh supported by the Soviet Union.
NixonSupported by the Soviet Union. You could say and other communist countries. Use the word communist for a change. And, well, I'll have crossed it out for the Chinese, Romanians. All right. Supported by the, by sure,
Nixonsupported by the Soviet Union. That, that's enough. Now, then say that if, and we're taking it, if, after, now that East Pakistan is virtually gone,
Nixonwe the India continues to defy the overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by the vote of the General Assembly,
Nixonyou see, as as uh reflected by, as reflected by the vote of the General Assembly, India will stand before the world as an aggressor.
NixonSee? Now, that is really what we need to say. We uh this this is contrary, this is contrary to every tradition
Nixonfor which India has stood since its birth as a nation. And uh we uh
Nixonwe call upon the government of India to uh to join with the government of Pakistan in having, and in and uh following the, you know, and adhering to
Nixonthe uh overwhelming uh expression of world opinion to have a cease-fire. You see what I mean? Something like that. That's the kind of language you need in this thing to get the goddamned point across.
KissingerYeah, absolutely, because Let me do this immediately. Well, work on it.
NixonYou see what I'm getting at?
KissingerNo, I know exactly what you're getting at, uh and you are quite right. I asked somebody to draft this last night. It isn't bad. It isn't bad.
NixonWell, it isn't good. But it doesn't It isn't that bad either. What I mean is, it's what you would expect them to draft in view of what we've been saying, what everything else. But you did get into a decent Your backgrounder was excellent.
NixonAnd I just thought, if you talk, and when I met with those leaders that morning, you know, um so we'd get the impression of those leaders that we were handing out all I know the leaders in the morning, I was saying, "We're going to cut off aid to India."
KissingerYou were I know, but you weren't there. The leaders came in, but I said, "We're going to cut off aid to India."
NixonI said, "You know we've already cut off Pakistan." And any objection? They said, "Hell no!" Yeah.
NixonBut anyway, what I'm getting at is, now, having said all this, what, what purpose does it serve to, to put out something labeling India? The purpose I see that it, that it serves is, what the, well, to the search here: one,
Nixonit helps us with our Chinese friends. Yes.
NixonSecond, it puts a little bit of heat on the Russians.
KissingerYes.
NixonThird, it puts some heat on the goddamned Indians. Right. In the world opinion. Fourth, it, it helps us with our own domestic situation here at home,
Nixononly to the extent that we're taking a beating, and I'm not concerned about it. This that isn't getting through to people. People that that's bad that isn't getting through to people for the wrong reason. People don't give a shit
Nixonwhether you're for blending, not for blending, because they don't care if the whole continent thinks goes down a cesspool. That's right.
NixonThat's too bad. But nevertheless, it isn't hurting us, I can assure you. Nobody But, you think, well, this is a great blow for our foreign policy. Bull! That's not All they're attacking is the people, but it is getting substantive, but not that.
NixonPropaganda.
KissingerI agree.
NixonThe propaganda is important for the four reasons I've just given you, see? High big.
KissingerAnd, uh, we've got to start, start in on the propaganda.
KissingerWhat And another thing you can do, which is just a little So, it won't hurt, uh, if we put that out, and what if Ziegler puts that out, or it's White House background? Put him out now.
NixonLet him get a press statement. All right. Clear with State, though. Let him and have State put it out. Is that what you have in mind?
NixonUh, or to have Rogers try to put it out. Uh, A strong press statement like this, we'll
KissingerI wouldn't mind having Rogers put it out. It'll have [unintelligible] For our stuff, on the tap, it has more punch if you put it if it's put out at the White House.
NixonWhite House.
KissingerBut, uh, but the advantage of Rogers is this: they are sticking it all on you.
KissingerIn fact, they are even, they're sort of vacillating whether to get me involved to keep me out. I mean, they are the thing The two lines of argument being made. One is that you love Yahya Khan,
Kissingerand that it's a personal pique at Mrs. Gandhi. That's true.
KissingerUh, the other one is that you and I were plotting this in order to preserve the China trip.
KissingerThose two are going to merge, because I've put myself so much Uh of course, I would. There's no question. on your side, I've Who wouldn't, though?
KissingerI mean, it's ridiculous. It's uh Well, this doesn't worry you, in fact, it helps. Well, that's what they that's what they
NixonThey have not touched you on this thing.
