Conversation 642-020

TapeTape 642StartMonday, January 3, 1972 at 10:23 AMEndMonday, January 3, 1972 at 10:56 AMTape start time03:26:26Tape end time04:00:50ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Smith, Gerard C.;  Rogers, William P.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  White House photographerRecording deviceOval Office

On January 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Gerard C. Smith, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:23 am to 10:56 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 642-020 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 642-20

Date: January 3, 1972
Time: 10:23 am - 10:56 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Gerard C. Smith, William P. Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger; the White
House photographer and members of the press were present at the beginning of the meeting.

     Greetings

     Smith's schedule
          -Trip to Vienna
                -London

Arrangements for photograph session
     -Seating
           -Angles

The President's schedule

The President's interview with Dan Rather, January 2, 1972
     -Lack of question on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]

[Photograph session]

Photos
     -Smith's address
          -Unknown embassy

[General conversation]

SALT
    -Report by verification panel
         -Problem areas
    -Rogers's experience
    -Popular opinion
         -Opposition to agreement
               -Arms race
                     -Soviet escalation
                           -US response
         -American Security Council [ASC]
               -Conservatism
               -Henry Tolbin [sp?]
               -Television shows
                     -Soviet threat
                           -Congress
                     -Soviet escalation
                           -Soviet tests
                                 -Number
                                       -Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
         -Soviet intentions and power
         -US negotiations
               -Appeal to public
                     -Right and left
               -Political impact

               -World opinion
-Treaty
     -Kissinger
     -Antiballistic missile [ABM] agreement
-Executive Agreement
     -Congress
           -Filibuster
     -John W. Bricker Amendment
     -Treaty
-Exchange of letters
     -Georges J.R. Pompidou
           -Azores
-Sub-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM]
-Pompidou
     -Letter
           -Maurice Schumann
-SLBMs
     -Smith's proposal
           -Defense Department
           -Details
                 -Tube numbers
           -Congressional views
-Final agreement
     -Effect on domestic front
     -Defense Department
           -Proposals
                 -Letters from Melvin R. Laird
                 -Details
                       -Interceptors
                             -Number
     -Possible criticism
           -Defense Department
                 -Views of Air Force, Navy and Army
                 -Lobbying groups
                       -Effects
                       -ASC
     -Proposal
           -Reporting
                 -Control
                       -State Department
                 -Soviet Union

                      -National Security Council [NSC]
                      -Details
                           -Interceptors
                                 -Number
                                       -Helsinki
     -Timing
           -The President’s forthcoming trip to the People's Republic of China [PRC]
     -Political climate
           -Public opinion
           -Lobbying by Rogers and Kissinger
           -Congressional support
                 -Barry M. Goldwater, John G. Tower, James Buckley and Edward J.
                       Gurney
           -Rogers’s conversations
     -Smith
-The President's goal regarding arms race
-Smith's goal
-Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
-Hyman G. Rickover
-Charley Reinhardt [sp?]
-ASC
-Gen. Earle G. (“Buzz”) Wheeler
-Defense budget
-Soviet budget
-John M. Ashbrook
-Negotiations
     -Pentagon
     -John S. Foster, Jr.
     -Gardiner L. Tucker
     -Foster
           -Experience
     -Tucker
           -Suggestions
     -Foster
           -Influence on Congress
     -Smith's and Foster's previous testimony before Congress
           -[Unknown congressman]
     -Foster
           -Views
           -Compared with Harold Brown
     -John Sherman Cooper

            -Forthcoming meeting with Smith, January 4, 1972
            -Past support
            -Future in Congress
            -Support of administration
            -Message from the President
                  -Possible meeting
      -Congressional advisors
            -Michael J. Mansfield, Hugh Scott, Cooper and W[illiam] Stuart
                  Symington
            -Symington
                  -Past performance
            -John C. Stennis
                  -Support for administration
                  -Cooper
-Defense budget
      -Possible submarine freeze
            -Soviets
                  -Kissinger
-Nuclear arms race
      -The President's previous conversation with Soviet Agriculture Minister
            [Vladimir V. Matskevich]
      -Parity
            -Land based weapons
      -Submarines
            -Building
                  -Authorization compared to appropriation
                  -Arms control
-ABM
      -Congressional authorization
            -Offensive weapons
      -Laird's previous speech
-Nuclear arms race
      -Offensive weapons
            -US public opinion
      -Smith's suggestions
            -Bill
-India-Pakistan War
      -Effect on US position
            -Soviet Union
                  -Mutual interests
                  -Negotiations

           -Middle East
           -Mutual trust
                -Trade
           -Offensive weapons controls
                -The President's instructions to Smith
                       -Negotiations
                            -Seriousness of Soviets
                -Intercontinental Ballistic Missile [ICBMs] freeze
                -Heavy missiles freeze
                -Light missiles, launchers and silos conversion
                -Detonation
                -Mobiles
                -Subs
           -Mutual trust
                -Public relations
                -Verification
                -Public opinion
                -Arms race
           -Smith's relations with Congress

     The President's forthcoming trip to PRC
          -People desiring to accompany the President
               -Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] crew

Smith and Kissinger left at 10:55 am.

