Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 681 › Conversation 681-007

Nixon, Andrews & Ziegler on Soviet Union Summit and ITT Scandal

Thursday, March 9, 1972 · 6:07 PM–6:20 PM ET · Oval Office · 12 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Andrews, Mark; Ziegler, Ronald L.; Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation681-007 on Tape 681 (tape position 04:46:59–05:00:18)StartThursday, March 9, 1972 at 6:07 PMEndThursday, March 9, 1972 at 6:20 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 681-007 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417180983 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon met with Mark Andrews, Ronald Ziegler, and Henry Kissinger to coordinate the administration's public relations strategy regarding his upcoming trip to the Soviet Union and to manage political fallout from the ITT scandal. The participants discussed ensuring that details of potential bilateral agreements with the Soviets remain confidential to avoid premature disclosure or diplomatic friction involving Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Furthermore, they addressed the need for a unified response to media inquiries, specifically regarding allegations involving John N. Mitchell and the ITT case, emphasizing the importance of maintaining strict control over information leaked to the press.

Audio

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NARA Description

On March 9, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Mark Andrews, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 6:07 pm to 6:20 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 681-007 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 681-7

Date: March 9, 1972
Time: 6:07 pm - 6:20 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Manolo Sanchez and Ronald L. Ziegler.

     The President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
          -Public relations
               -Robert J. McCloskey

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 6:09 pm.

                -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -William P. Rogers
                -Ziegler’s view

     Press briefing
           -International Telephone and Telegraph [ITT] case
                 -Foreign scope
                 -Henry Ford, II
                 -Jack N. Anderson
                       -Brit Hume
                             -Dita D. Beard
                                   -The President’s call to John N. Mitchell
                             -White House response
                                   -Charles W. Colson
                       -Marlow W. Cook
                             -Statement
                       -Mitchell’s statement
                             -Content

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 6:09 pm.

     The President’s forthcoming Soviet trip
          -McCloskey

           -Dobrynin
           -McCloskey’s telephone call to Dobrynin
                -Ziegler’s view
                -Dobrynin’s reaction
           -Kissinger’s view
                -Rogers
                      -The President compared to the Secretary of State
Show the rest of the log (44 more lines)
Ziegler left at 6:13 pm.

           -Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin
                -Forthcoming summit
                      -Premature publicity for agreements
                            -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                            -Rogers
                      -Agriculture
                            -Butz
                      -Health
                            -Elliot L. Richardson
                      -Science
                            -Dr. Edward E. David, Jr.
                      -Environment
                            -Russell E. Train
                      -Lend-Lease
                            -State Department
                      -Commerce
                            -Peter G. Peterson
                      -Rogers
                            -Dobrynin briefing
                            -State Department
                                  -National Security Council [NSC]
                                  -Agriculture
                                  -Publicity for agreements
                                  -Dobrynin
           -Plenary session
                -Rogers

     Kissinger’s schedule
          -Forthcoming meeting with businessmen
                -Colson
                -The President’s view
          -The People’s Republic of China [PRC]

           -Negotiations
           -Forthcoming US-Soviet Union summit
                 -Andrei A. Gromyko
           -Dobrynin
           -Stewart J.O. Alsop article
                 -Rogers

The President and Kissinger left at 6:20 pm.

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).