Nixonas long as, by God, the country doesn't give a shit. That's the point, that that's what they forget. They care, but the country doesn't care about it, Henry.
KissingerThat is right. What India packed? That is good.
NixonAll right, what'd you have in mind?
KissingerNow you could put something on the hotline to Brezhnev.
NixonAll right. Let's talk about the hotline stuff. What about what about a hotline to Brezhnev, and what about the British? All right, the British. You want to put a message to them? But the two that Yeah. I would say
Kissingerwe do a hotline to Brezhnev, which I would like to to work work on a little more, in which we say that "We're not going back to the Security Council. We had hoped to do it jointly with you. There is still time to do it jointly.
KissingerUh, because this thing may become public. And that should sound conciliatory, though it should have a few hookers in there.
NixonYes. Well, I would say if I didn't see this, I would say, here's the thing. Mr. Chairman, we have not We had to have a he's called General Secretary, Secretary.
KissingerGeneral Secretary, yes. Chairman is Mao.
NixonMr. Mr. Secretary, and and the General Secretary, since we have not had a response to the message to you of so and so, I am sending you this message under urgent conditions.
NixonUh, the, uh, that, uh, we, uh, we are going today to the General, uh, you know, to the Security Council again. Uh,
Nixonif you should determine, again, to veto it, then, uh, we, uh, we urge you, whatever you want to do then. See what I mean? I'd put it that way.
KissingerRight. Right.
KissingerListen, yeah. I wouldn't say we're ready to go for ceasefire, because if they publish that, we'd say you're willing to proceed along the course outlined to you,
NixonProceed along the we're however, we're going to proceed. That's very good. Proceed along the course outlined.
KissingerThat's right.
NixonWell, we shouldn't be here uh Now, what's the disadvantage to going to the hotline? If there is do you appear to be so anxious that maybe they're about ready to accept it, and then they say, "Ah, we won't do it. John's got to yell.
KissingerRight. No.
NixonWhy still stay attached to the hotline? It makes it more urgent for them, which makes it good.
KissingerYeah. It gives us a public record. The public record doesn't cost anything then.
NixonIt make it more urgent for them to do what? You might expect the motive.
KissingerIt makes it more urgent.
KissingerLet's take them and talk about hard lines, and [unintelligible]
KissingerAlso, we can't let State in on that. We can't let State in on that.
NixonWell, you're damn right we can't.
KissingerNow, with the British, Mr. President, uh I think I should talk to Cromer this morning rather than you talk to Heath. And I should get Cromer in and say, "Now, listen."
NixonI do this morning?
KissingerYes, "You are blowing the whole bloody relationship. We are going back to the Security Council,
NixonThat's right.
Kissingerand we just And well, talk to Cromer and say what?
NixonThat, uh, we, uh, that the the president wants to have some really really great, good talk with him, but the with Heath. Hello.
NixonHow are you? And the president recalls that Heath, on one occasion,
Nixonand Alec, at great length, talked about their concern about Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
NixonAnd say, "Now, you will note the great Soviet presence in India here. And the ships are not bound. If we continue to let this thing drift,
Nixonit will mean an enormous Soviet presence in the subcontinent, and subcontinent is gone to the Soviets. Now, you want to play that game, or do you want to join together and try to heal that?
NixonSome, you know, find this In other words, you have it you would really Because Alec is very much expressed great concern about the Oh yeah. And every time I tell him,
Kissingerfrom now from each [unintelligible] I just want to tell you [unintelligible]
NixonWell, let's figure out

— 1 min 6 s with no transcribed speech —

NixonI could put it in terms of, "Look, you know the British going to play their games. The president wants to work with Britain. He's uh
NixonHe supported you on Singapore. He supported you in the Indian Ocean. But right now, the whole goddamn house of cards is going to tumble down unless we save what is up in Pakistan.
NixonThe only way we can do it is for us to join together in this point and stop being ducked. I think Cromer would hear that.
KissingerYeah. Done.
NixonI want him to get this message after after. And then I can ride back.
KissingerYeah.
NixonAnd bring them. Now, let me Let's Let's go over again what we're doing the messages. I want to be sure we're doing it right. What do you have in mind?
