Conversation 656-017

TapeTape 656StartWednesday, January 26, 1972 at 12:14 PMEndWednesday, January 26, 1972 at 12:57 PMTape start time02:21:02Tape end time03:03:45ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Woods, Rose Mary;  Scott, Cornelius A.;  Ziegler, Ronald L.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Butterfield, Alexander P.Recording deviceOval Office

On January 26, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Rose Mary Woods, Cornelius A. Scott, Ronald L. Ziegler, Henry A. Kissinger, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:14 pm to 12:57 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 656-017 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 656-17

Date: January 26, 1972
Time: 12:14 pm - 12:57 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Rose Mary Woods.

     The President’s schedule
          -Recent meeting with Barend W. Biesheuvel

     Woods’s schedule

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     Fatigue
          -Speech

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     Speeches
          -The President’s Vietnam peace proposal, January 25, 1972
               -Woods’ conversation with Joseph Woods
               -Length
          -Preparation
               -Possible story
                     -Henry A. Kissinger

                -[Thomas] Woodrow Wilson
                -Theodore Roosevelt
                -Editing

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     Rose Mary Woods’s call to Thelma C. (Ryan) (“Pat”) Nixon

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[The President talked with Cornelius A. Scott at an unknown time between 12:14 pm and 12:22
pm.]

[Conversation No. 656-17A]

[See Conversation No. 019-099]

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[See Conversation No. 019-100]

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[End of telephone conversation]

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     The President’s schedule
          -Telephone calls
          -Wiley T. and Mrs. Buchanan
          -Murray M. and Nancy Chotiner
               -Family
          -Possible note to Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
          -John W. McCormack
               -Wife’s death
               -Possible overnight stay at White House
                      -The President’s forthcoming trip to the People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -Kissinger

                -Letter from John J. McCloy
                      -Advisor to Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament
          -Judge G. Harrold Carswell
                -Thank you note
          -Dan L. Beebe
                -Letter
                -Editorials
                -Correspondence
          -Visits by friends
                -Mrs. Olive Marshburn
                      -Julie Nixon Eisenhower’s wedding
                -Church services
                -Kennedy Center tickets

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 12:22 pm.

                -White House tour
                -Western White House
                -Herbert W. Kalmbach

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     White House gifts
          -Paperweight
               -Dwight D. Eisenhower
          -John R. (“Tex”) McCrary
          -Box

                -Thomas A. Pappas
                -Greek Orthodox Church head

     White House dinner for DeWitt Wallace, January 28, 1972
          -Guest list
               -Pappas
               -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
               -Hobart D. (“Hobe”) Lewis
               -Emil (“Bus”) and Patricia R. Mosbacher
               -Alice Roosevelt Longworth
               -Barry M. Goldwater
               -Edward W. Brooke
               -John J. Rhodes

Woods left at 12:25 pm.

     Kissinger briefing
          -Quality
          -Outline
                 -Clarity, feeling
          -The President’s letter
          -Television coverage
          -Still photographs
          -The President’s communications
          -US intentions
          -Recap of the President’s position outlined in Vietnam peace proposal speech,
                 January 25, 1972
          -Negotiation progress
          -Duration
          -Details of secret negotiations on Vietnam
                 -Comment by J. William Middendorf, II [?]
                 -Helen A. Thomas
                 -Travel
                       -Airplanes and airports
                       -July 1971
                             -PRC

Kissinger entered at 12:27 pm.

                -New York Times editorial
                     -Hanoi

          -Duration
          -Hugh Scott and Gerald R. Ford meeting with press
               -Exchange of Prisoners of war [POWs]
                      -Cease-fire
          -Cease-fire
               -US position
               -George S. McGovern
          -Overthrow of Nguyen Van Thieu
               -US aid
          -Confidentiality of channel
          -Effect
               -India-Pakistan War
               -Truthfulness of administration
          -Relations to other governments
               -PRC
          -Eight point proposal
               -Compared to nine point proposal
                      Reparations

Woods entered at 12:32 pm.

     Gift from head of Greek Orthodox Church
           -Greek junta
           -Catholics
           -Mrs. Nixon
                -Catholics
           -Value
           -Disposition
                -Julie Nixon Eisenhower
                -Pappas
                -“Handling” of gifts

Woods left at 12:34 pm.

