Nixon, Bhutto & Raza on Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and Geopolitics

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All the wine goes through the nose and comes through the teeth.

I've asked her a lot of times, and she's not even surprised.

What have you settled in here, Doc?

I think this is more comfortable in there.

Thank you.

Picture of the big white water.

Yes, but you can stop doing that right there.

That makes sense.

So I had to take it up to him.

That's all right.

You've been through a very, very agonizing experience.

That's enough.

His speech in the U.S. was very moving.

So you told him about your son.

Well, I'd rather let you take your status for me, as the so-called former Yankee Green Columnist.

Rather, I want to thank you for the opportunity and your invitation.

Well, I hope the chemistry with me will become decent, and with your prayers and blessings and cooperation between us,

I think we can still make a difference.

We can start anew.

You said the vision, the determination.

And I would like to see some part of that in terms.

Because we want to have peace in some way.

We are two of the poorest countries in the world.

And we've made a fool of ourselves.

We've made a fool of ourselves.

And we've made a fool of ourselves.

And we've made a fool

And then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then, and then,

I hope I don't make any more mistakes.

The first mistake I made was when, in 1950, he was investing in L.M.K.

Sanders.

I was supposed to be one of his first-year students.

That was the biggest mistake I made.

I don't want to make such a mistake again.

I have a student there that we have admired for a very, very long time.

We have handled problems.

I met you in 1954 when you came as vice president.

It has been an honor to meet you again, and we know that you're a man of determination, and you'll see the future with clarity.

Yes, sir.

I speak in personal territory.

You were not there at the time, but when I was in Afghanistan in 1963 and 1964, I didn't accept you.

Excuse me one moment.

I'll get this coffee.

Stay right where you are.

Push the button here and get some coffee.

Order me some too.

Yes, sir.

I just think you're closing the critical point of this group of ten meetings, isn't it?

Unfortunately, it won't.

That's what we're trying to do, right?

It tells the, uh, better than sorry.

The scenario keeps changing.

I don't know why they do that, but it changes.

Yes, we keep going.

Better than in the end.

It's hard.

The professor here is very active and effective in the vigil and voting.

Why are we doing this work for every revolution?

Do you need a tournament?

The other video's a PG.

I wish that I could play well in it, but I'm dead.

What if you don't play well in it?

I'm dead.

Listen, we have a small work to take care of.

Prior to the press release.

You want to talk to them about this problem?

They brought five or six employees from Iran.

Who was the President of the United States?

The President.

He is the President of the United States.

And they are talking about it to you.

You know, our problem is that press corps.

I'm sure the Chinese have never seen anything like that.

If you hear anything from your embassy on the internal developments, I'd appreciate it if you could

I heard reports this morning that there's been a continuation of fighting in the West.

Some reports I saw, I just saw a report with the students.

Well, I can't get to that.

I told you to get on that.

You know, I like to get to that.

forces for every action to be helpful to us in this great

Come on, hear what he's saying.

What did he have to say?

Revenge, counter-revenge, a spiral of revenge.

Revenge, counter-revenge.

I am surprised by this so-called guerrilla talking.

It's unquestionably like this.

They don't do it when the angels make them humiliate them like that.

The Japanese surrender to the American forces.

Well, uh, we, uh, where's...

You will return now to Rotterdam, will you?

Yes.

And then the problem really is to get the country back on solid footing.

Yes, you have to set the direction.

You have to set the direction.

You have to motivate yourself.

You have to think back.

You have to think, yes, this is something.

You have to come to this position.

And the only two points I'd like to make is you have to have one in your mind.

The first is that it's not really an Indian-Pakistan conflict.

Here, a very vital principle has been violated, a principle for which two world wars were fought, and international matters, society merged with international relations.

based on civilized norms.

This is going back, this is going back on into the gun hold diplomacy, this is going to open up the bank, all of the costs for every country, that a country can go and occupy another country by force, impose its will, interpret the internal thinking of that country,

take advantage of the mistakes of an internal affair, and here we were not pitched against the ATF, we were pitched against the Soviet Union.

And the Soviet Union wants to reverse Cuba at our cost.

And after ten years, a ruthless neighbor of ours has found an opening to come and restore the prestige at the cost of the people of Pakistan.

And she wants to show the Third World that we are the real leaders of the Third World.

And the whole matter of the Middle Eastern situation you are too familiar with.

I want to repeat it to your friends.

So Russia is now in the subcontinent.

If the Russians are going to do this, then this germ of cessation will spread very fast.

And secondly, this feeling that he succeeds like that, many other countries will get on the back-back, on the Soviet back-back.

It has to be stopped.

It has to be had.

What are the reasons?

a strong position, and we did as strong as we could, was that we saw this as being much bigger than the struggle between two countries.

It's a very sad struggle.

It's sad what happened in East Pakistan.

It's very sad that India and Pakistan, the Jews, have had this terrible conflict for so many years.

have diverted so much of their resources against it to build it up against each other rather than handling their own problems and so forth.

But those who simply see this in terms of India and Pakistan, this is the mark.

If you just see it that way, then it's $600 million.

It's $130 million.

So you're on the side of the six.

