Nixon & Haig on Indo-Pakistani War and Soviet-US Relations

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That's exactly right.

He turned the whole attitude in the Security Council.

But, what he just said now is all true.

Just as true as it could be.

What happens to that subcompact if the Indians get away with this?

And they gobble up, in a sense, you know, some of our underclassmen and take them all, won't they?

Yeah, I've got some of them.

Don't you agree?

Yes, I do.

I think this is it.

That's the way the Indians are anyway.

They're an aggressive type.

This has got to be such a, they don't like our, our, this is like, because we're non-white, and we don't want the whites to know.

It doesn't justify, it didn't justify the fact the whites did it.

It was just wrong.

It doesn't make, the moral record, non-whites do it.

No one whites do it.

But she believes it does.

Oh, they're so damn racist.

They have always been.

They've always been against us on that issue.

But God, even the last 20 years, he carries a load over there and they fill it up.

He's going to take it over.

He's intelligent.

He's ruthless.

Who knows?

He may do well.

He'll develop some great passions in that country, that's for sure.

Well, I think...

Yes, but I think with respect to that man and Pakistan in general, that the United States has commanded us very, very well.

He said that he's

His whole attitude yesterday with Bush, he said, America has been very strong in this.

Yeah.

And it didn't matter.

Well, he said, he said, we believe in the death.

We are going to change my feelings about it.

He said, I wasn't an American before, and I said, she was.

There were reasons, but when they went to the Chinese, I think they saw some of this coming.

But whatever the reasons may be, now the important thing is to stop it.

But this is the way to handle it.

You can build it up and have a little of it.

What is it, uh, the, uh... Do you have any further thoughts on the Soviet thing?

As in, do you say, do you express concern about the, uh, whatever, uh, present posture of the rhetoric?

You ever thought as to some way to keep it cool at this point?

Like, uh...

My view, of course, about this sort of a thing is much like a poker game.

I mean, there are times when you have a loss and you've got to cut your losses.

And we don't want to continue to show people a bad time.

Now, my own view is on this, that, frankly, the less time we continue to talk about Indian Pakistan and all the rest, the better.

I don't agree that the Serb wants to get out of the fact that we've done the right thing in the race.

He doesn't want to forget it.

We don't know for that.

Well, basically, basically, I'm going to distract you.

When you have won something and really want it, then you want to get out and start getting targeted.

I'm very involved, and all you've done is cut your losses and fatigue.

Hell, I don't think we want to continue to remind the people of our role in this kind of an action.

I don't think it's anything too bad.

Actually, I think we took a very bad hand and played it reasonably well.

But I think the best thing now is for everybody to fight it out and not say much more about it.

What do you think?

That's exactly what I think.

and it's too dynamic yet to start talking in any event because all the what will be the final outcome of this is hard to say it may turn it may turn in our to our benefit i don't think it will

And I think we've got other places now that we've got to look for trouble.

We've got to watch the Middle East.

But what can they do in the Middle East?

Like what?

Well, I think there's going to be a great resurgence in Egypt.

Here the Soviets have sponsored an action for the Indians.

The Tans come now and sponsor the action for them.

They've proven that if the Soviets can neutralize the outside powers, as they did in India, it's time for the Soviets to neutralize the United States and provide that mantle for their action.

And, of course, they're going to need more than a difference in picture.

could live and the evictions cannot.

That's the point.

I think we're talking in terms of not this year, we're talking in terms of later.

It can be difficult to become over-emotional about it in that respect.

This is a perspective that's not quite there because basically it's, he says it's just like, he says it's exactly like the desolation.

No, no.

The basic difference is that it's different.

That's right.

Because there, there they were back in the winter

Here, they're back in elusive.

Now, that's true, because we've just got to be sure that they don't get any false hopes.

When you talk about the anti-soap, we have to be able to continue to play the game of maintaining the balance.

Because in a dab, in the space of an anti-soap, you couldn't possibly get the injection.

It's not even starting.

That was the action.

That was the drill with the heater.

It just happens not to suck anymore.

Well, I think the ammo in arms we can adjust right now.

We've got more than we can adjust, and they can fight intelligently.

But if the Soviets thought for a minute that they could play the air protection, that they could provide the air cover, we'd have a tough go.

Oh, if the Soviets, you mean, themselves, I mean.

And that's a possibility, and that's where some of it, these are the stakes involved in our rolling over and playing dead here in South Asia, and we didn't.

And I think that's from the, they'll know that the United States, my God, if we would risk what we risked in South Asia, I think we've gained something in the Middle East as a result of this.

I think it will be bad now.

I'm worried that we don't start another round.

I see the department starting to talk again about more discussions because they're going to stalemate.

What will happen is there's going to be a rise of expectations and total disappointment because that stall happened in two to three weeks, four weeks, and greater frustrations in Egypt.

I think we ought to go very, very slowly on that until the summit's over.

At the summit, right, right.

Anyways, regarding the soldiers, I agree that they're killing.

They're kicking around.

So although, basically, I must say,

Looking at the Soviet behavior here, rhetoric-wise, they've been very restrained.

Very.

Very restrained.

Which must be a decision.

Rhetoric-wise, we could not.

I guess the reason is that all we had was rhetoric.

And they had the forces.

That they must know.

I think that there was a tendency to, that Henry became so emotionally involved in that, you know, watching every 12 hours or 14 hours or 24 hours and so forth, that

We may have not looked as balanced in the Soviet as we could in this whole exercise.

What do you think?

Well, I mean, there was not a message.

We called and we do this.

I understand why it was done.

I'm afraid to believe that we aren't getting our point across.

Yet, in retrospect, I think the point was across.