     Kissinger’s briefing
          -Tone of questions
          -The President’s point at congressional leaders meeting
                -North Vietnam’s war aims
                      -Overthrow of South Vietnam government
                -Michael J. Mansfield amendment
                -John F. Kennedy

            -Initial involvement in war
      -McGovern opposition
            -Reason for criticism
-Nature of proposal
      -Complications
            -Reasons
                   -North Vietnamese outline
                        -Compared to US proposals
                              -POWs, ceasefire, withdrawal
                        -Political components
                   -Pace of negotiations progress
            -Reason for criticism
-Critics of administration’s policy
      -The President’s April 7, 1971 speech
            -Kissinger’s briefing
      -Tone
      -Politics
      -Timing of publicity
            -Scott
            -Peter Lisagor
            -David Kraslow
            -Domestic politics
-The President’s meeting with congressional leaders
      -Mansfield amendment
            -Effect on negotiations
-New developments in negotiations
      -Publicity
-Thieu resignation
-Nature of governments
-Timing of the President’s Vietnam peace proposal speech
      -North Vietnamese offensive
            -Possible effect
                   -December 1971
      -Congress
      -Need for unity
      -Release of terms
-Difference in proposals
      -Nine points
            -Compared to seven points
                   -Cease-fire provision
-Cease-fire in principle

     -Eight points
           -Disputes
                 -Withdrawal
                       -Deadline
                 -Overthrow of Thieu
                       -Installation of North Vietnam allied government
                             -US support
     -Political aspects
           -US view toward particular governments
                 -August 16, 1971 proposal
           -Thieu resignation
           -Electoral commission
                 -Formation
     -Press reaction

Legislative leaders meeting
     -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s demeanor
           -Ziegler’s schedule
           -The President’s Vietnam peace proposal speech
                 -Terms
                       -Timeline
                 -Clarity

Agnew
    -Objections to administration’s proposals
         -Staff briefing comments
               -Withdrawal and ceasefire
    -Leak of proposals

Kissinger’s briefing
     -Reading of secret notes of Vietnamese meetings
           -Purpose
           -Folders
           -Speeches

Public relations
     -Kissinger’s talks with Ziegler and the President
     -Press
     -Congress
     -Vietnamese
     -Kissinger telephone call

      -Brian MacDonald
            -Fast in LaFayette Park
            -Background
            -Reaction to proposals
                  -Possible statement
            -Death of wife, Alice MacDonald
-Ziegler telephone call
      -[Forename unknown] Marino [sp?] of St. Joseph’s College
            -Reaction to proposals
            -Voting record
-Administration strategy
      -PRC trip
      -Kissinger briefing
            -Effect on McGovern
            -Effort toward unity
            -Press coverage
                  -New York Times
-Scott and Ford
      -Scott’s comment about surrender
-Attack on liberals
-Paul N. (“Pete”) McCloskey, Jr.
      -Roger H. Mudd
      -Brooke
      -Statement
            -Mudd
            -The President’s State of the Union address
      -Influence
-Previous evening’s speech
      -Length
      -Delivery
      -Pace
      -Tone
-John A. Scali
-Patrick J. Buchanan
-Charles W. Colson’s group
-Reaction to criticism
-William P. Rogers
-New proposals
-US stance
-Congressional leadership meeting

Ziegler left at 12:56 pm.

           -Kissinger’s briefing
                -Ziegler’s view
           -Peaceniks
                -Administration reaction
           -Kissinger’s briefing, January 26, 1972
                -Television coverage
                -Radio
                -Extemporaneous speech
                      -Effect of television
                -Text of proposals

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 12:56 pm.

