Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 647 › Conversation 647-007

Nixon, Laird & Haig on Vietnamization and Troop withdrawals

Thursday, January 13, 1972 · 10:35 AM–11:05 AM ET · Oval Office · 30 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Laird, Melvin R.; Haig, Alexander M., Jr.; Ziegler, Ronald L.Conversation647-007 on Tape 647 (tape position 00:20:38–00:50:51)StartThursday, January 13, 1972 at 10:35 AMEndThursday, January 13, 1972 at 11:05 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 647-007 ↗

President Nixon met with Melvin Laird, Alexander Haig, and later Ronald Ziegler to coordinate the public messaging strategy for an upcoming announcement regarding U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam. The participants focused on framing the reduction as a sign of confidence in the progress of Vietnamization and the South Vietnamese military's defensive capabilities, while minimizing concerns over North Vietnamese tactical maneuvers. They also prepared responses for anticipated press questions concerning prisoners of war, the end of the U.S. ground combat role, and the potential future use of American air and sea power.

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part A, 20:36

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On January 13, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Melvin R. Laird, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:35 am to 11:05 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 647-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 647-7

Date: January 13, 1972
Time: 10:35 am - 11:05 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Melvin R. Laird and Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

     Greetings

     Vietnam announcement
          -Questions
          -News summary

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese attacks
               -Media coverage
               -Probability of success
               -South Vietnamese
                    -Prospects
                    -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
                          -Morale
                                -American Broadcasting Corporation [ABC]
                    -Possible questions at forthcoming news briefing

Possible questions at forthcoming news briefing
     -North and South Vietnamese capabilities
     -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
     -Reliance on South Vietnam for its security

The President's statement of US troop withdrawals
     -Date of withdrawals
     -Possible follow-up questions
          -Handling
                 -Noting circumstances
          -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                 -Remaining US forces
          -Administration record

Democratic candidates
    -Edmund S. Muskie, Hubert H. Humphrey
    -Previous positions on Vietnam
          -1968 campaign

Vietnam
Show the rest of the log (169 more lines)
     -US troop withdrawals
          -Levels

POWs
   -Deadline
         -North Vietnam’s response
                -Call for overthrow of South Vietnam government
   -Critics of the President's policy
         -Possible responses
                -Aid to North Vietnam
                -North Vietnam’s position
                      -US withdrawal
                      -Cessation of aid to South Vietnam
                      -Overthrow of South Vietnam government
                -Humanitarian aspect
                -Nguyen Van Thieu

Laird's possible responses
     -Projected enemy activity
           -Press coverage
     -Tone

     -Withdrawals
     -South Vietnamese defense capabilities
          -Chances of success
          -US combat role
          -North Vietnam

Press stories
      -Energy activity
            -Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam
            -Timing
      -South Vietnamese defense performance
            -US confidence
            -Defeats and victories
      -Cambodia
      -Laos

South Vietnamese
     -Military capabilities
           -Manpower, training, materiel, morale
     -Towns
           -Kontum
           -Laird’s possible answers
                -Phrasing
           -Composition
     -Central Highlands
           -Montagnards

Troop withdrawal announcement
     -Format
           -Ceilings
           -Press interest
           -Future announcement
                 -Timing
     -Laird's comments
     -Laird, Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], Thieu

Laird’s possible answers
     -South Vietnam defense capabilities
     -Nixon doctrine, Vietnamization, Cambodia
           -Press questions
     -Air and sea power

          -Possible future use
               -Conditions
                     -1972
                     -Laos, Cambodia
                     -US forces
                     -POWs
                     -1972 election
               -The President’s possible remarks

The President’s possible remarks
     -US troops
          -Confidence in Vietnamization, South Vietnam defense capability

Vietnam
     -Remaining US troops
         -Responsibilities

Possible action by the North Vietnamese
     -Psychology of attack
           -Evidence

US casualties in Vietnam
     -Helicopters
     -Press reports of increases
     -Compared to the Battle of the Somme, March 21 – April 6, 1918
           -British casualties
                 -Compared to Germans
     -Compared to New York City death statistics

Troop withdrawal announcement
     -Vietnamization
     -Attacks by the North Vietnamese
           -Prediction
           -Timing
           -Publicity
                 -Psychological effect
     -South Vietnamese defense capabilities
           -Possible failures
                 -Terrain
                       -II Corps
     -Air activity

                 -Effectiveness
                      -ABC reports

     Air strikes
           -Damage reports
                 -B’52s
                 -Four-day strike of December 1971
                      -Effectiveness
           -Effectiveness
                 -Weather
                 -Evidence
           -US responses to North Vietnamese attacks
                 -Remaining US troops

     South Vietnam
          -Success
          -Economic progress
               -Inflation
          -Progress

     Rate of withdrawal
          -US goals in South Vietnam
                -POWs
                -Self-defense

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 11:00 am.

