On March 18, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:05 am to 11:52 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 688-004 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
One point I was going to make is that I noticed here
You see, they only read the left.
They don't read the right.
The left, of course, are gradual.
You might have a chance to read it on the other hand, but most of them are modernized.
It's interesting, the failed assessment was that the peaking summit was a great success.
I saw that.
Sir, I'm having a draw since tonight.
How do you figure that over there we'd still stick with Long Hall?
We have no real alternative, but I don't exclude that Long Hall is maneuvering to make a separate deal.
With the cops?
Yes.
Oh, I can't believe you said that.
Uh, Mr. Benson, so...
So, uh, Terry Smith was so scared by what you said yesterday that he's now requesting half an hour with you.
But I think it would be a good idea because then we could say he had his hearing.
And if you took a somewhat hard line with him again,
And then gave him the census.
Oh, any time next week before he goes on Friday.
He leaves Friday?
Yes.
I'm leaving to take my recommendations of the instructions to him that you should sign.
We should hand those to him about two hours before he goes on his plane so that he can't leave them around town again.
Yes, I've seen them.
Well, now, the better time to see him would be, say, Tuesday or Wednesday.
So then, because as long as you let him believe you are taking hard side seriously, what we are recommending, Mr. President, is a 242 deal.
Because if we go for Grand Forks and forget swashing, there are two things wrong with it.
One, we would stop all production of ABM because Grand Forks is completed.
Our production line would stop, and if then the agreement falls, they are going to be better off than we are.
Secondly, the agreement is now so negotiated that the defensive system should be easy to overwhelm.
Now, that doesn't bother the Soviets much because they have theirs primarily against China.
China is going to attack, if they attack anything in America, a missile field.
The only country that's going to attack a missile field is the Soviet Union.
So what we need is a slightly different defense.
The only way we can get that is to have two sides, one of which has the requirements of the agreement and one follows different criteria.
That is also the Soviet proposal, because the second side for them is a middle field.
They don't want that to be a constraint.
So this is the only way we can preserve modern technologies.
and not put ourselves into a hopeless position later on.
One for one.
We'll pay the team on zero.
Once you're down to one for one, you'll be at zero before you know it.
Because one for one, the disconfiguration makes no sense at all.
Two for two, according to Larry.
No.
242 makes sense, according to Leon, if you have one of them have modern components.
242 doesn't make any sense if they're all safeguard components.
And under the proposal that even the Soviets are willing to accept, the second side would have more radars and more interceptors.
Not by hard side, but they wouldn't be configured on the Moscow system now.
we are asking them to limit their radar to four locations.
Now, they're asking for six, or assume even six locations.
That's easy to overwhelm.
In return, if we have transports, we will be limited to four locations for our radar.
Now, that's absurd if you're defending missiles.
If you're defending missiles, you need a lot of radar so that they have to expect a lot of missiles to get the radar.
Uh...
Therefore, since Moscow deserves a different purpose, they will get some use out of theirs while we will get an extra no use out of ours.
You had a second, on the other hand, the Soviets had said that for their second side, for the ITVF field east of the Europe, they would not be content, they would not accept the notion of marks that exceeds limited radar fields.
There they would want more radars within the diameter of the field.
We could then ask for the same thing for our second side.
We could shift the marks from Grand Forks to Washington or keep the marks in Grand Forks if our second side is maelstromed.
Why are we going to Washington?
That is politically interesting.
We don't have... Now, the proposal isn't Washington.
The proposal is two sides, one of which would be Maulstrom.
That is the second side we are now building.
The way that proposal is written, you wouldn't have to make that choice until after the election, which the second side is.
The chief was Washington.
I am not... Why?
Well, I think the Chiefs, they play and lay up for some reason, wants it to, and thinks it's politically doable.
But that is not a decision you need to make now.
That you can decide.
You have six weeks to decide it.
Well, don't sniff.
He may be an odd-seeing man.
Yes, well, you have to just listen to him.
I wouldn't...
He flings.
