Conversation 656-010

On January 26, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Paul J. Fannin, White House operator, William P. Rogers, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Barend W. Biesheuvel, J. William Middendorf, II, White House photographer, unknown person(s), and Baron Rijnard B. Van Lynden met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:08 am to 12:02 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 656-010 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 656-10

Date: January 26, 1972
Time: 10:08 am - 12:02 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman and Henry A. Kissinger.

     Congressional resolution
         -Preparation of a letter
               -Kissinger’s talk with Hugh Scott and Gerald R. Ford
                     -Scott’s and Ford’s view
               -The President’s talk with Ford
               -Scott
               -Benefits
               -Kissinger’s schedule
               -Ford’s and Scott’s location
                     -Ronald L. Ziegler
               -Scott

     Kissinger briefing

     Proposed terms of cease-fire
          -Kissinger’s briefing
                -Political benefits
                      -George S. McGovern’s comments concerning the President’s statement
                            about Nguyen Van Thieu and North Vietnam
                -Possible revelation of North Vietnamese position
                      -Thieu overthrow
                      -Troop withdrawal
                      -Documentation
                      -As consequence of denial

Kissinger left at 10:11 am.

[The President talked with Paul J. Fannin between 10:11 am and 10:12 am.]

[Conversation No. 656-10A]

[See Conversation No. 19-93]

[End of telephone conversation]

     The President’s Vietnam peace proposal speech, January 25, 1972
          -News coverage
                -Inaccuracy of reporting
                      -Administration handling
                             -Assigning responsibility
          -The President’s schedule
                -Recent Congressional leaders meeting
                -Kissinger
          -Kissinger briefing to staff, January 25, 1972
                -Tone
                -Secret diplomacy
                -First draft of speech
               -Robert H. Finch’s reaction
               -Politics
               -John A. Scali
               -State and Defense Department
          -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
                -Congressional leaders meeting
                -Staff meeting
                -Thieu resignation
                      -Timing of announcement
                             -Peace proposal
                             -Public relations
                             -Kissinger

[The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 10:12 am and
10:17 am and requested a call to William P. Rogers.]

[Conversation No. 656-10B]

[See Conversation No. 19-94]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Budget meeting
         -Agnew
              -Complaints
              -Political future
              -Demeanor
                    -Compared to John B. Connally
                          -Approach to problems

[The President talked with Rogers between 10:17 am and 10:18 am.]

[Conversation No. 656-10C]

[See Conversation No. 19-181]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Agnew
         -Demeanor

     White House staff
          -Charles W. Colson
                -Scali
          -William L. Safire
          -Scali
          -Kissinger’s call to Scali, Rogers, Connally
          -The President’s schedule
                -Congressional leaders meeting
                      -Agnew
                            -Demeanor
                            -Consultation
                            -Staff meeting
          -Kissinger
                -Handling
                -Loyalty of White House staff
                -Meeting with Haldeman
                -Winston Lord
                -Demeanor concerning Vietnam
                      -Troop withdrawal
                      -Negotiations
                            -Status

                       -Trips
                             -Kissinger’s comments
                                   -Progress of talks
                       -Rogers
                       -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                       -Ellsworth F. Bunker
                       -Creation of record
                 -Positive outlook
                       -Press conference
           -Press conference
                 -Ziegler
                 -Necessity

The President’s Vietnam peace proposal speech
     -News coverage
           -Marvin L. Kalb
                  -Kissinger briefing
                        -Scali
     -First draft
           -Kissinger’s reaction
           -Edits
                  -Safire
     -Kalb
           -Scali
     -Dan Rather
           -Possible letters
                  -Demand for apology
           -Vietnam troop withdrawal
                  -Timing
                        -1972 election
                              -Kalb
                              -[Arnold] Eric Sevareid
     -Public perception
           -Prisoners of war [POWs]
           -Troops
           -Ceasefire
                  -Korea
     -Paul N. (“Pete”) McCloskey, Jr.
           -F. Bradford Morse
                  -Letter
                        -Colson

         -Withdrawal from race
                -Conditions
    -Effect on credibility of Administration
    -McCloskey’s comment
         -Secret negotiations
                -Administration action
    -Right wing’s reaction
         -Speech ending
    -Effect on attention to budget message
    -Thrust of PR
         -“Keep America United” theme
                -Congressional leaders meeting
                -Negotiations
         -Clark MacGregor
    -Delivery
         -Lack of Vietnam speeches
         -Complexity of subject
         -Clarity
                -Process
         -Style
                -Atmosphere
                      -Eye contact with camera
    -Campaign benefit

The President’s schedule
     -Signing of economic report
           -Press interest
     -Need for study
     -Forthcoming meeting with Richard M. Scammon
     -Congressional leaders meeting
     -Press picture
     -Maurice H. Stans’ announcement
           -Peter G. Peterson
     -Camp David
     -Economic report signing
           -Press interest
           -Photographs
     -Quadriad meeting
           -Timing
                 -Connally
     -Economic report

          -Stans
                -Dinner
          -Peterson
                -Press interest
                      -Swearing-in
          -Earl L. Butz
          -Rogers C. B. Morton
          -Camp David
          -Friday schedule
                -Dr. Rainer Barzel
                -Dewitt Wallace dinner
          -Weekend plans
          -PR
                -Preparation for People’s Republic of China [PRC] trip
                      -Briefing books
                      -Rogers and Kissinger

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 10:18 am.

          -Kissinger’s schedule
               -Press briefing

Bull left at an unknown time before 10:42 am.

          -PRC trip
              -PR
                    -Camp David
                         -Preparations
                         -Return to Washington, DC
          -McGovern and McCloskey
              -Administration counterattack
                    -Congressional leaders
                    -Vietnam critics
          -Media support

Bull entered at an unknown time after 10:18 am.

          -Kissinger
               -Briefing

Bull left at an unknown time before 10:42 am.

           -Television messages and domestic affairs
                -John D. Ehrlichman
                -Environment
                -Drugs
                -Benefits
           -J. William Middendorf, II
                -The President’s meeting with Prime Minister of Netherlands [Barend W.
                      Biesheuvel]
                      -Review
                -Kissinger
                -Rogers
                -Attendance at meeting of the President and Biesheuvel
                      -Haig
                      -State Department
                      -Rogers

[The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 10:18 am and
10:42 am and requested Haig.]

[Conversation No. 656-10D]

[See Conversation No. 19-95]

[End of telephone conversation]

[The President talked with Haig between 10:42 and 10:43 am.]

[Conversation No. 656-10E]

[See Conversation No. 19-96]

[End of telephone conversation]

     The President’s schedule
          -Middendorf

Kissinger entered at 10:44 am.

     Kissinger schedule

Vietnam
     -North Vietnamese terms
          -McGovern
          -Thieu government
                -Overthrow
                -Secret deal
                -Thieu
                -Publication of terms
          -Kissinger press conference
                -Review of peace process
                     -Timetable
                     -Withdrawal
                     -Government
                     -Ceasefire
                     -Eight point plan
                -US proposal
                     -Terms
                           -Unilateral withdrawal
          -Surrender
                -Deadline
          -Return of POWs
          -Overthrow of government
                -South Vietnamese people
                -US reaction
     -Agnew
          -Attitude
          -The President’s Vietnam peace proposal speech
                -Separation of military and political issues
                     -Clarity
          -Demeanor
                -Support for the President
                     -Kissinger’s comment to Bryce N. Harlow
                -Congressional meeting
                     -Budget meeting
                     -Possible approach to the President or Kissinger
                     -Effects
                           -Patrick J. Buchanan
                     -Troop withdrawal for ceasefire and POWs or political issues
                -January 25, 1972 meeting
                     -Agnew stance
                           -Ceasefire

                                        -Effects
           -North Vietnamese ceasefire terms
                -Troop withdrawal
                -Administration offer
                      -Troop withdrawal for POWs
                      -May 31, 1971 negotiations
                            -Political proposal
                -Indication of weakness
                      -Laos and Cambodia
                      -South Vietnam
                      -Bombing
           -US aid to Thieu
                -North Vietnamese thinking
                -Michael J. Mansfield Amendment
                      -POWs
           -Administration defense
                -Kissinger
                -Rogers
                -Agnew
                      -Analogy to the President vis-à-vis Dwight D. Eisenhower
                -Football analogy
           -Support for US proposals
                -Agnew
                      -Compared to Congress
                -Congress
                      -Scott and Ford
                            -Meeting with Kissinger in Ziegler’s office
                -Press conference
                      -Ziegler
                      -Preparation by Kissinger
                -Kalb
                      -Possible interview with Kissinger

     The President’s forthcoming trip to the PRC

     Press conference
           -Ziegler

Kissinger left at 10:57 am.

                 -Timing

                     -Ziegler

     Public support for peace proposals
          -Mail
                -Quotes from Winston-Salem; Maryland; New York; Birmingham;
                      Philadelphia; Connecticut; Searsdale; Texas; Amherst; Columbia, South
                      Carolina; Arlington, Texas; Wichita; La Grange Park, Illinois
                      -Frank L. Rizzo
                      -William A. Rago [?]
                      -Maureen Mullen [?] of Brooklyn
                      -Religious and minority groups
                      -Judge William Garbose of Massachusetts
                      -Mrs. Joseph Patrick Kennedy of Winnipeg
                      -Generation of peace, Adelphi [?], Illinois

Bull entered at an unknown time after 10:57 am.

     Biesheuvel meeting
          -Schedule
          -Protocol
               -Baron Rijnhard B. Van Lynden

Bull left at an unknown time before 11:02 am.

     PRC trip
         -Emil (“Bus”) Mosbacher, Jr.
         -Herbert G. Klein
              -Domestic matters
                    -Domestic Council
         -The President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union

Haldeman left at 11:02 am.

Biesheuvel, Middendorf, and Haig entered at 11:02 am; the White House photographer was
present at the beginning of the meeting.

     Introductions
           -Seating arrangements
           -Photographs

     Biesheuvel’s schedule

          -Antilles and Surinam

     [Photograph session]

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 11:02 am.

     Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 11:20 am.