     The President's interview with Rather
          -Press coverage
               -Television and radio
          -Question on the President's possible delay tactics regarding Vietnam, PRC and
               Soviet trips, economic program and reelection
               -The President’s response
                      -Newspapers’ view
                      -Bombing pause
                            -Lyndon B. Johnson

     The President's schedule
          -Forthcoming meeting with Rogers

Rogers left at 10:56 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yeah.
Yeah.
Do you want to see him in person?
No, I've already seen him.
Get him in, have all three of them in at once.
Yes, sir.
On the way again, again, huh?
Yes, we leave tonight.
Yes.
Oh, let's see, Dad.
I guess we're not going to have to go there.
Why don't you sit there, sit there.
I don't know what you're talking about.
I don't know what you're talking about.
I don't know what you're talking about.
I'm going to sit here.
Jerry sits there.
Okay.
Right away, I'm going to ask this.
I'm going to knock off.
All right.
All right.
All right.
Thank you.
Let me say it, I thought.
It would be good before you got back.
I've read this from Eric and we know there is problems that you have.
I mean, again, the more difficult going into the spectrum, and then come to the parts where I think we have no problem, where you have more of a possibility that you should go back to something where you have something to give your parents.
As Bill will tell you about this, of course, you have to take something easier, and it's going to be very difficult.
They escalate.
We have to escalate.
They hired Harry Tolman, a great television producer, to run a series of television shows with regard to... what?
So it's a threat to the starting level.
It's starting to bother Congress.
It's bad, too, with regard to what happened and what the build-up is.
You know, we couldn't get the office to decide that.
I'm not sure that they have conducted more tests this year than they have in any year since the test met, in order of various types.
and that's going to take you around, but they're true or not, and they are, and the colleges, they know some patients are true.
a great concern in its development in regard to Soviet intentions.
It's really that, as well as Soviet power, and therefore a concern for what kind of deal we're making and whether we're going to get taken or not.
It really gets down to that.
Under the circumstances, we have got to be very careful to be sure that negotiating war and agreement
that we cover all bases, covering both our right, as well as, of course, appealing to the left, because the right can be very difficult on this, and in the political world, you never know which way they're going to swing.
They think, they thought there was a way to stay in New York.
We in the United States, you know, we're sending lots of bars, and we're going to have to do this and that.
Now, having said that,
What I feel is a deal on the two things that I think that you ought to move on at this point that you have raised.
One, it seems to me that we should decide now.
I thought we had decided, but Henry tells me that, well, I mentioned in the last meeting, I think Bill Rick and so forth, that we have to start fuzzing.
We should decide now that the ABM agreement will be a treaty and the other will be a legislative agreement.
So that's decided.
And so it's a matter of that bill, if something comes up.
But your autocracies and so forth just said we can't give them such instructions.
I do agree that there's a... Let's just get back to that subject.
I don't know if we have no objections to that.
Well, maybe you don't want to say that.
I think you won't be up before Congress.
But he wasn't up anyway.
Probably.
Probably.
We might decide we didn't want to exactly agree with him.
Yeah, yeah.
We might check one or something else.
There's a window down there.
Yeah.
You might decide some other way to do it.
Well, some of them sound good, but the executive agreement is that in terms of the whole range of activities.
Well, they have been saying to pass the executive agreement.
Yes, or they're willing to go back and have a less formal arrangement, as they've heard before.
It wasn't out of the executive agreement.
It doesn't help us to call a lot.
We really need one, because basically that's one of the good residues of the fight over the brick permit.
They said, you know, executive agreements were terrible, and they were as bad as the treaties and the rest, but now we have executive agreement and a treaty.
We've had a treaty, and that just, well, maybe yes and maybe no, and the other, that makes it tougher.
So executive agreement, I think we ought to be pretty tough on it.
But we didn't set it on.
They proposed an exchange of letters, and we backed down.
So I think folks can speak to that.
Sure, we did write a piece of paper.
Oh, we had another talk.
We were doing our thing, you know.
Oh, that's what it is, though, isn't it?
Right, but right now, this is perfect.
We're not sitting.
We've got to get out of our way.
Now, the other thing, that's all we have.
That's all we have.
That's all we have.
Wait, I want to talk to you about that a bit.
Huh?
He's got to be on that list.
He is French.
He still wants to do French, but nobody's going to understand.
I thought you would have him there to deal with.
With regard to the SLBMs, it seems to me your proposal is sound.
