On February 10, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:00 pm to 4:45 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 669-001 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
I would commend it to you not only for what it tells about China and its leaders, but also about France's problems and the whole
We think, I give you this only to indicate the breadth of the kind of that all of us are trying to undertake.
It's very different from the other meetings that we've had at the highest level with the other governments.
I do this with all of the other countries, just not, of course, with the Soviet Union.
It is essential to do an enormous amount of homework just to come up with a starting line.
And I don't want to say that after having read as much as I have and as much as I will read between now and the time we arrive that I will be an expert, but at least I will be familiar with the men that we would need and the problems that may be discussed.
Tuesday and Wednesday will be used primarily to turn you off from any of the domestic matters.
Of course, the subject of the matters that I will be discussing with Secretary Connolly and Mr. Carleton over this weekend, and also for further briefings on the members of the NSC staff and the State Department on the transcript.
The time of departure is now seven o'clock.
Thursday morning, the 17th, on Andrews.
We will fly directly to Hawaii, and we will send Thursday night and all day Friday in Hawaii.
The following morning, the 17th, on the 19th, the press plane will go directly to China, dropping to Shanghai first and arriving in Beijing.
The Chinese government
So the threats came to me on the ground prior to the time that I would be arriving.
On that same day, Saturday the 19th, the presidential flight, the 6th, will fly to Guam, and we will overnight in Guam, and then take off the next day, Sunday, for Shanghai and Peking, arriving in Peking Sunday morning, or approximately 10 or 10.30 o'clock,
at least at the time, U.S.
The date, of course, is the 21st there and the 20th here, even though we've got the interaction baseline on the way.
A couple of other points that I know that have been raised in the briefing and that I can only cover generally.
With regard to agenda, both governments have decided that we will not make any announcements on agenda items prior to the meeting.
The agenda will be covered by a joint communique that will be issued with conclusions.
either before we get there or during the course of the meetings, unless the news item is decided.
While we are meeting, and the item can be discussed or disclosed,
With regard to this itinerary itself, the itinerary generally has been announced in three cities.
With regard to what we do in each city, it is being kept flexible and no final decisions have been made and none will be announced at this time.
Mrs. Nixon's itinerary will be much more public than mine, and she will have an opportunity, which I hope many of you also will have, to visit a number of institutions, places of interest, in Shanghai.
She may be having
looking forward to this with a great deal of interest.
And I think she demonstrated her trip to Africa.
Her events, I think, will be covered.
One side note is that, and I'm sure all of you who have been studying science have a little note of this, is that one development in 20th century China that is very significant is
is the enormous elevation in the status of women.
There is a total equality which is now recognized, and looking back over Chinese history, that is, of course, a very significant change.
Consequently, I think that Mrs. Nixon's activities will be significant for them.
It will be, of course, very significant for us in the United States to see other schools and the other institutions and how they compare with ours and the other countries that we live in.
As far as my agenda is concerned, there will not be a great deal of what I would call public, well, to put it, kind of sightseeing.
There will be some.
I mean, actually, I would hope to see some of the points of interest since the Chinese government is arranging for some.
But we have both agreed that this visit is one taking place at this time, and the first priority must be given to our talks, and sightseeing and protocols must come second.
And consequently, we agreed that we will not get frozen into any intended travel within the city, so to speak, in the event that that might interfere with an extended conversation
I do not want to suggest here that the talks, what the length of the talks will be, but necessarily, because we are, in truth, at a beginning, they will be much longer, both with me and with my and with Mr.
than with the leaders of other governments in the United States, because there we are not subject to any.
We have the opportunity to come immediately to matters of substance.
Finally, in order to perhaps put
And as I pointed out, the agenda items will be decided and will be published at the end of our community day.
They will be decided at the end of our community day.
They will be decided, of course, at the end.
But I think we could say this.
This trip should not be one which would create a very great optimism or a very great pessimism.
It is one in which we must recognize that 20 years of hostility and virtually no communication will not be swept away by one week of discussion.
However, it will mark a watershed in the relations between the two governments, the post-war era
the People's Republic of China, the United States, that chapter now comes to an end at the time that I was a member of China.
And a new chapter begins.
Now, how the new chapter is written will be influenced, perhaps influenced substantially, by the talks of the state government.
on our side and we believe also on their side.
We hope that the new chapter will be one of more communication and it will be a chapter that will be marked by negotiations and confrontations and one that will be marked by the absence of armed conflict.
These are our hopes.
We, of course, will now see
to what extent those forces can be realized in this version of history.