     Travel
          -Indonesia
          -India
          -Indonesia
                -The President’s visits

     Colonial legacy
          -Jakarta, Indonesia
          -Education
          -The president’s conversation with Lt. Gen. T.N.J. Suharto
          -Antilles
          -Retention of influence
          -African and Caribbean nations
          -Nassau, Bahamas
                -Soviet Union
                -British withdrawal
                -Tourism
                -Transition pace
          -Indonesia
                -Relations with the Netherlands
                      -Brink of war in early 1960’s
                      -West Iran (West New Guinea)
                -Suharto
                -Inflation
                      -Progress
                -Possible visit by Biesheuvel
                      -Dutch professionals
                      -Suharto
                            -Sukarno
                      -Indonesian revolution
                      -State visit by Queen Juliana, 1971

                 -Students
            -Suharto
-US position in Pacific area
     -Edward R. G. Heath
            -Singapore
     -Georges J.R. Pompidou
     -West Germany
            -Relations with Japan
-The Netherlands’ role in world
     -European community
     -Inter-government committee
            -Financial aid to Indonesia
-Japan’s role in world
-Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia
-Indonesia
     -Population
     -Geography
     -Natural resources
     -Java
            -Population
                 -Jakarta
-Indonesia
The Netherlands relations with the Pacific area
-Surinam and Antilles
      -Role
            -Kingdom of the Netherlands
      -Foreign policy and defense
-United Nations [UN]
      -Small nations
-Antilles
      -Geography
      -English-speakers
      -Venezuela
            -Aruba
                 -Oil
      -Defense
-Autonomy
      -Preparation for independence
      -African nations
-The President’s previous trip around the world in 1953
      -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon

     -The president’s meeting with Winston Churchill in 1958
          -Autonomy
          -Great Britain’s experience

Common market
   -National sovereignty
   -Great Britain
   -France
   -Economics
         -International trade
   -Political cooperation
   -Use of economic power
         -Effects
               -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]

Power centers
    -Brazil
    -Africa
    -Asia
          -Indonesia
    -US
    -Europe
    -Soviet Union
    -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
    -Japan
    -Coexistence with PRC, Soviet Union
          -Philosophical differences
    -Europe, Japan, US
          -Productivity
                -Compared to Communists
    -Monetary system, trade
    -Security
    -Japan
          -Economic power
          -Military
                -World War II
          -Reassurances by US, Europe
                -Treaty commitment
                -Nuclear deterrent
                -PRC, Soviet Union

Europe
     -NATO
          -West Germany
          -Forces
                -Unilateral reduction
                     -Soviet Union and Warsaw pact
     -Sense of belonging
          -West Germany
                -Soviet Union
                     -East Germany
                -Willy Brandt
                -Kurt Kiesinger
                -Great Britain
                -Ostpolitik
     -Unity
     -Konrad Adenauer
     -Alcide de Gasperi
     -Robert Schumann
     -Biesheuvel’s experience
     -The Netherlands’ role
          -World affairs

Common Market
   -Statement
   -US role
         -Protectionism
   -Economic prospects
   -Britain
         -Heath
   -Pompidou
   -Compared to previous one
         -Rotterdam
               -Perception of market
               -Wars
                    -Manufacturing

Attendance of ambassador
     -Protocol

Rotterdam
     -Exports

                 -Compared to New York
                 -Common Market
                     -Trade
                          -West Germany

Van Lynden entered at 11:25 am.

     Greetings

     World affairs
         -US protectionist sentiment
                -US intentions
                      -Outward look
                -Reaction to possible European protectionism
                      -Japan
                -Europe, US, Canada, Japan cooperation
                      -Security
                      -Competition
         -Monetary matters
                -Group of Ten
         -Japan
                -The President’s talks with Heath, Brandt, Pompidou [?]
                -Group of Ten
                -Beliefs
                      -Compared to western world
                            -Economic self-interest
                -Political cooperation
                      -World War II
                      -[Emperor of Japan[ Hirohito
                            -Visit
                -Contributions
                -PRC
                -Soviet Union
                -Productivity
                      -World War II
                -Tanker purchase by Dutch
                      -Oil companies
                            -Dutch-Shell
         -US economic power
         -The President’s trip preparation for trips to PRC and Soviet Union
                -Meetings with European leaders

                -Italy
     -Italy
           -Government
                 -Emilio Colombo
                 -French constitutionalism
     -Latin countries
           -Italy, France, Spain
           -French Constitution
           -Fragmentation
           -France
                 -Gen. Charles A.J.M. de Gaulle
                       -Political unity
                 -Communist Party
           -De Gasperi
     -Meeting with Biesheuvel
           -Benefits
           -NATO
                 -Netherlands as an ally
                       -Public opinion
                 -Joseph M.A.H. Luns
                       -Manlio Brosio

The President’s forthcoming trips to the PRC and Soviet Union
     -Difference between trips
     -Enmities
           -US position vis-à-vis PRC and Soviet Union
           -Soviet Union relations with PRC
           -PRC
                 -Japan
                      -US, Soviet Union

PRC trip
    -US intentions
         -Contact
               -Prospects of recognition
                    -Taiwan, Republic of China
                          -US treaty commitments
               -Benefits
                    -Communication
                    -Reduction of chance of confrontation
                          -Korea

                                -Vietnam
                                -PRC nuclear power
               -PRC power
                    -Population
               -Japan
               -US pacific responsibilities
               -Gulf in philosophies between US and PRC
                    -Need to bridge gap
                          -Nuclear weapons
               -Nuclear weapons in PRC

**************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-009. Segment declassified on 11/13/2017. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[656-010-w004]
[Duration: 32s]

     People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -Nuclear capability
          -British-French
                -Alexander M. Haig’s opinion
          -Age
          -Delivery systems

**************************************************************************

     People’s Republic of China [PRC] trip
          -US intentions
               -Contact
                     -Prospects
               -Soviet reaction to PRC trip
                     -Paranoia
                     -Bilateralism
               -PRC’s relationships
                     -Isolationism
                     -Soviet Union
                           -Hostile border

               -US
                     -Korea
                     -Vietnam
               -Japan
               -India
               -Rivalry with US, Soviet Union

Defense spending
     -Biesheuvel’s conversation with William P. Rogers
     -Effect on Europe
     -The Netherlands
           -Increase in 1972
     -NATO
     -Michael J. Mansfield amendment
     -Alternative uses
           -Ghettoes

Soviet Union trip
     -Substantive nature
     -US relations with Soviet Union
          -Relations
          -Difference
          -Trade
          -Middle East
          -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
     -Europe
          -Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR]
          -Arms limitation
                 -SALT
                      -Briefing of NATO countries
                      -US commitment to NATO
                      -Scope
     -Familiarity
          -Problems and benefits
          -Pragmatism
          -The President’s background
     -European discussions
     -European security conference
          -Rogers
          -Timing
          -Bilateral discussions

                -Benefits
                -Views
                     -Italy

Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:25 am.

     Rogers’s arrival

Bull left at an unknown time before 12:02 pm.

                     -Nicolae Ceausescu
                -Soviet intentions
                -US view
                     -Need for security
                            -Germany
                            -NATO
                            -Defense budgets
                -Soviet aims
                     -Germany
                     -Loosening of Europe’s ties with US
                -MBFR
                     -Timing
                     -Linkage to European Security Conference
                            -US caution
                     -Agreement among allies
                            -Brosio
                     -Danger of linkage to European Security Conference
                -Cultural component
                -Agenda
                     -Andrei A. Gromyko
                -Likelihood
                -Eastern Europeans
                     -The President’s previous travles
                            -Poles, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechoslovakians
                -Agenda
                -Possible benefits
                     -Communication, trade, security
                -Germany
                     -Italy
                     -Brandt
                            -Ostpolitik

          -Rogers
          -Gromyko
          -MBFR
               -Rogers
               -Gromyko
               -Search for formula
                     -Dutch domestic situation
                          -Multilateralism
                     -NATO
          -Need for caution
          -Timing

Forthcoming European meeting on monetary matters
     -Timing
          -Possible location
               -The Hague
                      -World Court
          -Europe’s relationship with Communist nations, Japan
          -Possible locations
               -Rivalries
               -London, Paris, Bonn, Rome
               -Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg
               -The Hague
               -Belgium

The President’s schedule
     -Biesheuvel
          -Schedule
     -PRC and Soviet Union trips

State dinner, January 25, 1972
      -Van Lynden
      -Rogers
      -The president’s Vietnam peace proposal speech, January 25, 1972
           -Location
                 -Oval Office
           -Preparation
                 -Drafts
                       -Idiom
           -Michael J. Mansfield
                 -Rogers

                -Rogers
                     -Talk with the President
                           -Biesheuvel’s interest in television
                -Mass media impact on politics
           -Dutch cabinet sessions
                -Reporting
                     -Interviews

     Dutch television
          -State involvement
                -Broadcasting companies

     Vietnam
          -The President’s peace proposal plan
                -Possible reaction in Europe
          -Elections
                -Thieu offer of resignation
                -International oversight
                -North Vietnamese reaction
          -Possible North Vietnamese military action
                -South Vietnam
                      -US aid
          -North Vietnam
                -Analogy to North Korea
          -Peace proposal plan
                -US troop withdrawal
                      -Political agreement
                -US aid to South Vietnam
                -Soviet and PRC aid to North Vietnam
          -Political agreement