     Return telephone call from Ronald W. Reagan

Butterfield and Kissinger left at 12:57 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

You must be tired, aren't you?
Yeah, I got a little tired after the things, because, you know, you don't... Oh, but you have to sit down.
I thought it was great.
You know, the way that we
that I do those over a second, you know, that somebody's got to write a little story about how you do, how much work you do, if you want to work in speeches, of course, and whatever few in the old days did.
Some presidents wrote their speeches, Wilson wrote some of his, and so did G.R., and I write some of mine.
But he said that no modern president has ever
on the enormous work, but you know it pays off because I get out the stuff that doesn't fit me and I get it boiled down and boiled down.
You notice how we cut that damn thing down.
You've got to cut it and cut it and cut it and finally get it down to something that's
He called right away.
And I didn't call Pat and told her everybody there.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Hello?
I just wanted to tell you that I am very sorry to hear about your brother's death.
And also to tell you, too, that Stan is just doing a fine job on our staff here.
Well, yeah.
He's a fine young man.
Yes, I remember that huge crowd down on Peachtree Street.
Yes, I know you were very close to him.
Would you tell them that I called and express my sympathy, please?
Fine, I just got it.
And the Yolks and the Buchanans, and they had Mary Totner and Nancy.
Who's Nancy?
No way.
His wife.
She, I think, is like the last one.
She's the lady, she's the...
And they seem very happy.
I hope they are.
They're really very... She's an attractive girl.
Very attractive.
She has two daughters, I think.
One in high school.
Here's this demo.
I thought you might want to write a little set of the pads or something like that on the corner.
Not with mine.
I'm not going to take that one.
And someone suggested, you know, that now John McCormick's wife has gone, maybe he would come something at night, but you had suggested maybe having her, you know, in to spend the night.
You don't want to do that before there is time to check in.
And...
And we need to do an autograph for a picture of
Somebody had suggested to Judge Carswell, and I was pleased and honored to support you that day.
Quite right.
Now to Judge, uh, what's his name?
Harold.
What is his name?
He tracks them off.
Harold.
Harold Carswell.
Appreciation for his...
slender for his outstanding and dedicated service to the nation.
I have out there for you.
Oh, somebody wrote, oh, you might have to read Dan Beattie's letters sometime.
I'll put an airplay on it.
Dan Beattie, the writer.
You know, the publisher of that Orville.
He's still living?
Yes.
Oh, yeah, he's sending in good editorials all the time.
I've written him and you've written him.
We've sent letters to him.
We've sent him.
and um he's just he's a cute old man yeah we've just sent him several letters that's why he's saying he doesn't send them in four letters but um in a column that somebody sent to me um mrs mark's friend says they hadn't been back here you know they couldn't make it to the julie's wedding and so forth um
I didn't open the door for my husband either, she said.
I don't remember why they stopped me for it.
She doesn't sound critical.
No, she wouldn't.
She just was asked, and they asked.
I don't know if she would...
Totally.
I don't know what she's going to do when they come.
I don't know the reason.
I'll take this call and say that if they are coming... That call that we have a band, we have church services, and that they might want to be here for one of those.
I think that's the thing.
Of course, if they come, we'd have to have them
Well, that's terrible.
There's just no time.
Well, I wouldn't mind.
I think what I should do is have them let us know if they plan to check back in.
If I ask her to hear that we would like to see them and there might be a special event, then I want you to give tickets to the Kennedy Center.
Come on in.
Do you agree?
Yes, sir.
And then, for example, that there are going to be, you know, complimentary tickets for the, you know, tickets for the Senate and the White House and, of course, you know, special tours and so forth.
And I hope they can do that.
I don't know the question.
Why else they ought to be?
I don't know.
I just think somebody just ought to.
But we're not there.
They call us to the well-earned place.
Ask your papa to do that.
He ought to, right?
I just want to say that the one that Bob Halston gave me...
But you've got a post list as much as you could.
And they are having this party for some of the others who are not.
Yeah.
Great.
And they'll come in for the awards.
And the only people that are in the past are well-hosted.
Because all those people will know each other.
Did Alice Hoffman get invited or not?
Yes, she was not on the list, and after you mentioned that, I had them call her, and she'd come.
That's great.
A lot of the people who were suggested at first are... Dead.
Well, they're not out of town and so forth, like Goldwater and Brooke and... A lot of them, two or three or four senators.