I won't put any other questions.
It's not relevant to the book, having said that he is sure that the first question that I will ask you is will you provide aid to China and the direct trip there?
It's a test to talk or determine, and I will be determined by your answer.
Can you give any indication that that is true?
Well, you can listen.
That gets into the area that I will decline to comment upon because it
involves the agenda items.
I cannot really predict with as much of confidence as Mr. Malraux perhaps has as to what Mr. Mao Zedong's questions will be.
So consequently, I don't believe it would be proper to comment now on a question that has not yet been asked by him.
He did ask, but I don't have an answer.
Mr. President and the President, if you look at Mao Zedong's story, if you look at the
They will be primarily dialogue, given a very, a very subtle, but that is made between the talks that will take place.
that we have been negotiating about.
And those subjects are more to be negotiated.
Of course, there will be dialogue as well.
of the meeting, there will necessarily have to be a substantial amount of dialogue before we can come to the point of negotiating on such-and-such matters.
I should emphasize, too, that it has already been pointed out by Dr. Gist, when he returned, that on the state of these matters, that they will be primarily bilateral matters.
Mr. President, Mr. Haldeman has had very strong words for critics of your peace proposal, saying that it's consciously aiding and abetting the enemy.
Your statement was somewhat softer.
The Democrats do not seem to do it enough.
Do you think that Mr. Haldeman's statement, he's so close to you, and a lot of people interpret his thinking as very close to yours, should be left to lie as it is, or is it something further that you should say?
There's nothing further that I can say.
I think Mr. Ziegler covered the situation.
All right, Mr. Haldeman, you ladies and gentlemen, you pressed me very hard on Monday.
I stated my opinion very clearly yesterday in my summary of the state of the world speech.
We have here a situation where there is a difference of opinion.
and how they should conduct themselves at this time.
As I pointed out, I consider it a matter of judgment.
I do not question the patriotism.
I do not question the sincerity to disagree with it.
Because a lot of people disagree with me on this and other issues as well.
Perhaps to put it in clear context, I was a very vigorous friend of the policy that I was in at the time.
I was a critic, for example, of the settlement which resulted in the partition of Laos, which opened the Ho Chi Minh Trail and paved the way for the invasion of the South by the RPF.
I was a critic of the policies and the actions which, I think most observers would agree, contributed to the assassination of Chiang.
and the succession of coups, which then brought on further incontinence.
I was a strong critic of the conduct of the war before I was a candidate, and after I was a candidate.
But once I became a candidate, and once President Johnson announced he would no longer be the candidate after these talks began,
I said then that as far as I was concerned, as a man seeking the presidency,
I would say nothing that would in any way jeopardize those whose thoughts.
So there is, in my view, and I do not ask others to hold it in my hands, but there is, in my view, a very great difference between criticizing policies that got us into war and criticizing the conduct of war and criticisms by a presidential candidate
of a policy to end the war and to bring peace.
And what we had here is a situation, as Secretary Rogers pointed out, a situation where within one week, after a very forthcoming chief of police in May, various presidential candidates sought them to oppose
Another settlement which went beyond that, my own judgment is that that kind of action has the effect, as I implied in my remarks yesterday, it has the effect of having the government in Hanoi consider that
consider at least that they might be well advised to wait until after the election, rather than negotiate.
And so my view is that as far as I was concerned, that is why I did not criticize when I was the candidate for president.
I was the president of Johnson's government in the old days.
And I thought it was good, Judge, that as far as others are concerned, they have to be self-aware and conscious.
They apparently have determined that they wish to take another course of action.
I disagree with the course of action.
And I would strongly urge that, at this point, that all candidates for Presidency, Republican and Democrat, review their public statements.
and really consider whether they believe they're going to help the cause of peace or courage, whether they're going to encourage the enemy to negotiate or encourage the enemy of the war.
I stated my position very categorically.
It is different from others.
I respect the other opinions.
that you have to let people judge because of the drugs.
Is there a real flexibility in this country on the question of when President Putin should resign, and his flexibility in Saigon?
Is there a real difference, and are we going to do anything about it?
President Hsu said today, and based on his interpretation of what Secretary Rogers had said, I think the misunderstanding can be cleared up by what I now say.
Every proposal we have made in Paris has been a joint proposal by the government of South Vietnam and the government of the United States.
Every proposal that we have made has been after consultation with and after receiving suggestions from the Democrats of South Vietnam, as well as the Democrats of the United States.
The best example of that is the proposal that I announced from January 25th to the Senate on October 11th.
