Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 642 › Conversation 642-015

Nixon, Kissinger & Woods on SALT and Vietnam War

Monday, January 3, 1972 · 9:25 AM–10:04 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Woods, Rose Mary; Bull, Stephen B.Conversation642-015 on Tape 642 (tape position 02:33:23–03:12:35)StartMonday, January 3, 1972 at 9:25 AMEndMonday, January 3, 1972 at 10:04 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 642-015 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate strategy for the upcoming SALT negotiations and a planned foreign policy speech regarding Vietnam. They discussed maintaining a firm negotiating position on ABM and SLBM weapon systems while managing public perception and potential domestic political criticism during an election year. Additionally, the President issued a directive requiring all U.S. diplomatic contacts with Bangladesh to be cleared through the White House to avoid jeopardizing sensitive relations with China.

Download MP3 (part 1) · 167.6 MB ·Download MP3 (part 2) · 168.6 MB ·Download MP3 (part 3) · 148.0 MB

This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 02:33:23 into the tape and ends around 03:12:35.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
2:33:23Yeah, I think they're going to kill him.
2:33:25They're going to kill him.
2:33:55If you don't mind, in the background, do that.
2:34:01Yeah.
2:34:05Well, did you prepare?
2:34:07But, I'm telling you, you prepared.
2:34:08Because I know, I know, since I was in England years ago, that there might be a different option.
2:34:17But...
2:34:27Yeah, yeah.
2:35:33I thought the way the news played your interview yesterday made it even stronger.
2:35:40I mean, they picked out all the strong parts.
2:35:42I don't know whether you saw it this morning.
2:35:45They mentioned both withdrawal and residual force.
2:35:51Very respectful.
2:35:52The CalPRA was very respectful this morning.
2:35:56We've got a little problem on the bill, because I have one over here, and one over here, that has to do with the .
2:36:07What I'd like to do is .
2:36:11I told Bill about to come .
2:36:14He comes in.
2:36:25He wants your final position on ABM.
2:36:27I've never been there to him.
2:36:52Besides, I don't think you should get much found on APN, because we've already gone a long way towards that.
2:36:58It makes no difference at all.
2:37:04I'd like to get some thought for it.
2:37:14I wouldn't even say there won't be any final position, Mr. President, because you've just leaked it.
2:37:22I would say you're selling the president very carefully.
2:37:25I'll say that I have a problem with the defense.
2:37:44Well, no, he's already dealing with them because they've got their own fish to fry.
2:37:48I've got to get more up with them.
2:37:50I would just say you're studying it.
2:37:52It's a tough problem.
2:37:54And you let him know.
2:37:55What?
2:37:55What?
2:37:57Why don't you say what you can't do?
2:38:01Well, I think you can tell him that he can tell them that it should be a treaty.
2:38:10for ABM and an executive agreement for a venture, that the SLBM should be in terms of two rather than in terms of both.
2:38:18These are two major things.
2:38:22Are the other things you want them to go on the present line for a while longer?
2:38:26until we let him out.
2:38:27That is the best thing to do.
2:38:30Under those circumstances, you've got to get a win-win bill here.
2:38:35So that he knows that we're treating him differently.
2:38:37Because he's got an idea of his position.
2:38:40And if he doesn't, he's right in the hand.
2:38:42He's right out there.
2:38:44This falls to him.
2:38:45This falls to him.
2:38:51Well, he's going to be annoyed later.
2:38:54Now, uh...
2:38:58Well, you know, you're told this bill is launching and I'm, this happens to be one that's so complex that he doesn't understand it, so I'm not that eager to get him into too much of the line of command on it, but whether he'll be in on one meeting or not doesn't make any difference.
2:39:22It's not a message.
2:39:36Well, Laird is playing such a crooked game.
2:39:41As always, he has a bewildering series of memoranda here.
2:39:48One of them is that he wants three ABM sides.
2:39:52Another is that he wants to go for an NCA defense now, defense of Washington.
2:40:00Uh, another is .
2:40:01. .
2:40:18And I think I can, the Soviets have already asked for a recess on the 20th.
2:40:26Now Smith thinks he can talk them out of it.
