On February 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Ellsworth F. Bunker, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:53 am to 11:33 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 665-003 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Hi, how are you?
I'm sorry we can't keep you here.
I had a letter to Paul.
I noticed the King died.
You mentioned the fact that I...
I had such pleasant memories of his faint visits to the United States, and your wife was saying that he had remembered us, and I didn't know he was sick or anything.
But he had a heart attack about that part.
He had a heart attack or something like that.
I know.
That's why I had to catch him.
I got it.
He was sick.
He had a heart attack some time ago, and he said that he was gone.
Yeah.
Hunting.
He was a hunter, that's right.
And he went hunting around the low country and had a lot of time down in Southerland.
At a conference in old Caesars.
In the 18th.
So he's ready for it.
Yes.
He's had much more education than the King.
He went to Cambridge, he went to Harvard, he studied in Japan.
My wife, you know, is coming with me, and she's got to start in Saigon.
The last time that we got good, it came down to check it back.
Do we feel worried that they're accusing him?
He's a good soldier, you know.
He just wants to do everything, but it's awfully hard to know what they're doing in the circle place.
Well, I think if we move at a measured pace, he's waiting for me.
After this meeting, I've got something.
He'll read this out later.
Asia chapter in the meantime.
He's removed at a measured pace.
The Indians have their own reasons to get close.
That's why I called him to swap it around.
The Indians have no interest in the Russian satellite.
Well, look, the point that I make is that the point that I make is cheating.
which I think we've got to realize that poor Americans, we're always worried.
John Cox is very outspoken on this point.
He's absolutely right.
We're always so passionately worried that our foreign policy is going to so enrage another country that they will refuse to accept our aid.
Now, there hasn't been anybody, I'd like to see, please see what the ambassador has to say.
I'm in a rather interesting position.
Keating recalled when he and I came here as freshmen of Congress in 1947, we were among perhaps 10 Republicans who were supporters of aid to India, and I supported all my life, my political life, still do, and so forth and so on.
But I said, well, I'm not going to support aid to any country that is, at that time, engaged in a military action period.
So with that, I made the point to Keating, I said, look,
I said, India, I said, rather than, he said, the point that some of our friends in the States say, how can we reassure the Indians?
And they all look at them, how can the Indians reassure us?
Because basically, I said, look at India.
What are their options?
They have three superpowers that they have to deal with.
One is China, the other is Russia, and the other is the United States.
The only one that they are sure has absolutely no designs on territory, economically, politically, is the United States of America.
We proved it by $10 billion over 20 years without a string and got a kick in the tail of the United Nations every place else.
They cannot say that about the Chinese, which were invaded in 1962, and they cannot say that about the Russians, who maintained a very active subversion network throughout India, particularly.
Now, therefore, so, what did Indians want?
I said, don't go crawling back to them.
The thing to do is to say to them, now look, we're glad to have a very responsible relationship.
We want to help.
We want to cooperate.
But it must be on the right kind of basis.
Doesn't that make sense?
We want India to succeed.
It's the largest free world democracy.
But it's a great mistake for American ambassadors to feel, and officials, that
No, I think, I think actually, Mr. President,
may not agree.
I think our relations with India can be on a better basis a year from now than they were on November 22nd when this whole thing started.
The Indians have been sort of putting our money into their budget as if it were a regular contribution.
They never really supported us on anything.
And if we have a realistic dialogue with them, deal with them as a great country that has to make concessions to us and to which we make reciprocal concessions,
I think it would be on a better basis to make aid a subsidiary aspect of the relationship rather than a primary contact.
And they will feed us on Bangladesh, Mr. President.
Within a year, if their army stays there, they are going to be in trouble with the Afghani.
The Russians have to compete with the Chinese in Bangladesh.
The only way the Russians can do that is to back their own Communist Party.
in Bangladesh, that interest is going to affect West Bengal.
So we are in pretty good shape.
It is really only ones who in Bangladesh have parallel interests with the strangers it may see.
And if we just keep our cool now and move at a measured pace, as you pointed out in the meeting, I think we're going to be in good shape within a year.
Anyway, that's another subject.
Getting back to our frank subject of
Vietnam, about the only new note since we met yesterday was the speech by Muskie.
which I'm part of.
It was a formula for surrender.
It was straight when you really read it.
This is what Harriman has been pushing.
He's the guy who's refurbishing his old ideas every year.
It really showed that Harriman has just
That was a stupid thing.
I mean, it's just, yeah, surrender.
I mean, well, don't you think most people, though, just have to support what we have done and offered?
How the hell could you go any further?