The offer on the part of President Trump to resign a month before the election was his idea.
And we included it in the proposal.
It was a very, in my opinion, a very statesman-like thing for him to do, and showed his devotion to the proposition of trying to find a way to break the political deadlock, which is deadlock being a law.
Now, at this point, I can say that any future
will be joint proposals of the government of South Vietnam and the government of the United States.
As far as we are concerned, we have made an offer.
It is forthcoming.
Many have said it's as far as we need to go.
We are ready to negotiate on that offer, we and the government of South Vietnam, but under no circumstances
Are we going to make any further proposals without the consultation and the agreement of the government, particularly on political issues?
Because the political issues are primarily there to decide.
I would say also,
Are we going to negotiate with our ally in a way that undercuts our ally?
We're not going to negotiate over the heads of our ally with our enemies to overthrow our ally.
As I said in my speech on January 25th, we are ready to negotiate a settlement, but we're not going to negotiate a surrender, either for the United States
Nor are we going to negotiate the surrender of 15 million people of South Vietnam to the Congress.
So as far as President Chu and his government is concerned, our government is concerned, the proposal that we have made is a great proposal.
If there are to be any changes in that proposal, and we don't intend to make any, unless and until there is some indication that the enemy is negotiating good faith, it will be a joint proposal.
The next step is up to the enemy.
Our proposal is on the table, and it's going to stand there until we get a reply from the other side.
You have said in the past that if the Democrats hope to make any decisions now, that you would be pulled out from my office.
Do you feel that that issue now remains a live issue, and are you disappointed that it is that, that it does still remain part of the public dialogue and so we can't say when?
Well, I'm very disappointed that the United Nations refused to negotiate that.
I, as you know, have always pointed out that we have a two-track approach to getting the Americans involved.
Our favorite track is negotiation.
That could have ended in 69, 70, 71.
We made various proposals.
The longer crack is the end of the thing.
That will end the American involvement in a predictable time, as I think most of us can see.
As far as pulling the rug out from under those who critically criticize, and it's not a partisan issue.
There are Republicans as well as Democrats who have disagreed on this.
I respect this.
I would say that I think any American would be delighted to have their rug pulled out from under him on the scene if it brings peace and an end to the killing.
That's what we're trying to do.
And I would hope that presidential candidates particularly would consult their conscience before they make proposals
which might be his red, might be, they would not intend to do it, but might be misread by the Army, and thereby encourage them to wait until after the election before even discussing a very important proposal.
Mr. President, why are you not, sir, holding these conferences with very much rigour?
And what in particular do you have against all of our new conferences?
I believe it's been more than eight months since you held one of those.
Well, I oppose those conferences, but I believe the face of what their department is.
And as far as televised news conferences are concerned, I find the ladies and gentlemen in the press corps have a very vigorous difference in opinions, which is the most valuable for them.
I remember the last time, a few months ago, when I was in his office, the first time I had an in-office conference, Bailey, the chairman of the White House Correspondents, said, this is the best time to press conferences.
I've heard Mr. Radcliffe makes the best kind of press conferences, one of them alone.
So I will have Q&A with one commentator.
I add questions and answers to some members of the press, as you know, alone.
I will have in-office press conferences.
Sometimes I walk out to the room there, as I did when I announced the East Oakland Summit,
has press conferences in the room there, the press room, so that whoever wants to make film, and on other occasions we may have a televised press conference.
I would only say, finally, regarding the televised press conference,
It is no more work than one like this.
But I would suggest that I do follow the columns and the commentators pretty well.
And I know that there was considerable, I would call it criticism, but an eyebrow raising in regard to why has the president been on television so much?
He had a day in the life of the president, and he had an hour of prime time.
He had a half hour in the night before he turned to CBS.
And then he had an hour with Rand, another CBS.
And then he had a State of the Union message, and he had a...
Let me say, I think television has probably had as much of the President as it wants at this point, and that's why you're making this kind of comment.
You had some public advice today and yesterday about how critics of the Washington Post themselves.
Do you have any public advice you want to follow?
I've asked you a couple of questions.
You haven't left open the question of your flexibility on President Chu.
He is upset that Mr. Pence is running for office in Saigon.
And in the case of Pence, his policy is flexible.
But do you plan to consult with him early, at some early point in this meeting?
We already have.
We're in a constant consultation.
I've discussed the matter with Ambassador Chu.
First, as he said in his own statement, because if you'll read it carefully on it after he comes, we have consulted.
First, that we have never made a proposal except when it was a joint proposal.