But that's not a disturbing thing to a certain extent.

to a certain degree, it's basically talking about morality and moral position.

But that's something else.

That was what Merger Stalin said on the division.

So he had to go a little about any of that.

Our position here, which is, you know, he takes a lot of heat for what the administration has in this country, particularly in the Martin's magazines, Times, and so forth, the New York Times, and the establishment press.

Our position has been widely criticized because they said, look, you're lining up with basically a non-democratic country against a democratic country.

And second, you're lining up on the losing side against the winning side.

And third, you're lining up, same with the second point, you're lining up with a smaller number of people against a larger number of people.

Now, all that is beside the point in my view.

But what really is involved here

If you make decisions on the basis of the size of the country, then all morality, all the basis for international order is out the window.

If you make decisions on the basis of what a country's system of government may be, rather than what it does, then morality goes out.

If a democratic country does something that is wrong, it's just as wrong as if a non-democratic country

The third point, though, which is very important, is that there must not be developed around the world the acceptance of the idea that where one nation disapproves of other nations' internal policies because it affects them directly or indirectly, that it can move on the other nation.

If that is accepted,

the problem is that it could become a raging virus.

That's the way you see it.

Thank you.

Thank you, sir.

And secondly, in politics, you're a pragmatist.

It's not the arithmetic of numbers.

It's the logic of politics.

Mr. Campbell did not talk in those terms, because they were in the clouds.

But you're on your feet on the ground.

You're in the subconscious.

The performance of power, if it is shifted in this fashion,

it's going to create chaos and orgy in the whole of that region.

And when such a terrible war would have been fought over a small country like Vietnam, it's a subordinate belt that has been in significance.

But tomorrow, what we have ahead of us is either we live as impeccable enemies, fighting for another thousand years from house to house, plot to plot, or we turn a new chapter in our relations.

India will be knocking at your door, begging for your help, because all this is the sound of the world.

And only the United States has the resources and the power to clean that sound.

If we talk it, it can be cleaned.

So you have, I don't think, anything very important on that, Mr. President.

You know the Indians prepare.

They will come and they stick their chest out after this victory.

They've won after 700 years.

And they can be very mean conquerors.

Well, this is not the final story.

They look at it like that.

But it's going to upset the whole structure of the government.

And it's a heavy progression in Afghanistan, it's a heavy progression in Iran, it's a heavy progression in Burma.

I am listening to Iran, Iran, Iran, all these things.

I am saying that I will come and explain it to you.

I will come and explain it to you.

The United States is a vast space.

I will explain it to you.

I am taking the long view rather than the short view.

Well, anybody who's welcome.

looking at it 10 or 15 years ago, would not want to have the Chinese to have bad memories, or unpleasant memories, because they are not, let's face it, they don't have the strength now, particularly with their concern about their Soviet border, they don't have the strength to take any other problems on their plate.

Give them 15 years, it could be a different story right now.

If you try to do the task, then you will find yourself.

That's in the India side.

Why the India side?

Well, I don't know.

Nobody can be such a killer.

They're moving along.

Nobody can be such a killer.

They're the Chinese people or evil people.

They're the most people in any country in the world.

Third, they've got some great resources.

So, in the end, they're going to be a great power.

That's the point.

This is a stigma they came up with.

Basically, that's the stigma.

So, even what's not effective, tell them that thing.

But we have to pick up the pieces.

We need all your blessing and support.

We are very, as I said, we're saddened by the events.

We're saddened.

We don't like to see Pakistanis killed.

We don't like to see Indians killed.

Either one.

In that sense, there is a concern for both.

On the same token, in the case of a respected member of the world community,

I think it's very important for a country's integrity to be respected.

That's why we hope the ceasefire continues so that it doesn't wear down the grain.

No matter how brave your people are, you just don't have stuff.

And then after that, beyond that, looking to the future, economically and otherwise, there has to be a strength in the country.

May I say on our part, as you know, we are very limited in what we can do because of the compression of conditions.

On the other hand, on the economic side, I want you to know that we will

I praise your age very sympathetically.

As you know, I reversed an attitude toward Pakistan since I've been in office.

Not much, but at least it's changed some.

And at this point,

If you can build, basically, if you can live and let live a society down there, the United States will be prepared to help.

I mean, and we are told that our commissioner, Secretary Rogers, is going to be doing the same thing, that we will examine the situation very recently, and we will...

Knowing that you suffered a lot, you probably had quite a lot of rebuilds.

How much damage have you done?

Mr. President, there goes one other matter which I want to talk about a few minutes.

There might be some people in the lobbies who might start to talk about Bangladesh, recognition of Bangladesh, etc.

I think, I know your position most well, and you're a global power.

Let us first try to negotiate with anybody we can, with all options open.

If the world moves hastily on this matter, not only could we be endorsing the Indian invasion and the dismantlement of my country in this way, but if this can be definitely done, I can ask you to believe that there is a possibility of a negotiation between the Maharashtrian side and the Indian side.

We have given our political request to Pakistan, my party, but you're going to be the majority in our opinion.

It's an argument that there is a chance, but you're trying to try it.