Do you think we can?
I don't think so.
Well, I don't see it.
I think you've put it on the line.
And you do believe that the morale situation is not as bad as some of our newspaper guys say out there?
Oh, not at all, Mr. Preston.
You see, you know, I mean, you've got to market the news on several times.
Well, today they have a new line in the news summary, Mr. Preston.
It's that your prediction of the offense, it must be a phony, because the South Vietnamese don't seem worried.
Don't what?
Don't seem worried.
Because the South Vietnamese don't keep order, so they say, why is the president so worried when the South Vietnamese are so confident?
On the one hand, they're frightened to death.
On the other hand, they're not worried.
Anything to meet the United States?
Yes, of course.
Some of them.
Some of them.
Reassure them.
Reassure them all you can.
Yep.
Well, just...
One thing we did not, I think you should know, uh, the, uh, this, don't, don't, don't say this to me beyond this meeting, but, uh, we've ordered the actual carrier ready.
Oh, good.
Are we, we've ordered more B-52s?
No, it's been ordered A-81s and everything.
I just, I mean, just on the, I think you've got to put it properly.
Well, I see more today.
I have to double the number of B-52s.
whatever is necessary.
So there's one hell of a show that we have for them.
I know a lot of them have to be refitted or whatever they have to do.
But get the hell over there.
Right now, let's have an awesome show of strength.
Now, between now and the time we return from China, we cannot hit the door.
None of us will.
Now, the other thing is we've done everything we've got.
Mr. President, a lot of this argument about targets is probably because when they know they have X number of soldiers, they gear the targets to the soldiers.
When they have more planes,
They'll find, they'll wait a few pounds if they, and they've got to be somewhere in a defiant little area if they're going to attack.
Yes.
You mean, in other words, how they can be, I don't see, I don't see where they can concentrate on just bombing.
But it doesn't make, if they're going to have a battle in a certain area, they know where the enemies are.
It's saturated.
It's saturated with that personnel law.
Don't you think so?
Instead of screwing around trying to get an elk truck one time or a bull the next time.
Some of this bombing is silly.
Yes, and this defense issue of bombing affects the enemy morale tremendously.
That's what I understand.
Oh, yes.
But also, as I said yesterday, they've done an increasingly good job on this interdiction.
The trucks they gather, the throughput is a small proportion of the input.
They've done a fine job on this question of the farming and who the more people to choose.
The farming of these sand sites becomes important.
And once again, both directors and I, we could get authority to bomb these SAM sites.
Now the authority is for bombing when they fire an aircraft.
So when the radar is locked on, the problem is that that's late to start attacking.
And the other problem is weather.
You've got to see it.
They'll sometimes only get a dollar a day.
My point is that the protection of reaction should include the right of the neighbor, which is not going to do something, the right to hit the same sites.
Protective reaction should include romantic reaction.
I think the way to handle it, Mr. President, and I haven't had a chance to talk to Elkwood yet, is that
One is to give them a blanket authority.
That has the disadvantage of getting out and also of his doing that something with the aircraft.
The other is right now they can hit only when the radar is locked off.
And that's very restrictive because that means that the plane which is in trouble also has to fire.
The third possibility is to say that Abrams can hit any SAM site that has locked off even if it is no longer locked off.
In other words, if a tank is a problem, and you tie it close, it's good.
Right now, they can use only drives.
Yes, this is one thing we would like to do.
They may have not used this, and I'm not sure how, right?
Now, here are the locations.
No, no, here are the locations.
Yes, that's right.
Could he knock it off while we're in China?
I don't think they should be doing it while we're in charge.
But couldn't he stage it as long as we in this room agree on the ground that they had fires?
He is to say, he is to call all of these
Well, just call it protective reaction.
That's what it is.
Well, that's because it's a chromatic reaction.
I am simply saying that we need to expand the definition of protective reaction to mean chromatic reactions where a sand site is concerned.
I think that, but let me be sure that anything that is down there is just called an ordinary protective reaction.
Who the hell is going to send it in fire?
No, but could they stop from slapping it at every bloody breathing?
Yes.
Why do we have to put, you tell them, I don't want to be talking to them.
I want to tell you when we get back, he is to tell the military not to put out extensive briefings with regard to our military activities from now until we get back to China.
Do it, but don't say it.
He can do that.
He can at least be our officer.
Uh, Mr. President, they're about, the enemy has about a hundred and sixty-eight sand sites.
They've got some in southern Laos, three in southern Laos now.
Now they've got about ninety-eight of the man, but they can move these, uh, anywhere within six hours from one site to another.
That's what they do.