He knows now there will be no new proposals made except when it is, unless it is a joint proposal.
And I trust that this press conference
that I'm having now with you, ladies and gentlemen, will reassure not only him, but the people of South Carolina as well on that point.
As far as flexibilities, Secretary Rogers referred to what we have always said, that we have put a proposal on the table, and we're ready to negotiate.
Now, that does not mean, however, that after having made such a proposal, that two weeks later, we're going to go a step further and say that we'll go further than we have in any proposal.
At this point, I emphasize here today, we have made a proposal.
We think it is reasonable.
The enemy does not respond to it.
Until the enemy does respond to it, there will be no further proposals and no further concessions on our part.
Mr. President, you spoke in your foreign policy report about the aspirations of the U.S. and U.S. people.
Could you give us some idea of the factors and perhaps the timing of the decision on the recognition of anything like that?
Well, with regard to the problem of the Bengali people, first, let me say, along the humanitarian side, both before the war, during the war, and after the war, the United States has been the most generous of all nations.
We will continue to be that separate from the political side.
With regard to the political side, we have understudied
our whole relationship with the South, with the South, and as part of that relationship, of course, the 70 million people in Bangladesh are involved.
We have not yet made a decision with regard to recognition.
And we should not expect a decision prior to the time that I return from the channel.
Thank you, Mr. President.
What are your views on the constitutional amendments on busing?
Let me get out of here quickly.
My view is one of us is well known.
I favor the local control of local schools.
I oppose busing for the purpose of racial balance.
Those are my views, which have been stated on occasion.
The problem we have now is that some courts have handed down decisions which seem
to differ from those views.
And so the question arises as to whether legislation or a constitutional amendment is necessary if we are to see that those views that I have just enunciated can properly be held and implemented.
Because if the courts acting under the Constitution
decide that the views that I have held are unconstitutional, I, of course, will have to follow the courts.
Under these circumstances, therefore, I have ordered a study of the legislative route and of the constitutional amendments.
And as part of that study, I have asked Senator Brown and Senator Baker in the Senate
and Congressman Steve and Congressman Len and the House come to the White House on Monday for the purpose of discussing their amendment.
The purpose of this discussion is to see whether the constitutional amendment approach is the best approach to this problem.
After I have met Monday, I will be glad
I have not made a decision on it, but the matter is under consideration.
Mr. President, what is the position of civil suits filed in the names of immigrants by neighborhood legal services lawyers against local state governments?
Is that a legitimate function of neighborhood legal services officers?
I'm not going to get into that at this point.
Mr. President, on another congressional matter, you've been drawing suggestions from Democrats and others on the tax reform program.
How do you intend to respond?
I didn't hear it.
How do you intend to respond to the first part of the question?
The proposal for tax reform, which gets used in this program, tax reform and employment for Democrats,
There will be no increase in taxes this year.
It's obvious that even if the administration would recommend tax reform this year, it would be impossible for the Congress, particularly the Waste and Means Committee, as much as it has on the State and the Finance Committee, to develop a reform in revenue during the rest of every year.
So there will be no taxes this year.
I pointed out in the State of the Union message that we are studying the problem of the property tax.
We're studying it first because it is the most regressive of all taxes, and second because
In those states, and that's most of the states where the property tax is the primary source for financing public education, recent court decisions indicate it may be unconstitutional.
Under these circumstances, that's why I've asked the McAvoy Commission and the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to study this problem as to how
general tax reform might be undertaken, which would meet the objections to the property tax and perhaps mitigate the inequities and find another source of revenue to replace it.
Then we come to a tax reform.
You don't want to hear about the tax reform.
The value-added tax, to be put in perspective, we have not recommended the value-added tax, and at the present time, it is one of a number of proposals being considered by the Treasury Department, by the Domestic Council, and the others with responsibility.
as part of the general tax reform, but one point that should be made is this.
The property tax is regressive.
In the event that we finally decide, after Harry's and his two commissions, that tax reform is necessary for the future, and it will have to be next year, not this, we're certainly not going to replace one regressive tax with another regressive tax.
That's why, when you discuss value added,
And Secretary Connolly and I have had a long discussion about this just two days ago, and we're going to discuss it again in Florida tomorrow, along with other problems of that type.
But we discussed value-added.
It can't even be considered unless the formula can be found to remove its regressing features if you had it across the board.
I don't know whether such a formula can be found.
But to sum up, we have made no decision with regard to evaluating tax.
At the present time, we have not yet found the way, frankly, that we could recommend it to replace the property tax.