We only had one congressman, and I heard...
I don't care whether it was Goldwater coming.
Sorry.
Rose, Johnny Rose would come.
I just want to give you a brief report that Henry did.
The best job he's done since he's been here.
He first of all outlined with great clarity and good feeling and passion, you know, conveying your feeling and your determination and so forth.
Read your letter.
We had still taken, but we did not use it.
I don't get it right.
Well, it's a close call.
You know, afterwards, we thought, well, we blew it because we didn't have the TV cameras on.
But I don't think he would have presented himself as well with the TV cameras.
But he went through and read the communications that you had sent, talking about Dr. Kissinger and the feeling.
And he said he started off in a way that
conveyed the sincerity and determination to achieve a just and workable solution, recognizing their side.
And so they did an excellent job.
And then he went through and said, here's where we are today.
Here's where we stand.
Here's where we're going.
And then he went through and recapped your position that you presented last night with great clarity.
And what he felt the
The Future Herald, and then he went through a little bit of the progress of the series of negotiations.
And he spoke for about 45 minutes, which was good.
Because he didn't, you know, it took him a while to read that.
It took him a while to explain the problem.
Then he told him a little bit about how, just for three minutes, which there was total silence in the room, about how he got there.
How did he explain it?
Well, he said that the military aircraft... Just so you know, we're not talking behind your back.
I think you should figure it out, too, if you don't.
The ambassador would say to me, he said, he did the best job that he has ever done.
Well, I told you.
Tell me about the three minutes.
What did he say?
Well, he told them.
And Helen Thomas, I think we're going to have to remove the chair.
Helen Thomas asked the question how he got in.
And he said, well, I don't want to get into details because we want to maintain the channel.
But generally, we flew in military aircraft to a field.
And then we transferred to others.
ended up in smaller airports that are seldom used.
You could see him.
God, this is like out of a movie.
And he said, we stayed on the outskirts of the town.
And the other side made the arrangements for the meeting place, which never became known.
And he said, he was there in July on his round-the-world trip.
because he was there openly.
He did point out that he'd been there after he came on the way back.
He said, you got that out of the state, but you got that in there.
Remember how the son of the rich said, why didn't you?
You're kind of a natural.
You should have stopped the mosque.
And go ahead.
Go ahead.
You know.
But the interesting thing, Henry, and you weren't out there, but when Scott, and it was a lot of the same group, when Scott and Ford went out to the press room, you could sense a few of them going through the judgment, well, is it true that you never offered a
Fixed date just in exchange for POWs.
Well, when you were finished, you did get that question.
Because it was explained so clearly.
In other words, the fact that in November we offered for exchange of POWs a ceasefire, we would be out by August.
So that statement in itself fixed in their mind the fact that, yes, indeed, if they would have agreed to give us some prisoners back in a ceasefire, then
Why do we ask for a ceasefire?
But he covers it.
You see, the point is, on this proposal, nothing but the ceasefire is agreed to anyway.
That's not the problem.
We're not asking for anything that they didn't agree to.
I think the government is going to have one hell of a time.
No, he didn't ask, but Henry hit it because he said...
He went for about four minutes on the overthrow, indirect, direct overthrow.
And on the indirect, he talked about the aid being taken away.
But on the direct overthrow, he said, they left it to our own.
They were gracious enough to leave it to us.
They didn't tell us how to do it, but they said we should do it.
And I said, now, we are trying to protect the confidentiality of this channel.
We want to say no more than is necessary for the American public to have a clear opinion.
So I hope we won't be foolish in approving what we have said.
You can.
But we can't.
On your behalf.
So... Well, this...
The thing about this rock is that what Henry just said there...
And this all goes back, incidentally, remember I told you, you didn't know what Henry and I were up to, but I told you to forget that goddamn, you never worried about any of that anyway.
But I said, it's all going to wash out.
Do you realize what this does to the Indian-Pakistan ship?
Sure.
Do you also realize what this thing does to the Batman in the future when they say, well, are you telling the truth?
when we say, well, maybe we're doing something else.
They're going to be very, very respectful.
I dropped the seeds of a few more things in that respect, because they said, if you want to say what you discussed in Peking, I said we won't discuss our efforts with respect to any other government on this affair, because those possibilities are still open.