2:40:44And I don't think you should show any eagerness for a recess, because I think I can position Antonio to ask for it, so you are not the villain.
2:40:54Smith's line is, every verification panel meeting, Smith says, I just want to make sure now that the president is installing this for the summit.
2:41:04Because if Kennedy were the president, he should be installing it.
2:41:09I always say, no, your instructions are to get it as fast as possible.
2:41:13But of course, if Kennedy were the president, the whole content bureaucracy would be stalling it for the summit.
2:41:18That's just so.
2:41:20For example, why didn't we stall for the summit?
2:41:24So that he can get the credit.
2:41:26He is running for re-election this year, Mr. President.
2:41:29I was so excited that we were going to go on these two things.
2:41:40That's all you have to do now.
2:41:58I think you are going to have a major problem.
2:42:00Certainly, I've got a cable from Sunca.
2:42:06I think we can go almost any time we want to.
2:42:10He'd prefer it after the 15th, but that's our plan anyway.
2:42:14I don't mean on true control of the peace plan.
2:42:17And he'll let, and he thinks that you will let us do the whole plan.
2:42:20The what?
2:42:25He'll let you do the whole plan?
2:42:28That you will let us put out the whole plan.
2:42:34What is your voice for these people when you speak?
2:42:38Yeah.
2:42:41I think, well, you know, I could give an hour's back on the record for all we care.
2:42:48Which, for the sophisticates, is going to be devastating, and I think I ought to do it probably anyway.
2:42:55But I think you ought to do it to tell it in a speech which could really be about death.
2:43:01This is what we've done.
2:43:02This is what we've offered.
2:43:04This is our answer.
2:43:0619th.
2:43:0719th is good.
2:43:09Well... Yeah, I know.
2:43:10If you do it Tuesday night, one would have to do it at night.
2:43:17That would be more than in Paris.
2:43:40Doesn't get them.
2:43:42But you know you have trained SEALs in the...
2:43:45There are two trained SEALs who will reply.
2:43:53On the other hand, if we deal with the press intelligently on this, and this is one that we can really make a massive effort on, you ought to be able to get some favorable press also.
2:44:10What I thought, Mr. President, but I don't know whether that's possible, is whether the State of the Union could be put off until either Friday or the following Monday.
2:44:42The advantage, I see the advantage of having two days in between.
2:44:51The advantage of the evening of the 19th is that they cannot possibly have anything ready for the session on the 20th.
2:45:04But on the other hand,
2:45:10Oh, it will, it will knock their eyes out.
2:45:13But I wouldn't touch through the peace plan, I would go through some of the history of it.
2:45:22Because that's what will give the peace plan some meaning, then it isn't that you've just dreamt up a peace plan.
2:45:29But you've had a consistent policy for a whole year.
2:45:32Why don't you get all back in there, too?
2:45:34Oh, please.
2:45:35The idea is to be, you know, right at the point that I don't want to do it on my own.
2:45:48And I don't want to do it on my own.
2:45:54No, the point would be this.
2:45:57I believe myself, Mr. President, that if we keep this secret as we can, that the impact will be so shocking that it isn't going to be very easy to piss on it, because here were the people who were saying you didn't respond to the second point, and it will prove we anticipated the second point.
2:46:16Here are the people who said you didn't set a deadline.
2:46:18You've been setting a deadline.
2:46:20I mean, it will take them more than a day to recoup from this state.
2:46:23You know, the people who say that we are fighting for you and you have over the design.
2:46:29That's awful.
2:46:30I think it would be very well if the parents would be able to make a new shot, John.
2:46:36I think, however, I would rather not have.
2:46:39Well, a little hope comes out of this one.
2:46:42Your mom.
2:46:43I think there are a lot of tension in the first place.
2:46:52I think it's amazing.
2:46:54It's amazing.
2:46:55I think you and I are going to be able to do it.
2:46:59We're going to do it.
2:47:02That's the other thing.
2:47:06If you make your sense of the Union in the evening or at noon, then I think maybe the 20th.
2:47:15I mean, then maybe the 19th and 20th.
2:47:23Because even if they piss on it by the time the particular report gets here, even if they come right back,
2:47:32They just can't get organized that fast.