     Reporters at announcement release

     Questions for Laird
          -Duration

     Television cameras

     The White House Press Room

Ziegler left at 11:01 am.

     The President's statement

     Laird's comments

           -Vietnamization
                -Confidence in South Vietnam

     Troop announcement
          -Troop ceiling
               -Future announcement
          -Coordination with South Vietnam, Laird, JCS
          -Laird
               -Questions
               -Confidence in South Vietnam
               -US ground combat role

     [David] Kenneth Rush
          -Meeting with Laird
          -Hugh Scott
          -Proposed meeting with John C. Stennis, Margaret Chase Smith
          -Possible appointment as Deputy Secretary, Secretary of Defense

     Ambassador William J. Porter

The President, Laird and Haig left at 11:05 am.

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They opened it for reading the news, I read it.
The networks, the law issues, you see.
The party says they want to build it up.
They curse the attacks and all that sort of thing.
Which isn't too bad, as a matter of fact.
They do the fact that the far south would not be concerned there.
They're very likely not to succeed.
Well, they're going to take some hits, but they're going to... Yeah, they're going to do well.
They're going to do well.
The agency, I know, is going to want to do better with the argument around this law.
I thought that...
I don't know if you draw that, but it should be drawn.
What I'm going to ask you is probably some of those questions.
Well, I think it's well to admit that the North Vietnamese will be able to carry on a few spectaculars, but that the South Vietnamese haven't given those in the hands of...
Proudly, security proudly, they're not going to win every battle, but they're going to win the vast majority of the battles that they face over there, and they have the equipment, and the program has moved ahead well, and I've been given assurances by General Abrams that the program is such that we can arrive on the South Vietnamese borders very well.
Now, their follow-up would be .
I'm not speculating about that.
It's never been predicted.
All the circumstances probably evaluate the situation at that time.
In fact, what are you going to do about it?
Do you have any suggestions of the situation?
How would you handle that question?
How do you deal with that question?
I would just say that there will be a remaining presence of the United States forces there until the POW question is resolved.
They may want to put you on the spot.
Of course, we're down to the point where we would answer.
Well, if you try to give me any numbers, I'll just say that.
I just don't make projections with Calcats about
Our record speaks for itself.
It's a good record.
Here's where we started, and here's where we're going to be.
Yes, and we're going to be almost halfway out by the first of May.
And I think I can probably get a couple of hunkers about some of the people that were... That's very strange, the silence on the escalator going up and up and up and down, straight down to these places as we go down and down and down.
It's very interesting to know the...
Some of those who said absolutely nothing when I first met them, when our number of Vietnamis had been constantly increasing, and who had no plans, whatever, in the 1968 campaign for reducing them.
And now, some of the most vocal in criticizing a French woman.
With this announcement, 87%.
The prisoners for dead might be able to get into that.
You obviously have an answer.
Well, that's a totally blue question.
I think if you could get harder and whiter,
My gentlemen, that's a good reference.
Since the President pointed out in his statement to the South Asian Authority last week, and he did, I said, they're not interested in that.
Whatever.
They've said that they're quick to oppose their prisoners.
It's true.
The overthrow of the government of the South, that South Vietnam, and the, you know,
Well, it's all right.
I would say that anyone that tries to interpret the position any differently is either knowingly or unknowingly hating Hanoi.
Yeah, good.
Hanoi is the... And not our position.
That's right.
They're not hating Hanoi.
They've got costumes for something else, which is that they want the United States not only totally out, but withdraw.
Stop all fees, stop Vietnam.
They want to overthrow the Chu government.
That's their last offering.
That's what they send me here.
Now, I'm coming down to the point.
I'm trying to get...
I'd like it if it's all right with you.
Sure.
I'd like to bring the humanitarian thing in if I could.
Always.
Always.
That's one thing that I'd like to talk about.
I think I need to stress that.
Absolutely.
Excellent.
Excellent.
But if you don't raise the point, if you don't say that you thought it was some of the most naive
the kind of questions that you've ever heard.
What about offering a deadline in order to get to our prisons?
This is an offer that they've already turned down.
They turned it down last fall.
They turned it down just one week ago by saying that their demand is for the total stop of aid for North Carolina.
And they overthrow the Q government.
And this is what people want to do.
They play a political very, very hard game.
That's an odd question, totally.
And frankly, it's one that does disservice to the prisoners, and so forth and so on, because it creates a condition that just doesn't exist.
I had a couple other thoughts.