     Biesheuvel’s schedule

     Briefcase

The President, et al. left at 12:02 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I want to read it.
I haven't seen the letter.
Oh, fine.
The letter is what I called for and I...
Oh, this guy has no letter.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, a letter.
Because I think a letter is better on both sides.
And the two of you have to give out a letter.
What time is your meeting?
10, 10.45.
When did you finish?
Come back in.
Tom, are they still there?
Yes.
Are they out?
Yeah, I mean...
one and then the other.
I think the letter would be much the best, but if you get a letter and get it fast, that's better.
We'd like to have a letter in the next two days.
But that's Jack's idea, and you can go get a letter, and you've got it all for that.
But as long as he doesn't come to read your instructions, then I... Oh, no, no, no, I don't want to get a letter.
No, because the resolution...
Okay, good.
Actually, now I think it's a good idea to
You got one, just, just, we're set on, we can really make some hay out of that, that goddamn McGovern thing about the president lying on the, on the...
I know, I know.
He says you lied that they didn't demand the overthrow of the Jew government.
He knows that the North Vietnamese did not demand the overthrow of the Jew government.
They only asked that we withdraw our support, withhold our support.
What did you just say?
Mr. Chairman, he's got overthrowes in there.
He will not reveal the results.
I tell you that the overthrowes were carefully chosen.
We can document it.
They make two propositions to us.
One withdraws for it.
which incidentally has exactly the consequence of what was thrown in.
But they went beyond that and specifically asked us to replace it.
We have it.
That's it.
We have it.
It was documented enough.
And if you press it too hard, we'll release it.
Well, don't say they press it, but just say that they will.
And if they deny it, just say it.
Why don't you say, if the North Vietnamese deny this, we'll release it.
That's the part you get off in Europe, I don't know what you have here.
Oh, I see.
Yeah, that's right.
I think so.
That's right.
I think there he is.
He was there this morning.
He said he was going back.
Well, it was a great airtime.
We love the old man.
So we're glad to have you here.
Well, well, well, well, you're here.
You're all of us, and I do appreciate it, Paul.
What about you, Paul?
Oh, good.
We can pick up some of the stuff like this.
We can make some money out of it, I think.
Of course, we don't want it in the basement.
It isn't a matter of debating, it's a matter of naming these people for lying.
I agree.
They're saying that it plays out to your thing that the people who are in this work were, you know, it's not their fault.
Now, I think some of our people ought to say the president may not quite realize some of this.
Maybe it is some of their fault.
Maybe these people weren't so misguided as we think.
Maybe they wanted to be misguided.
I mean, you can start some pretty rough stuff.
Well, you're right.
Good leadership.
Good.
Well,
Well, we've done it.
You know, one thing, I was in much better shape than I was, geez, it was great for you to have him up there last night, because that, you know, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was,
I knew he was going to be totally depressed, and he went through this recital of how the peace talk, how his efforts at secret diplomacy had failed.
That's what it was.
Well, I don't know.
Well, well, please, have you, will you please go back and read his first draft?
Okay.
I've already seen it.
Get the first draft.
I can't talk about it.
Now, that's the thing.
I couldn't find that interview.
Well, listen, it was really scary, because you got the impression, I must say, that what you were going to do was go on TV and announce it.
Ladies and gentlemen, sorry to say that, but that's really what it sounded like.
Well, we turned that around, and that's what we were saying, you know, he got mad, because they started asking questions.
because he shocked these people.
And they were, you know, these are good, this is our way of getting people like Mitch.
And, you know, we were looking at him and he said, these people don't give a damn about the substance.
They only care about the politics.
And I said, Henry, if somebody doesn't care about the politics or any substance, he might as well realize that now.
He needed to be shocked.
But then, according to Scalza, by the time he got to the press briefings, he was just in
totally different here, did a very good job.
And he did a good job with the state and defense people.
Because we were concerned about making sure that we had them on the track and consulting stuff.
What are we going to do?
If that hand was wrong, he should have announced it too, offered to resign first, and then come up with the peace proposal so that you got the much better Mrs.
Patsy, that PR plan.
He said that?
Yeah.
With Henry there?
Yeah.
He should have announced, well, what do you mean?
Had he read the speech?
No.
But his point was, you had a great news story that the two stepped down, and that you should have used that, and then a couple days later you should have gone up.
Let two Anansis step down, and a couple days later you should have gone up with a peace proposal.
I mean, the guy just peaked.
Two over nine.
Well, of course not.
But the point is that even if he would have, it would not have been a lie.
He's always nitpicking everything we do.
Well, plus, he's a dead ball.
I mean, he came out.
I'm not saying that he did this as a budget reason.
He had a budget reason.
He did it again this morning.
You know what I mean?
He just is a current invention.
Well, the problem is the contracts that it is terrible to keep comparing people.
Contracts have been coming.
Coming if you ask you.
How should we do this?
He'll tell you.
If he thinks you're doing something wrong, he'll say, I think it would be better to do two first and start on that.
But when there's a confronted decision, he never said it.
He only looks for the problem.
That's possible.
He never goes into it.
He should have done it somehow.
Just sitting here about all day.
Doesn't it really piss you off at night?
Oh, you're so goddamn naive at these meetings.
Get one.
Got one.
But he hadn't heard the speech or listened to it.
The other point was, though, that, you know, we were here at the Bible meeting, weren't you?
Remember the same thing?
And, Jesus, he's a nice guy.
I remember when I used to sit in that chair for a year, you remember, I'd sit there and swallow it.
But I was always trying to buck up for us, and I'd order us, and all that.
And you did the rest.
God, that's the quietest thing.
Always have to raise the page.
See, he sounds as if he's on the other side.
But it wasn't Goldwater's voice.
Ha!
John, he's refreshing.
Now, that's stuff about spitting something up down there.
Throw it down there.
Throw it up the other way so it meets.
Ha!
That's what it is.
Probably many things.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
It is.
Is there anything more?
I've got another 15 minutes.
Should we get Colson in now again, or is he?
Oh, don't need to.
He's probably kind of productive.
He's got Stanley going.
Stanley's all fired up.
He's got Sapphire working on some backup stuff.
Now, this is Scalius.
Bill's very good.
Oh, yeah, I talked to him last night.
I never called him.
I didn't call him.
I said, I didn't want you to call him.
I didn't talk to him.
What else did I talk to him about?
Bill Rogers, of course.
I didn't talk to him.
I didn't talk to him.
I didn't call him.
I didn't call him.
Good.
I didn't call him.
It was good.
Now, that's Scalius.
They might not say it.
I mean, when I said it, I said it.
Of course, most of the leaders are all good.
And to put God in a damper on me?
I thought they should have been up there saying, God damn it, we're all for it, this and that.
You see what I mean?
Part of the problem is he wouldn't consult with us.
Do you know about it?
Well, he knows he is going to be consulted, right?
Of course, he said that.
I don't think so.
But that, well, maybe he did the same to the shot.
Well, you know, that's torture, though.
You turn Henry around.
You know what happens?
You turn him around by being pretty rude.
Maybe that sometimes means a little bit of trouble.
But you've got to do it carefully.
If we were otherwise, he...
The question, see, those guys are just straightforward, honest people, and that drives Henry mad.
He thinks, he says, that is not a loyal group, you know, they are not supportive.
And I say, God damn it, you know, I spent an hour with them afterwards, and they're trying to patch it back together.
It was, you know, it went to the Lord in there, you know, they were working out that they were loyal to the Lord.
a couple points, you know, what you've got to do.
See, Henry's really depressed to a slight degree, you know, to a major degree, because he knows exactly what's happening here.
You know, he's just, you know, his view is when he grinds himself down to the core and we're bugging out, then that bothers him.
And I think he would rather have concluded the thing with a big...
So he knows that negotiations failed.
He'd say that he struggled.
If you remember, every time he came back, he says, we say the project team was tired.
It looks better.
And the team was better.
They were nicer.
But this time, we really got them going.
And I think we're going to get it.
Remember, he'd say there's a 25% chance.
Now there's a 50-50 chance that he'd find people to blame all the way along.
Projections, they know they're not good.
Of course, I was always the pessimist.
And he'd try to say, well, hey, leave them up to this and the reason.
My mom really looked at it and so forth, thinks there's been a change and so forth.
And there never was, you see, because Henry was doing wishful thinking.
But the other side of the woods, which he always said, even if it doesn't work, we're making a record.
And he made a hell of a record.
It didn't happen.
It paid off.
And that's the record it's worth on.
And that's why I think he feels up to date, because he realized it did pay off.
He was still up, not saying anything, after she'd been up there and been standing there for a while.
And he says, this is writing so well that I don't think I should do my press conference tomorrow.
You know, if I was hoping it would just get in the way of Ron talking to me.
I'm sure he should.
I've wondered about it, too.
But I think he should.
I think there's...
The point is, we can't just ride on the headlines.
We're dealing with a bunch of dumb people.
So we've got to have this explained to them over and over.
And it pays off.
Now, Martin Kalb did a hell of a job for us last night.
I hate to admit it, because I hate to admit it.
Because Henry Dray did it because Scali spent 15 minutes with him after the briefing, going back over, simplifying the points.
See, Henry and H. Martin Council agreed intellectually.
Scali knows that Martin and Calvin are more intellectual than any of the rest of us.
And that you've got to boil it down.
See, Henry doesn't like that.
Scali simplifies the thing.
He says, you know, Scali, you know, Scali is a very healthy house.
Well, Henry got splited when I take this.
Well, no, he can't complain about when I take the speeches.
He knows I have to deliver it.
But I know that he was horrified at my first draft.
You know, he thought that, well, maybe it'll do a little better.
But we kept working and working and working.
I kept cutting and cutting and cutting.
I know that, of course, that Bill Seibhardt was a soldier.
Bill Seibhardt was a little discouraged.
I thought I was a little damned.
Right, so the way I did wasn't good, not good, silly little phrases.
Absolutely.
And that was a grand challenge.
You did a great deal by not having a man.
Now this, right there.
But now, for instance, Cal is a guy now, he's committed, in a sense, to our root, at least for the moment.
And I think...
Whatever.
I think Scali should move in now, as he intends to.
Just play the hell out of Scali.
Rather's committed the other way.
Rather's trying to piss on him.
Okay, that's good.
You know why?
Sure.
To destroy him.
Sure.
Can anybody follow up on that?
I think a couple of nasty letters that go to the rat.
I think it will affect him.
I think it will affect him, you know, that you, I recall that you said, I think you, old president, mentioned an apology, you know, that, you know, for on this thing.
Something like that.
We're saying, well, I don't remember what he said about the dweller for implying he had not, he said that we had, yeah, that we had, that we had, that they had turned down this offer and all that sort of thing.
Why don't you come on?
He was squealing last night.
He kept trying to turn it.
It was really kind of funny because he said, well, this makes it absolutely clear now that we won't have all the troops out of Vietnam before the election.
Cal said, no, it doesn't at all.
I said, we will.
I said, we will either way.
But he was, they were talking about the time sequence.
The separatists were saying, well, it would be, you know, they'll have to discuss it for a few weeks in Paris, maybe a few months, and then they'll move to the sixth month.
And rather add those up and immediately came out with it would be done by November.
He kept trying to put it in the election context.
The others will make the point this is related to the election.
We would have our groups up in November if we had an agreement.
We have an appeal about this fact, so it would have been great.
We would have held care to leave that $25,000.
You'd have most of them out.
You'd be on a course of... Oh, we'd have peace about it.
Peace.
And see what we shoot at the end.
Did it cease fire?
It should have stopped.
I heard of them out of Korea.
It is.
20 years later.
That's good, then.
But that, we can work that kind of thing.
We've got...