But I want to first vote the people, travel with the people and then bypass the law.

I want their consent, I want their approval, I want to test their facts of life, as to how we stand.

I have not been able to make a commitment to the High Court, but once I make a commitment, I have to keep it.

So I can't say anything here now.

You don't know what I'm going to ask?

Exactly what I'm going to ask.

I have a month to go to the people, talk to them, restore the dialogue, pick up their morale, all these things, and then go step by step on these things.

But I don't know how our position has been, Mr.

Sergeant General.

I told you we have property in the institution.

Now we have property in the institution.

We have a present plan to do so.

That's the state I watch right now.

You can move it on the humanitarian side according to your free traditions.

That's a different matter.

And then they'll appreciate it more as well.

It tells them quite clearly that we are in search of a lasting solution.

I think in terms of the humanitarian side, there are a rare, you know, both sides of the border should be through the UN, not through a government.

But if you do it yourself, you don't want to do it.

I have to explain more deeply, sir.

Well, I'm thinking that, well, yes, the difficulty is that we do it ourselves.

uh, bilateral with the government, and, uh, return all the money, and that'd give more structural government, you see, uh, well, they could, they could be examined, but, uh, you know, what's, for example, how do you, how do you get a, you know, East Pakistan, or, uh, you know, two, there are two ways of that.

You already have some agencies that, that, and, and, in fact, more of those agencies do that.

Because they must know that we are the proponent of the sanctity of the United States.

As we put up more than the rest of the world combined, by all of your talk, we need to turn some of the things down there in the United States.

We've done this much, and we're glad we can.

And as a Secretary of State, the initiative should be not anxious, because now the Indians will try to seize the initiative.

And the Indians should be told that now you have imposed your will by force,

to bring about the Bangladesh, what do you say, the people of East Pakistan, what is it?

What are you doing about Kashmir?

It's only to throw the onus, because I am knowing them as well as we all know them.

After a little respite, they say Pakistan withdraws from the ceasefire line and all these new things.

So the world is in your eye.

You have to use force to go into the war and to interpret your way and say what do they want you to do.

There are all sorts of problems there.

You can't have probate and retrograde at the same time.

So it will put the onus, shift the onus.

And then I think also the medical, the political, technical problems must be taken into account.

We all have in mind all of these concerns.

Our major goal would be first to help people who are in a humanitarian or other way, but second also to

contribute to peace and stability in the area, and that means the right of each nation to survive, to contribute to and to have its integrity without being taken off by another nation.

These are just critical, good words, how we can contribute, but how we contribute remains to be seen.

That is the position we're taking.

And I think I'm

And it would be important for you to convey to your people the importance of the message I have here, particularly because you're a person of God, and we've seen it in the Christus, and today's message I have here.

in this power and very deep trouble that is keeping up with the spirit.

It's very hard.

But they must not, they must not feel that as a result of the agonizing experience that they've been through.

They're always lost because they lose their spirit.

They don't celebrate it.

How do you feel about it?

Are they going to keep the spirit up?

Well, that's not the time.

It's basically your fault.

But if you can, I've done my best with that.

You've used it so much that you've learned it perfectly.

Well, I wish you well and that you extend my best to all of our friends in Pakistan.

When you want to survive, you want to help people, for example, you can.

But it's not like it's our job, and you shouldn't.

We do it, we say, you know, the so-called next to the doctor, you know.

They think it's a win to get out of Asia.

It isn't at all.

It's the only way to stay in because it's based on the assumption that the United States, rather than going in and furnishing the arms and the aid and everything else, furnishes the men also.

We can't do that.

It's a different matter.

What we are doing now, we will help others to know themselves.

It's a different matter then.

The problem is that we want to, but basically it's self-respecting nations.

We must have a deep belief in each other ourselves.

We want to give the child a little destiny, a thread, or a meaning.

We want to help others to help themselves, rather than to come hanging with a circle.

we know best who are our fellows because we know our group.

Thank you.

bargaining, well, actually not so much bargaining, in this case, but the social, so people are bargaining with each other, very rarely, for instance, in our philosophy, but we think it's important to start the communication, to start the dialogue.

You'll find both quite different stories in Chinese.

Yes, very different.

I'm a writer.

You're a writer.

I'm a writer.

You're a writer.

Oh, I can be a campaign manager if you want me in 1972.

Oh, I can give you...

This is a presidential complex.

I know President Yalga has one.

Thank you.

that what was the saddest Christmas, and I thought it would be after the elections in 1968 when I lost her first.

I said, no, not at all.

I said, the tendency, once you lose, is to oppose the family together.

And it was not an unhappy Christmas.

It was the family that was supposed to be together.

We felt closer than we had because of the leap.

Now, in your case, that could also be the case.

So, you may be happy to have your time each day.

But only if you've got an introduction.

Only a little luck.

And I'm going to give you a test of your, of a nation, of a person, of a style, you know, that's what it is.

And then if you come back to my funeral, you're going to have to give it up for you.

Now, you're going to turn your life around.

You're not going to see your brother die excited.

No, you're not.

Nixon, Bhutto & Raza on Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and Geopolitics

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on December 18, 1971

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