KissingerNo, I don't mean this show with The thing is, we've instructed State to go back to the Security Council. If you instruct State to back to the Security Council,
Kissingerand to do it with a cease-fire and withdrawal, to implement the General Assembly stuff, Right.
Kissingerget it vetoed, if necessary. Right. Then be prepared to get Pakistanis to move towards for a simple cease-fire.
NixonFine.
KissingerThat won't happen till tomorrow, but we've got that all lined up and ready. The General Assembly won't meet today, though.
KissingerNo, no, we'll it'll take through today, probably into tomorrow to get it.
KissingerThen people get deceived. We have about a week before this thing plays out, because they can't shift their army that fast.
NixonNo, the pacts will hold off for two weeks, that's what Two weeks. So, you got ten days. In other words, they could they could the Pak Pak side will collapse before then. Go ahead.
KissingerRight. Then, we uh order um then we try to get the cease-fire resolution through, as I've said.
NixonRight. All right. I got all that. Now, what about What do we do is a public statement is First, a public statement along the lines you indicate.
KissingerNow, what is the purpose of the public statement? For for purpose of did I mention you you think did did you think what would be a public statement, or are might talking you into a public statement here?
NixonHow's that? I thought I talked you into a public statement.
KissingerCome on. No. I didn't I know. I think I I think we have to do a public statement. I think also we have to do a public statement uh to impress the Russians, to scare the Indians,
Kissingerto take a position with the Chinese.
NixonChinese. That's the main. Mostly with the Chinese. But you got some first strike, but that's all right. That's that's the number one
KissingerAfter that's after what they've said, you we've honor bound.
KissingerThat's right. What they said to me and what they said to Bhutto.
NixonRight. Now, don't forget we need it.
KissingerAnd uh uh and
NixonAnd that, uh, and to, and to clear our own air in the public. At least take the meat, the American public has taken this position for a good reason. We won't take any more now.
KissingerIndia and the Soviet Union, that's right.
NixonThat's All right. Let's let's let's Let's let our opponents side with India at this time of this aggression. People don't want war, Henry. They don't like it. Yeah, they don't.
KissingerAnd that's fine with us.
NixonAll right. So, you believe a public statement is in order? Now, you're going to try to get Rogers to make the statement for you today? He'd say that, "What is is it worth trying to get Rogers to make, frankly, this move today?"
KissingerIt isn't worth it, because he'll try to water it down too much, and then, also, by the time they get through explaining it,
NixonYeah.
Kissingeruh alright, say the So I mean, we're again in a Cambodia situation. We've got to cope with the goddamned thing on our own, Yes. with whatever with keeping them at fixed so minimal and take care of the basic situation.
NixonAll right. Fine. Fine. I agree.
NixonYou call Cromer immediately, then.
KissingerI'll call Cromer, and
Kissingerhave the idea it isn't a British bluff, and we can wait until the outcome of the use of force, I expect. I know, but I expect.
NixonIs it worth is it worth the urgency?
KissingerYes, I think it is. Let's get the British unsalvageable here. I can turn it, I have other reasons, even if the British say no. We're talking to the British about things that are very, very important.
NixonI'm just going to tell him, this is the time to ask for the US and American we got together, the French are not going to go along with our relations with them, but we want to raise the problem with you first. I see, they think it's a very clever move.
KissingerI just think it forces their hand into the and makes it look very odd. And if I do it very do it very odd, it has to be at it that way. If they figure it out. Yeah. All right.
KissingerNow, in the hot line, we're going to put What if the are we being are we being over anxious somehow? No, we're not. Because basically, the over answer is asking for a reply.
NixonWe're not letting the Russians fiddle us along. Why, why Oh yeah, [unintelligible] they're still going.
KissingerAll we're doing is to reiterate what I said to the Agriculture Minister and what you said to Matskevich. Right.
NixonThat's a [whispering] hell of a good line. [/whispering] It's a [whispering] It's a [/whispering] It's a typical Nixon plan, I mean. It's bold. It's It is pushing the chips into the pot again.
KissingerRight.
NixonBut my view is, if we do nothing, there's a certainty of a disaster. This way, there's a high probability of one. But at least we're coming out like men.
KissingerAnd that's [crosstalk] That's right. That's right.
NixonAnd that helps us with the Chinese.