And, uh, so, and, uh, Henry, we, uh, they beat 52 very well.
We lose 52.
I don't want it done from the 17th, from the time you leave.
Until you get done.
Until you get done.
All right.
Between now and the 17th, then, will you work out the authority?
Yeah.
He can hit Sam Sykes, period.
Okay.
But he is not familiar with the public operation, right?
And if it does get out, because he said it does, he says it was a protective reaction strike.
He used to describe it as a protective reaction.
It doesn't have to spell out that they struck.
I thought, it is a sand cycle.
A protective reaction strikes against the sand cycle.
But you know, when we were getting the jet passed and the rest of the week, we called that a protective reaction.
We've been talking the hell out of a lot of other stuff.
So what we wanted to figure out is, fair enough, so he's got about two weeks, about 10 days, nine days to get off.
He should be able to get off by at least from the 17th until the 1st of March, he's dead.
As far as North Vietnam is concerned.
But then tell them to get those sand bombers and start getting some in South Vietnam.
In the V3 front, and of course in Laos, too.
and the D.E.
from Laos, and don't forget Cambodia, or some other thing.
I'm not going to change a side of it.
Now the other thing, Henry, that we have to remember when we talk about the DMC, we are not going to get across the DMC until I can get back to Canada.
That's a silly thing to have, with Long Road and this side of the country.
I have no problem with hitting on the northern side of the DMC.
sure that before that that's what i meant i think we should cover the whole emc but it's more difficult if you get it almost yeah it's uh
south of the dividing line, they can all be in a curvy sanctuary.
I don't think, I don't know what else to believe, that they will attack in high court before the middle of March.
I think, uh, I think that's about it, yes.
Maybe the first, the first march on.
The weather gets better then.
Well, we're back.
Sometime in March, yeah.
No, I think that's all.
Oh, sure, I think that's all.
No.
Sure.
Well, that would be fine.
I think that's it.
That's great.
We will see that the authorities are at work.
I can assure you of that.
The authorities will be at work.
We will see that more planes get put in there and carriers got them and they should have asked for more planes and carriers.
I don't understand the question.
Mr. President, if you hadn't been at the briefing yesterday, that's a...
was sort of fixed to lead you to the opposite conclusion.
Oh, I thought we were doing everything we could.
No, I thought it was great.
I got tremendously encouraged when you moved in, I must say.
Well, they have to do it.
But I was concerned that we haven't done it.
The one carrier is going to be on its way now.
It will be there before the end of the month.
OK.
which is about as fast as they can get.
And they discover targets once they've got the plan.
That's the question of priorities.
Right now, they'll always tell you they're hitting every target they get,
They also know that they have certain limitations.
That's my case for Houston.
And for the next three months, we are better off wasting time.
I would very much like to have, in the D3 ground, if that's what it's called, I'd really like to have some saturation bombing now.
I mean, just take off everything else and for a couple of nights, just bomb the Chief of Staff.
There are two or three divisions there.
We ought to be able to just strike the hell out of them.
Well, it's interesting in Northern Loud, Mr. President, where they have next to no opposition left.
We expect to stop them outside of Long Kien for four weeks now.
Yes.
With B-52 bombs.
Yes, we did.
Well, it's the only thing.
The Wang Pao forces are pretty demoralized, and I think it's the single most important factor.
There are other factors, supplies and so forth.
And every week, they're going to attack again, but every week we gain.
But just that much ahead.
Yes.
Yes.
What do you think?
Yes.
Okay.
Up in Long Kien, but of course the Lao army is nothing compared to the Shao Tzu in the media.
Well, how many bodies did they find in one of those grave areas where they went in the other day?
There's not quite a lot.
If you go in, and frankly, the enemy can be demoralized at that point, but if then the South Vietnamese on the ground come in, it's like they're artillery varieties in every war.
You've got to follow up with them.
Otherwise, it's a ruse.
They aren't supposed to be coming to do that.
Thank you.
Just maybe.
Just maybe.
They're doing better than we think.
He says they're better than we think.
They are.
You know, as we go out, they gain confidence.
I went up to them.
I talked to General Lamb.
I went up to him.
End of November.
Went out in enterprise.
I talked to Lamb about his problems under the MZ.
He said, no, no, no problem.
And one interesting thing, just as an example, a year and a half ago, we were pulling out our 9th Division in the Delta.
General Nunn, who was commanding the 7th Division, was very worried, and said he couldn't fill the gap.
Joe Olsen talked to him, and he said he was very worried.
He went back to see him last fall, and he said,
I talked to you, and the 9th Division was pulling out, and you were very concerned about it.