The other point, sir, was silence, too.
We are...
quiet in the room was when he said, well, they may ask why we have an eight-point proposal, why the president put forth an eight-point proposal, and I had a nine-point proposal that they gave to us secretly.
And then you indicated we could not agree to the assistance.
To reparations.
The only reason we have eight and they have nine is because we took out reparations as part of the settlement.
We can't pay reparations.
But
But before you went to but, you said, oh, there it is.
And then Henry went, but we told them that we were prepared to, in the president's personal commitment, to involve in the MRC.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
And this had a hand around a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a,
Yeah, I'd like for her to... Could you hold it and send it to Julius here?
Because Julius is going to be enthusiastic about it.
Oh, well, then send it over.
I'll send the little one.
Send the little one over and send the other one too.
So now you can say, Tom, have us send this.
As a matter of fact, you ought to tell her on the phone that it's a hell of an machine and it's worth, you know, $50,000 or something like that.
So there's a problem with this.
Maybe one of ours.
How much of that stuff do you sort of take off before you ever get in here?
About 75%.
Well, you know, I usually get wonderful things they send me.
You know, the peaches from Oregon, they used to send me some.
Magnificent pineapple from Hawaii and the rest of it.
God, I never hear about it.
I caught it the other day.
I stalked somebody, you know, and said they've been to Rose's place, their apartment.
You should have seen the marble sprues and all the chips they ate in Kansas City.
And I didn't see it.
There he got it, and then it's supposed to come to me, and she takes off.
That's what it is.
That's what it is.
Well, just don't get caught stealing.
Don't mind somebody stealing, but don't get caught.
That's right.
Well, then they go ahead, Ron, and they eat.
But they were pretty funny.
You know what?
I thought they were very respectful of the question.
They were?
Absolutely.
They were.
Well, but...
I don't know about...
There have been times that... We have.
What I had isn't this distance.
It's not.
It's this distance.
God damn it.
They're nitpicking away at it.
You know, I really nailed it at the last legislative meeting, and when I made the point, I said, now let's understand the kinds of people that we're trying to appeal to.
I said, Hanoi will not like this, because their goal, of course, is something that we cannot give at the overthrow of the government, or a change of government, I'm going to call it.
As far as our domestic critics are concerned,
There are some honest people, and as a matter of reason I said that, there were two or three in that room that had voted with the goddamn Mansfield Amendment, who thought that we had the better half of the peace side, but who now can be and may be satisfied, so we must vote for them.
However, there are others who, for different reasons in Hanoi, but people who think it was a mistake for Kennedy ever to get us involved, take I.O.
twice, take it to that every time, had sent 16,000 to the first entrance to Vietnam,
People like the governor who honestly oppose it all along, who frankly don't want us to succeed.
And those people are going to criticize this for another reason.
So you can't win them.
On the other hand, the greater majority should be for it.
And I think it's a powerful thing.
One thing I hit today in this briefing was a number of the commentators I heard this morning said, why do you have such a complicated plan?
Why didn't you do this?
I want you to know, this plan is complicated because it follows the outline.
They wanted it this way.
We came in with a proposal which was very simple.
Prisoners.
Prisoners cease fire and withdraw.
They never said cease fire is wrong.
They never said this or that.
What they said was it must have political elements.
So it is in order to speed up progress, not to slow it down, in order to meet their demands, that it's complicated.
It is following their outline, not our outline, that it is like this.
Then when you get the question... Now listen, let me say, when people raise a complicated line, that is just a goddamn camouflage.
They're against it, that's all.
They're just trying to find something wrong.
Don't you agree?
But there wasn't, after all, you remember, Ron, when I briefed before the President's April speech last year, and somebody got up and said, that just isn't enough.
We've had really emotional meetings.
This one, I may be wrong, but I think even those who may sort of nitpick away at it are really quite impressed, and they...
They're sort of hacking away, but they haven't hacked so much.
I watch television.
No, you have to keep in mind, too, Henry, that most of them have carried a view about the war.
Most of them are in the category that I mentioned, the leaders, who think it was a mistake to get in, who think it was a mistake to stay in, and to be done.
want to prove that they're right and want us to lose.