KissingerAnd if it goes down the tube now, we will have done the best we can.
NixonWe'll have played it to the hilt and it's Well, if we If it goes down the tube, because we can't get anyone to support us, by tomorrow our fleet will be in the Indian Ocean.
KissingerYeah, and [crosstalk] well
NixonAnd uh
KissingerYou see all those Russian tanks, all the Russian ships, and all the rest lining up with the Indians, and not one liberal newspaperman [crosstalk] test it.
NixonAnd these liberals, 500 million people, we are to blame for for 500 million people. Why are we to blame? Because we're not letting 500 million people rape 100 million people. That's the way they think.
KissingerIf and everybody worried about Danzig and Czechoslovakia, and all those other places, because
NixonIf South Africa gobbled up Basutoland, and we said, "Well, they're 10 million South Africans."
KissingerYou're on the wrong side. That's right.
NixonNow Henry, the liberals have gotten themselves being totally exposed here. Their only interest is in who's going to win.
KissingerAnd if these bastards think of it is for this high-toned morality leak, we don't even pretend high-toned morality on some of these issues, except in the deepest sense.
NixonOkay, listen. I got an idea to bite here's some Vietnam eggheads for it now. One, take carefulness, one,
Nixonfrom now to the end of the year, there is no appeal from this. I was shocked to find that Porter was dancing around, and I know, because we have not given him any better instructions,
Nixonwith regards to this postponement of the meeting, where they he allowed the other side to say that we were sabotaging the meetings. Now, the instruction is, there is to be no meeting for two weeks.
KissingerFine.
NixonMaybe, we can put in by market, uh, for two weeks.
KissingerThere is to be no meeting. There won't be one next week, anyway. I can tell you. He's not going to have one the next week anyway.
NixonWe,
KissingerUh
Nixondid we track that built that we, we had three [unintelligible]
NixonWell, let's be quite honest with ourselves here with regard to the Russians, and with regard to this, you know, if we uh And there's a difference of view in this, and I maybe wrong, but I believe that the North Vietnamese, in any talks that they've had with us
Nixonuh from the time of the bombing halt, their talks with you and so forth, it was false. I don't think there's ever been a serious intention.
KissingerExcept before we scared the life out of them.
NixonMaybe. Maybe. I doubt. But nevertheless, there was before the period, there wasn't, but you can go over to Paris, I have no regrets that we have, it was necessary to make the record and so forth, so we make the record.
NixonBut, at this point, as far as those talks are concerned, extend to them that one for us.
NixonThe illusion that they're talking peace at this point, is ridiculous.
KissingerOh, they haven't. They're sabotaging They talk about sabotaging.
NixonThey sabotaged. Now,
Nixonof course, having you kind of put the boys' head to the s- our words on on the plan, because I'm inclined to move a lot sooner with regards to calling Porter back.
NixonThe The plan, of course, that we presently have, is to go is to make our uh public state shortly after the first of the year.
NixonUh, you know, our our six-month withdrawal, whatever the hell we are going to do, and it will be that, there isn't going to be anymore of this shit-ass stuff about, "We're running over to Paris, waiting two more months", that we've done that enough. And we're not going to hear from them.
NixonAnd so not hearing from them means that we have no choice, having told them that If we make another two month announcement in January, they'll think we're the weakest fish, that's the whole problem we've got here. Not the two months.
KissingerNo, I don't The advantage of two months is, if you did it in January Mr. President, what I think is, if the two month announcement in January was not a sign of weakness to them, but a sign of strength. They expected a total announcement.
NixonWell, I, I know it was right, because it had panicked that rest totally. But if this time we bubble again, the other way,
Nixonand there's there's nothing in it for us, because we If we say, "Well, we're going to be negotiating for two months." They know they're not negotiating. They know that we don't expect them to negotiate.
KissingerIt would be the negotiation, the advantage uh we uh If you remember our original plan was to go the full thing then in January, and there's something a lot to be said for it.
KissingerThe advantage of two months is to get you over the China trip while keeping the thing still fussed up.
NixonWe may do that. My point is My point is, whatever the situation is in January, Porter's coming home. That's fine.