How do you feel about it now?
It's the best thing that ever happened.
Take them out soon.
Of course, there was that boat, yes, that we took.
We forgot which fleet that was.
Well, but Adrian said, what's happened to that 7th Division is a near miracle.
Really?
Yeah.
No, they're coming along.
Well, hell, when we went into Cambodia, we were afraid to let this opportunity go in without American advice.
Yeah, I know.
Perfect.
And everything.
Yeah.
And today, we are letting the mantle to take offensive practice with us all.
Sure.
Sure.
Yeah.
And, too, as, uh, you know, speaking of the confidence,
He's, I think, handled the psychological part of this impending offensive very well.
She said to me, letting the people know, but not putting it in terms of going to frighten them, because they don't need to be frightened, just so that they're not surprised or so.
And I think he's done it quite well.
Wow.
The problem is the system for compression of arms.
We've got enough sitting on two arms.
We don't even have to move any.
Got it.
That'll take months.
No.
That's a fairly easy thing.
They just have to put bomb bags in there.
Get the hell away from them.
In fact, they've got 13 additional ones that they used to have that they pulled out of them, which must still be fitted.
They used to have 60, now they only have 47.
Well, let's get it up to 60 right away, but higher, higher.
You know what I mean?
Just put it at a... We're going to put it at more than an hour and put an order out.
But time is of the essence.
You want to have it at D-52, that's when the battle's over.
Well, you'll have a chance this afternoon when you talk to... Well, I'll tell him that, but then we'll put an order out, and it's later.
You have to be aware that the enemy's following the order and not ready to speak.
You understand?
The ship, though, is already on its way.
The ship has been ordered to be there by March 3rd.
That's fine.
That's great.
You see, having four carriers, it has 100 planes.
160.
160, yes.
That's all.
That helps a lot.
And, well, it helps, for example, when we do a two- and one-day strike, we can just put
Well, this will re-insert you a little, if you need to guess.
The main part is that the turrets...
It isn't just reassurance.
We've just got to tell them, fight like hell.
This is their country now.
And their ability to get more aid and everything is going to depend upon their ability to handle this.
And if they do, we can do it.
If they don't, it's not going to be good.
Everybody's sitting here as if they just failed.
It's a joke.
I don't think it's going to fail.
I don't either.
How do you feel?
I don't know.
Oh, I think we can contain anything that has got
And if they can suffer, I think you said that yesterday, anything like the ratio of casualties that they did last year, I think they can't keep taking that.
They've taken about, last year, about 100,000 kills.
They took 16,000 in lands on their own.
Yeah.
Yeah.
And, uh...
No.
The tense of Lansan was that there was next to no fighting after, after the war.
Yes.
No, exactly.
We're fighting here now.
Yes.
That's what we said we would do.
Yes, exactly.
We could have fought more times.
No, it was very effective, the Lansan operation.
Very effective.
And what do you think how it was reported?
How?
Yeah.
Oh, Cambodia.
Yeah, it was very effective.
Also, that brought us along, otherwise we can't always be down the drain.
Well, in effect, there hasn't been anything, any significant activity in 3rd and 4th Corps for two years now.
No.
Remember when Townsend, we thought we had came six to nine months, Townsend came in, said we came two years, everyone said he was just, uh,
Telling us what we want to be.
Very good, of course.
He was right.
Well, anyway, but now, incidentally, I, you know, we discussed the situation with regard to your own tenure there, and I know it's been a great burden.
But at the present time, with this, with this offensive and everything coming on, I've just got to ask you to stay until we see it through.
Yes.
Sure, fair enough.
Yeah.
What makes it be the Marshal?
The watching post would like to recall them.
They make that proposal to me every month.
But most of the other times, you know, it's a great thing to do.
Well, I've been in many issues, but the immorality of their approach just doesn't shock you.
I mean, I mean, really, as a man who's followed for all these years, you've served the president's president, or as Republicans, and this and that.
But isn't it shocking that you've got an establishment in this country?
I mean, how they reacted to Vietnam.
It was incredible, really.
Every time the enemy wins.
Yeah.
Oh, sure.
Every time we lose.
But they're going to laugh and laugh.
Mr. President, I'll stay on the course.
I, you know, my wife and I, we've been living in France for more than five years.
And she, of course, too, for a long time.
And so what did we do?
Well, I think she'll stay on.
Oh, she'll stay as long as I stay.
And if you want me to stay on through the fall,
Let's just say this, that I think you stay until we resolve this offensive and also the diplomatic offensive.
Because you've got to have somebody there to be in confidence and to show up in the event negotiations.