Now, Henry, the only problem I have with that is that I want to be sure that the defense has no cash for that now.
So let's go ahead.
In other words, rather the numbers of submarines as far as the tubes, correct?
Right.
That makes sense.
And also, that will sell with our, again, with our congressional people will sell well.
Now, the outer ranges, on the other hand, and the outer ranges only at this point,
that I want to take the temperature over the next several weeks.
is what are the limits of a final agreement, which, of course, they want you to say.
I want to reserve that until I see how we're coming along here.
Once that gets out and the fat is in the fire and all hell breaks loose on the domestic front, now, on the other hand,
And let me say that we need your best state.
What about me?
Now, let me say this.
The facts is all over the line on this man, right?
In fact, we have five, three different letters from that one.
You know what I mean?
No.
And I don't want that.
So you see, in a minor way, I find this beer in the hell of a spot.
I don't know which one to take.
Don't read it.
4,000 interceptors.
That's right.
That's in the name of an APF agreement.
They want 1,000 interceptors to be used.
Well, you see, the one in the area, the secondary library, what we're not against here is that at the moment, I have a little bit of a mind of a dream kind of thing.
Even though our cell is polished, we've just got to just deal with it.
that we have an open question on that because no matter how we try to keep it under our hands,
Once it busts, man, good God, everybody's going to shoot it down.
I mean, the defense, they did the best, let's face it, you know what the hell it is, the Air Force fighting the interceptors and everything, but you do know goddamn well, I mean, that's what that is, isn't it?
Or is it?
This, I think, would go, I think it would go, I think it would go, I think it would go, I think it would go, I think it would go, I think it would go, I think it would go, I think it would go,
It's a peculiar group.
It's not.
It's not from the small group of people in the Department of Defense.
The military service won't give you any trouble on this.
Well, let me tell you, a small group of people in the Department of Defense can give us one hell of a lot of trouble.
Because you see, Jerry, they've got their lobbies.
And this year, believe me, the lobbies are working overtime.
You know the American Security Council, like that I mentioned, I mean, and the people in Rhinos, when I saw they had a problem, I realized they were dull, and there's going to be a problem.
I don't know how you can do it with these type conversations, if the reporting could be kept in some check so that when these load ideas to the state don't respond, they don't report them as accepted.
You know what I mean?
Because I can't imagine that these reports that they haven't presented any to this proposition would be true.
Well, they weren't.
We still stated it at the last NSC when Paul said we thought we were.
No, I thought you said it.
And so they have now come out and said they're talking about 150 interceptions.
Which I thought was a healthy development.
It was less than they were talking about.
Now what we'd like to do is to go back and first get these two things out of the way that we talked about.
And second, test the water to see what's doable.
You know what I mean?
So we know where we are in the meantime.
In the next two months, I would say
Right after we get back, or prior to, or even after we get back from our China thing, which is about the first of March, we should be able to know about how the
how the political things are going to work out here.
When I say the political thing, I'm not suggesting that we're going to make this decision based upon the winds, the political winds, as they happen to be blowing.
But I do know that what we are capable of doing is going to depend a hell of a lot on that.
In other words, I think the overwhelming majority of the American people favor an arms limitation.
I think it will welcome an arms limitation.
But I know also that there is a substantial number of people who are starting to raise and will continue to raise holy hell if they think that the arms agreement is one that, frankly, left us in an inferior position.
Oh, believe me, you should hear me.
I've got to do a lot of handling in here.
Bill's got a little bit of a hammering.
I've got him on, too, because they think he's pretty tough.
We've got Goldwater, Tower, Motley, Gurney.
All of these folks now are fine guys who have completely supported us on virtually everything.
And frankly, it's been hard for them to do so.
These guys are in line now.
But I, uh, but now that I'm speaking truth, I don't know if that's a fair conversation, but what's going to happen on this call?
Are we going to get this or that or the other thing?
And I say, look, we've got to take out the shader.
Uh, we're going to make it, and if it was going to be wanted, some way is going to stop this, this, uh, absolutely senseless escalation where neither side is ever going to be able to get advantage.
That's really what it's all about.
Mr. President, I don't want any sort of deal with this problem.
I've grown up in this business with Scoop Jackson and Rickover, and frankly, my heart is on the side of the strongest possible deal.
I'm not interested in getting a deal with them going the other direction, and these fellows know that.
Jackson knows that.