2:47:40But I'm not so sure they're going to fix on it.
2:47:43They have.
2:47:48I think the Soviet strategy is to demonstrate that the Chinese aren't capable of doing anything.
2:48:12No, no, but you do it for yourself.
2:48:22You don't do it with your left back.
2:48:48It's a monster.
2:48:49It's a monster.
2:49:05The advantage of the picture is that it gives you another peace story.
2:49:19The disadvantage of the picture is that it may make you regret and think we're getting to the crisis again.
2:49:24But we've done through that before.
2:49:32On the whole, I'd be in favor of the pictures.
2:49:36You see, they're really, really long.
2:49:38Tremendous, and it's covered beautifully in the dress.
2:49:46And each little fluff that she just raised her glass and her toes, it's written in a very fluffing way.
2:49:56I mean, it makes her more human.
2:50:00I mean, it made a good story.
2:50:01I mean, normally they wouldn't cover a ghost at all.
2:50:05Everyone says with what poise and elegance he handled it.
2:50:10I think it's a terrific thing.
2:50:15Put it back to this thing on salt.
2:50:20I wouldn't give you more than half an hour, Mr. President.
2:50:23Hello, 15 minutes.
2:50:24Good.
2:50:25I told him that before.
2:50:43Well, you've never spoken about it.
2:50:45I've definitely decided that you should have a treaty on the ADM and the executive agreement on the ADM. Second, with regard to SLBMs, I think your idea, shall I put it this way, that your idea is different, that the number of weapons, the number of weapons, the number of tubes,
2:51:06now the third
2:51:23On the end of the day, I'm in the process of setting it up.
2:51:27Well, we're finding that I want to be quite candid with you.
2:51:35There is a very great political problem.
2:51:40But this country is going to change.
2:51:43There's great doubts about this thing.
2:51:47I'm going to tell you.
2:51:54Right.
2:51:54Right.
2:51:55Right.
2:51:55Right.
2:51:55Right.
2:51:56Right.
2:51:57Right.
2:51:58Right.
2:51:58Right.
2:51:59Right.
2:51:59Right.
2:51:59Right.
2:52:00Right.
2:52:22But now it's always the case you can't fire anybody.
2:52:31All right, all right.
2:52:34And, uh... Oh, uh...
2:52:48Uh, come around the top a little bit.
2:52:50Do you have to run?
2:52:51No, no, I don't know.
2:52:52I don't remember.
2:52:53Fine, fine.
2:52:59Uh... You'll be going to the plane, won't you?
2:53:10Yes.
2:53:10Oh, I wish I could talk to you.
2:53:13Uh...
2:53:15I tried to think about this.
2:53:17This double whammy.
2:53:38We will still go work with the tribunals on the 35th.
2:53:44Okay.
2:53:46Mind you, that is either put out, but you take part of the message to go out and do the press conference.
2:53:54Yeah.
2:53:55Or do it in an office press conference here.
2:53:58Well, the press group is the same kind of thing.
2:54:00Yeah.
2:54:00Makes no difference.
2:54:02Yeah, the group is the same kind of thing.
2:54:08Oh, in the press room you can get TV coverage.
2:54:10It's more useful.
2:54:11You can't get it in here.
2:54:15Yes, but you prefer that rather than just having to put it on.
2:54:18Yes, it looks too defensive.
2:54:22Ah, nothing, nothing.
2:54:24That's all.
2:54:25All right, then, with regard to the piece.
2:54:32Here's another overture from Mrs. Candy, but she's willing to normalize the version to the left.
2:54:39He noticed that he didn't ask God to thank him.
2:54:42He in fact said, listen, by next July, Mr. President, we'll look down to him and screw him.
2:54:50And but I thought it was a masterful performance.
2:54:53He, uh, if we could have picked the interviewer, we wouldn't have picked him, but we would have made a mistake because, uh, he came across as such a lightweight and so petty that, uh,
2:55:09No.
2:55:10I must say, the only time I was tempted and I thought he really deserved it was when he asked for it.
2:55:22When he asked for it, I thought it was that insulting question.
2:55:29Well now look, what about the charge that you're putting off the end of the war, you're putting off the summit of China and the summit of Russia, that you're going to have a policy until the election year?
2:55:44But you put it down today, but I think you usually put down a team shot on it by showing class more effectively than by shooting back.
2:55:57I remember that Johnson was on television once, and they were harassing him, and he said, well, what would you do?
2:56:04What would you do?
2:56:06And it came across so petulant.
2:56:08I mean, you would never do that.