I think that one thing that's true is for you to posture a course in the country for the fact that there will be some increased enemy activity.
But don't allow your, uh, prophecy with regard to increasing enemy activity to be the lead out of this story.
What I'm getting at is this.
after it would likely have that way of leading, because that's what they've been writing for the last four, three, four days.
And I can simply do it the low-key way, which, of course, you're a master at, and I simply say, now, let's see where we are.
And here's a little twist that I thought.
This new withdrawal, which is an increase to a low term, not a big increase, but some increase over, as has been every withdrawal we've made over our previous withdrawal,
as far as I'm concerned, is an indication of our conviction that the Vietnamese now have the capability of defending themselves.
You could say the American Crown Combat Rule has strong
Then you should say, you should say that they, that now, having said that they are able to defend themselves, the South Vietnamese aren't ready to win the battles, all battles, any more than the Americans run all battles, when we carry the front of the fighting.
The South Vietnamese are able to defend South Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese, and they're ready to be able to defend their country, and North Vietnam has no chance at all to defeat them.
And this is an indication of our confidence.
Now, having said that, gentlemen, it is true that the enemy activity, I know the stories of some of you ladies and gentlemen writing about increased activities in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam.
You know, curiously enough, those stories are written all the time at this time of year.
There's always increased activities.
In the death period, this is the time when the enemy does increase.
The question is not whether the enemy increases its activity.
Some may be anticipated, some may be predicted for months.
The question is how solidly the enemy is performing when they, for the first time after eight long years, have a slow response level as far as defense and ground activity is concerned.
And this is an indication of our confidence on that one.
How does that sound to you?
I don't know.
I think it's great.
Okay.
Say the battle's won, the battle's lost, and that's good.
Just as we lost the battle, so we won the battle.
But here's the situation in regard to it.
You have another argument?
No, I don't have another argument.
No, I'm concerned that you've got ideas of those.
Okay.
I think it's important that the story come out here is on reductions and not on the... No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.
Everybody would have fought 15 times, and it still survives.
You believe we'll get it done.
As far as the office is concerned, this is always a hard time to hear your office.
It's very difficult.
But we do not have any ground capability, you know.
And as far as the oceans are concerned, we're hoping they'll be able to survive it.
As far as all of Vietnam is concerned, we are absolutely confident, as I said, that the South Vietnamese now have the men, the training, the material, and the morale to defend themselves against the South.
And, uh, again, I didn't even get off that little town of Kong until, uh, when I say, for example, the, uh, the, uh,
There will be battles won, battles lost.
There will be towns lost, and towns won.
But in the end, it's up to the intermediate to win.
I just put it that way.
I think it's better if they don't use the names as much.
That's right.
I use that because I think they would make too much out of that town.
Yeah.
Well, if you were to say, you know, there would be, you know, right, Perrin is one of them.
Perrin is one of the Perrin Little Brothers.
But I think it's always better,
You're right, you're right, you're right.
So what you want to come out of here is the fact that I know that technically it's not correct to talk about anything except ceilings, and we should talk about ceilings.
But the only thing that I'm interested in is the headline, so I'm going to say, I'm announcing today that we're all in addition to 70,000 for the next three months.
I'll make another announcement before I make a first.
I'm very glad to read you all the details.
So I don't think we have any problems with that.
It is important that we get this story based on the 70,000 withdrawals.
The only line that I think I might put in, I might add, which will be a good way to redraw to you would be this, I just say this withdrawal is,
which I've always said passes withdrawals through the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by President Hsu.
That's the clear approval of President Hsu.
And it's an indication that we've drawn out of 6,000 of our, of our confidence in South Vietnam.
It's not about the ability of defending itself.
Some of them want me to say that, and then you, and that means a record number, and they want me to say, well, what about all these battles?
Yes, because they always have at this time of year, and say, I'm not trying to do this, you know, for the rest of it.
There are going to be battles that are going to be hard to fight.
But that biasing is going to be done after the next doctor, and now we have met the optimization.
Biasing enemies.
Biasing invulnerables, by the way.
Now they call it an air bar.
They may try to pressure the barrister.
How long is an air bar there?
What do you say when you have that question?
Well...
I don't think we should ever propose the possibility of air and sea power in that area of the world.