Now, for instance, Brad Morris has got a letter, maybe Chuck told you, from a saying, if Nixon did this, this, and this, then I would not run.
Well, you've done it.
Now Brad Morris is going to call it and withdraw from the race, as he said he would.
And the bounce we're getting all the way through is just
the shoring up of credibility.
I wasn't sure whether this would go one way or the other.
It could have bounced either way.
Remember ours?
Yeah.
And it could have.
It could have bounced the other way of credibility, but it hurt the credibility because you'd been doing something behind the secret, behind your back, behind the people's back.
McCloskey's playing that out, though, that he isn't going to get anything out of it because all the others are going just the other way.
Now, old Fred McCloskey said, why do we go behind the people's back?
Yeah.
There was...
More deceit, you know, or something.
Well, now let's be sure that we get off the ground.
We've got to, that's right.
We're calling in on that.
The right is apparently solidly with you.
Which also surprises me, because your clothes, I think, helped a lot there.
The United States will never do anything.
So, I thought we might have to get the writer turned off again.
It sure as hell has got the attention taken away from the legend.
I think we were very lucky that it was this week instead of last week.
Probably.
Because now it can ride.
And at the point we were just talking about, I think, I think,
really got to work on it.
It's not just we've got to get the instant reaction set, or stay on that, but we've got to not do that at the expense of because we're going to have to keep this thing going for a while.
Well, they'll hear it in college, and they're just going to follow.
But that's when we've got to keep it going all the harder.
At least that was our plan yesterday.
I assume that you don't intend to back off of it.
No, sir.
That was the point we were making.
They're going to get us to keep America united.
I put that with the leaders today.
United America.
Of course, we're going to get there.
We're going to get there first.
Yeah.
That's what I say when I try to guess who is there, the writer, or somebody else wants to say it.
I've had a lot of times when I've had to go to the notes.
Well, I mean, I wouldn't know.
I wouldn't.
You know, it's quite interesting that the, uh, that, uh, that, uh, so many people, uh, currently like the, uh, delivery of the speech, which is, of course, just another off thing, but you know what, one of the reasons, we haven't done one in a while, you see, we had two economic ones, and that doesn't have any, but you know, the Vietnam speech is always, uh,
It was delivering together with the speech.
I think a lot of you got the impression that you covered, which was true, of course, a very complex thing, and yet came through with it.
You understood afterwards what you'd done.
I don't think anybody can go back and recite it.
I don't think they know step by step, but they understand the process.
They understand the sequence that developed here.
And, you know, it all came through very clearly.
And just with that style, just for that kind of speech, it is very good when you sit in the chair, you read the speech, you hold it there, you don't pretend, you don't screw around with the teleprompters and all that stuff.
And I just think you're absolutely right on that.
And you've got, you look up an awful lot of that.
You just, like the speech I've had,
You read it, but you're looking into the camera a good deal of the time.
Oh, what's it doing?
I wonder, maybe, if we might just sign the economic report today, and then it will look better tomorrow.
And I don't think it's a story, particularly, but I mean, I mean, we don't really need a story tomorrow.
I'm just thinking that I might have tomorrow off, you know, because I could use the day off.
I'm going to start reading.
So anything on the schedule tomorrow, I think, or maybe there's some bad stuff.
Scanning, maybe.
Who?
Scanning.
What's our income?
Right.
Right.
Uh, there's not a reason to have it do it tomorrow.
The reason I say that we give it to the Congress today, maybe he wants a story.
See, I don't intend to have a press figure anyway.
I think it makes a difference.
We're going to announce Stanton, I think, tomorrow.
Oh, Christ, I need to be here to do that.
Do you want to go out to eat or something?
I don't know.
I don't know.
Oh, I guess I'll be here.
Would you want to go on up to Camp David or something?
Yeah, I'll let you get away from Camp David if I can help.
Oh, why not?
Oh, I don't understand.
I don't know how I can help.
The economic report I had signed today, I need to look at the picture of tomorrow.
I'm just getting, you know, a scan of the ship to do the economic report after the quarter end meeting today.
I'm sorry about the time on that, but that was my question.
I was curious, too.
John Connolly, he couldn't do it.
I just thought you were going to do it.
I just thought you were going to do it.
We only did it for John.
He has to leave at 3.30 or something.
No, I'll tell you, we won't do it that way.
We'll sign the economic report in Canada and also get the sanctions in Canada.
God damn it.
I've had an interview with Sam.
He feels all right with me.
Oh, yeah.
This year, you're really not doing as much for Sam as you are for Peter.
Well, I don't want to do anything for Peter.
Well, except it's a new capital.
You know what I mean?
You know what I mean?
That's the big deal.
And it's no surprise.
The story's not.
So it isn't any big bombshell announcement.
I mean, the point is that you can't do it twice.
Oh, god damn it.
You wouldn't swear it in half.
That's the story.
Well, we've done most of it twice.
You know, you trot butts out, and then you swear it in.
Oh, I wouldn't do it twice.
You'd probably try it more than that.
Well, I'm not going to say it in five years.
That's for damn sure.
Any time you're recommending that you do that, there's supposed to be a...
I don't know how to go at it.
That one, I'm not so sure we need to.
Oh, well, I guess you're right.
Actually, you could run through some morning stuff and then go on up to Camp David at noon and come back.
Time for a parcel on Friday if you wanted to.
Yeah, because you have to have dinner.
It's not the dinner.
You're lost.
You're lost.
Okay.
It's Friday night, isn't it?
But we're Saturday and Sunday.
You're going on Saturday morning.
Yeah, we're going on Saturday, but if I want it, I'm going to park.
Park or something like that.
Okay.
Let's do everything that you want.
Yeah.
Done.
We stacked it all in the morning together anyway, because I've been trying to get some clear time for you for China stuff.
And I think we ought to... Yeah, we ought to start, because we've made the point of your great preparation for these trips, and that you're not going into China on, you know, your eyes closed and all that, and...
We know, I mean, you've done the preparation work, but I think we ought to start saying you're doing it now.
We ought to have the stacks of briefing books and all that sort of stuff.
Preparations for the discussions.
Because I think we probably, for appearances sake, there ought to be a couple sessions with you and Rogers and Henry.
Where we put out the... Yeah.
I think we ought to start building that again.
Well, we'll say that in the spare time that there is, we ought to start pumping down as being China time.
If you don't think that, what if I put too much emphasis on that?
Well, I could go out tomorrow and say, I'm going out to do some reading and prepare for every meeting.
You can do that.
If I go to camp.
There's what?
You know, there'll be interruptions.
If I go, if I go, no, but if I go through the action, then I can tell nothing is going on.
I'm going to get some radio time away from here to do some prepared action over in China.
And I'll be back the next day.
I got on top of this counter-attack with a sidekick or whatever.
He asked me.
I'd, uh, I'd, uh, I'd, uh, I'd kick McCloskey in the ass from this evening.
Pretty tough.
I'm trying to get the leaders all sitting up to kick him in the ass.
It was, uh, it really, uh, really, you know, I think it's very expected.
We really put it to a market, not the goddamn war, great crowd, goddamn party.
And I think we've got a better, certainly a better initial bounce from the media than we thought.
And we figured they'd lash back.
And I think they will.
They haven't yet.
Mr. President, Henry's about to start his briefing.
He has to brief us.
There's figures that will be over by 1130.
Unless he has a guy he should be able to see.
We're going to be up to our ass in domestic messages.
which, yeah, but I mean, it seems to me that's going to make the public news of your interest in domestic affairs.
I don't believe that, if I may just say something.
I don't, I know that John currently disagrees with me, but my going out on the battlefield with the television every time they send a message is a good thing, but I'm just bored as hell.
I just don't want to do it.
No, we should let them write just on that.
I'm going to sign that.
Well, is that another thing to go out on the battlefield about?
I really think so.
Now, you always say, what about the environment message?
What about the drug message?
What about the snack?
Let me find another way.
I think sending a message is not a good way to get a message across.
I really don't think it's a good way.
a good way to get a problem crossed off.
Except that it gets you, it sure is, as far as you go in and talk about it, it is in that it gets the thing on the record for the people who care.
I don't think that mine's going on badly about it.
It is, but I don't think, it's not so good.
The only thing, the only things there that I think we ought to take a stab at a few are, not just on the areas like drug stuff,
You know, some of the things where we can make some.
Incidentally, Minder wants to see you after the meeting with the prime minister.
He is so sure with what's going on.
Review your discussions with the prime minister.
Review them?
For Christ's sakes, is he still the ambassador?
Yeah.
No, he's returning to his post.
He's here for the meetings.
Never here for the visit.
And I wanted to get any of your views on the U.S.-European relations with the United States.
I really can't, even with a friend.
You haven't seen him for a long time.
Who's recommending that?
Henry?
Well, Rogers is recommending, Henry's concurring.
Of course I haven't seen him for a long time.
Oh, shit.
I don't think he has a bore.
I mean, he's a nice guy.
We gave you the other pastor shit.
Yeah.
And I thought I'd tell him about the pastor shit.
I mean, you said he sits in on the meeting, right?
I don't think so, no.
He is who sits in on the meeting.
I didn't do that.
You don't have... Well, now you don't sit in on the meeting.
The pastor's sitting in on the meeting.
Well, God damn it, he can sit in on the meeting.
This is just a courtesy call.
That's the way they're being handled.
They privately, generally will sit in on this too.
Can we have him?
He's going to the State Department for lunch today.
Bill will give enough stuff on that.
I think you can just leave it at that.
I'll let him sit in on the meeting.
All right.
I didn't say that I'm an endorsement.
I just like to sit in the meeting.
Yeah.
Hey.
Hey.
reason he can't.
Otherwise, I've got to waste a half hour talking to him afterwards.
I mean, is there any reason?
Yeah, you know, I mean, this guy really shouldn't be seen, even except he's a Dutchman.
But Jesus Christ, I mean, it's a pure social call, you know, to crap around about some of the stuff and that, but God damn it, our ambassador sits in.
This is the kind of private talk I usually have.
The ambassador sits in.
And then tell them, I'm sorry, but I'm tied up right after, you see.
You see, because they had him on now for a half hour meeting after the Prime Minister and I didn't know how much time has been on hold.
Yeah, so, okay.
What they're trying to do, what they're trying to do with all these things is a private tentative.
Well, God damn it, this thing, oh my goodness.
I thought he was coming back in.
Well, he doesn't need that.
Well, you're going in now for your briefing.
Right.
I have to review a few.
Good, good.
I have to say, I just want to say that I think the lines are particularly fine.
I think that Bob says that they raised this government point that
for the effect that they didn't want to overthrow the government.
This is what I'm now going through.
I just don't want them to have...
They've never used a good overthrow.
They said change, but, you know, you've got to change the government.
Then I say, how are we going to do that?
They said, that's your problem.
You put them in, you know how to get rid of them.
Sure.
They said you know how to get rid of them.
Yeah, you know how to replace them.
Well, that's what we're doing.
And they said, if you make a secret deal with us to get, to replace you, uh... Well, that's overjoying me, Kevin.
Of course.
Then everything else will follow easily.
I see.
I see.
What do you think of the possibilities out in our Vietnamese?
Well, the North Vietnamese reaction has been very interesting.
How do they respond to this by overjoying you?
Do you think...
I don't think they're going to say that they're not the overjoying government.
Do you?
Yes.
If they waste you, they won't dare.
If they threaten us too hard, we'll just publish the transcript.
I mean, on this one, we're on absolutely safe ground.
Whatever, is there any other point you have in mind, Mike?
Well, I was going to ask if you want to emphasize, because you're, you know, you're hot property to these damn clowns.
Well, I was going to review how we got to where we are, what the proposals in gross terms were.
Then, first of all, this is our proposal.
This is how we got there.
On May 31st, we did this.
On August 16th, we did that.
Each one of them met their demands.
So now, just so that we narrow the debate, we're down to only two issues, withdrawal