2:56:11You prefer putting him down this way.
2:56:14Oh, yeah.
2:56:16I think you did it in a classy way, and that people watching it had to see who here was a concerned president trying to do his best for his country.
2:56:26with a big sweep and knew exactly what he was doing, and this little bastard is sort of snapping at his heels.
2:56:37Speaking of silly questions, Archie, what do you think of anybody out there in Chicago, you know, in Williamsburg, to ask a silly, goddamn question about his
2:56:49You know what I mean?
2:56:50Yeah.
2:56:51First, yeah.
2:56:51Second, how many people really have read Gloria Steinem?
2:56:55What came out of that?
2:56:56Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
2:56:57That's the other one.
2:56:58That was the other one.
2:57:01Also, this charisma question, that's the one that next time it comes up.
2:57:06Although you asked it very rarely, you said you do it by performance.
2:57:10And you cooled the country.
2:57:12But I think... Charisma.
2:57:14This is something that is crazy.
2:57:16You know that.
2:57:17But I think...
2:57:19On that one, you could afford to be a little more objective instead of saying, you say you match your performance against what somebody else of these people mean by charisma, pretending without doing anything that you don't do.
2:57:32You're not a movie star.
2:57:39The other one was like, oh, he's so into it.
2:57:43black people are different from white people.
2:57:46And you have a beautiful name.
2:57:48Aren't they?
2:57:49Sure.
2:57:50As a matter of fact, wait, yours are different.
2:57:53That is true, aren't it?
2:57:56No, but that, I thought, incidentally, Mr. President, I listened to about 15 minutes of it on radio, and I sometimes regret that this isn't the radio age, because on radio, I mean, you were effective on television.
2:58:12But on radio, you really sounded overwhelming.
2:58:21Radio is a good medium for you.
2:58:23Unfortunately, not many people listen to it now.
2:58:27But your voice is very effective on radio.
2:58:43That was an effective format, also some of the shots through the window.
2:58:50They took some shots.
2:58:52They didn't just hit you one-on-one.
2:58:54They sometimes took a shot through the window of the whole room with you sitting there.
2:58:58You must have had a camera.
2:59:00They had a lot of shots directly get on.
2:59:03Yeah, it was good.
2:59:05It was, I think, technically very well done, this time.
2:59:08Let's check that out.
2:59:11Coming back to this, maybe I'll think about it and talk about it at some point.
2:59:18Great question.
2:59:22Nineteenth.
2:59:25I wouldn't fall on the sword for the eighteenth, but I think there's a lot to be said if you're determined on the, so that they cannot have the
2:59:36At the, uh... Next session.
2:59:38Next session.
2:59:39But they'll be careful about turning it down anyway.
2:59:42Well, you understand, it is just the next session before the next session.
2:59:47There's no session between that and the time I speak.
2:59:52I speak at noon.
2:59:54And they will metaparse, but nobody's going to go, God damn, they claim what they've done.
2:59:59Well, that's a good point.
3:00:00So I think it makes no great difference.
3:00:02You can do it either way.
3:00:02Well, if I did it to be easy, do you think they might make a public statement before it's said?
3:00:07That's what I think.
3:00:08Well, they will scream that you're revealing secrets.
3:00:13But I... Maybe that builds ground.
3:00:15I wouldn't...
3:00:16I wonder if it isn't better to have a day between the two.
3:00:18Let's think about it.
3:00:19There's a lot to be said.
3:00:20Otherwise, it looks a little rough.
3:00:23Why not do it, I think, the 18th?
3:00:25The 18th is a little bit more major, not quite as dramatic and so forth.
3:00:30There's a lot to be said for it.
3:00:33It's the day the Congress comes back.
3:00:36There's a lot to be said for it.
3:00:39Why don't we do the 17th?
3:00:41No, that's a little early.
3:00:44The 18th is Tuesday, the day the Congress gets back.
3:00:50And then all these banshees will be out, sticking their necks out with their peace plans, and the rest will not come on tonight.
3:00:56But we will announce this in advance.
3:00:59But I wouldn't say what you're going to say.
3:01:01No, I'm going to make another, I'm going to make a statement on Vietnam.
3:01:04You're going to make a report to the nation about Vietnam.
3:01:07Report to the nation on Vietnam.
3:01:11And we see now that we see...
3:01:12But why do you have to do it?