You never ask him what he thought.
You ask Snitzy what he thought.
But not him.
And I don't think we should.
He's such a small little shit.
I just think you don't want stories around that he didn't have his day in court.
We'll see what I have to do.
Nothing.
With him?
We'll see what I have to do.
One at a time.
We're not going to agree to that.
I don't see how we can.
Because that would stop our technology.
It would freeze us into attention.
Isn't this something we have to handle directly?
Oh, yes.
I'm handling it, Mr. Freeman, but we've got to have him go through it, sir.
I've already told the Freeman the direction in which you're taking it.
we had to hear the defense arguments yesterday that was the most important thing because what kind of people were going to blow this out of the water smith's people agreed in and they agreed they really wouldn't oh god they're for peace and they're just they're actually so unrealistic defenses unrealistic for stupid reasons but not the decreases that are wrong there damn
The only funny thing about it is this business of Rogers insisting on submarines, and that's a curious damn thing.
And yet, we've got to see it.
I think he'd put his arm against including submarines.
You think it's unwise, but...
I think it's unwise.
I think we can probably get it, and I think we'll regret it after we've gotten it.
Where's Smith on you on that?
He wants to include them in a sort of...
But he can live either... On that one, he'll go either way.
What are we standing here to do on that then?
On that, he should try to...
He should try and come back here if he can't get it.
Okay, I'll see.
And now with regard to the summit generally, you've got a hammer-in with regard to the entirety... necessity of, uh...
building up the toughness of these various things.
Yes.
So that we don't have just the idea that, uh, that, uh, that Jesus is going to give you a sort of cakewalk, and that all I'm going to do now, that's, that's got to be very careful programming, so that everybody, that the press is built up, that there's something to go to the summit for, other than putting the name on things that the departments have already negotiated.
I couldn't agree more.
Now, what can we do?
Well, I've got to leave us with no program.
for his own selfish reasons on the commercial side, which, thanks to Saul, is going to be the biggest.
It's important.
Hold him in order to talk to Flanagan.
Flanagan is very loyal, but he likes to do things very much according to routine.
And he likes to shoot memos out of the bureaucracy.
He's tracked very well.
I'm holding him back not because I want to get into his business.
I don't want to get everyone stirred up.
What I'd like is the agreement pretty well done before you get there, but only Peter and Flanagan and you knowing it, so that you can surface it once you get there.
On salt, I will just work out with Cabrini that one issue be left unresolved.
Say submarine.
Well, make it very tough.
Make the same thing do.
Don't let the goddamn Smith object get any result.
All right.
It's better to leave it very, very tough.
All right.
So we can have the two-for-one and so forth, and have Smith arguing for the lower one.
Have Smith arguing for a softer position, and I actually will get it.
All right.
So that's one-for-one.
have any serious concern.
That's what you do.
Then we won't be able to bring in .
And we'll break down.
And then you need to figure out not only that, but in other fields.
You see, I saw that, you've seen the little stories with that service, they'll reach a crescendo as time goes on, because
Not only the bureaucracy, but our political opponents will want to make it appear that this trip was not necessary.
Yes.
And we don't think it's necessary.
Well, of course, we can make a very strong case in any event that it was for your trip putting a deadline on these negotiations.
It would have dragged on for years.
But I can get it programmed so that on the major issues, on commercial things, on Seoul... On that incident with Bangladesh,
I will have to do something in the office.
I think at this point we ought to indicate it more properly.
We have told the Chinese you would accept recognition the first week in April.
So what can I say that can cool them off?
I'd say you have it under active consideration the expected decision day within the next month, the next three days.
Within the near future.
Within the near future.
You said the review is very far along and you'll make a decision in the near future.
The review is very far along and you'll make a decision in the near future.
I had another thought.
When you get back, perhaps we can sit down and figure out a plan whereby we give, you know, whereby we give Roger something to do both before we go and while he's there.
In other words, we have the whole man thing worked out so that we keep him free.
And also this business of raising the point with regard to what his position is.
