Nixon, Haig & Haldeman on Indo-Pakistani War and Vietnam War

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Yes, he is.

He's a pretty slippery fellow.

The ION has asked for it very strenuously, and I think it's a good thing.

I am playing low-key.

I'm just told it's a good idea.

All the actors take the picture.

That's good.

We don't want to play as a prime minister.

You see what I mean?

We don't take pictures of foreign ministers unless it's from NATO.

No, I don't.

Well, that's fine.

There's problems back at home with him, of course.

to how this is going to get unsorted.

He's going to make a strong power clock when he gets home.

How do we get it cut off for some time?

Does he know that it's not supposed to be a long appointment?

Yes, I'll tell him before he comes in that you have another meeting.

But I have to interact with him, as you know, as the economic minister here.

Do you want, what do you want with that?

I can do it in 30 or 20 minutes.

I think 20 minutes is all right.

All right, well, how long?

Eight or 20.

We've got about 20 minutes before he has to.

I think all he, he's nearly after, if I can say the least.

I'd like to give you more time.

As you know, the lieutenant's meeting here, and he has to be having discussions with your colonel.

Well, I guess the whole thing has come out of us.

We would expect the, I think probably, we're lucky that West Bank and Pakistan is completely destroyed already.

Very much so.

Well, some of the facts are coming out a little more clearly now.

It's pretty clear.

They wouldn't have made it.

The Westpacs just would not have made it.

They did try very hard in Kashmir, and they got flicked.

They really did, and they just couldn't break through.

There are also indications that the missile ships

the Soviets provided the Indians really were a very key military factor in the thing.

They were very precise in their missile firing.

They started fires with the Indian Air Force, which was the most capable, were able to just come in and keep burning.

Because at night they had these fires burning.

They fired from the sea.

From the sea.

And it's considerable upheaval now in West Pakistan.

Students are very, very upset with the Aliyah.

Because of the ceasefire?

Yes.

They want very strong Americans.

I think strong, strong Americans.

Why?

Because they think the Americans stood tall and stood taller than the Chinese and this and that.

rather interesting term.

The Chinese, I don't know, they didn't do a goddamn thing.

They didn't do anything, right?

No.

Well, they sent equipment.

They didn't move anything towards that border.

And I think that was the key point, that something was going to frighten them.

Maybe it was something that they could have done.

They had a barrier.

They are now totally paranoid about the Soviet.

They're scared to death?

Scared to death.

Well, fortunately, the Soviet is totally paranoid about them, too.

They're not scared, not as scared at the moment, but, uh, they are, uh...

It's a real...

I should read here that they're... Oh, there it was on the Soviet part.

I just talked to Walter as he went in there.

I saw the Chinese ambassador in Paris this morning.

He said the guy was just raving about the Soviet Union.

He was almost being compared.

Well, we have been, of course.

We've stood up in words.

I've been done a hell of a lot.

I didn't have much to do.

So move that fleet around.

That problem was a good idea, though, wasn't it?

It was a good idea, sir.

Yesterday, we got a request from the Saudis to port-ball.

of a nuclear-powered vessel.

These people have been totally anti-American.

Never wanted a vessel in the United States.

We did it.

We're going to do it.

We told them we'd do it.

Now, they're just scared of that.

We want this to end.

Now, I think we have damaged, limited this.

to the point where just about the maximum.

And I think with the Chinese, we're in great shape.

I think with the Soviets, there have been some bruises that are dangerous.

Dangerous in the sense that they .

Well, I think in one sense, they don't feel we played it properly.

And we, of course, know they didn't.

You mean they feel we didn't play it properly because of our public?

He went public there and banged on them so hard.

And really, their crimes are more in the earlier days than after we started our contact that we had to.

Yeah, actually, when Henry made his statement on the plane, which was the first, really, that was the first time of getting it on, so it was about done then, wasn't it?

That may have had some effect on him.

Yes.

What did we hear from them that you...

We haven't heard a word, and I think they're pouting.

Well, they've completely blocked any action with the U.N. around.

Yes, they have, and they continue to, and they hold pretty safe because they're resolute enough.