I know that Buzz Wheeler in this American Security Council was careful to say, in the absence of a strategic arms limitation agreement, we're going to be in a bad way unless we do something.
So even Buzz is interested in this.
And I will tell you that this is a district's complex.
The defense budget will be a strong one.
We're doing it.
We're having a strong budget due to the fact that the Soviet, of course, has a very strong budget.
And when I say strongman, this is in some sense my age or my beauty or my cat, but... Well, basically, if the systems and analysts
which is Tommy Foster and his father, Gardner Tucker.
And they have wonderful mental knowledge.
The first one, obviously.
But he has really been seeing those underpads for about 15 years.
And Gardner Tucker, the fellow who has this computer mind, has never had any relationship with international negotiations.
And he's come up with some of the weirdest suggestions as to how he should handle this.
Foster has to turn one plus.
He had it down in the Congress, Jerry, consider one plus.
Because he, you know, he's a really bright, decent man.
You know, oh, yes, he does a little bit.
I'm not mad about it, because some way we can soften him up a little bit at the end.
Well, I go up, I testify with Fauci sitting right beside me, and we have not really had very much disagreement.
I remember Congressman Reitinger saying, well, he's overcome this problem.
I think that sounds like we're going to need some progress here.
But when he's by himself, he really scares people, and has been for a long time.
Since he took over, Harold Brown, Brown was on our delegation.
He's a great pitcher man, and as well as a fine engineer.
He had a lot of pretty kids.
I've got people coming to Indiana all the time.
For instance, tomorrow, John Jordan Cooper is going to talk to me, and I presume I'll just be about as right with him as I have been in the past.
I think he's going to be a great help tonight.
Yeah.
Yeah.
He's not going to run tonight.
And next time, he says, this year.
He says, this year.
Yeah, he comes on this year.
I'm sorry, Garrett.
I was going to offer him some financing tomorrow.
I'm sorry, Garrett.
Our lives are very different in China.
He's a decent man.
He's a decent man, and also he's with us.
He's 100% with us on our presence all the time.
You might be pleased to know that I said that I heard this.
I'm not sure.
I do think we should give more thought to congressional advisors as such, as you come closer to the deal here.
I think we could have them over there.
Or sort of test the label that is the salt to congressional advisors now.
Yeah.
Well, I think if you could get Mike Masri over, he's got his cougar and pretty likely we're not Stuart Simon, but the following is this, but he's 3,000%.
What?
Is he?
He's... Well...
I can say we're not... We're too conservative.
We ought to be more liberal on this.
Yeah, but I think you'd lose both voices.
He doesn't have much strength on the side.
He's fighting, he's fighting, and all the people that we need are in action to come down to earth.
It's been rather interesting to know the big man at that time of the day, and I didn't think, but he and old Dickie didn't come together, because he always preferred to start from the beginning.
The big man at that time was not the most dependable and decent man that had arms.
is John Stennis.
If I thought John Stennis, I think Henry would read it.
If I called him, you will too, they'll get here today and say, John, black is white.
He'd say, okay, he is that kind of man.
You know, he would raise his questions, but this guy has been fantastic, hasn't he?
He'd be a good one.
If he got Cooper and Stennis,
For a day, he's all that I heard.
Well, Stanton's strong.
He knows what his will is for.
You can tell me.
Amazing, Father.
And he's a doctor of total confidence.
Absolute total confidence.
And neither would I be political, I ask you, Father.
Stanton's ready to do it.
Never.
Never.
He just wants to.
If I know what helped my country,
to help them in that way.
If I could go back to the budget for a minute, we are going to have a very substantial new trust in the suffering program.
I mentioned to Henry that it would be useful to simultaneously, some, like Henry, to quietly get across to us that this is something that would be justifiable if we get the right deal, if we get the sufferings included, let's say, and freeze.
because they're that's why our pressures are in the double culture if you look here this is
Well, I sat here and told that fellow, you know, the agriculture minister, when he was here, I said, here's where it is.
I said, we're in a position now where we have virtual nuclear therapy as far as the land-based weapons are concerned.
I said, now...
The two great powers are in that position.
Neither is going to put out the other end of the match.
I said, we're just not going to let it happen.
And you're not going to let it happen.
We know that.
So what are the circumstances?
It's in our mutual interest to just quit running a race that neither of us is going to win.
And so let's have an agreement.
And I think that's a really, really good test as far as we're concerned.
You know, it takes a hell of a long time to build submarines and all of those things.
And the authorization is considered more of an appropriation.
considerably more, but we get our control, it changes the game.
That is the goal that we need to accomplish.
But the same goes for that.
We're not going to run out of time.
That's right.