and government.
That's to get the ceasefire one out of the way.
Because I say the ceasefire isn't the issue.
They've agreed to that.
And...
They've agreed to it or they haven't raised that as an issue?
No, they've agreed in the eight-point plan that's agreed to.
Those are the only two unresolved issues.
So the ceasefire part is just...
out of the way.
And then I'll say now what is new in our proposal.
We've given up on the proposition of mutual withdrawal, if people are willing to set a deadline unilaterally for our withdrawal.
We've agreed to total withdrawal.
And then I'll go through this.
Then I'll say
The only two, but what they want is not a, they don't want a negotiation.
They want a surrender.
They want us to set a deadline that runs irrespective of what else happens, regardless of prisoners or anything else.
And they want us to overthrow the government and replace it with one of their choosing, regardless of the wishes of the South Vietnamese people.
Those are the two big issues.
And that we cannot give up.
And that we cannot give up.
It occurs to me that, I'm saying, Bob, before you got into the room today, and it was just a rod, and they could get some of it, but the fact was that we hadn't read the speech.
He said, well, I didn't know you were there.
And he said, well, why didn't we offer?
I mean, he said it wasn't clear.
I said we had offered a military thing.
I said we had offered to separate the military from the military and lay that down.
He said, well, that wasn't clear from the author.
Well, God damn it, clear.
It was the clearest English I've ever written in my life.
Mr. President, well, I turned to Harlow and I said, can't you get into his head that he's on the president's side and that he can fly back here in the middle of a meeting?
My feeling is...
He didn't mention the point.
No matter how legitimate his point is, he's got no business.
Exactly, Mr. President.
Even if he's 180 degrees opposed to it.
He was totally wrong to begin with.
But secondly, at a meeting where he is with the president and congressional leaders, he should support you.
He did the same thing at the budget meeting.
He did the same thing at another meeting.
If he has any questions, let him come to your office afterwards and say, Mr. President, I have serious reservations about this.
But in front of...
I beg your pardon?
He should come to you and say that.
Or say it to me.
But it's a great mistake for him to, in front of congressional leaders, to give them...
Well, and then congressional leaders will wonder what the hell is going on in this agreement session if the vice president...
The poor vice president is supposed to be smart as hell.
And he misses the point, Dr. Frank Stiglitz.
Nobody can miss the point on that.
I said, period.
They make the choices for them.
We will either go to jail, six-month withdrawal, and return receipts for our $50,000, or we will do the other.
The choice is theirs.
You spelled it out.
The funny thing is...
Bob, don't you remember, at the meeting yesterday afternoon, he took exactly the opposite task.
The meeting yesterday afternoon, he opposed the proposal of ceasefire and withdrawal.
I can't understand why you stick to ceasefire.
It doesn't mean anything.
That's right.
Why do we stick to it?
All we do is get in trouble.
Why do we get in trouble?
Well, no, he said they can, as soon as we are out, they're going to break the ceasefire.
Of course, but what the hell?
As long as we're pulling out, we want our tail shot out, that's the line to be made.
Well, no, because they've offered us a ceasefire.
But the hell of it is, we can.
It would be a really total abdication if we protect ourselves and they can throw all their forces against the South Vietnamese while we are out.
still in the country.
This is just a way of handing over the country.
I'd say it's no problem.
They've agreed to the formulation we've got in there.
It's from their draft.
And then you can say, well, then that'll come down to a critical point.
Then why don't you just offer withdrawal from prisoners?
I said we've offered... First of all, I'll say... Because obviously a ceasefire is to our advantage and they've agreed to it.
So why should we offer something less than that?
And I'll also say, gentlemen, they have turned that one down so often that when I went in there on May 31st offering the president's plan of withdrawal for ceasefire and prisoners, they didn't say, this is fine except for a ceasefire.
They were saying, we won't discuss this at all.
It's got to have a political proposal.
And since then, they've, but we cannot, Mr. President, I have to say, we cannot in honor just sell it out.
I think we all suffer from it.
That's my point.
We can't.
I'm just trying to get the goddamn tough arguments to throw through.
If you have a ceasefire, it shows actually how weak they are, because if they were strong, they'd accept it.
They'd save it for prisoners.
Because they should be able to overthrow Laos and Cambodia easily without a ceasefire.
And then they could...
turn it all against South Vietnam, but they're not confident enough of themselves.
They want us to overthrow South Vietnam.
The reason they don't want to cease fire is that they don't want... No, it would mean that the reason they would want to cease fire...
I'm not sure.
The reason they want to cease fire is that they want to stop our bombing.
Right.
Well, but that they could get with the ceasefire.
No, the reason they don't want the ceasefire... No, but they want it now.
You see, you were saying they agreed.
No, no, they agreed it was part of an overall settlement.
I see.
The reason they don't accept it, the reason they don't... We certainly get across the point that we are willing to separate.
We are not the ones who are there.
We'll separate the issues, or we'll do it in a package, or we'll face it.
The reason, Mr. President, they don't accept...
who won't accept even withdrawals for prisoners is because what they want, above all, is for us to serve military and economic aid to Cuba.
That's what I think of the leader.
I said, after you, after you, they're giving you an amendment.
Oh, that's very strong, too, the Mansfield Amendment, which after you give that, so you withdraw regardless of what they do.
Then they'll talk about prisoners, and I'll say, oh, no, we won't give you the prisoners until you withdraw all aid.
But they are not...
If they were confident they would do withdrawal for prisoners, they feel that as long as there's military defenomigated, too, they're not going to make it.
They're damn right, too.
That's their problem.
I think you're right.
That's their big problem.
Well, anyway, you should feel very good.
You really learned this thing.
You should feel very good.
Roger, but I just say, Father, Agnew just drove me up the wall.
Roger stood up for Trump, defending him.
I called him.
I called Bob and I said, God damn it, Agnew.
But Agnew really was, it wasn't right.
Yeah.
But we just had to solve the problem, you know.
But you were, I've never known a vice president to criticize.
I was just sitting there, defending Eisenhower.
We were wrong.
That's my point.
I have to.
He's the president.
I'm on the team.
You know, it's like the poor goddamn guy on the football team.
The quarterback calls and plays.
The son of a bitch plays no good at all.
You're going to get clobbered by the defensive left end.
What do you do?
Run the other way?
You try to knock out the defensive left end.
You get clobbered.
In any event, the vice president shouldn't sit there as if he were just one other participant.
He gave you a harder time than the Congress.
Congress is fine.
They didn't know anything.
But they were all right.
You and Scott, I have to say, I met with you and Jerry and Ziegler's office.
And he's trying to do the one thing that you should make this to the extent that it does come up.
Because Ziegler just has his kinds of difficulties to say this.
But you say there's overwhelming support for the proposal.
Can you say that?
If half an opportunity presents itself.
There really is.
Is the procedure going to go down?
I don't know.
What did we just say?
Good luck.
Don't feel for one moment.
You have to be there at 1045.
I'll say we're going to go over this already.
I know it is.
What I did is take time to prepare.
Go in there.
We'll lay it out and be sure that it isn't too complicated for these unskepticals.
I've got a good presentation.
I know.
You have a good presentation.
You were excellent this morning, but what I had to do was give it to them the same way.
You even had to call Bill all right.
Yes, I have.
He sent me a letter of congratulation.
It was not good.
It was pretty good.
As long as I tackled it, it was pretty good.
Good.
I still have a promise in Germany.
Consider it very favorably in March.
You all need advice.
I have it.
I have it within two or three weeks.
That's right.
That's right.
I haven't promised it, but I've said it.
Good luck.
Everybody's happy.
You can't give that to a single one.
But don't rush out there until you're ready.
I'll tell Zicker to hold it.
Zicker should be ready.
You've got to press her to go ahead and do a screw.
They've got plenty of time to write.
They already have.
We can go ahead and love them jeans.
He'll say, anyway, I was with the president.
You said the wire thing has the God bless you kind of thing.
Yeah, that's interesting.
You know, we get those on this kind of thing.
You can tell there's an emotional issue, but it's thanks for a proposal to end the war.
People will back you, God bless you, from a judge in Winston-Salem.
You were excellent, God bless you, from a guy in Maryland, an admiral.
Partly endorsed these proposals.
We support your policies all the way.
Continue the good work.
Profound thanks for your untiring effort and our wholehearted support for your continued determination to end the war with honor and courage.
Philadelphia, you have the hall.
Behind you all the way, Connecticut.
Congratulations on a fine speech.
I think you're a very brave and courageous president.
Welcome.
Thank you, sir, for being our president, and God bless you, from a woman in Texas.
We support your current peace plan 100%, and we are Americans.
The Green Strip in North Vietnam is reprehensible to us as U.S. American citizens.
A couple of American cities are more desperate needs and adverse.
Thanks for your courageous leadership.
You have our support and prayers.
Columbia, South Carolina.
Eastland, Arlington, Texas.
As you pass behind your program for peace in Vietnam, Wichita.
If you 100% or some of your critics would agree, we'll agree.
Family and I offer our prayers for your good health and the success of the goals you outlined tonight.
We agree with Mayor Rizzo.
You are a great president.
Respectfully submitted, Lillian A. Rago, Philadelphia.
Thank you.
God bless you, President Nixon.
Get rid of your inheritance and please get re-elected.
You're evil and you're frozen.
A lot of this is basically religious people.
Maybe, maybe you're some minority, but you're religious.
Good.
I applaud your outstanding forthrightness in your speech for peacetime.
Judge William Garbosi from Apple, Massachusetts.
That's good.
It's interesting.
Thank God the Americans have it.
I believe I have voiced the view of most responsible Canadians when I say thank God the Americans have a president like you with big guts and gall to stand up and face the foes of freedom, though you did in your courageous and inspiring speech tonight.
Keep up the good work.
Sincerely, Mrs. Joseph Patrick Kennedy from Winnipeg.
That's over.
Yeah.
This is my place back to Generation of Peace.
The initiative for Generation of Peace.
I don't bother now.
I want to say to you right now, right now, that this is the people of Charlotte.
They know that.
Does anybody know that?
Or even Joe, before he died.
Yeah, I know.
It doesn't work that way.
I will say it.
He said you can't go beyond 512.
I don't give a damn what happens here.
No.
So I'm going to do that in time.
If you're ready to ask any questions, I'll do it.
I'm going to ask a question.
If you're ready to ask any questions, I'll do it.
He's got to be there and he's going to hold it on for him as far as he let it go to Russia.
Mr. President, Prime Minister DiPietro, and President Arias and Prime Minister, I would say that you are welcome here.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Well, come right over here, Mr. President.
Prime Minister Hustler here.
Thank you very much.
You sit there, Bill, and now you sit here.
Bill, I'll take a picture if you'd like.
That's the best we could all do.
I don't hear any message here in the country.
I know.
I'll get that out of the way at the end of our talk.
You had a good visit today, didn't you?
Can I tell you what that is?
What is that?
Caribbean.
Caribbean.
Oh, that deals, that deals in Syria.
Ah.
Well, that'd be that.
Yeah, yeah.
I've heard of it.
2-1-7.
You're on your way.
Did you see this?
I got this.
You got this.
I got this.
I got this.
I got this.
I got this.
I got this.
I was thinking of the Indonesian background.
They just want tea, don't they?
You probably drank a lot of tea there because of many changes.
You know, in that dimension, you've done that, of course.
In India, you didn't make it.
No, I didn't.
You know, I've been in India a lot.
I was going to say I've been in Asia two or three times.
And, of course, it was as it was for all countries.
areas, it was difficult, you know, the retching department and the rest, but, uh, the Eulogy of Cardiff, the Eulogy of Cardiff and the rest, you know, we have to remember that, uh, those who were colonial powers in countries like that, uh, left a fine legacy of Angus Beck's name.
I mean, what you, what you left in terms of, uh, the, uh,
and physical appearance, and also education areas and others.
And it's well-noted by any of the people in town then.
Now, of course, they have their independence, and they've got to move their own way.
But your relations are good there.