I don't know if I'm talking about something else.
I'm talking about the fact that I'm going the other way.
I'm going the way of saying we don't want to get them in a position where they say that, ah, we're not going to get the Americans involved in 572.
Do you want to leave hanging out there if possible?
Let me get a point.
You know, Michael, we're always going to use it up there.
Do you think I should leave that panel open to questions?
I've always said this, as far as operational
Operational conditions may change, but I can assure you that as long as there's any remaining American forces there, the American Army will continue to be... Oh, that's the point I'm making.
Let's suppose we have a total withdrawal.
Let's suppose we get our field judges about.
Now, Mr. Secretary, do you think we might continue to have air strikes?
Well, that's a rather nifty question, and I don't believe it deserves any purpose in answering that.
That's the way I handle it, but I'll handle it anyway.
I just have not, I've never wanted to come down and say it was positive that we wouldn't decide.
You know that, but we can't.
But we're in a situation where we may have to, some of us may have to, three or four months before the election.
I think it'd be better for you to do that.
That's right.
You should change the timeline, which you've done badly.
But on that, I think it is better if you take the second license than you have to, and that I don't take it.
Do you want me to say then that this withdrawals an indication of our, as the Secretary will elaborate his remarks, this withdrawals an indication of our confidence in the success of the atomization and the ability of the South Vietnamese to take over now the defense of their
Which is what it means, you know, 69,000.
69,000 people out there can't even defend themselves, let alone defend South Vietnam.
69,000 people will have their hands full getting the things that they have to get out of it.
Get out of it, yeah.
That's right.
Yeah, off their bar wheels.
It's not very many people, Mr. President.
What is your view on this?
You know, I think this is exactly right.
I think there are two things to keep in mind.
One is the enemy's trying to build the psychology of the big attack.
Therefore, we shouldn't build that.
We shouldn't contribute to that.
But that also...
I think you might say that, in the young years, that we might say this is sort of a unique culture for yesterday, that for the first time, and the first time since this war began, then instead of keeping this attack secret, are doing the old thing, which may indicate that they want to have the psychology of an attack.
And that's the way that these goddamn people are running.
They're trying to work out how to get Jesus to surrender to Adam.
Now, we aren't there.
That's the plan.
American casualty, what did the casualties turn out to be?
Five.
Jesus.
We lost four yesterday, so that's three.
But we have some sort of a... Well, we get it.
They've been shooting a few helicopters lately.
Yeah.
Well, for Christ's sake, you've got to expect it.
You can't...
So they'll have time until that week's story.
Headline, American casualties sharply in the reach of five.
500% of cases over the last 20 years.
Let me tell you what execution happened in Illinois.
The great battle of March 21st in World War I, Mr. Brady, who was supposed to have lost, but they lost their honor by which, in the end, turned out to be a loss for the Germans because the Germans didn't pray for them.
The British, of course, didn't have a hell of a lot of money for that kind of money.
They lost $400,000.
The Germans lost slightly less, even though they were on the attack.
So, war has changed.
Imagine if you were Secretary of Defense and you were picking up captured U.S. Germans.
100,000 per day.
All those who were not killed, about half were captured and dead, and the other half were killed.
coming looking at this landing more people killed in new york city right now
Oh, well, that's been true.
We've had about, we've run it up to about 100 homicides a week.
Sure, sure, sure.
We always have many homes with drugs.
Anything else you think, what do you think the emphasis should be on the Inverga cytotoxin?
No, I agree completely.
I guess we've got to get... We want to get the size of this in the case of success of the imposition.
Third, we want to discount and advance this crap with regard to the fact that it's a hell of a defense.
This offensive is ridiculous to me that I've gone on for days and months.
Second, it always comes at this time of year.
Third, the fact that the enemy shot at so much of us must indicate that they want us dead today, psychologically.
And third, fourth, we believe that as far as South Vietnam is concerned, it's not a big deal.
There will be reports of battles, sea-sawing, there will be a sea-saw battle before them, because it's that kind of terrain, particularly there in the 2nd Corps.
But in the end, South Korea needs to have the men, the equipment, and the morale to defend themselves.
That's all.
We're going to pour in the goddamn air in this career, aren't we?
We are.
oh one of the things he had last night said the air strikes did no good now that's not true i read the reports
No question about it.
We can't get a readout.
You know, they go out there, these guys are up there, and then we want to get a readout of all the bomb damage.
We put about 2,000 tons of B-52 stuff in there.
We can't read it out.
We're not getting a readout.
I referred to our four days earlier.