Have you done anything about that already?
Well, of course he can handle all the subsidiary negotiations to begin with.
When can he be told that?
Well, he's pretty well been told that already.
Has he?
Yes.
I mean, we don't call them subsidiary negotiations, but Hill and Grant, which means he has four or five of the second-level negotiations now.
Now, one thing, there's no problem, for example, there.
I mean, although we've got to work out how great they're going to be.
Of course, there must be private talks between me and the Russians.
I don't want to have very big meetings in front of us all to kill a friend and all the rest.
I don't want to discuss things with them.
On the other hand, you ought to have a ton of recessions.
It's all here at the beginning, which they will want to do, won't they?
Oh, yes.
We can have two or three planned recessions.
And then there should, I see no reason for there to be any private talk between Roberts and Brezhnev, for example.
But do you understand, he understands that I have perceived the version of privacy as near as possible.
Well, frankly, I haven't traced this with him because... Not privacy, I mean with the British.
Oh, yes, that's settled.
That's what I meant.
What the British has told me was he would prefer not to raise it formally because that will create the same problem with their public bureau that we have to draw to put it that way.
Yeah.
But it will definitely happen, there's no question about it.
And indeed, the President is very anxious for it.
Indeed, yesterday when I said to him, he said, what does Flanagan, what does, what does Chasen want to discuss with Barroso?
I said, well, he'll want to put down the schedule.
How many hours for meetings?
He said, well, he knows President so he can talk to you that he recommends we just put down the starting time.
But don't give the feeling that there's a cutoff time.
And I think that's fair enough.
Another time, is there anything, Henry, since Rogers is not going to go to South America, that we could, this place we could send him between now and the summit?
I wonder if it would do any good to have him, uh, would it, uh, fire over to Europe?
That'd be good.
Uh, could he stop at C.E.
Pompidou, Brahms Avenue, or whatever, which, uh, has that been her, uh, her, or should he do it himself?
Oh, I think that'd be good.
Now, the point being that,
Prior to our going.
Prior to our going, and the point being to, we have to get a discussion of, about European Security Conference, and it's just that.
Okay, I'm going to step on the discussion.
You know what I mean?
You know what we want, but.
He's not very confident, but.
But on that, we know what, what have we decided with Brezhnev on that, can I ask?
I don't, I don't know.
Debrina.
Debrina.
Well, Gromita and I thought we never agreed.
Gromita was pressing it hard, and we were pretty well, I think... Well, our present position is we're dragging our feet so that you could conceivably agree at the summit to preparatory talks later this year.
And...
And to prepare a conference for next year.
Well, I don't think Rod, but if he goes to Europe, which is not a bad idea.
He shouldn't do it during the week of the 20th to the 28th, because that's when I'll be in Europe with it.
April.
Any other week is fine.
Because that's what I'm in Europe between the 20th and 24th on this Vietnamese business.
Why don't you send him before that, get him over there?
Or would it be better after you tell me when?
That's a real question.
Well, he can't come and go before.
He can't go much before.
I think maybe from the 25th on he could go.
25th?
Yes.
And then I think his charter is... And his charter ought to be that he will discuss with the Europeans the whole range of the summit.
He can't discuss what he doesn't know, so he...
If you say European security conference, you make the Europeans very nervous.
Yeah, but he should discuss with the European leaders at some point.
At some point, and get their ideas.
Yeah.
Like what he says.
Yeah.
how do you think we ought to get this?
I wrote this down, and it actually assured me that that was a good move to get him, you know, sort of in play, but not in play, too.
And hell, it sort of consults with the Europeans, which ain't a bad idea.
I think it's good.
And actually, it's better to have it closer to the summit.
That is to say, around May 1st.
May 1st, right.
Well, the funny thing is, he's got to be back here.
Now, when would you...
Do you think we ought to give him a call and suggest that, or how should we work that out?
I mean, let's just, I'm trying to take us, let's be subtle here and see what's the best way to get this.
I was thinking maybe you ought to call him.