Right now, they're stalling out on anything.

I went down to the Charlie Starchy Reply in Mount Gandy, which has been delivered to me and the Ambassador this morning by Secretary Roger, and which we're on a schedule to release at 2 o'clock.

Do we think we should release it?

Henry thinks we should.

As of the last reading, I've had mixed emotions.

I wonder if it's worth it.

I mean, I wonder if it's worth it to screw around with the Indians and all that sort of thing.

Well, it says now that we are making it public, and I think we're committed to it now because of the letter.

It isn't vitriolic, but it does answer her public charges.

What we've done.

Yes.

Indicated what we have done.

That's right.

Well, if that's right, I don't care.

And it's good to keep her under guard because that ceasefire's got a hold, and there's still fighting going on in the West.

And they're making the big fuss from Delhi, and they're saying that the PACs are not abiding by it.

So we still got to move.

I'm confident it's going to pull, but there'll be two or three weeks of little infractions that could be used to blow up again, and I think we have to stay tough with their food spirit.

Coming back to the Soviet, of course, your view is

I'll let him take it the rest of the time.

Should the next move already be theirs?

I think since the next move is theirs, I think to a degree we can, uh, we should not take it on public anymore.

I agree.

What the hell, what good does it do now?

The only purpose of taking it on is to get it ceased by, I don't think it makes any difference who did what now.

They won.

Of course, that's the other side.

They won.

And what we've got, the only imagery we have to portray, and that's been done to the degree it should be done, is what the United States did in the interest of peace to get the fighting stopped.

I think that is out pretty well now.

It's very well understood by people who initially did not understand.

You know, it would be a flurry of individual file convulsions.

Oh, hell yes.

Sure, sure, sure, they'll go on.

Well, they're going to try to make Mrs. Gandhi look like the peace-loving, you know, she can't, well...

It ought to be a hard case to make, I suppose, since you start with a public opinion that leans in their direction and doesn't buy it.

They probably can't.

God Almighty, if some other country had done this, they'd never be present on it.

They'd never be the moralistic, sanctimonious creatures to the world, could they?

No.

But they did get away with it.

They did get away with it.

A double standard.

And we've had some increased activity.

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

I know it's the air, actually, because mine's the private air.

Now it's worse.

I think what we've got is the campaign in Laos starting about 30 days earlier than we had hoped it would.

And this time they've moved all the way to Jakarta and a massive amount of anti-aircraft.

I think they learned in the Laos operation last spring that they can be very effective with it.

So we've lost two T-28s today and three F-4s.

One of the F-4s was shot down by a MiG over Laos.

And the other two, one we think ran out of gas while it was trying to hover.

The other one, we don't know what happened to him.

Also, we lost a reconnaissance, an unarmed reconnaissance company has put that in.

Over the sand fire, he's thrown the North Vietnam into Laos.

Now, the Chiefs, of course, are chomping at the bit to go with this plan.

I've talked to Henry about it.

I really think this is a bad time to do it.

I think we should wait a week.

Well, we do it now.

It just escalates the war problem.

Yes.

And you can't do it right now.

People aren't ready for it.

They're not.

Not before Christmas.

You know what I mean?

People want Christmas.

That'll get them to let them.

I mean, so they're used to people losing a few crimes, right?

Well, I think we should start.

I think the Defense Department ought to say that this is an unacceptable step up in the activity.

But don't let it be at the defense level, not at the secret level.

No, no, no, it's not here.

Don't roll it out here so that everybody gets scared to death that Vietnam's going to explode again.

Sorry, now let it, let things be cool between now and Christmas.

No, no, I think we can't do it around the 26th.

Right after Christmas time we go to the

I can go down and see, uh, Brown.

And we just let him have it, I think.

The 26th, the 27th.

Okay, we just told the Chiefs to be ready then.

That's the time to do it, Al.

Yes, sir.

Well, I, I agree completely.

Henry does do the things that speak for him.

No, no, we mustn't do it now.

Looked like a knee-jerk reaction on our part because of the mission.

Mission?

Salvation, sure.

And, uh, it, but so we interpreted for the Russians.

Just give it a week.