NixonWe cannot continue to be over there with that show. That is just not making any sense. We must not continue for three years, and we are we could be held responsible here after We didn't call the bombing halt, they were originally responsible. But, starting in January 69,
Nixonfirst with Lodge, and Walsh, and then with the for all, uh, Bruce, and the rest,
Nixonwe have been sucked, we've allowed to be played by them and those talks have been nothing, but nothing, believe me. They haven't helped us a bit in this country. The talks have hurt us in this country. Very bad guy polled it's found 80% of the people think the talk talks have failed.
NixonUh uh uh From our standpoint, like that could be the beginning, 80% of the American people.
KissingerNo, what I would recommend so is to pull Porter home, No, no, I would I would consider very seriously putting the full record out in January, calling Porter home, and making
NixonThey are making a talk. You bet.
Kissingerand making a two-month announcement. And that Just to keep your opposition off-balance.
NixonIt's fine. We're the same here. The two months is fine. What I meant is, what I meant is we can't put it off two months on the basis that we're going to wait for that on the ground, or negotiating crap. That's the point.
KissingerWe could say
NixonWe go for two months.
KissingerAll right.
NixonSee that's the clinker in this whole plan. The clinker in this plan is that there's down the road we still got those those POWs, and uh,
Nixonnow there's no problem there. At that point, well, when you're down to, Henry, when we're down to 70,000, that's what, February? Yeah. So at 70,000, you say, well, we'll keep 40,000 there until we get the POWs. Correct? That's what you have in mind. All right, we get the point. But the guts of the border back is the same. I agree we got, we've got to stop these goddamned pirates,
Nixonall of our fellow colleagues. Now, how about sooner than February 1st for the border back? How about sooner?
KissingerNo, I'd do it the first week of January, for the first ten days.
NixonAll right. Now, that brings me to the second part of the equation.
NixonIt may be that we should not delay the strikes and all.
NixonNow, your concern is the Chinese, I understand.
KissingerYeah.
NixonI don't believe that that is a I, I if the Chinese respect strength, after all, that is strength. And I'm inclined to think that if they if they want to see the Yankees, if they see him do any place, any flair, it's likely he's see one 21 extra ready to ship to the Russians. It may be that we're better off to get uh, cranked up and just to get those people to work, and get them to mesh them right now.
NixonNow, you understand?
KissingerI I would I would wait until while they're screaming at the UN about real tough thing and I wouldn't get it confused. Uh, these five days won't make any difference.
NixonAll right.
KissingerWhat is your concern about the uh
NixonI'm concerned about the effect on the Chinese and the Russians and the Indians. Now, if the Russians and the Chinese and Indians have an impression
Nixonthat the man in the White House is tough,
Nixonthat's the only hope we've got. You see, if we're not throwing enough toughness into the equation, we look soft every place in the world. And so my theory is, one way we can look somewhat tough, in a collateral area, is to is to get that That's been my argument on the bombing anyway.
KissingerI agree.
KissingerUh, and for that it would have I think to do it right now when maybe the Chinese are moving, it will give the Russians a ploy. Uh, I I'd do it after the after this UN thing is played out. If you give the order on Wednesday, we can get it done by Friday.
NixonYour thought would be to get that done by Friday, the 17th.
NixonI'll shout for [unintelligible] 48 hours.
KissingerOh. Chinese want to meet on an urgent basis.
NixonMeet you?
KissingerWell, good I can't be in New York. Uh, they want to meet Haig.
NixonOh.
NixonNow, that's the New York Chinese or the or the uh,
KissingerHuang Hua.
NixonThat's, I think that while I have that totally unprecedented. No question, they're going to move.
NixonI have that impression. Don't you?
KissingerTo them, the Indian is going to score it.
NixonWell, this may change their plans, but no, this changes plans. All it means makes more urgent the other line, they don't know.
KissingerSo, Al will go down there.
NixonAnd go to New York.
KissingerYeah.
NixonThe reason they've sent it to you is that you had told them, Henry, that you'd be out of town and they could see Haig. That period is up for you. That's, that's correct. I don't see why. Why do they say they want to see Al rather than you?
KissingerBecause they said, "In view of my departure, Huang Hua wants to meet Haig." I told them I'm leaving tomorrow for the Azores.
NixonAll right, fine. You have there. Well, this afternoon. They wait until noon.
KissingerYeah.
KissingerI think we ought to trigger this anyway. This gives them more sauce.