But with the obligation to face up to the need
to reduce or reform property taxes, the Treasury Department necessarily is considering other methods of taxation.
And I emphasize again, there will be no new taxes this year.
And second, whenever any tax reform is recommended by this administration, it will not be
One which will replace one form of the drain with another form of the drain.
It will not be one that increases the tax burden for the mayor.
It will be one that simply reforms it and makes it more affordable.
Mr. President, we haven't had a press conference with you for three months.
I wonder if we could have one or two more questions.
I would like to ask you about the decisions that were made by administration officials during the India-Pakistan war, as Mr. Kissinger told us.
that this administration had no bias toward Indians.
Subsequently, papers came to light, quoting Mr. Kistler, saying that he was getting told from you every half hour because the government wasn't talking.
Every hour.
Every hour.
Because the government wasn't talking enough toward Pakistanis.
I'm wondering, from a credibility standpoint, how do you reconcile these two things?
what I think was one of the saddest days of present-day Eisenhower's presidency.
At the time, we had to come out against the British, the Franks, and the Israelis in this alleged crisis.
We did so because we were against the war, not because we were anti-British, anti-French, or anti-Israeli.
As a matter of fact, we were pro-British, and pro-French, and pro-Israeli.
But we were against war more,
Now, as far as India is concerned, for 25 years, and those of you who have followed me in the House will know this, as a member of the House, as a member of the Senate, as Vice President, while I was out of office and now as President, I have supported every Indian aid program to do.
I believe it is very important for the world's largest non-communist countries
to have a chance to make a success of this experiment of democracy in comparison with this great neighbor to the north, which is the world's largest communist country.
That and, of course, other reasons, of course, involved.
But as far as the anti-Indianism, I can only say I was anti-war.
We did everything that we could to avoid the war, as I pointed out, and at this point,
We're going to do everything that we can to develop a new relationship with the countries in the subcontinent that will be pro-India, pro-Bengali, pro-Pakistan, but mostly pro-peace.
That's what that part of the world needs.
A million were killed in the war of partition.
That's probably a modest figure.
And then they went through the terrible agony again in 1965, and now they're going through it again.
And it was Prime Minister Nehru who told me that more than anything else, what the subcontinent needed was a generation of peace.
That's where I got the phrase.
Now, as far as we were concerned, I believe that our policies, certainly they made mistakes, but our policies have the purpose
of avoiding the war, of stopping it once it began, and now of doing everything we can to heal up the wounds.
Mr. President, it's great to have discovered, sir, who was the source of the papers that released Mr. Anson and then planning any action against that person, if you know who it is.
First, we have a lot of circumstantial evidence.
Second, as a lawyer, I can say that we do not have evidence that I consider adequate or that the Attorney General considers adequate to take to court.
You can be sure that the investigation is continuing.
If the investigation gets a break, which provides the kind of evidence which will stand up in court, we will present
but we cannot go to court on circumstantial evidence.
We know now that there was really very little possibility.
As a matter of fact, you know it now.
I said it then over and over again to those who had to listen to my speech.
I pointed out that I thought there was very little chance, but I said as long, and this was my phrase, just read this morning, as long as there was any chance whatever,
And I could not be sure because I wasn't being involved.
For a breakthrough of the peace table, I was going to say nothing that might destroy that chance.
And that was my view.
It made him wrong.
Could I take it closer?
It was a different way than that.
As a consequence of your position in 1968, you were promising to end the war, but because of the negotiations that were going on,
you felt yourself unable to tell the American people how you proposed to it once elected president.
Now it is almost four years since these negotiations, in a way, began with President Johnson's announcement of March 31, 1968.
Do you think that under these circumstances, it is fair to the American people and to your private and to this nation
or those who seek to hide something and who have views on the war, not to say how they can proceed if a order can come down to the next president.
All the candidates for the presidency have a right to say what they want.
They must determine whether they believe it is right to say it.
I concluded in 1968 that as one who was a potential president, and that was critically true after I received the nomination, that while I had a right to criticize, it was not right to do so.
Now each of these candidates may feel
that the peace proposal that we have made is one that they don't think goes far enough.
They may feel that we should make one that would overrule the government in South Vietnam.
Or some other proposal that would satisfy them.
They have a right to say that.
The American people then will have to judge.
But I have suggested now
that we have made a proposal that is fair, it is forthcoming, it should be negotiated on, and the responsibility for the enemy's failing to negotiate may have to be borne by those who encourage the enemy to wait until after the election.
I have to look at it.
Come on.
Come on.
I don't know.
I don't know.