And also, we're concerned that maybe I, politically, might succeed.
Now, therefore, they're going to piss on us.
And God damn it, let's face this, kick them in the balls, right?
Of course, they're a hell of a start.
If you started at this question of why you're making it public now, of course, it's a hell of an argument for them to make, considering that they're making...
that they're making things public.
Somebody, I think, Litterko said, why make it public now?
Somebody asked the question, why do you make it public now?
Is there any other reason except for domestic disharmony?
I said, well, the domestic issue isn't negligible.
We need to have a united people to end this war with dignity.
I said to the leaders, one thing, incidentally, I hope somebody takes notes of this, or I made the point, Henry, and they said, well, what about the Mansfield man?
I said, well, it may be quite candid.
I said, if we have the Congress after this speech, which goes as far as we can go, go off in every direction, you can kiss negotiations goodbye.
You're going to kill them.
Now, they have got to stay there.
Don't you think so?
I'm just going to put the monkey on their back.
The more you're going to say it, the more you're going to say it.
I said secondly, but there were other reasons.
The second reason is because when you ask what was new yesterday, what was new yesterday is that the president and President Hughes
The other side would have considered it a negotiating given.
Now they know we are committed to it.
The mere fact that President Chu has offered to resign changes the political landscape in South Vietnam and is in itself a tremendous confession.
Thirdly, I said every government, we have that experience, every government has the experience that they don't want to make a decision unless they have to.
and that they may have thought they could wait a month or two months.
We are now asking them to take a position.
Those were our principal reasons.
Well, then somebody said, did you do it because of the offensive?
I said, the basic decision was made at the end of December, at a time when we thought there'd be a series of high points, and not an offensive.
We did it because with Congress coming back, we did not want to be in a position where our public
and private positions were totally inconsistent with each other.
We needed united people, so the President decided, soon after Congress came back, he would put before the American people, before the Congress, enough of the facts protecting only those elements that were required to keep the confidentiality of the Channel alive.
And I sort of quoted the North Vietnamese about
and not tempting us into revealing the number of the same.
You said we're prepared to have them released.
I said if they want to release, we won't release the nine points because it's sales, but if they want to, then I gave an explanation of the differences between the nine and the seven points, which one of them, which I hadn't realized until I studied it yesterday, was that their ceasefire in the nine points is much more detailed
Then in the second point, it is a real ceasefire.
While the second point is sort of lame.
So this killed the ceasefire issue right there.
I said, now one big difference is that the nine points offer a genuine ceasefire.
See, so then no one came back to me and said, why do you have ceasefire in your package?
You know, this is a very good point.
Ceasefire's in the package because they've already offered it.
That's right.
It's not a problem.
We've accepted it in principle.
We've accepted it in principle.
And I said, just so that we can narrow the questions to the contentious issues of the eight points we had, there are only two that are in any sense in dispute.
Which are what?
The withdrawal and the cue.
And I said, on withdrawal, what they really want is that we get the deadline that runs no matter what happens.
And on overthrow, what they want is not that we, that few girls, what they want is that we put them in.
And that is what we object to.
To ally ourselves with them.
I said they want us to ally ourselves with them against the people who've been relying on us.
That is what we can't do.
We will give them a fair chance at the political process.
And I think this country, I don't know, but I think they're going to have a hell of a time dealing with this because, as we were willing to say publicly, it is not true we are protecting any particular government.
In our August 16th proposal, we were prepared to say we are not ready to any government.
Yesterday, the President said we will accept the outcome of any political process.
It's in our proposal.
The Jew offers to resign.
The Jew offers to put the whole electoral process under an electoral commission, which he doesn't control.
Then somebody said, does he appoint the electoral commission?
I said, no, the electoral commission is negotiated between us.
It's negotiated at the peace conference.
You've really got those bastards with the hair short.
They must be mad as hell.
No, what I mean is that they're mad because they didn't get it.
So they didn't get it?
Yeah.