We are, uh, wondering about, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh,
Bob and Mike?
Yes.
They're calling to bring him?
Yes, they are.
They need training.
They are in a training camp.
You know, I'm pretty sure I'm not the sort of person to call when he's in the front line or anything.
And without letting him know, they're going to destroy us and we're going to be in trouble.
We're going to get him to change his mind and show him something that he's not seeing, but he would have not made it that far, really.
Maybe he didn't have any business with me.
Right.
He went to Europe.
I think they did.
I'm surprised.
I was listening to that discussion with him.
The issue of President Trump is something that he would not call a catastrophe, and we have to discuss this lately for the President of the United States.
It's fine.
It's fine.
It's all amazing.
Well, there was so much, and I'm going to hold that for tomorrow.
It's all the same, because we had to hide that, and the breathing was going wrong, and then we went over the slide.
It was very, very hard.
Well, yesterday, yesterday, I was sent to the strike position.
Yes, sir, I accept it.
When we talked to the board, they said they needed to trade them between the ICT and the Soviet Union, which is good.
And the ICT was really consistent.
That's what they said.
They were more in shape than they were in shape.
So we wanted them to buy the ICT.
That's the point.
Yes, sir.
The way we did it.
These women picked something.
You had called in to the general and said to him, I need you to deal with some people.
And it was the fourth thing.
Jesus Christ.
You know, the fourth thing, the conversation with the customers.
Well, I don't know what's going on.
I didn't even know what the customer was working on.
I didn't even know what the customer was working on.
I didn't know what the customer was working on.
So Lincoln immediately put out a statement so that I would try to follow up with it.
He said the testimony in giving the statement to me involving the President is totally false without making a categorically deny that I ever had any such request.
He said that I never had any such statement, made any such statement anywhere at any time.
The President has never made any request to me directly or indirectly to sign the settlement of the IEP meeting, and I took no part in the settlement of the meeting.
So that this same thing is part of them, I go on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on.
I mean, in fact, the State Department would call the Soviet Union Embassy to talk about pressurization or presidential visit, and the Soviet Union is most significant in the region of Russia.
Yeah, and he wanted to find out from me before he could be sent back to Venezuela about what it was about.
And he had now got returning the call.
Because she wanted to talk to me first.
And then I said, don't go, but you are.
I mean, not.
But we're in this.
I told them to go to the White House.
I just want to make sure.
I told them I'm going to go and call them to the doctor.
And then for nothing is going to happen.
But if we told them about it, I would say that we're in great responsibility.
You know what I'm trying to call, but I just want to draw a point in front of you.
I can't do that to you.
Well, it's the President's trip, not the Secretary's trip.
That's the point.
It's the President's trip, not the Secretary's trip.
I think you've got to know the grain of the discussion.
I think you've got to tell the truth.
Or maybe this is part of the point.
Let's look this way.
This is something to be made.
We must not dribble out before this is everything that's going to happen.
Otherwise, the leaders will be the thing.
You said that they'll jump on and say, why do they have to wait and prevent?
Why couldn't they have done it at the diplomatic level?
We'd all work it out.
That it's very much their interest and our interest.
We want this and everything and nothing to be agreed to except privately.
And nothing to be believed, nothing to be discussed.
And to bring it to the point because I think we have to do it.
I'm dying because of you.
For that reason, I don't want you on the planet Earth.
I don't think we ought to.
You know, we got to the east side of that rock.
You know, we have to raid that.
If we miss, we've got to save it.
It must be in absolute confidence.
Otherwise, they might do in the position that they have done it all.
And I just want to let you know where you're going.
And I just want to let you know where you're going.
And I just want to let you know where you're going.
And I just want to let you know where you're going.
And I just want to let you know where you're going.
Yes.
Meaning we won't be coming.
Alright.
We can use... ...fantasy agriculture, and we can just make damn sure that there's... ...some section not agreed to... Yeah.
...until we get there.
It can be precious in the north of England, and we can make damn sure, if you fight the game, that there's some section not agreed to until you get there.
That's true.
Yes, sir.
Okay.
So we can go to Britain... ...and help... ...uh, and to... ...fantasy agriculture.
so we can hold those signs we can put over the dangerous environment we can get to train maybe instead let's say handle and leave that's because he just handled commerce in such a way that it can't be finished i think that's the only i must say also that way it's perfectly clear if across the board no one
Um, things are happening.
Well, you see, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried, I'm worried,
I'm pretty sure that what I'm getting at is that even in the NSC system, I'm afraid that they'll go back and take the debrief and say they'll put out a story to the effect that all of these things are unusual to do at the time.
And we cannot have that done at the time.
We cannot have a story in advance of the case, and they can go here and say it's all debriefed, because they will, in fact, say that they're briefed now, if you've got my point.
So what an underpricer has to do is not to say they're a creature.
He should say they're a single open negotiation.
You and I know that at least.
Yes.
All he tells them is they're open negotiations.
That's normal.
I'm happy with that.
I'm happy with that.
I'm happy with that.
I'm happy with that.
I'm happy with that.
My father said, we want to be a community with a group of businessmen.
That's right.
Cope.
Cope, I see.
Yeah.
I know, I mean, it's great, but I don't know what the meaning of that would be.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Do you believe in this house?
I do it about once every two days.
I'll stop that.
I'm not going to do it.
You guys are going to have to do it.
I'm not going to do it.
You're going to have to do it.
Mark, what do you want me to do?
I'm going to have to do something.
I'm going to have to do something.
You agree?
Oh, fine.
I'm doing it only to be helpful.
It's, uh, not a bad thing to do that.
She changed the last of mine.
Yeah, I mean, it's easy.
It's easy.
Well, then, if it's the best, then I think it's the best of both worlds.
Well, I'm going to be sure.
I don't think that's a good idea.
I don't think that's a good idea.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
It's too bad I haven't had to deal with it.
I get that.
I think I get the point that you're trying to make.
In other words, sir, I also really believe that Vince did not know exactly what he was saying.
Right.
Let me see.
Let me see.
He wrote a very helpful letter related to my problems and disputes.
Well, he's not going to convince him of it, but he says he's going to have to convince him of it.
That's what he said.
That's what he said.

Also recorded on March 9, 1972

  • 322-039 2:40 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:40 pm and 4:30 pm.
  • 322-040 2:40 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:40 pm and 4:30 pm.
  • 021-040 4:03 PM · 37 sec — unknown person(s) talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:03 pm and 7:10 pm.
  • 681-003 4:31 PM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:31 pm to 4:33 pm.
  • 681-004 4:36 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:36 pm to 4:41 pm.
  • 681-005 4:41 PM · 53 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:41 pm to 5:35 pm.
  • 681-008 5:35 PM · 8 sec — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 5:35 pm and 6:07 pm.
  • 681-006 6:07 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at 6:07 pm.

All 28 conversations from March 9, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 681-007, March 9, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417180983). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/681-007 (accessed November 1, 2026).