Oh, excellent.
In fact, they watch you right now.
I've asked him.
I've talked to him so hard.
He said, we're, he said, we keep, because you know the country, and you have a...
I think one of the points that I think is very important to like to hear your deal about here and so forth, is that as you move out, you know, and all this independence, et cetera, et cetera, it's very important to retain as much documents as you can.
They need you, you know.
It's really a tragedy, just speaking here,
and we can't say it was a public baby because it would raise the devil and so many people, but you know and I know it's a tragedy to see so many of these new countries in Africa and in the Caribbean that are totally not capable of a wrecking shell.
I mean, that doesn't mean that there's any way to stay.
But my goodness, you take place a lot in Nassau, in the Soviet area.
It's right up the brink of going up here at the moment.
The British are getting out, and of course, the poor, the Slopians are doing their best to try to run it.
And it really takes a change to ruin Nassau, particularly.
Now, it doesn't matter.
It could take time.
But the point is that if the transition could have been a little slower, slower in some way, that presence could have been kept.
Maybe they could have made it.
You need to sort of retain
We were on the brink of war with Indonesia 10-12 years ago.
We were on the brink of war and you can see how relations have developed now.
And I think Mr. Swarovski is doing very well.
Five years ago,
Indonesia had a deflation confidence of 600%.
And now, 8%.
Yeah.
Even better than in Europe.
I don't know.
Has Dr. Prime Minister been to Indonesia since the dependence?
No, not yet.
Mr. Foreign Minister.
Yeah, yeah.
Without trying to get into your business,
I think you're good.
This is a terribly important part of the world.
You know, there's still teachers and doctors and so forth who live in Indonesia.
They're a country that will have a private enterprise.
They're not anti-either European or white, et cetera, et cetera.
I mean, Sahara is smart enough to know that Sukarno will rule the place.
And sometimes, you know, you're traveling from that part of the country.
I think he cared a bit more.
You see, the revolution is too far behind in the generation now.
Oh, you heard it.
Our queen made a state decision.
And when was it?
Last year.
Last year.
Last year.
Which was a big success.
Yes, I've heard quite a bit about it.
Why?
How do we solve it?
Isn't it easier to sit down?
Sure.
Well, that shows you.
But you see, you could go on a governmental basis and sit down and have a good talk with the Sahara, who's a military man, but a decent politician, and work in terms of cooperation.
I just think it's a good idea.
at some point.
I think, for example, in the Pacific area, that great part of the world, it isn't really a comfortable or healthy position for the United States to be the only non-white power active there.
As I told this to Pete, and of course they retained some sort of a presence now in Singapore, I visited to talk to you, and
and suggested that the Germans ought to be a little closer to the Japanese, and they've been, and they are getting closer economically, and they should, and I think that in your case, that you ought not to just preside over yourselves and be a very prosperous and a very healthy member of the European community.
That's my view.
I agree.
I agree, Mr. President.
We have an excellent cooperation in the Intergovernmental Committee, which is dealing with the problems of financial aid to Indonesia, of which your next address is also in Indonesia.
You're part of the Dutch, right?
Yes, I am.
The Dutch are in care.
We added a little bit.
Not quite a bit.
Because of your attitude, the Japanese, we call them so far, too.
Oh, I know.
You're the chair of the group.
The Japanese, of course, I think, are very hard partners.
But they've got a whole lot more room to do.
We've all got to help these countries because of the nation.
We talk about Vietnam and Thailand and Cambodia and the rest.
They're all important, actually.
There are lots of people in Seoul.
My God, he's got 140 million people, 1,000 miles to go.
Miles.
It is rich.
Resources are just fantastic, you know.
Fantastic.
Job, I remember from my chart, he has the
the most uh it's the most thickly populated there was area in the world yeah the general yeah well tell me about other tell me about europe and
and ask me anything you want about what we're doing.
It's in our talks here.
Thank you very much.
I want to ask about Indonesia.
Well, I think that there is, I do think that Indonesia, and I think so too, in your Pacific relations.
Keep it handy.
Keep an order.
Not for purposes of colonialism or anything.
I mean, that's... No, you don't agree.
I've got to stay there.
You know, the Netherlands and Wales are no longer colonies.
They are independent members of the kingdom of the Netherlands.
Are they?
They are.
They are.
That's good.
There are people who want more.
Oh, sure.
They want more.
Progressive.
Oh, I don't agree.
I don't.
The amount that it gives of foreign policy and defense, that is in our favor.
Especially defense, I think, is important.
Well, they're out of here.
They don't want to handle it themselves.
Why should they have an army taking an air force in the middle of the world with a delegation of the United Nations?
Now, that's ridiculous.
You know, some of the nations, you try to pay them $100 per population.
It's the same boat as you've got next to us now.
We say that it supported the U.S., of course, we all did, but it denigrated to an extent.
But then I've heard the tales of six islands, very small islands, who are still important from a strategic point of view, in terms of where they are.
And as soon as we should leave, in my view, you get a process of disintegration of those islands.
Sure.
free of it once they speak English, they are free Dutch.
Venezuela has some interest, Aruba, or other.
But it is a tiny problem, little problem, and still it is a problem.
How to deal with that in the future, you know.
I personally think it's really important to keep some time with them.
Oh, I couldn't bring my feeling in the field of defense, as you see possibly, to help themselves and others come.
I'm mostly the wrong one.
I don't.
We all are.
Well, my views are quite conservative in respect to many very practical reasons.
If people are able to govern themselves and defend themselves, fine.
If they're not able to govern themselves and defend themselves, then help them develop the capability.
But don't go off and leave them.
It's like throwing a bird out of the nest before it can fly.
It's foolish.
And you just...
Oh, I learned that from the first time.
Well, I didn't learn that.
I learned my character on World 53 when I visited.
It was 73 days.
I went to 20 countries for my life as vice president.
I remember Churchill.
The last time I saw him was about 58.
And he had stroke at that time, and all the rest of them.
He still was sharp enough at the end of the day to correct me or something.
But he made quite an assurance in me.
He said, we in Britain have taken several centuries to learn.
He said, do you remember a couple of years, a couple hundred years ago, we were chopping off the head of the .
He said, now, what are you going to do?
You're not going to leave these people?
That's why some of these nuts, they really are, who are just fanatics with regard to a way that everybody should have a self-awareness.
In other words, franticize everything.
They're wrong.
For the good of the people.
It is wrong that they're good.
That's all.
In Europe, you see, Jesse and we are just feeling the other way around.
It can't work.
But how?
It can't be helped.
How do you feel about your trip to Europe?
How do you feel about your work here?
It's kind of a story, but do you feel the Commonwealth?
When did the British...
Also, especially a country like France, but I think also Britain, are prepared to not only go the way of economic cooperation and free trade within the area, but also to work for it politically.
Right.
That must be done.
Because when we only make an economic block, then we get into trouble with the rest of the world.
because the economic competition can be rugged.
But I think it is good for ourselves
And our responsibility is to cooperate, to cooperate politically.
Exactly.
And if you have this economic bloc, it will mean that you will become a political power.
And eventually, I mean, of course, we have people, but beyond that, the economic base, the economic cooperation can lead to cooperation in other areas, political, mutual security, and the rest of it.
a strong third force over a fourth force.
We have basically, as I see it, there are five forces.
As we look at what we can talk about, I don't need to downgrade Latin America because, you know, 50 years from now, Brazil would be a great power.
It's coming fast.
I don't need to downgrade Africa, but it's maybe 500 years away.
The rest of Asia is important, especially Indonesia.
But as far as
power in the world is concerned, economic and potentially military.
There's the United States.
And, of course, there's Europe.
Free Europe.
There's Russia.
There's Communist China.
And there's Japan.
That's the key.
And it seems to us that the key to our approach is to see that
try to live with the great communist superpowers, China and Russia, recognizing that our political differences are irreconcilable, but that that is what we can't fight about.
But it means also that in terms of the other parts of the world, that Japan, the United Europe, and the United States, where we will be strong competitors, all of this is inevitable economically.
Because, you know, that's the nature of things.
We're a free nation.
We're a productive people.
All people.
The people of Western Europe, the people of Japan, the people of the United States, we're the most productive people in the world.
And we can operate as the Congress of the United States.
Because our system is better.
It's a free nation.
But we've got to carry that economic competition to keep it in the right channels, have the right kind of monetary system, and have fair rules regarding trade and the rest.
But from the standpoint of the security and the rest, there it must be to get, because we're all in the same box.
And here's just Japan.
Japan, an economic giant.
because of what happened in World War II.
The United States must constantly reassure Japan
and as our European friends should do so likewise, that they are part of a free world economy.
But as far as we in the United States are concerned, we assure them of the viability of our intention to honor our treaty commitment.
Second, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, because otherwise this great power of Japan
Now the third, soon to be the second economic power in the world is under grabs with China and Russia.
So we gotta have a home.
They must have a home in the free world, right?
And so in Europe, would you really look at NATO in a sense?
This we would not say to our German friends.
correctly, but you know it's true and I know it's true.
There are many, many reasons why NATO must continue and continue its forces and not have any unilateral reduction.
One of the major ones being that as long as the Soviet Union maintains, the Soviet Union in the plot maintains its forces, for us to do it unilaterally would be a very, very wrong table to them.
But even if there were no Soviet military threat, you have to recognize the fact that there needs to be a home for the Germans in a free Europe.
And if they don't have a home, free, right, the Russians have to take even arms, pull them, because they've got these jerks, right?
This is a group of people constantly, like I've seen here, because of the Senate, you've constantly got to reassure them, right?
Brown knows this.
He's the predecessor of this union, right?
You've constantly got to say, look, Germany will be a part of us, and that's why Britain coming into the market is a good thing,
to give them more of a view to belong to this.
They're out of politics.
There are reasons for that, and we all understand, because they have the property of Germany.
But we must constantly see that the Germans are reassured that economically, politically, militarily, their home is in the United Europe.
Right?
That's right.
That's right.
So then, you know, the political cooperation in Europe was started by people like, I don't know, the Caspary Professional.
Those were the giants.
Those were the giants, the fifties, you know.
And you're too young to know.
Oh, I know some of those folks.
The Caspary are very nice.
Yes, I've known the Professional as a member, as a member of the European Parliamentary.
But they were the giants of European getting together, you know, and we need political leaders in Europe.
And ten governments is quite something to get done together, you know, it's all that is
But it must be done, you know, it must be done.
The Dutch have always taken a very outgoing position in this respect, haven't you?
You've been, in respect to the European...
Yes, there is where a small country like ours, not so important to world affairs, can do something.
That's right.
On a European scale.
Absolutely.
There we can do something.
And I was very grateful by your statement of the signature of one of your members, which was a very positive one.
And I know that you, in the United States, think that a common market sometimes protects you.
I think it is.
What you call your protection is the root of it, I think.
I know some of your organizations, but the elopement of the common market buying Great Britain will make it, I think, more vulnerable.
You think so?
Oh, certainly.
Certainly.
Because of all the economic things of Great Britain, with respect to the British, they're an outward-looking people.
They are.
They have been.
And I think he is an outward-looking man.
I mean, he, of course, is an outward-looking man.