3:01:14Announce it.
3:01:15I mean, when you made your China announcement, you said... No, no, no, no, no.
3:01:20The only thing is, I want them to know when they get back, that's hanging over them.
3:01:27But what difference does it make?
3:01:29They are so far out in that field, Mr. President.
3:01:32Believe me, I've studied everything anyone has ever said on Vietnam.
3:01:36It would be absolutely to your advantage if they put in proposals, because you're going so far beyond them.
3:01:43We have to let that version go that far, so we can say it announced in North Vietnam.
3:01:48Now, the only problem is, you can take it under certain circumstances.
3:01:54We ought to go back and put the truth and everything together a little bit more.
3:02:01That is something to consider.
3:02:04I almost mind their names.
3:02:08If you put the truth with it, then they're going to have two leads.
3:02:14Well, that's the point.
3:02:15You see, if you do a low-key troop thing on the 13th, Mr. President, you've already foreshadowed it.
3:02:22It's a world-shaking story, and people will say, well, let's trust that they get ready to mumble around about that.
3:02:30Although, what you said yesterday got a very good press today, a very good television.
3:02:38Right.
3:02:41So I think you can...
3:02:59I think it's a double whammy shot.
3:03:01I agree.
3:03:02I agree.
3:03:02Because that peace plan, if we present what we did last year... Well now, are we building people up after having made this agreement?
3:03:10Are they going to expect that they will fight the crisis and change the war?
3:03:15What I'm getting at is, are we building people up?
3:03:19No, I'd say I don't expect anything dramatic, the President.
3:03:23I wouldn't, I wouldn't knock it down either, but I'm yet to keep it.
3:03:26If your thoughts would be to simply say, I want to report on Vietnam, I just want to speak of Vietnam and, uh, I just want to say a foreign policy announcement.
3:03:39Yeah.
3:03:39Why say Vietnam?
3:03:41I don't see why.
3:03:41Just say a foreign policy announcement.
3:03:44You remember the... Yeah, I made the foreign policy statement when I was 18.
3:03:51That's a, that's, that would be my recommendation.
3:03:54And I think, and I think we can give a very punty, I think we should give an account of what was done last year, Mr. President, because otherwise it looks improvised and also we can devastate our opponents who've been nagging at you all the time last year.
3:04:13Yes.
3:04:14And this is what I'm trying to do.
3:04:15And secondly,
3:04:18I think we ought to do some fairly extensive backgrounding out of here to the thoughts of people, giving them some motion.
3:04:25Let me just tell you one thing.
3:04:28I'm sorry.
3:04:33I'm sorry, I was ignoring that for a moment.
3:04:48I forgot I got to see Rose in person, and I thought I'd have to spend 10.15 on it.
3:04:53And you can call Rogers.
3:04:54He can come at 10.15.
3:04:56Rogers?
3:04:56We'll see if we can get her to get it done.
3:04:59Rose, then I...
3:05:00The only thing I want is to be visited.
3:05:03Yes, sir.
3:05:04And then I want to cut it through 10.30 that way, and I'll just tell Sven I'm visiting.
3:05:10I don't want to get in trouble.
3:05:12That's possible.
3:05:14You just deserve it.
3:05:15You talk to her.
3:05:16She's always been around the track.
3:05:19Oh, yes.
3:05:24I just want to make sure that I don't end up with rashes on my back as I have been on everything else since then.
3:05:32Well, let me have this.
3:05:33It's all mine.
3:05:36I've got Laird, too.
3:05:37There's Laird, and then Rogers.
3:05:39But more than that, I've got to carry the public relations.
3:05:43We can't make a goddamn deal on salt here.
3:05:46We can have an election here with all the right-wing race in hell.
3:05:51It doesn't sell.
3:05:52And I'm going to have to carry that.
3:05:54I'm going to be cold turkey with these bastards.
3:05:57They're all for the peace, but I know what's going to happen.
3:06:00See what I mean?
3:06:01You're right.
3:06:16in his name, God Almighty.
3:06:21We did everything that we could possibly do.
3:06:25We did everything.
3:06:28First, when the call started in March, we cut off the military pipeline, the military pipeline to Afghanistan.
3:06:40Second, when the call started in March, we committed, in March, $500 billion to report on all the residents.
3:06:50And we didn't do enough of the wreckage.
3:06:55didn't do it earlier we got there we used our headphones with the audio identity to change the clinical civilian authority there we used our headphones with him also a mutual pullback