KissingerWhat we discussed, the press releases, and, uh,
NixonCan you, uh, Al you reassess this piece, they're going to move, what else can we give them? No questions. Yeah, I think you want to guarantee, so Soviets, we gotta guarantee that. Somebody, we may not be able to do it, but we got to guarantee it. If they want us, we will guarantee it.
KissingerWell, but we have to think that through. If the Soviets move against them, and then we don't do anything,
Kissingerthen we're finished.
NixonSo, what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons in, Henry? Is that what you mean?
KissingerIf the Soviets move against them, uh, in these conditions and succeed,
Kissingerthat will be the final showdown. We'd have to If And if they succeed, we'll be finished.
NixonYeah.
KissingerWe'll be through because no one will then believe us.
KissingerWell, then we'd better call them off. I didn't think we can call them off, frankly.
NixonNo, I don't think you can call them off. If you don't uh give them some assurance, but the price you pay for that is almost as bad as if you If we- If we call them off, I think our China initiative is pretty well down the drain.
NixonSure.
NixonOur China is down the drain, and also our stroll with the Russians is very, very seriously jeopardized.
KissingerIf the Russians get away with taking down the Chinese,
Kissingerand if the Indians get away with facing with licking the Pakistanis,
KissingerI mean, we- what we are now having is the final
KissingerWe may be looking right down the gun barrel.
NixonWell, what's the Chinese view of the Soviets?
KissingerWell, it's the Chinese view which they expressed to Bhutto yesterday that the Soviets will back off. I think the Soviets will back off if we face them.
NixonWell, that's the point. The reason that I had suggested, will the Chinese move, is that uh they talk about the Soviets moving into the border and all that sort of thing. Well, then the Soviets, at this point,
Nixonare about to to to to go running into that damn mess uh, having in mind the
Nixonthe fact that uh, the Indians from the Indian end, shouldn't they anyway?
KissingerWell, we've got to trigger this quickly so that we are positioned and not in the tail of the Chinese.
KissingerThat's Otherwise, we have no moral basis whatsoever for supporting the Chinese.
NixonBasically, Bhutto asked the Chinese to move, too, didn't he?
KissingerThey're not doing it because of us.
NixonWell, that's what I mean. I can't- I mean, let's get that straight right away. Well, who's, why are the Chinese moving?
KissingerThe Chinese, but, I think it's a good idea, Mr. President. The Chinese- well, we asked them, but that's not the reason they're doing it.
NixonNo, the way, the way you threw it at them, the way you threw it is uh, to Huang Hua, like you said. You said, "Well, we're doing these things. Want you to track it." Remember, I said, "threaten to move a couple of divisions."
KissingerWell, and, and I said, if you- [crosstalk] You go a little further than that.
KissingerAnd I said, I said we would scare- and I said, you be, and I said we will, uh, we will do what we, we will prevent pressures on you, or we will hang other countries. Now, but it's, it's immaterial who made them do it. We didn't make them do it.
KissingerThey are acting for the same reason they've jumped us when we approached the Chinese border.
NixonIn Korea, you mean.
KissingerIn Korea, that was it. It's exactly to them [crosstalk] that area.
KissingerIt's exactly the same situation. But leaving aside now whether we made them do it or not- we did not make them do it- my feeling would be the same, Mr. President, if I had not talked to them on Friday. They don't move that fast. This has been-
NixonThey didn't even think about it.
KissingerOh, yeah.
KissingerThis has been building up.
KissingerMy feeling is, Mr. President, leaving completely aside what we said,
Kissingerif the outcome of this is
Kissingerthat Pakistan is swallowed by India,
Kissingerrevolution.
NixonWhat do you have?
KissingerYou've got the Soviet Union,
Kissingeruh, with uh, with 800 million Chinese,
Nixon600 million Indians.
KissingerThe balance of Southeast Asia terrorized, the Japanese immobilized,
NixonUh, the Europeans, of course, suck
Kissingerafter them.
Nixonand the United States the only one. We have we have major parts of Latin America,
KissingerAnd, uh-
Nixonwho knows?
KissingerAnd Africa.
NixonIsn't that a story?
KissingerThat is why, Mr. President, uh, slightly academic, but-
NixonYou'll be alone with- and we'll-
KissingerThat's all.