It's always like the point was across at the time I had the meeting with the agriculture minister, but that the Soviets could not believe it, that they just weren't getting their goddamn attention from the Indians.

I think it took a long time to get the Indians to come around.

I think they must have, I think they wanted the Indians to knock off the dock off the floor.

Oh, absolutely.

But I'm not, I'm not, I'm not, I'm not, I'm not, some of our later protestations were too effective.

Well, I don't think they were.

No, I think the deal was, and we had an intelligence report on Thursday, that in order to get

the Indian guarantee that they would not go on in the West.

They had to wait until the Bacca fell.

They had to assure Gandhi that they would immediately recognize the Bacca.

And they've already started in that direction.

I think Sonia's had a problem.

She's not easy.

Oh, sir.

She was told not to go at all.

But she did come.

Well...

But one thing that it all has done is it showed the Soviets that we're not going to be patsies no matter where it is, and that one side is not going to take advantage of it.

Yeah, they just as well need to recover their head, frankly.

The Soviet gets irritated and tells us, I don't know, to increase their situation.

Soviet?

I don't think they will.

Well, particularly, you know, they'll put us totally in the Chinese bag then.

They want this?

Yeah.

And the Chinese know they can put us in the Soviet bag.

If we didn't have those two things going, we'd be in a hell of a shape.

That's right.

But at the present, I would say that certainly the Chinese must feel better.

I think we feel better.

And that was really the difficult part of this whole exercise, is how we could do what we knew had to be done and not the other way, either the Soviets irreparably or the Chinese irreparably.

And we managed to keep them both on track with a greater cost to the Soviets.

So our whole plan was to say, not anymore.

Is that right?

Tell everybody to calm down.

Getting back to the

the North Vietnamese thing.

It may be that they're just deciding on maybe to knock over Laos.

That may be their limited objective at this point, for this season, what do you think?

I think Laos and Cambodia, which is really a manifestation of their weakness, but it happens to be also the toughest thing for us to manage.

Sure.

But I think, I don't think they're going to knock over either one, but I think they're going to give us a big step back.

Well, I think they're going to knock over either one.

I think he should become a figurehead and get out of things.

He just seems to be emotionally unable to do that.

Well, they've got the doctor looking at him this week, and, uh... Well, he's done all right, sir.

He's not aggressive.

He's capable, but not aggressive.

It did take some heat off.

They moved two of the regiments of that division back into Chuck.

But they left the real tough regiment, 271, right along Route 6, and I think we're going to get some more trouble this week.

That's the...

But it did, it got the other two, had to go back to protect the place where the Arvin were operating.

So we still got some work to do there.

I don't know what you're going to do, but I'm going to...

Air powers.

Oh, they're usually massive air, but that's not going to solve it.

It helps, but it's not the answer.

Jesus Christ.

I wonder about air power.

I've got to read that big command-a-day about the Civil War.

It doesn't mean anything at all about air power.

It's especially helpful with the army because they've learned how to use it.

Cambodians don't know how to use it.

They don't know how to

control it and bring it in close and use it like they would artillery.

And frankly, where in the earlier days when there were no Cambodians, just enemy, we could be more indiscriminate about it.

Now we've got troops all around and you can kill your own people unless it's properly controlled.

So it's less effective now than it was two years ago in Cambodia.

we will be prepared you can uh you can get the word to uh the trump to change that uh the time to hit is incredibly precious i think that's the best job i do too i think anything now would be a very bad stuff it's a good time

That's what you've got.

They won't expect that here.

No, I don't think they'll expect this kind of a SOC, for instance, a three-day SOC up as far as Bend, including no civilian targets, of course, but there are some good military targets around Bend.

I don't know how close that we have to get before I understand it.

And then we would also include this South Vietnamese offshore rocketing, which is a good thing for them, too.

They're squealing like pigs about postponement of Paris.

That really got their attention.

I think we should have gotten their attention.

My feeling is that those, that pair of socks, they are two for them and one for us all the time.

I mean, we are just, what the Christ has done to the dogs.

Nothing.

Nothing but just delay.

What are these, we're, we're, we're postponing peace.

You know, I think we'll have a response for you on this.

I don't, I think they were going to make some kind of an initiative, which would have been a propaganda initiative and they haven't had a chance to do it.

And we pushed it off two weeks right after that.

Yes, sir.

Now Porter's done a superb job over there.

He's done exactly what you're supposed to do.

He's done very good.

He speaks well and everything.

And that makes sense from them and not, you know, I don't know, they've been delaying and handling and filibustering and so we're just going to sit there and take it.

I think that gets their attention.

I do too, because they don't want to lose that.

And probably before.

Talk, talk, fight, fight.

It's the old, you know, they did that in Korea.

I didn't postpone it.

I had no good soccer that Christmas.

Maybe that's in the background.

I must say, I had the possibility to go to New York City.

I went there and talked to my son.

Well, I've never trusted the Soviet side.

I think the Soviets are the real mischief-makers.

I think that this India-Pak family

It's not a strength in us with China.

Because China has seen its weakness dramatically.

It's got to recoup.

The only way it can recoup is by moving closer to us.

And they really may be more helpful.

They now see a new threat.

Uncle Sam's no longer the threat.

It's the Indians and the Soviet-backed Indians.

So I have a feeling we're going to get some benefits from this with the Chinese, which in turn will translate themselves into benefits in Laos and Cambodia.

That's one of the few benefits of this exercise, but I really think we will realize some help from it.

Can you just wait a while?

Yes, sir.

Nixon & Haig on Indo-Pakistani War and Soviet-US Relations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on December 18, 1971

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