Well, anyway, incidentally, speaking of friends, I tell you what, the baggage is one of these, meaning you don't need any enemies to you.
He wasn't there.
Were you there that morning?
Were you there the last time he was with me?
I had him come in late because I was preparing for your assessment.
What did he do?
Well, he started price-packing him for more than the leaders did.
Oh, my God!
He said, why didn't you have this?
Why didn't you have that?
Well, he didn't understand.
He said, well, why?
I said, I don't know.
One thing that wasn't clear, he said, is it true, Rudy, that we have offered a straight proposal of a ceasefire?
No, of a withdrawal ceasefire?
He said, oh, yeah, sure.
I said, you remember I said that.
I said, we offered that.
We offered to negotiate it in June, May.
We offered it in 90 months, in August.
And then in October 11th, in my speech yesterday, we offered it in the alternative.
We could separate that out and do that alone.
We'll do it as part of the political package, or we'll do it as part of the things.
But the choice is theirs.
God damn it, if there was anything clear in that speech, it was that that speech was very clear.
But he didn't care.
I don't know.
I wonder if he read it.
Yeah, but he's in a contrary mood, because yesterday afternoon, at your staff, at the staff briefing I did at 4, he took the opposite line.
There, he said, why the hell did you put, he said, that proposal, trust of withdrawals and ceasefire, isn't good enough, because as soon as you're out, they're going to break the ceasefire.
So, what's he going to do?
What's he going to do?
Well, he doesn't have an idea.
One thing I did is I read the two notes with which we transmitted the documents, and I said those were secret notes.
They were never intended for publication.
They just give you a flag of the spirit with which we approached the North Vietnamese.
We have used invective.
We have said we want justice.
We have said we will admit it.
Of course, I have to confess, I always had in mind that it's a true crime.
Well, remember, you always said every after every one of your meetings brought in great focus.
Just remember, we're speaking for the record.
He knew goddamn well.
I've got a lot of beautiful speeches I made, which I'll address to them, but you think it's tough.
Oh, they forget to put the whole thing up.
The thing is, though, one thing I think we have done wrong, and we talked to you last night in the morning, and saw me and everybody talking.
But I think what has happened here is that, first, I think we caught your friends in the press corps off-balance.
Absolutely.
Yes.
And second, I think we have caught our enemies in the Congress off-balance.
I have a very interesting thought.
You remember this fellow, Bruce Basting?
in Lafayette Park, Brian McDonald, during four years.
Gibson?
Quaker.
Quaker.
To whom I then talked into breaking his fast.
He called me for an hour and a half last night at midnight.
You took the call?
I said he cried.
He said, I won't let you know.
I apologize.
I doubted you.
You've done everything you've ever done.
Can I help the administration?
Anything I can do.
The blast?
The blast of the flooding?
But I'll call him today.
I'll tell him that you can make a statement.
It would be 10 a.m. Or if he would simply approve you saying that to someone.
Or just say, would you mind if I...
But he was...
I couldn't get him off the damn phone.
His wife was assassinated, was murdered by some Negro.
She was a Negro herself three weeks ago.
And
He said if only Alex had been there, we would have seen him.
No, he's an Irishman, not the Irishman.
He's a decent peacemaker.
He's just a soft-headed Jew.
But he was just, I literally... What did you tell him about it?
I got the phone again, because all of a sudden... Did you tell him about this?
The Marine?
Yeah.
Who?
The Marine, the colleague, the professor from...
He called and said that he had been one of those who was doubtful over the last three months.
He was again in tears.
He said, he said, if I had only known, he said, if I would have had only known, I wouldn't have been one of those back fighters.
He said, I knew, he said, he voted for the president for you in 1968.
He said, I felt then that the president of the United States could be one of the greatest presidents in history of this country.
He said, tonight I have no doubt about the fact that he is the greatest president in the history of this country.
And, you know, great emotion.
He said, three of my students came back in coffins.
He said, I've been one of those that has been backbiting the president, has distrusted the president.
He said, but there's no question in my mind now that everything that he is doing, everything that he is undertaking is in the best interest of the
We have been constantly having a fencing now for the next two weeks, or from now until we go to China, answering every on-the-spot, every false attack, right and left.
Not letting them get off the ground.
None.
But I think we've killed the government in this region today.
I mean, I deliberately did it.
I said it.
I began by saying nothing has been more on the President's mind than to unite the people in ending the war after all the anguish, after all the suffering.