NixonNo, no, and in fact we we've been alone before. The point is, we-
KissingerChrist, all men knew, you remember when we gathered around here, and, and we talked about uh
Kissingerthe lead wrestles, and all the goddam college programs, of 300 students, and the Chinese, they move, who went into Cambodia.
NixonBut what I
KissingerAnd Laos was even worse.
NixonBut what we might consider today, is what we're going to do with it.
KissingerMr. President, whether I shouldn't stay here
Kissingerand,
Kissingeruh, and, uh, and skip the Azores.
KissingerWhether, given what's coming up, it wouldn't be better for me to stay here.
NixonRight. What do you think, Al?
HaigWell, let's think a bit.
NixonMmm.
HaigI don't think- I think that-
KissingerAfter the meeting, if he wants to see you, I bet I'm not going to make a decision here. I bet it would be in an hour, it'll probably get more clear than all this.
NixonAlso, there's something else that is important. Uh, it's just as well the, to, for us not to appear in such an urgent crisis and all that sort of thing.
KissingerYeah, it-
NixonIt isn't, and the fact that- the fact is, that when something occurs, you can't leave Washington, but I can, that isn't- what do you- you see my point?
KissingerNow, that would depend- I kind of think this is shot, nope-
NixonCommunications are perfect, no
KissingerI know, but you have to decide, answer that, you have to make the decision.
NixonYeah. That's right.
KissingerAnd nobody else.
NixonUh, but I also, well, you, you, you have no ideas for this, though.
KissingerAl was present. Al was present at the other meeting.
KissingerNow, you better, you call them back. Set it for, well, 4:00 at the hotel.
HaigUh, well, I need 4:00, or if not, I'll go sooner.
KissingerJust get it after they've left. I want to tell you, while we're doing this,
Kissingerwe've got to get this tricky, quickly, so that we are positioned. I mean this leaves no doubt now what we've got to do.
NixonRight. Now let's come back to this here on the message. You say they want to see Al. I don't remember.
KissingerUh, that's what I
NixonThey either want, or they want more reassurance. Yes, they need something more direct. Well, I think so. Can we get him a memo on November 5, '70?
KissingerTo [unintelligible]
KissingerAnd that's what they'll think.
NixonI know they'll believe you, yeah. That point is-
KissingerNo, the point is-
NixonI did. I am more-
KissingerWhen I, I, I put it in more-
Kissingeruh,
KissingerArmageddon terms to the Soviets. When I say that if the Chinese move, and the Soviets thrash them,
Kissingerthat we start lobbying nuclear weapons, that isn't what happens. That isn't what happens. What happens is that
Kissingerwe then do look awful to the Soviets, and they lose, we find they just stay in office, when goes in.
NixonWell, we don't have to lobby nuclear weapons, we have to go on alert, we have to, we have to put forces in, we may have to give them bombing assistance. We may have-
KissingerIf, if-
NixonOne thing you should forget, we clean up Vietnam at that point.
KissingerWe clean up Vietnam. I mean, at that point, we give an ultimatum to Hanoi.
NixonYeah. That's right.
KissingerBlockade Haiphong.
NixonRight.
KissingerUh, we blockade Haiphong. Now, that will hurt China, too, but we can't worry about that at that point.
NixonWell, we'll say that it's for the purpose of protecting Americans, and there is a grave superpower confrontation.
KissingerBut above all, we have to give the Chinese the sense that if the Russians threaten them,
KissingerWait. The first thing we can't we cannot, as a first thing, then move against Haiphong, because that would then say the U.S. and China- I mean, we'll pick up
KissingerNorth Vietnam in the process of that. I mean, North Vietnam will be finished then if Russia and China are at war.
KissingerUh, we can take it out in any problem.
NixonYou're talking about, well, yes, Russia and China would go to war. Russia, I-
KissingerI wouldn't bet on that, Mr. President.
NixonWell, you put it this way: Uh, I didn't-
NixonI, I have always thought that India and Pakistan inevitably would have a war, and there can always be a war in the Mid East. As far as Russia and China is concerned,
Nixonthere are other factors that, that are too overwhelming today, at this particular point, for them to go at each other.
KissingerWell, wait.
KissingerWell, Mr. President,
Kissingerthe the Russians, first of all, are not rational on China. Secondly,
Kissingerif they can get a pretext to wipe out China, then your trip and everything else is an incident.