See, what's going to happen here, Jerry, is that while we have great difficulty, I would have to admit, in getting the situation.
There's all the support we need for all this.
All the support we need.
And the thrust will be in that direction every time.
I mean, like, you know, Larry made a speech about this conference about two weeks ago.
And, you know, Larry, according to him, what the hell are you going to do?
So I would lay off of that, very strongly, the idea that there is a strong Senate in the United States because of what they're doing in the office.
It's like the United States had an office.
escalation, so also sit down.
And it's not just the president that who reprised the offensive escalation beyond what we're doing.
The second is the issue that Jerry is facing, the raid, in which we might be pushing the authorized program.
I think that that message we'd better give the way Jerry suggested in the ear, either through Bill or through you, General.
rather than get that mixed up in the Vienna phase, because otherwise, we're going into Congress one way and talking about the other quarter of our house is angry in Vienna.
And also, it's a good idea for a negotiator to ask for a strategy.
Let's find a strategy, huh?
Right.
Good idea.
Good talk, good talk.
Well, just for your own guidance, that's what we have in mind.
We'll do it here.
You're right.
We'll do it here.
But at this time, they will see what happens.
Is there anything, Mr. President, that I should know about any change in our attitude towards soldiers or soldiers in the Indian episode?
In the episode, we raised some comments as far as our judgment of whether the Soviet will cooperate.
We believe our future interests are preserved by trying to cool off
very capitalist situation that we have, and, uh, can be mitigated with these programs, you know.
With regard to the, uh, with regard to salt, uh, I think we should just proceed along the same channels, along the same, uh, always, of course, have it in the back of your mind.
I just want to say, it's kind of a fact in your mind that we don't have to think about everything.
I mean, let's face it.
We have problems in India.
We have problems in the Asian community.
That's a hell of a lot less probable that we're going to find agreement on the salt and trust each other.
Because trust is a hell of a lot of this.
read the alphabet, trust, and so on.
And trade and so forth, whether we move in that area.
Now, that doesn't mean to say that, look here, unless you do this or that, or whatever the case might be, we won't do this or that.
On the other hand, it's true that the buses are going forward together.
They operate that way.
And frankly, they were operating
And that's the only way to do that.
The only way to do that is for a lot of you to do, no offense, or in terms of your mood and so forth and so on.
The real question is, look, are you really serious?
Are you really sincere?
Or is this something you ought to do?
and one of those deals where you want this, but you're going to guess that you're going to want something else.
Well, I mean, serious English point.
I'd like to leave one thought with you, and that was you said, you told me to tell them to start last November.
You had judged their seriousness by how they were going to have a full exchange on the offensive control side.
I think they met your challenge.
The whole last session was on the offensive side.
I understand.
And they've agreed to the ICBM, please.
They've agreed to the heavy missile, please.
They've agreed not to convert light missiles or light launchers or light silos into heavy ones.
We still have some questions about deafness.
We still have some questions about the mobiles.
But it seems to me that they go halfway into your suffering, including that you still very much .
But that is a condition that we have to make a little later.
I'm going to give a test on it.
But they match your request, I think, very well.
I would like to direct what you said.
Well, I think it might be better if somebody from a public relations standpoint, too, and we should take his mind into it.
There really isn't any other trust in the Salt Oaks.
I mean, this is going to be an agreement that we're sure that we can verify.
And the version says neither is going to get the advantage over the other.
And it's just a part of the game that doesn't involve trust.
And actually, I suppose it does involve some elements of trust.
But it doesn't.
But we can talk.
This only covers a significant portion, but it doesn't cover a hell of a lot of others.
And I think we were to say that that's what I meant by customer.
We moved here, so we're going to control this.
But there's an awful lot of other stuff.
There's a lot of other stuff.
We don't want to make a deal with them.
They're just going to go out and try to beat our brains out someplace else.
That's what I was thinking.
Yes, I think that's right.
I agree completely with Bill on public relations matters.
If you ever mention that there's no trust, we get a hell of a lot of mail.
They say don't trust those dirty Russians.
And if they say it's hard or something, they have serious interest in my business.
That's true.
We're trusting them for a serious purpose.
It can't be verified.
And as the president says, although it makes no sense, it's his senseless proposition.
They escalate, and we .
It must be the self-management of those who do it.
And that's the only that it lacks for.
Indeed.
Thank you very much.