And no one else to do it.
So I'm convinced that it's obvious.
Well, we're not completely convinced.
I don't want you to say that much.
I'll just pull it off when you're there.
I think this is a year or two.
It's a testing year.
You say one thing, but I don't know what it means.
I don't think so.
Because whatever happens in the record.
Yeah, yeah.
I didn't know that they had a foreign minister going out with them.
Mr. President, I would like very much if you could give an intimation.
I mean, I want to keep it on .
It's about what, how you see the eventual force level so that he can .
Well, I'm going to have a lot of negotiations there.
Yeah.
Where do you think we ought to be on July 1 or September 1?
Without negotiations, in other words.
Let me see if we can't get you the number.
I don't know at the moment.
No.
the other hand, we get home, and we gotta get down to what is the residual force?
What's the residual force?
Yeah.
Yeah.
The point is, though, that if he knows what to shoot for, then he can balance his force properly.
And he understands why the short-term thing turns out.
A second point, a second assertion is this, that General Vianne wrote to General Abrams
asking for activation of two additional divisions in case to compensate for the withdrawal of the two Korean divisions in 73, FY 73.
Now Abrams has turned that down on the ground that the 13 divisions currently in the structure is about the limit of what can be supported, plus the five.
They plan to get the spaces for this by reducing the popular forces.
Now, his view, and I agree with him, is that the important thing for them to do is to strengthen the regional popular forces, which are the key to security and pacification.
And if they are, then it ought to be big enough at the present level.
But you might be getting some...
The next point is that, on this question of the courier divisions, Keel thought that he had an understanding with them, as a result of Kim's trip to Seoul, that they would keep these two divisions through 72, and then they thought about it at the beginning of 73, or the end of 72.
Then this information came up that they might want to withdraw them during 72.
One of the reasons given was that with our combat forces out, they'd be the only country, outside country with forces there.
Well, the Chief of Staff has been to, came to Saigon and talked last week to Abrams
and wanted to know what support they would have in the way of helicopters and so forth.
And Abrams went over the whole thing with him.
Then he left and said, well, the Ministry of Defense will be here on the 9th of February, and he said he may have some good news for you.
Well, I think that it may be they'll keep the two divisions through, or maybe they'll want to
withdraw one division, and maybe they want to bargain, see what they can get.
If they can get anything more out of it as a way of support, I don't know.
I think it is important, from Peter Mee's point of view, is to try to keep them there through 72.
with all of this stuff ahead of us here.
So I think if we can do something along those lines, I know it's very expensive.
Yeah.
You've got a better mind, huh?
Yes, sir.
Before you came in, another point, if you make a note of this, that John Hoyer seems to know
In the event we do not have a settlement, what we anticipate will be the residual force, the only result of which is the curse.
So that you don't know what kind of a balance you're meeting.
Uh, I think we should discuss that here and, uh, or something.
He has not made a recommendation.
He realizes that some of these may involve considerations that go beyond military problems.
So you, you, uh, give me some time, right?
So we'll, we'll get a message out quickly.
I'll back you up on that, right?
Is that the way you'd handle it?
Yes, sir.
I think it would be best if you just— Right, yeah.
Right.
And that's what he had planned, because we don't—the difficulty you see with getting it out any other way is that the whole damn thing will get out.
And he said the president's planning to make another troop announcement on April 15th, and then the residual force will be 25,000, or the recreational force will be 50,000.
We just cannot throw that away now.
We've got to keep that as a bargaining chip.
That's the reason I've been quite concerned about this.
But we're getting an order of magnitude there.
Right, sir.
And the way you'll handle it there, if you'll work a couple of options, I think this would be more.
We'll work this out, though.
We've got to make sure we have a spot on a great division.
That's right.
That's what I'm going to do.
I'm going to have to do a damn lot of that thing.
I'm going to have to pull it up.
We've been consistent through 72.
The Koreans know it.
They may not be concerned about helicopter support and their logistics support and some equipment they'd like to get from us, I think.
But I think we've worked this out.
Yes.
We've worked this out.
I think it's going to be a difficult year.
I think we'll pull through if we can get enough money out of Congress.
And that's the main thing.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Otherwise, I think it's really shit.
Well, Mr. President, I shouldn't be freaking out very much, you know.
All right.
All right.
Don't lose it.
Don't lose it.
Right.
I'm going to order it out again.
We're not going to stay here for six years and lose, but we have a few more Americans, and if we win, we can continue to fight.
The American people are ready to lose for six years, too.
I'm going to realize what happens.
Good.
Thank you.