3:07:11We passed on to her, and then, yet, she still resorted to military.
3:07:16Once she was ordered to military, went to the United Nations.
3:07:20And the way it was done was to get to the United Nations Cross, where, with the ceasefire resolution, it was vetoed at Security Council, and then passed by a 10 to 1 march on the General Assembly.
3:07:35We had 104 boats with her.
3:07:37And I said, so 10 to 1 margin, that's better, 10 to 1 margin.
3:07:42And then, gee, and under the circumstances, they voted, and they rejected that.
3:07:47We then used our air force with the Soviet Union and with India, because India had swallowed up Pakistan.
3:07:55the effect around the world of one name, whatever provocation, using the internal problems in another nation as a justification for the war, could only have the effect of, and particularly where that was supported by a major superpower, could only have the effect of encouraging that sort of action around the world.
3:08:26But I think it's a hell of a record.
3:08:28And if you compare it to the alternative, Mr. President, there was nothing we could do to change the Indian pro-Soviet orientation, which was based on $800 million worth
3:08:46of military equipment at a time when they cut 1.7 billion of American aid, one can in fact make the argument that we financed the Indian purchases of Soviet arms.
3:08:58That was the cold reality of the situation.
3:09:01We would have lost the Chinese option
3:09:05we would not have gained anything in India.
3:09:07We will be at least as well off in India for having taken the position we are infinitely better off in China than we are somewhat better off in Pakistan.
3:09:15So on balance it was a cold-blooded calculation.
3:09:19It was not peace.
3:09:22Now we are having a problem, Mr. President, with our Council in Dhaka.
3:09:25The Chinese went along with us on the
3:09:32The UN ploy and our relations with the Chinese have never been better on the condition that we don't recognize Bangladesh.
3:09:39Now that son of a bitch called on the Bangladesh foreign minister yesterday and extended New Year's greetings to him.
3:09:49And state has to be prohibited from any such contacts.
3:09:52No one else is doing it right now.
3:09:56At least until you've seen it.
3:09:58No, but until you've seen it peeking, we are just loading another 10-pound weight on ourselves.
3:10:04Right.
3:10:05Let me do it all over.
3:10:11God damn it.
3:10:12I don't care if they leak it.
3:10:19I mean, I don't know.
3:10:21Well, let's say that ends now.
3:10:23I will put out a memorandum.
3:10:24Why don't I get a memorandum saying,
3:10:26The President has said that any contact with the Franklin Tech authorities must be cleared at the White House prior to its session.
3:10:36The President was surprised and concerned when he saw that.
3:10:57and concerned, so that our council general, without worry, had, you know, had called on him, saying that he agreed to let Ashby go.
3:11:09This is being quietly interpreted in international circles as being an amount to a step toward recognition in the American press.
3:11:20You and the fact that recognition has not even been extended by Soviet Union, this weakly believes is a mistake, and you don't think I should just save my soul for once?
3:11:37Okay, I'll draft it for you, sir.
3:11:38I confirm on the list, thus put it out, that I could describe some distractions and so forth, and other deserve chances that I said that.
3:11:47I want no further contact with the men with that.
3:11:50You'll hear no contact on the media with the guy in here.
3:11:54On any pretext.
3:11:55On any pretext.
3:11:56Any contact, whatever.
3:11:58And I'll add it, Counsel General.
3:12:00Yes.
3:12:01He feels that he's been conscious to not follow those directives.
3:12:05God damn it.
3:12:06I think he's got to be taught.
3:12:08He's not been loyal.
3:12:09No, he's been taxed.
3:12:11All right, let me put him in.
3:12:14He's been in my way a couple of times now.
3:12:18We'll take these people out.
3:12:20I don't like them all out there.
3:12:23I think Justice Trey's directives will do it.
3:12:26From me?
3:12:27From you.
3:12:27Yes, sir.
3:12:29That's not our argument, and under no circumstances in any further context, the Bangladesh must be cleared.
3:12:35And I want them to say, to me, for clearance.
3:12:40Just say, to me, for clearance.
3:12:42Because of the very specific nature of the problem.