There's a very strong action on this Cuban thing.

What?

We've got vessels out, but you know, the Panamanians said they didn't want our help.

We sure would.

So what are you doing anyhow in terms of having the forces there?

Not to engage, but we'll take the current action and only fire if we're fired on.

Right.

We have a right to have forces there.

There's one little hooker here, though.

You have to be aware.

I think we should be ready to act on these things.

They'll give us a provocation sometime and just knock the hell out of it.

Are you concerned that the rhetoric has gone too far by the Russians?

Well, I think it's at the point now where any more would be much too much.

I wouldn't say it's gone so far.

We were both acting in a vacuum.

We didn't know what they were doing, and they delayed so much that we couldn't take a chance, so we had to keep going.

Well, they were told that.

Yes, sir.

They have been told that.

That's what Ron's office told us, I understand.

In hindsight, I think we overplayed it a little bit.

Yeah.

Because they did act.

As I said, they were going to act.

But we overplayed it, frankly.

I think that the terror is the unintentional one.

The fact that we're complaining about it.

Absolutely.

That was the point.

Got any dope yet?

Yeah, the county says it's not going well at all.

There'll probably be no agreement today.

The Canadians are insisting on floating.

The real problem, the Japs, the finance minister hasn't even been in a meeting all morning.

The other guy has, but not the key guy.

And he's currently talking to Hull now.

They broke it for lunch.

So there's no real progress at all on trades.

But he said we didn't.

We were expecting maybe we'd have a trade agreement, but we wanted to be sure we had some focus on the trade.

He said, unless it breaks in an hour or two after lunch, we'll give up.

They've just taken a lunch break now, and they'll go back in, he said, about 3.30, somewhere between 3.15 and 4 o'clock.

they'll have a final decision as to whether they've got anything or not.

So the Germans have been the most helpful of any of them, but they've backed off from where they were last night, that Schiller called Braun, and Braun made him back off from where he had agreed last night.

So the Italians are the major problem, that they've taken a totally intractable hard line, that the most they will do is a 5.5% devaluation.

where everybody else has agreed to $38 an ounce, which would be $8.6.

He says, no one can figure out what the Italians are up to, but he says, I think they're voting right now in the election, again, and that they're afraid to do anything.

He said, we would be perfectly happy to go without it.

We don't give a damn, really, about the Italians.

But he says, the problem is the French and the UK apparently won't go without the Italians.

So they're hung up there.

He says, that one seems to be the insoluble problem.

He says, we're driving as hard as we can.

I was wrong.

He is not here.

He is at the economic community and has been screwing things up from the French side from there.

It wasn't what he was doing here.

It was what he was doing there and then getting back to, what's his name here?

But I'll bring him in about 25 until then.

We're ready.

Sure.

He said, he's not discouraged, he says, you know.

He said, we're grinding them hard, they're sitting tight.

He said, we've just got to see.

That's what he said.

He said, if we don't get it, we should give up.

We should close them down now and call another meeting, set another meeting, and let them go back.

Of course, the Italians said, get the election behind, and that ain't change.

Should the market break?

That's all right.

Yeah?

He's kind of puzzled by that.

Italians, he says,

They're just saying that the Japs and the Canadians are very disappointing, yeah.

If he wants to get any help with the Germans, Henry can go far, you know.

He said he's not worried about, he said they backed off some from where they were, but he's not, that's not the problem.

And he says, there's no real progress.

They're all plain and slow in the whole thing.

They're all just kind of... Well, the important thing is for him to end the day in the event we don't make a deal.

If you well understand that with the statement that we've made progress, there's not going to be another meeting on that deal.

You see what I mean?

He must not end the day and say, throwing up our hands.

All that sort of thing.

But it has been a very constructive meeting.

We still have a lot to work on.

We decided to have another meeting on this.

Such and such a day.

And in the meantime, we've got to work on recalcitrant people.

We can't do anything with the Canadians apparently.

And you may want to talk to them.

They're going to

Secretary Connolly, please.

Okay.

Nixon, Haig & Haldeman on Indo-Pakistani War and Vietnam War

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on December 18, 1971

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