Oh, the four days earlier.
This has been good.
Well, the...
It did some good, sure.
We've got some pictures.
They aren't very good.
We've had a bad weather situation out there.
You know, that drone, that one drone that got... We're just saying, once you put it this way, we've had a bad weather situation.
We don't have the photographic evidence, but we have evidence from other surveys.
My friend came back saying that the event, that it had been accomplished, the mission had been accomplished, and it's very, very effective, very effective.
I put it this way, we haven't made that strike.
frankly, you would not have recommended the president to withdraw the press brief.
I'm sure we can get into the...
I put that in.
That's right.
And they probably will ask me again if we're going to do it again, and that's something that I just... Oh, okay.
After all, we're done.
Less than 100,000 men.
If they, uh, if they can carry all those men and they can keep them out of terrorism and the rest, we'll respond in time.
We'll respond according to what we believe is necessary.
Absolutely.
Let's back it up.
You know, we've done so well here.
You know, there's the other side of the coin.
South Vietnam has done well.
The mother's family wants the damn country.
They used to be a terror in the place.
They were there.
Look at it now.
90% of the country is pacified.
Right?
They're doing well, too.
The economic progress has been much better than it has been in inflationary and everything else.
Fight it.
Fight it.
The projects have been made there in a short period.
You can't bring them out any faster than we're bringing them out, Mr. President.
You just can't do it.
We started out with about a 10,000 rate, and we're up now to this rate.
It's 23,000.
But some will say, well, isn't that disappointing?
No.
They say, we're going to do exactly what we should.
And no, and incidentally, our part, we didn't go to, we had Vietnam for the purpose of getting our prisoners back in Persia.
We didn't go to Vietnam for the purpose of withdrawing.
We'd go to Vietnam for the purpose of achieving an American objective, and that is the right of the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.
Anybody ready?
I'm going to call them in now.
Now, you've got it all.
Yes, sir.
As I said, he's going to let us have as much as five minutes, sir.
Get the baggage office here.
All right.
I'll just tell them I'm just going to answer the questions on this, too, or you tell them that.
I'll see.
I don't want to get into a lot of this stuff today.
I'll see if you want to take questions on the president's announcement.
Yeah, got it.
President, the president, the secretary of state president.
You're going to have the public turned off, so we can take all that sort of thing.
Yes, sir.
We're doing a lot of information.
We're doing a lot of information.
We're doing a lot of information.
Now, let's see.
My house up there will say hi.
no i think the way you uh
uh over the next three months this means that our group ceiling will be 69 000 by may 1st i don't have another announcement to take on that time this announcement has the appearance
It has the approval of the government of the non-Secretary of Defense.
That's actually one of the major questions.
Maybe I could do a poll like that and turn it to you, and then you get all the solutions.
I think that's a good idea.
I think it's a nice kind of color.
I think it's a good idea.
But remember, this, you should get it in the line.
This indicates our confidence in the South Asian nation.
Now, it's also the line, the American ground combat, where we've studied it several times before, has had it.
It has.
I mean, we're getting shot at, but we don't fight it, are we?
But they know we don't.
Now, I don't know.
Yeah.
and he had to go around information to look at this.
I'm afraid this may be tough with all these contacts and things like that.
Please stop.
Just like that, these are under consideration.
Why don't you just say that he's not a consideration, that there are several people, he's one of those who's a cop, so that he doesn't get it, doesn't make a second choice.
So, yeah, he's my little friend.
You know, the two people that I taught in this deputy's pilot is in the security area.
He's the best with the Russian port.
I have a port.
He's a very good guy.
Since we're getting out of this goddamn Paris thing, why don't we get him back?
He's a great guy.
And he's been hired over there.
Oh, he's great.
He's been hired.
He's really tough.
All right, all right.
  • 647-001 10:10 AM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:10 am and 10:12 am.
  • 647-002 10:12 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Rose Mary Woods, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:12 am to 10:19 am.
  • 647-003 10:19 AM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:19 am and 10:34 am.
  • 647-004 10:19 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:19 am and 10:34 am.
  • 647-005 10:19 AM · 34 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:19 am and 10:34 am.
  • 647-006 10:34 AM · 38 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:34 am to 10:35 am.
  • 647-008 11:05 AM · 39 sec — United States Secret Service agents, Manolo Sanchez, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:05 am and 11:07 am.
  • 647-009 11:11 AM · 30 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:11 am to 11:41 am.

Conversation 647-007, January 13, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/647-007 (accessed November 2, 2026).