On January 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Rose Mary Woods, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:25 am to 10:04 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 642-015 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 642-15

Date: January 3, 1972
Time: 9:25 am - 10:04 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

The President's interview with Dan Rather, January 2, 1972
     -News coverage
          -The President's responses regarding troop withdrawals and residual force
          -Reporting by Marvin L. and Bernard Kalb

William P. Rogers
     -Economic meeting

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
      -The President’s forthcoming meeting with Gerard C. Smith
      -Rogers
           -Photograph
           -Credit
      -Antiballistic missiles [ABM]
           -Smith
                  -The President's views on ABM
                  -Rogers
                  -Negotiating position
                       -Possible leak
                       -Defense Department
                              -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
      -Sub-launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBM]
           -Executive agreement
           -Tubes
           -Smith
                  -Negotiating position
      -Rogers
      -Smith
      -Rogers
           -Attendance at meeting
      -Smith
           -Possible action
      -Melvin R. Laird
           -Memorandum
                  -ABM
                       -Number of sites
                       -Location
                              -National Command Authority [NCA]
                                   -Washington, DC
      -Soviets

          -Tests
                -Smith
                -State Department
                -Congress
                -Number
                      -Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
                -The President’s concern about Soviet intentions
          -Recess from talks
                -Smith’s view
                      -Soviet summit
                           -Edward M. Kennedy
                -Kissinger’s instructions to Smith
     -Soviet summit
          -Kennedy
                -Bureaucracy
          -Smith
                -Credit
                -1972 election
     -US position
     -Congress
          -Possible problem

Vietnam
     -Peace plan
          -Cable from Ellsworth F. Bunker to Kissinger
                -Nguyen Van Thieu
          -The President's possible speech
                -Backgrounder by Kissinger
                -Television
                -Effect
                -Timing
                     -Possible date
                           -Paris
                     -Dealings with press
                           -Coverage
                                 -State of the Union speech
                                       -Possible delay
                -Possible content
                     -History of negotiations
                -Timing
                     -State of the Union speech

                       -Possible response
           -Possible response from Administration critics
                -Administration negotiations
                       -Seven Points
                       -Deadline
                -Thieu
                       -Possible resignation
           -Possible rejection by North Vietnam
                -Effect
           -The President's possible speech
                -Timing
                       -State of the Union message
           -Possible response from Administration critics
           -Forthcoming Peking and Moscow summits
           -Soviet Union
                -Possible strategy
                       -People’s Republic of China [PRC]

The President's forthcoming meeting with Smith and Rogers
     -Photographs
          -Gerald L. Warren
          -Desirability

The President's interview with Rather
     -Question regarding the President's possible delay tactics regarding Vietnam
          -Summits
          -Congress

The President's forthcoming meeting with Smith and Rogers
     -Photographs
          -Effect
                 -Soviet Union

Thelma C. (“Pat’) Nixon's trip to Africa
     -Photographs
     -News coverage
          -Press and television
          -Toast
          -Mrs. Nixon’s demeanor

SALT

        -Meeting with Smith
            -Duration
            -Points to be made
                  -ABM treaty
                  -Executive agreement
                  -SLBM
                        -Kissinger's view
                        -Number of tubes
                  -Political implications
                        -Popular opinion
            -Smith's role in negotiations
                  -Deadline