KissingerYour trip, in their mind, was an incident on the road-
NixonNothing, there would be- they'll screw the whole trip.
KissingerYour trip to them was an incident on the road where they would isolate China,
Kissingerand could then turn against China in '73, '74. Now, that was fine with us,
Kissingerbecause it pushed China over on our side,
Kissingerand we could play it. But if they feel out-
NixonWhat are you trying to suggest here? Are you trying to get to the point that maybe we ought to tell the Chinese, tell the Chinese that we won't back them?
KissingerNo, I think we have to tell them we will back them.
NixonWhat do you think, Al? You think we should tell them we won't back them, and discourage them?
HaigI think, they, they made clear to the Paks yesterday three things. One is, they said the Soviets are cowards,
Haigthe United States stood the Soviets down recently in Cuba and in the Middle East.
NixonDid they know that? You told them that.
KissingerNo, they said that to the- to Bhutto.
NixonIf they think we- if they believe that, then they got, then they got the message where nobody else did, because they
KissingerThe Chinese respect you. The Chinese-
NixonWell did they- how the hell do they know we stood them down in Cuba, for instance? You must have told them that. Well, I told them about it, yeah, of course.
KissingerYeah, you wrote to that. But-
NixonHow about the Middle East, how do they know we stood them down?
KissingerWell, because they see what happens. They th- they are tough customers. When all the bullshit is said and done, they know the Syrian tanks pulled back unconditionally.
HaigAnd, that's right. Ground. That's, that's the social reality on it, so they feel only, only,
Haigif the United States moves toward the Soviets,
Haigthat will provide the cover they need to take on the Indians,
Haigand we've got to take on the Soviet Union.
NixonSo,
Nixonway do you do that? So, you would like to sheer on view, for damn sure.
HaigIt's more precisely the same way, we have a terrible domestic problem
Haigin the sense that no one can conceive of the seriousness of this thing, and they just have another posture. But to ease into that, we can't just go-
NixonAll right, well we're going to do this- That's right.
KissingerAll right. We've got to tell the Soviets today,
NixonRight.
Kissingerthe direction in which we're moving here, is except to be of, of the Indian control.
NixonWell, that's still being a, a massive tribute.
KissingerAnd that is the, beyond the Indian subcontinent. What else do you do, we- We tell-
NixonSuppose the Chinese move and the Soviets threaten them, then what do we do?
KissingerWell, we've got to move, I think, beforehand, we have, with the Soviets. I see it, because
NixonYou think they'll go to war?
KissingerWe've got to step, come on.
NixonThey're at war, we'll be at war.
KissingerAs soon as the Chinese move, we have to tell them that.
NixonYeah.
KissingerWe can't tell them before the Chinese move, because that would look like collusion.
NixonThat's right. That's right. Okay.
NixonAll right, the message can get off, and, uh-
NixonOkay. Go look at that. I think that the message is in the right tone, but
Nixonif you don't like it, tell them to tone it down some. It's-
KissingerNo, I think now we have to strengthen it, Mr. President. Yeah.
NixonNot the message to Russia, I mean the public statement.
KissingerNo, well let me write it, and come right back.
KissingerYeah. But
Kissingerthey have never asked for agreement with us, and it would not, it would not be the second time.
KissingerIf it were not for peace, but we'll threw it out if it is.
NixonWell, of course, they may be telling us, well, why don't you move?
KissingerWell, and, in that case, they will let us- We already told them that we wouldn't move.
HaigI'll be there.
  • 016-077 8:23 AM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:23 am and 12:14 pm.
  • 635-001 8:23 AM · 54 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:23 am and 8:38 am.
  • 635-002 8:23 AM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:23 am and 8:38 am.
  • 637-001 8:32 AM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:32 am and 8:38 am.
  • 635-003 8:38 AM · 9 min — President Richard M.Nixon and Rose Mary Woods met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:38 am to 8:48 am.
  • 637-002 8:38 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 8:38 am.
  • 635-004 8:48 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:48 am and 9:10 am.
  • 635-005 8:48 AM · 30 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:48 am and 9:10 am.

Conversation 637-003, December 10, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417183021). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/637-003 (accessed November 20, 2026).