rather than getting into the market, but he is an awkward man.
And that's just like my mom, too.
Of course.
And our country, too.
If you look out now, basically the French look in right now.
Pompidou may change his venture from an economic standpoint because he's basically motivated by economics.
But that's all right, too.
At least he's not rigid.
At least he doesn't.
That's your judgment.
Yes, certainly.
Certainly.
But the enlarged gold market, that is my feeling, will be less inward-looking, more outward-looking than the gold market of the 60s.
When we started the gold market in the 50s, there was one city involved against it, and it was Rotterdam.
They thought the common market would become a continental market.
So the big businessmen in Rothenburg, they were deadly against it.
Dutch farmers were poor, but people in Rotterdam were wrong.
So they have really profited from the common market.
Enormous.
Have they?
It is their manufacturing and trade.
It is their manufacturing and trade with Germany.
It has really profited from the world now, I think.
That's fantastic.
Fantastic.
Would you like to have your master convene him?
He's been out there a long time.
Oh, yeah.
All the time.
He's been all the time.
Yeah, he doesn't come.
He doesn't feel that we're breaking the protocol here.
All right.
Yeah, yeah.
I'm going to have him pass New York at midnight.
He's going to be here.
Oh, that's a good problem, Mark.
It's a good problem.
especially with the overseas trade, the way that you always have been used to it.
Do you know what I mean?
Yes.
Well, I'd like to hear that you deal with the eventual tendency of the new Europe will not be turning inward or turning downward.
That's what we have to watch here in this country.
You see, the United States has a very, very strong and we want to continue looking outward, and I think we will.
It takes two to make the deal.
And if the new Europe turns to protectionism, they're too tough.
And if Japan continues to be, as they are, very, very tough, the inevitable reaction here is to react to that.
And I think of nothing more detrimental to what we were talking about earlier, the necessity for Europe, the United States, Canada, and Japan
to work together in terms of security, et cetera, because we are basically the three we're in, the three great powers, I guess, as lined up on the other side of the two great Soviet powers that aren't as large.
It would be a great tragedy if our computation, which is inevitable, became destructive.
That could happen.
And that's why it seems that, I think on the monetary thing, I think the Group of Ten is a good idea, if you know what I mean.
Yes.
Because every time we can bring Japan into a deal, we should.
Every time.
I mentioned this to both, uh, both Heath and Grant and also John, but you see, whenever you can bring Japan into any kind of conversations, parliamentary conversations, uh, uh, economic and personal and monetary, we discuss.
because Japan is the only non-white country of the great three countries, and Japan could be schizophrenic.
Japan's only tie, really, only tie to what we believe in, what you believe in as a European, what I believe in as an American, is frankly very non-exotic.
We must, of course, cultivate that.
We must not be .
But beyond that, we've got to have some political cooperation and so forth.
And now that it's 25 years past the war, despite the problems with the end of Korea and its visit, most people are ready for it.
I mean, they recognize the new.
that who Japan can be and will be a very constructive member of the free world community.
But the most important thing we've got to make out of it, because just thinking of Japan, we're tied in.
Just thinking of China.
More of a question.
What a power it could be.
Because, my, they're an able people.
Oh, they are.
We all are.
We're all too, you know.
They have productivity.
Well, it's fantastic.
They obviously have bills for the world nowadays.
Your property, your people, you buy their tax returns.
The Americans, we built our building a couple of days ago.
I said the L.A. says we can do it.
You know, take us out both by hand.
We can do national reform companies.
Dutch Shell.
Dutch Shell.
They buy them.
That's the true movement.
Could I say, I think it might be useful to you
First of all, to say that I would have left before my visit to Beijing and to Moscow to have had an opportunity to meet personally with the heads of government of all the European countries, I could not do, because time did not permit it.
I have, as you know, with the three, the Italians, because of me,
because they're going through that one of those periods where they don't have a carpet.
So I said they don't do that.
And the last year, they got a birdie.
They're just so true to the story.
How do you carpet this time?
the world, because they have more of an emphasis on great people.
Anyway, they had a group of people, she's a fine, very good economist, and you would think they would keep a man like that.
You know what the Italians need?
They need something like a French constitution.
They need a strong...
As a matter of fact, if you look to the Latin countries in general, the Latin countries, and by the Latin countries I mean Italy, France, this is all Latin, certainly Spain, all Latin America, they need basically more of the French Constitution than the American Constitution.
I don't mean that he became dictators or anything, but they need the strong, because they otherwise tend, in the Franco times, to attack by attack.
And they had too many attacks.
The French was a disaster, including De Gaulle.
De Gaulle's great contribution to France was not important.
De Gaulle was in the spirit of pulling together, giving in to government.
They didn't have government before.
But I'm glad I had a chance to meet with you.
And I'd like to say that one of the reasons is that
As we look over the security of NATO, at least since I've been here and I've jumped in since then, the Dutch have just been, you've been like rocks, you've been tough, and we appreciate that.
You stood out there, and I know you've got a public opinion, but I don't know if your country has any of the best strong support your country has.
And Al Lutz, of course, is moving into Grosse Ville's job, and he'd be a fine man there.
He's a strong, vigorous, articulate man.
And so I'm glad that each week we could have this kind of talk.
But I want to say that before going to P.K.
Kamaska, I'll give you a brief rundown of what I think we're trying to accomplish both places.
The two trips differ very much.
They're only alike in one sense, but both are communist countries.
But an indication of how different they are is that, and this is ironic, but as far as Gingrich is concerned, while there was a time when the United States was considered to be enemy number one in any communist country, we're now retreating.
And we welcome that, because basically, the Russians consider the Chinese the number one enemy, and the Chinese consider the Russians the number one.
It's going down the line.
And the Chinese might think that the Japanese are potentially more dangerous than we are.
So whatever the reason for that, we now come to the Chinese basically as one in which we are trying
to start on long road.
We do not know where to go to land, neither do they.
But we do believe that by starting the long process of some sort of contact, I will say how this meeting will not come recognition on our part.
Because in Canada, since we still recognize Taiwan and will continue to honor our treaty commitments, they know this will not come on.
what may come out to be, however, of some method of communication in the future, some contact in the future, and perhaps reducing the chance in the immediate future of a confrontation between the United States and PRC of Asia, such as we had in Korea, which I suppose we were interacting with in Vietnam.
And looking further to the future, when they become a superpower, nuclear superpower, to be in a position at that time, we will have such relations with them that we can discuss differences and not inevitably have a clash.
Now, also, no one can look at Asia
and take some of their related Chinese out of it and say you didn't have any policy in the Pacific that will succeed or prevent a war without having the Chinese part of it, which is as cold-blooded as that.
This is not done at the expense of the Japanese.
It's not done at the expense
It is solely a question of the United States looking to the future, our future, as a Pacific power, with the responsibility to try to keep peace in the Pacific.
And we cannot leave that responsibility unless we develop some relationship with the Chinese government.
And that's what we're doing.
So we'll discuss a lot of things.
We'll discuss their role in the Pacific and our role in the Pacific.
We'll disagree on a lot of that.
But the most important thing about that is that it occurs and that the Chinese and the United States will become a process of, shall we say, getting to know each other.
Now, this is not said in any sense of sentimentality.
There are many people who have looked at the China visit and interpreted it exactly the wrong way.
They say, oh, this is great.
Now that the United States and China really never had any differences, everything's going to be settled.
It's not that.
No one in this world knows how great the Gulf is between their philosophy and ours, their interests and ours.
But I also don't know in this world, I think most of the weatherland do, how imperative it is to see the great nations that have these enormous differences, where you've got the nuclear then hanging in the clouds, and God can find ways to kind of talk them along.
I agree.
And you already told us about their movement.
Exactly.
Now, it is, as you have, they're the third, I would say, would you say they're the first in the French?
Yeah, they're the first.
Yeah, yeah.
But also they're going to go on pretty good with the H-bombs as well as the other.
I don't know what the delivery systems, whether they are .
Looking to the future, it's in heaven.
If they want to do it in 20 years from now, they'll be a super nuclear power in 20 years from now.
And that's what we've got to think about, not the good people, but what we've got to think about.
Now, obviously our air government,
Russian friends don't look for any favor on this visit, not because they think we're up in it, but because they think they are sort of paranoid about the Chinese as the Chinese are about them.
We're seeing how they are.
My total lie, both the Russians and the Chinese, is that we're seeking good bilateral relations, both
without being at a chance with the other.
It may be helpful for them one day to try to protect.
You see, the problem they have, the Russians, let's suppose, let's suppose that China's isolation remained.
What kind of world are we going to have 15 years from now?
All right, the Russians,
that huge border, standing there, hostile to the enemy.
The United States, far across the sea, having fought with Korea and directly with Vietnam, and Japan, an ally of the United States, India, whom they despised, also an enemy.
What had happened?
What had happened?
could be the very confrontation without them.
You see, so somebody has got to be able to do that thing.
I'm talking to the papers.
They aren't papers, militarily.
But we, because they know that we are their only rival in the superpower game, except the Russians, that might threaten them.
We are the ones who have to do the deal.
That's what it is.
So you've got to look at it that way, too.
I think that's a very realistic approach, Mr. President.
Also, you are going to talk with them.
I've seen your budget yesterday.
You have increased your defense budget.
Yes, sir.
And that is, I said to the Secretary of State yesterday, that is very courageous that he will help us in Europe, too, you know.
We increased our country to 70% in Europe at that time.
It's never a pleasant thing to do.
No, no, no.
We get something to do.
And I wonder if it gets any popular.
But I'm saying, when you took it one day, when the NATO countries had that billion dollars, you know, that almost did harm us for a year at this time.
Oh, yes.
Otherwise, people would say, oh, we've got the man's fuel, and all these other things, which
Now on the other side of the coin, now the two-mention budget, the Russian visit is a very different one.
In other words, we have relations with the Russians.
We talk with them all the time.
In the time that I've been here, we've had differences, but we've avoided confrontation.
But the Russians, of course, are interested in any number of subjects.
They're interested in trade, they're interested in the Middle East, they're interested in
arms control, as we are, as we're negotiating to solve.
And of course, we're vital to Europe.
Now we'll start with others, and actually whatever subjects are still open at that point, like our arms limitation, these trade, of course, will definitely be discussed, and maybe some arms will be made.
However, on the other side of the coin, I would have to accept
As far as Europe is concerned, our line is very rigid.
And we are not going to, for example, take like an EMR.
We have no intention, whatever, of allowing that to be assumed for discussion of that.
Well, that's something we've got to work out on ourselves before it's discussed with anybody else.
And so that's not... And also, in terms of arms competition, as you know, your government has been briefed on ourselves very, very now a lot, as have the other NATO countries.
They, under no circumstances,
will we allow our arms limitation talks in any way to compromise our NATO commitment?
Now, they constantly are trying to break any forces and weapons and so forth that really apply to NATO, in other words, to get us to Knoxville.
And we constantly know that's not the subject to be discussed.
We're discussing it.