And the idea that you're calling him is that... Make him feel good.
Is that I, well, and that we're all working together, that you could say that the...
Probably playing golf today.
Mr. President, good morning.
I don't want to raise the will to end it, sir.
No, no.
No, I think it'd be nice if you would let me call you.
Yeah, well, I...
I think it's something that could wait till I get back.
Well, I'll tell you what, I was thinking it'd be something you could do now.
Well, if I could reach it now.
If you could reach it, because you could say that, uh... You could say that I was, uh... That I was...
that I recall from my son, that from my son, if you could sit here, he wasn't in this morning, but I recall that we did want to
consult with him beforehand, and rather than at the ambassadorial level, in about two weeks before the summit, they say, he could plan to go to Europe and see the big four, and then maybe stop by NATO, and then come out after NATO, that that would be a very useful thing to discuss the whole range of the summit.
And if he could do that, then I think that would be a very effective thing, and that's
How's that sound to you?
Excellent.
Now, don't you think it's good for you to call him?
I'd be excellent if I could call him.
It would help my relations with him a lot.
And, uh... And it would also get him...
Put it out of the way.
Any way you can save me, if you recommend it.
No, no, no, no, no.
Well, as manufacturers, just say that I was... that I had reminded you that I had been talking this morning and I had said that we... No, you shouldn't.
I didn't say talking this morning, but I... that I felt that...
that with the Europeans it was essential that we follow up on what our...
It would make them feel better if you saw the thing.
Yeah.
From our many sons that I had thought that I had, that I recall mentioning at least to Heath and maybe to Puck, too, that we'd be in touch with them again.
I had thought at that point the ambassadorial level would be adequate, but I said it would be better if Heath could do it, since he's not going to Latin America.
that if he could take a planned trip to go to Europe, and spend perhaps 10 days there, with seeing not just Bormann, but the heads of government, you see, that fills him up like hell.
You know, he could see both, in other words, how that sounds to you.
We can be sure he'll filter that.
But it's good to know he should see the heads of government.
All of them.
All of them.
The only thing that really matters is success, and the only thing that matters is what I do, what freshness I have.
I could not care less.
The other thing is to get the pain out of our hide than somebody else's.
You know, I look back on that horrible, horrible day.
You know, this is through the experiment.
There, on a choke.
I'll never forget that.
Jesus Christ, that was awful.
You know, all the men...
all the way to the point that we're not going to have it again.
Absolutely not.
And also the stakes are high, and I think the Russians are going to be ready to make a tough and quick deal with us.
They may want to... Dave, Dave, I haven't let it get too far now, Dave.
Well, you could talk with your conversation to the brain, sure.
Oh, Dave.
Actually, one other thing in that respect, if you could tell...
Well, if you don't reach them today, then I'd get hate to call them just to say I tried to reach them.
Yeah, I'd reach them.
That's right.
That hate call.
Just for planning purposes could hear.
Right.
So they're, you know, the first man to drop it.
I think it's excellent.
And I think it's very helpful with the Europeans.
It's very useful with the Europeans.
You see, a lot of them would like to have you come over here, but we could just might as well let you play a game with them.
On the 15th of April.
But I'll be just there two days.
And I may, if we get that meeting with the Vietnamese, I may go over to a conference in Belgium to give us a cover.
Yeah, that's right.
And there I can see some of the NATO people will be there on a personal basis.
I should take a public trip.
Yeah, let's just take a little trip to Rochester.
With regard to the Soviet... Also, this is an interesting thing.
You know, Rogers came in after I had talked to Lund and said he understood Henry was going over to talk to the European leaders and so forth and so on.
And I said, that's just absolutely false.
I mean, I didn't say it to Rogers.
I called him and said, so this knocks that down totally that he's going.
I'm correct in that.
Just the, it's unbelievable what I, you know, problems.
That was made, I think that though, I think what happens, he does people, and so I, so he's calling, and people who come in from the very stinking little, little story, and reflects and just irritates him and bugs him, and then goes up the wall, and it's terrible, isn't it?