We are here to score the bar points.
We are here to do so that at least we can end the war that has divided us so much in dignity and in unity.
Those are the principles.
We're just trying to put before you what happened so that you can raise your questions at the level of the president's concern.
I don't know whether they're going to carry the text of this.
It's on the record.
Do your best to get the text carried.
I think they will.
Times ought to carry it, but they'll carry it.
It'll be a big story, though.
Oh, sure.
You mean the interview with?
The interview.
Yes.
This will be?
Oh, sure.
But last night I thought maybe we shouldn't do it, but after I saw some of the stories.
No, no, that's what's important.
Yeah, well, it just keeps us on the intensity.
It answers the questions that some people have.
It helped with Scott Porter, possibly, when they came out.
Yeah, that's all right, sir.
Scott got himself caught a little bit up on surrender, but that was all right for him to say that.
It's fine, you know, for Scott to say that.
You can say things, but you can't say them.
Why, did he negate his records?
No, no, no, no.
He said that anyone who advocates simply a withdrawal and change for the POWs and less than this, or, no, he says the difference between people accepting this is the
with a reasonable mind and then those who want to surrender entirely.
And then they came down a little bit on who you're saying surrendered, but that's right, it's a quotes movie.
The response of the people of World War VII is that we're going to attack them right.
We've got to attack these left-wingers, right?
I tell you, McCloskey, I saw McCloskey on television, he said, I think the guy has flipped his lid.
Even Roger Mudd jumped on him.
He was on with Brooke.
He made Brooke look like a right-winger.
Brooke defended you, not very enthusiastically.
He said he wished you had come further, but this is a tremendous step in the right direction.
Then McCluskey said, he's deceived the American people.
Did you see it?
Roger Mudd said, how has he deceived the American people?
He said, because he didn't mention it in the State of the Union address.
Do you think there's a four-way difference in deceiving the American people?
Even Mudd, Dr. McCluskey, you.
How long was the speech last night?
Nineteen minutes.
That's good.
That's a good one.
I thought it was the best delivery that I have heard you...
Your right face.
Strong.
That one was strong.
You didn't appear to apologize.
Well, anyway, have fun.
But, Ron, I want you to watch and have Scali watch on his son and Buchanan.
Don't bother me.
I know.
You bother me.
Goddamn it, Rick.
But I don't bother him.
Whenever anybody raises their ugly head and says something that's wrong, get over the Colson group, you know what I mean, and chop their damn heads off and have a denier in the White House.
Get Rogers.
May God make him say something.
He will.
He will.
And say, look, you and he said this.
You talked to Colson.
That's part of his job.
so that we do not allow the little lies now to be called.
We've got a good position, and the way we summed it up, Henry, is the way a lot of people are saying.
I've gone as far as I can go.
Let's stick right there.
Now, one other thing, Henry, but it is very important.
Every son of a bitch now is going to come up with some new proposal, some new way to do it.
Let's do this.
Why don't we do that?
And they're going to say, why don't we offer straight prisoners for withdrawal?
Or something like that.
Although I think you'd kill them pretty well.
But nevertheless, the answer is safe.
We have made our proposal, and we're standing by it.
And don't give in.
Don't change.
We have made our proposal, and we're standing by it.
As you said in the leadership meeting this morning,
Someone has to make the decision as to how far we go.
That decision has been made.
We stand by it.
That's right.
Well, the leaders were told this morning, for a change of God in heaven, that they are also...
I was very strong this morning with them, too.
All right, fine.
But I... Well, I'm glad you really knocked him down.
You should have heard it bigger.
You know, he's... You know, he's a cause for disease.
You said that you really slaughtered us.
From now on, we're going to take on the fish next to us, and if they crap on us, by God, crap on them, we've got to fight them now.
We've got to fight them.
I'm a little sorry I wasn't on live, because I was really eloquent today.
Oh, that's what he said.
God damn it, I wish it was on live.
It must have been TV.
Not on television.
No, but I know it's radio.
Of course, I didn't know ahead of time.
I spoke extemporaneously to it.
Of course you did.
It's good.
It's been on the line.
It might not have been quite as good, though.
You never know.
Television tends to make us all flee.
Let me just see if the, uh... Well, they all use words, but I wonder if they use words.
Well, they have the text, though.
The hell with the text.
I was thinking of, even if it's not on television, we can get out a radio show one day and say,
Dr. Reagans, return the air cord.
You want to hold it?
I'll finish it and take these on.
All right, thank you.
Dr. Reagans?
Hello?
Yes?