the limitation of those arms that have to do with the ability of each of the two powers to bring the beauty to it, and not the thing that would affect our relations with NATO.
Now, as far as the Russian, this is concerning.
I heard Kim said that it would be very hard for him, here again,
This is the thing we all have to realize.
There's that old song, one of our musical comedies, I'm getting to know you.
And there are many naive people.
And who would think about, if you just get to know people, you won't have any differences.
My God, some of the worst differences are on married people who know each other too well.
And getting to know you doesn't solve problems.
Getting to know you just simply may provide a method to discuss the problems.
Now, we know the Russians will.
They know us well.
And where I think this summit, or whatever it's called, may have a chance for substantive success for others, if not, it will be highly regrettable.
I know them at AOT.
I will say this in any sense of ego, but you know it because of my background and theirs.
And we have been very forthright about it.
We haven't panicked.
We say, look, we do have some differences.
If you want something different, basically, as far as I'm concerned, they wanted to panic over us, and we want one over them.
So we both recognize that.
So we bargained hard to see that neither gets it.
And that's the only way to make a deal anyway.
And so far as Europe is concerned, we actually say, look, we're not going to go here and talk with you about how we're going to sink all our friends.
I mean, that's another matter in the future.
Maybe we can talk about that.
One other subject I should mention to you, which is a very lively subject in Europe and all the other in the state of racing in Europe, and that's the European Security Conference.
Bill Rogers has probably spoken to you about it.
The point is there that they have talked about the European Security Conference, but our view is that that's something that is still down the pike a bit.
I mean, it isn't ready to
to move it.
It's something that certainly can be explored on a bilateral basis and discussions among various .
But we've got to find out what we think can come out of it, what good purpose it can serve.
Now, in Western Europe, there are varying views on this, varying groups of attention.
Italians are very strong for it, and several others are.
And in Eastern Europe, Dorster, Francesco, and so forth, they tremendous ideas, but they see it as a way, perhaps, to get just a little bit out of the barrel.
The Russians want it for their own reasons.
Oh, yes.
Oh, yes.
Because they perhaps may see that while the European security countries, they know the word security is a misnomer because it isn't about security they're talking.
They'd like to sort of create a compression line for European security countries.
There's no need for all these...
forced to do what you don't want to see them try.
So for that reason, what I'll argue is, I would say, argue is deliberately not opposed.
We will consider it.
But we don't, we're not going to buy into that quote.
We should take the hard look at it and want to see how is it, we think what is most important is for us to remember that the security of Europe
is what has kept the peace and kept Europe free for the last 25 years.
That does not be compromised.
If that is compromised, then this could all unravel, particularly the terminal problem right in the heart.
So therefore, what we have to do is to maintain
That basic security here, that's why it enables to us to work.
It doesn't mean that forever you're going to have to have a huge budget to maintain forces in Europe and the rest of it.
Maybe there is going to come a time.
I don't think there's going to come a time.
That's true for years now.
But we can see some limitations in this area.
Certainly we're going to talk about it.
But at this particular point, we've got to look at the other side, what they're up to.
And as far as our Russian friends are concerned,
Their aim is to, you know, to take off the Germans.
I think.
But what do you think?
Now that I've said it, I want to hear what you think about these things.
Yes.
I think you are right.
That's always the nature.
And to get loose in Europe from the United States.
all the Europeans that they would like to have, they would like to have Europe as an archipelago of its own, close to Europe and Russia, and elusive from the United States.
Therefore, in the end, our discussions are also of vital importance.
You can be sure of those.
We looked at all the schemes.
How do you like, I might say, we just haven't seen one yet that is not going to be at our disadvantage.
Have you any idea about the timing and the linking of any of our discussions and a European security conference?
We're very cautious about this.
Very cautious about it.
And we think we've got to sort it out on ourselves first.
Yeah.
I don't think there should be.
I think there shouldn't be a linkage between MPFR and MPFR.
When I say linkage, we couldn't put the two in the back.
I think we should consider both separately.
On MPFR, as Al said, what we have to do is to sort out that problem.
among ourselves to see what kind of a formula we could agree to that would not weaken us vis-a-vis the bloc.
That's what we have to do.
And we have not yet found such a formula yet.
And the Rosy old nation is looking around for this and that.
Now the European Security Conference is another subject.
I think it should be treated as another subject.
Because I think if you confuse the two, or mix the two,
that the inevitable result would be to say, well, they have a European Security Conference, and then maybe the VFR is going to be mentioned.
And I think the European Security Conference, which has nothing to do with security.
It has to do with culture and a lot of other things.
I understand.
So far.
Do you know anything else, sir?
Well, I think all of the data will probably be related somewhere down the line.
Oh, yeah.
They talk about that.
We've got the original direction.
At the present time, at the present time, to look at and compose the agenda that they have,
And we don't, when Jamaica was here, we might as well, what's the agenda?
That's what everybody was going to come out of.
And in a sense, at this point, I would have to say, I don't mean that this will always be the case, because eventually there will be here.
And also, I must say, I feel for those people in Eastern here.
If there's anything that touches Congress, do that.
But that's where I, I mean, I've been to most of those countries, as I'm sure you have.
God, and I didn't oppose, I'm not thinking of their governments, but the Poles and the Romanians and the Hungarians and the Czechs and the rest of the great people, you know, here they are.
All of them, they killed.
So if we did any way that we could level that up, it would be four.
But at the present time, all that I have been able to see as far as an enchantment for a European security conference would indicate
that our friends on the other side would like to have it for the sake of having a meeting.
Now, we have that kind of a conference for the sake of having a meeting.
That's for their interest, not to ours.
What we have to do is to get some very specific things that might come out.
There might be, for example, more communication, more trade, more...
a few other things, eventually perhaps the problem of security.
But again, we must buy a conference with the thought that that solves these
this enormous problem with the division of Europe.
The Germans, of course, are the one, I imagine the Italians, the Germans had a tremendous pull in that respect because, you know, from actually being in the heart of Europe, lost politics and the rest, but our attitude, as I emphasize, and as Rogers will also tell you, I'm sure, is our attitude is one that, you know, when we talk to our European friends,
Well, that VFR, we're taking a very hard look at it to try to see if, among ourselves, we can find any kind of a market that we can offer.
And that's what we should say.
That also helps you in terms of your domestic.
We're looking into that.
Let's not do anything illiterate.
We'll do it all together.
And we won't delay it.
We'll weaken the alliance against those who might oppose us.
As far as the European Security Conference is concerned, well, it's an interesting idea.
Interesting idea.
But as far as, as General Manchin, that we must see, we must see on ourselves what might come out, what can be discovered.
When you say so, do you mean we should be careful?
Just a little.
Yeah, that we, on our part, do not see that this, see, yeah, that we have to have a whole, yeah, we feel to be a part of it.
Now, that doesn't say it won't, does it?
But I guess that's taking time.
Yes, taking time to see what we're buying here.
And, uh,
the 10th Council, that's the title.
Yes, that's another conference we get in the course of 72, and that is what we call a summit, and that is the conference of the government of the United States, and the heads of governments of the
You call the market companies.
That'll be in September.
In the second half of the year.
Yeah.
Where will that be?
I don't know.
Not yet fixed.
Not yet fixed.
What kind of a thing is that?
I think that conference will, before we officially start with the new members, might be useful, especially for what might be useful this time.
also to discuss our relationship with other parts of the world, the United States, the communists, and Japan, and the developed countries, you know, that might be useful.
I think that will be useful.
That'll be a very fascinating time.
That, you know, the reason I was not really interested in suggesting Hague or something, sorry,
I don't think you can have that conference in any one of the four, like London, Paris, Milan, or Rome, because, you know, you should have it in one of the countries that is small, one of the smaller countries.
Right.
Yes, although you have to go right over the stairs, you can have it in Brussels, you can have it in Luxembourg, you can even have it in Strasbourg.
Well, I can do it.
I think you're the only, as I said, and I'm so glad because of the work and your schedule that I have on the agency, but I think you're the only leader of the AOT.
other than the big tree that I'll be able to see before Peking.
Between Peking and Moscow, I may be able to kind of work some of the others in, you know, because they'll be older than us.
We haven't.
But at least we've got a chance to do it.
No, I'm very grateful.
I'm very grateful.
We were lucky last night, you know, we had a dinner.
That's it.
Oh, I know you are a master in...
I saw your television broadcast.
You had that with your secretary of state.
Dr. was there.
Yeah, and Mr. Metzger was there.
Yeah, yeah.
That was quite interesting.
Yeah, yes.
So that was the compliment, you know, for the way you did it.
I did it right there and then.
Oh, you did it there.
I did it there.
That camera's here.
Yes, yes.
You talk, as you know, you have been in politics for a long time.
It's about 15 drafts.
I do a lot of, I do wrecking myself a lot.
Because if I have to hit it in my own idiom, it's other people's wreckings, or in your own, but it's got to be what I say.
But people don't know how I talk, you know.
So I use my own cool expressions.
That's what he said, wasn't it?
That's what he said, wasn't it?
Yeah, I talked to Rodgers this morning, and also last night, and he said, he told me, he was there with you, and he told me, he told me, he said, you know, Brad, this is very interesting to tell, but this is amazing, I'm told it's just shit politics.
It's just, it's just communication.
I mean, when we have that, it'll be good because we don't have to just butter up the press.
We can impress them.
It matters, okay?
But tell them to set this up.
We have weekly camera sessions and every Friday evening I'm live on television to report on our decisions.
You go on live television?
On live.
And then I'm interviewed by my friend, my progressive, Morris of the television.
I have all of those.
Is your television state-controlled?
No.
I mean, I said good, I hate that.
We have low-governmental companies, bureaucracy companies, but also with problems.
All of them have problems.
But I have to hear all of you say very progressive.
They are, they are.
But that's part of the grief.
That's the way it is.
But I have a feeling that your...
Your plan for peace last night will be welcomed and will be judged positively in Europe.
That's my feeling.
That's my feeling.
I'd love to say, especially about what you said also about free elections.
Well, we've gone really as far as we can.
We've got two of our bases all set down a month before the international body.
They'll run the elections.
They get a free shot at it.
Like you said, I would anticipate that our Vietnamese will reject it.
That's what they always do first.
They will give us a pop, give South Vietnam a pop in the next two or three months.
But then they've got to look down that barrel and decide, are they going to fight forever, or are they going to take a deal?
Because they can't win now, in my view.
The South Vietnamese are strong enough with our continued assistance to defend themselves and so on and so on.
So North Vietnam, I think, is going to have to make the decision that North Korea made many, many years ago.
They're going to have to live with the situation for a while.
When and where do we want to do that?
It remains to be seen.
But we at least need to position ourselves there.
But the essential part of your plan is, if I understand it well, is we leave.
That's right.
Six months after the political agreement.
That's right.
We go to land.
Oh, no, no.
First of all, what we tried is that we, and the thing is that we are going to continue, of course, in our assistance to South Vietnam, economically, because after all, the Russians and the Chinese are continuing their assistance in Vietnam.
We trust, eventually, that it could be done so.
I'll take you off your car here.
Thank you.