With regard to the Soviet welcome,
I think that this, at some point, we were discussing with the Marines about this part of Earth.
Well, if you had nobody or somebody, I said, I would say the American press will be watching very interesting to see whether the Soviet has the same kind of talent.
We don't want to reflect on the Chinese, but time will give for them.
I don't give a damn whether they have people or not.
I really don't.
Well, I think they will have some of the regions that have to do with the fact that the Soviet is
not it's no freer but it's just a different kind of an outfit and it's of course a different situation and in japan they just don't come out of the street unless they're ordered in russia
But I wouldn't count on that name.
How would I answer that?
The reason is we found out in China, you know, and it doesn't make any difference.
It doesn't.
No.
It doesn't make any difference.
People have seen crowds in the street.
So it's a cruel world.
And what happens in the Soviet, far more than the Soviet, is what happens.
This is what happens.
You communicate.
This is the news.
You communicate.
That would be a good way.
I...
tentatively subject, of course, to your views or our instructions on it.
The communique is written on the assumption that we will have released a number of agreements to previous states so that the communique will just list the agreements we have made, list some common principles we've agreed with its audience.
and then conclude with an invitation to President to visit the United States next year.
It gives them a shaking sense.
But you would list all the agreements, but if you went into the detail on every agreement in the communique, these 20 pages, and I thought the decision was to get those agreements out the previous few days, so that when you leave the Soviet Union, there'll be only a communique that sort of summarizes the news
Yes, the one that I think ought to be in the final communication should be the salt one.
I don't think I've ever heard of something like that.
Otherwise, your final communication doesn't say much.
Well, yes, it says a version of being invited to the United States.
Well, you see, if you had this, summing them all up would be loose again, listing them all together.
Could be, but I think the salt one, I mean, did it.
Well, the salt one would be so big that it ought to be loose again.
That you have no other news, you don't need a communique in a different result.
We'll have it for the last time.
Oh yes, the salt.
You might have the salt and the communique the same day in different news cycles.
Or you might have the salt on your last day in Moscow and the communique on the way out if you had it in China.
Well, we can play that any way it suits you best.
Sure, well, we don't need to decide that now.
Well, that's all I have before we leave.
I'm just going to sit down there and not worry about a thing.
This will be mainly concerned with domestic policies.
I'm easily reachable, Mr. President.
They put in a special telephone.
They put in a special telephone.
Of course.
But I forget things.
I wouldn't
Worry about every story every day.
You know, that can be hard to do.
But try to get away from it a while, and then you come back with a more detached view.
But we all need to be sort of detached views in this period of America.
You know what we were saying, right?
Well, I just didn't have a dream.
Yeah, Dan, something.
As you say, Freeman, you were reflecting on what you heard in Philadelphia, and what you heard in the arts, and what you heard from the actor.
But you were absolutely right.
What made the time trip was at all different.
These writing press would have sung it without a trace, as they had tried to.
you know, they are coming to.
Anyway, the, uh, the FAA tried to sink every, every initiative we've had, really highlighting the biological warfare.
Believe me, if Kennedy had done that, they would be giving him the Nobel Peace Prize.
It's much more significant.
What do you think?
What do you think?
Mr. President, if Brandt got the Nobel Peace Prize, what did he get it for?
For what you did, his Ozpolitik was nothing until you made it go over the Berlin Agreement.
The Ozpolitik was a cave-in.
The Berlin Agreement saved him.
But anyway, I've got to say, that has done it.
And so it is with everything else.
That's what we've got to face.
And we've also got to face the fact that we've got little jealousies within the departments.
The big things that are happening are too big for them.
This is the overriding thing.
That's what I'm saying.
Last night, you were out.
Well, I had dinner with the new president of Johns Hopkins University.
He used to be a colleague of mine at Harvard.
He's a mother.
Steve Muller?
Well, he was bugging me.
I don't think you've met him.
He's a liberal.
But he had...