Smith
     -Administration handling

Kissinger's schedule
     -Plane

Vietnam
     -Forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement, January 13, 1972
          -Format
                -Press conference
                -Oval Office
                -Press room
                     -TV coverage
                -Ronald L. Ziegler
     -Peace plan

India
        -Indira Gandhi
              -Possible normalization of relations with US
        -Relations with Pakistan
              -The President's interview with Rather
                   -Question

The President's interview with Rather
     -Rather's performance and tone
          -Manolo Sanchez's view
          -The President’s view
     -Question on the President's possible delay tactics regarding reelection

          -Vietnam, Moscow and Peking summits and economic program
          -The President's response
     -Compared with previous performance by Lyndon B. Johnson
     -Handling critics
          -The President's response
                -Public opinion
     -Question on use of "Ms."
          -Gloria Steinem
     -Question on the President's charisma
          -The President's response
                -Performance
     -Question on race relations
          -Differences
          -Quakers and Catholics
     -The President's performance
          -Radio
                -Kissinger’s hearing
                -Television
                -The President's voice
                      -Effectiveness
     -Camera shots
          -Oval Office window

Vietnam peace plan
     -The President's forthcoming speech
          -Timing
          -North Vietnamese response
                -Negotiations
                      -Possible public statement
          -Congress
          -Announcement
                -Desirability
                      -PRC
                      -Negotiations
                      -Networks
          -Troop withdrawal announcement
                -Lead stories
                -The President's response during Rather interview
                      -Troop levels
          -Edward R.G. Heath
          -Possible build-up

                -Announcement
                     -Phrasing
                -Background
                     -1971 negotiations

[The President talked with Rose Mary Woods at an unknown time between 9:25 am and 10:04
am.]

[Conversation No. 642-15A]

     Instructions

[End of telephone conversation]

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:25 am.

     The President's schedule
          -Woods
          -Smith
               -Rogers
          -Woods
          -Smith
               -Scheduled meeting

Bull left at an unknown time before 10:04 am.

     Kissinger
          -Dealings with Smith
          -Dealings with Rogers

     The President's dealings with Melvin R. Laird and Rogers
          -SALT

     SALT
         -Public relations
         -Negotiations
              -Election year
              -Right wing
              -Liberals’ views

     India-Pakistan relations

     -US aid
           -Military
           -Refugees
     -Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
           -Military to civilian government
           -Mutual military pullback
     -Gandhi
     -United Nations [UN]
           -Cease-fire resolution
                 -Veto in Security Council
                 -Vote in General Assembly
     -US use of influence with Soviet Union and India
     -India’s possible action
           -Effect on world
     -US efforts
           -Effectiveness
     -Soviet aid
           -US aid
     -US relations with PRC, India and Pakistan

Bangladesh
    -US recognition
          -US counsel in Dacca’s call to Bangladesh foreign minister
               -PRC
                     -UN
               -State Department
               -The President’s forthcoming trip to PRC
               -Possible memorandum
                     -Phrasing
                          -White House clearance of contact
                          -The President’s view
                                -Interpretation
                                      -World and US press
                                -Soviet recognition
                                -Rogers
                                -Counsel
                          -Rogers
                          -Presidential clearance of contact
                          -Interpretation
                          -Soviet Union

     Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with the President

     Foreign policy
          -The President's guidance
          -Kissinger’s authority
          -The President's authority

Kissinger left at 10:04 am.
  • 642-006 9:02 AM · 43 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:02 am and 9:07 am.
  • 642-010 9:07 AM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Richard A. Moore met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:07 am to 9:14 am.
  • 642-011 9:15 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Gerald L. Warren, unknown person(s), and Rose Mary Woods met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:15 am to 9:19 am.
  • 018-001 9:19 AM · 18 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 9:19 am.
  • 018-002 9:19 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers talked on the telephone from 9:19 am to 9:23 am.
  • 642-012 9:19 AM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at 9:19 am.
  • 642-013 9:19 AM · 41 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 9:19 am.
  • 642-014 9:19 AM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:19 am to 9:23 am.

Conversation 642-015, January 3, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/642-015 (accessed October 12, 2026).