He was bugging me to see whether he could get your papers put on something.
Well, I... Mr. President, I didn't...
I said this is out of my jurisdiction.
I didn't... No, I know, but... No, no, but it shows...
that you've become a prestigious figure in these university circles.
John Hopkins wouldn't fight to get the Johnson Papers, I can assure you.
And so, and again, at this dinner party, these were not the most important people in the world.
They were all liberals.
The respect for you has, there is a total change in the attitude towards you.
Well, you know, that's the real problem.
Bill, you've got to see it.
You've got to ride this wave rather than bopping it.
Isn't that the problem?
Bill puts himself in the position that the State Department would have co-equal grants with the government, which is not the effect.
There are more rules.
Who did what?
Did the President do it or the State Department?
Yeah, but he doesn't perform.
It isn't that he wants to have it handed to him on the basis of prerogative.
And when he's going to see Dobrynin on Monday, he hasn't told us what he's going to discuss.
Now, I think we've got Dobrynin very well programmed, but if we haven't, it's...
It's just Dulles never did that, and Dulles never... Hello?
But Bill's never said a word on his own.
He didn't think.
I saw a group.
Well, Bill will see, and then he'll want to come in and work with me a lot.
I saw, but I...
I'll be busy, actually, with all my domestic things.
But Bill's a...
But still, I think...
It is, I think...
The idea that he's competing for attention, that should really not enter anybody's mind.
The only issue is what serves you best, and especially this year.
I mean, in November, no one is going to vote for Rogers.
But I think there's, it would be a mistake to make a change this year.
I... Well, we thought it through.
We can't do it by the street, Mr. Hudson.
The dirt deepens too much.
But on the other hand, we're going to run this with an iron hand for some point.
But some of it, you cannot afford it.
And that's an effect we've told the brain.
And that's what it's supposed to be.
All right.
I hope the Green is terrible enough to tell Rogers what we do.
He isn't such a snake to do that.
There's nothing in it for him.
I don't think so.
He's got a different relationship here.
What can Rogers do?
What can Rogers do for him?
One thing we may consider, Mr. President, if the Israelis start getting complicated, we could turn the Middle East back to Rogers.
and let him tear up the peat patch a bit.
And, uh, except you'd, you'd have unsure retaliation during the election.
Yeah.
But what we may have to do with this, with the Middle East thing is to, you have to be able to come back from there and say there were no secret deals, it seems to me.
Oh, absolutely.
Absolutely.
So,
We may have to keep that in advance and settle it in September when I go over there.
But in such a way, I don't want to be the guy who settles it.
I'm just trying to get them from the division.
Believe me, the man who settles the Middle East is going to have such a bizarre of the Jewish community against him in such a way.
There's no glory in a settlement.
The point of the Middle East is, I understand, that the Soviet wants a settlement.
That's something we'd rather have our feet on, but what do you mean to throw it back to the army?
Well, I want to think about it while I'm gone, how to do it.
The trouble is, we cannot ignore, the Israelis basically will not accept even, I'm sure, I've felt that, that they won't accept one.
the deal of withdrawal of Soviet forces for their return to their 1967 boundaries, which is more or less what they proposed to us, with some slight modifications.
On the other hand, I don't see how we can not accept the proposition which would get the Soviet forces out of this.
Absolutely.
That in the American national interest, God, I'm Jewish, but I do not see how we can get the Russians out of the Middle East so that we can...
I don't see how a president of the United States can fail to accept this.
Now, you have the tactical problem.
What you may want to do is not to finally settle it this year so that you're not embarrassed in the election and do it next year.
And I think if you have to take on the Jewish community, the best time to take it on is early in your term after you've been re-elected.
Yeah, we see what we can do with the Russians.
Not a crisis.
Well, think about how great an action Roberts would be.
Well, we've just gotten it away from him, and
He is just, on this one, too incompetent, Mr. President.
That's the problem.
I mean, he had it screwed up.
Oh, yeah, he thinks he's still doing it, but every initiative he's taking is...
So he has no negotiating track right now.
We have to take it away from him.
Technically.
Technically, he's got it, but nothing is working.
So the only one that's open is this Soviet proposal...
But if he gets it, it will leak, and then we'll be in the middle of a horrible confrontation.
The old Soviet proposal don't ever look at that.
Now, that's what I think.
That's what I think, yes.
He doesn't know that.
Oh, too dangerous.
I think we should keep that.
But what we may have to work out for the Soviets is a somewhat slower schedule than we envisaged last year.
I'm afraid if you settle it at the summit,
Finally, they will have to tell the Egyptians.
And that being the case, I think it would be too dangerous for you to make an agreement.
So I think you should make it, if you do make a secret agreement, make it closer to the election, and then don't surface it until well into next year.
And don't surface it as an agreement, but simply operationally.
As well.
What do you think about that?
In the meantime, we can settle it.
I signed the order with Laird.
Of course, sir, so we have time.
But I was...
It's now time they, those people, got to get there.
This is Henry, the 5th of March, you realize that?
Yes.
It's the 9th, 8th of March.
And, uh, well, if we last two more months without an offensive, we'll have blood in our nose.
It's a long time, but we'll have an offensive.
But your point is maybe we should have one.
I'd rather have it now because then we'd be home straight.
Unless it succeeds in that case, it's still better than it has been.
They're sure.
Look, if it succeeds now, it certainly will succeed later.
So what the hell?
Well, no, I'm not certain.
I don't know.
Do you think the Russians really want to talk about Vietnam or something?
If we can drop that in and sell, you know, I don't know, as if, uh, quite anything wants to come out of it, you know.
I think that they would like to...
They feel it's basically a loser.
Now they're running.
I think there's no great additional achievement.
Now they've seen four runs taken at you.
That's right.
The Russians looked after the election, too.
Yes, and the Democrats aren't that much of an asset for them because the Democrats will be much tougher on the Middle East.
Yes.
Which to them is a big problem.
The Democrats will be uncompromising.
And you will want to settle on the Middle East, and I think the deal they offered us is not a bad one.
scream as the Israelis may.
The only question I have is the practical one.
When do we raid the Israelis?
The point is, oh, we're not raiding them, really.
I mean, they would think so.
But getting the Russians out is a damn good deal for them to give up a few humps of desert.
That's right.
What is the situation in regards to the Vietnam or the Russians?
Do you invade in France, Stephen?
Yes.
You do?
God, they ought to.
Somebody ought to.
Well, that was a very important, it seemed to me, observation by that little jackass in that delegation in Paris.
I think it was that time.
About the election.
What do you think?
You think they can talk about that?
Now, the internal situation in the United States, you know, they aren't running any riots now at the moment.
They're not going to be able to succeed if they start one.
I'm not sure that it will help you.
I think it would...
If the Wallace-type voters wouldn't rally around you, then... No, the...
And, of course, you've dropped that hint to the Chinese and to others and to the brain, I guess, that, well, it's going to be tougher for the man for the election than before.
Oh, yes.
Oh, yes.
I keep dropping that in.
Very much so.
And it is.
Oh, no question about it.
But maybe it's healthy.
So I think there is a chance of, I think there's a,
that it's still a chance of doing it in Vietnam.
Of course, we may have to play with the Middle East a little bit to see whether we can make it to Vietnam.
We may be able to get an interim agreement at the summit on the Middle East.
But I think you may want to consider not getting the Jewish community all stirred up before the elections.
Particularly if we do that kind of a deal at the summit, is the...
The basic of the Jewish-oriented writers, the press, will say, we sold out Israel at the summit.
That we cannot have.
Well, that's...
But I think we should do the deal.
We just have to find a way to do it.
Well, I'm glad you're going.
I wish I were going with you.
I always like to do it on a vocal.
and see the things, the tigers, the doggos, the 200, see it down, I've never been, the rocks, all they call me, it's a place.
Get out.
Watch the water.