On March 23, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., White House photographer, unknown person(s), White House photographer, Stephen B. Bull, and members of the press met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:08 pm to 5:02 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 692-003 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Well, Mark, how are you?
President, how are you?
Well, let's sit over here.
I think they want to take a picture of us.
All right.
I think that the important thing to emphasize
Uh, yeah, we were ready for a picture, you know, I told Ron, but, well, you do tell him, you know.
Yes, sir.
I think the press must be, they might want to get some of this, you know, run this thing, because they might, they'll run the problem, at least.
Which is good.
Uh, it seems to me that, uh, that's why I look at the situation generally, that if, uh, to the extent that you can, in your, uh, meet the press appearance,
if you can direct your remarks to a general reassurance with regard to the approval of a China visit, the fact that you went around and spoke to these leaders, and explained the purpose of it, and what happened, and so forth.
Any, for example, strong statements of approval that you could even mention specifically would be good.
If you could avoid getting too much into the timeline issue, mainly because the issue has been beat to death already, in other words,
If the lead out of your thing is simply, well, that Grady talks about the tyrants, you don't have to answer the question when they get into it.
But if you could locate it or put that in a lower profile and say, well, after an original home rule or whatever it is and so forth, that we can listen to that without having to get out and say, well, now that they'll say, without being driven into a position
where we are, frankly, restating what has already been stated on many occasions, that there are no secret deals.
Our treaty commitments remain in force.
We'll get here to that.
But that is the situation.
And also, I think another thing, in terms of the whole general planning, you could, in terms of the China visit, after all, you've been in this field for so many years, you've been, which you should remind me of, you've been a consul general in Hong Kong, in Indonesia, you're quite aware, if you could put yourself very squarely on the side of really, that this is a great initiative, it's very positive, it's very important in terms of
When we looked at our objective of peace in the Pacific and Asia and security for our friends, this was a necessary step, a step that's been taken in the right way, and it's one that should be reassured to our friends.
If he doesn't, you can also say, and I want to hear it too, but I'm just going to give you a little feel of the things I think they need to hear here.
You go and say, do this as an expert, and say, I know all these things.
If he doesn't, I say, the easy thing to do always is to, when you have a situation, is to say, do nothing.
Let us suppose that we just left the status quo as it was, with the DRC, in fact, isolated, no communication with the United States.
You could do that, or we could proceed on this course.
The other course was one that could only lead to consequences that none of us would like.
This, at least, leads to some hope, hope for a more peaceful, and that is the feeling, as you said, the one thing that comes out of this is the feeling of hope that the people of Malaysia have.
I think that
I think, too, it will give you an opportunity to knock down, because they'll try to get you to do this.
There's always stuff that they do that the state doesn't disapprove of the decision, and the state department would downgrade it, and so forth and so on and so on.
And that's just nonsense, you can say.
We've worked together in the preparation of the plans, just as we're working together in the preparation of the plans for the Soviet song.
But this is a matter for all of you to hold on to.
Thank you, Mr. Terry.
And if we work together, we will in the future.
And this is...
This is an initiative which is one which has strong support among the career diplomats in the State Department.
These are some of the things, some of the fields you could give.
I mean, I don't mean, of course, these things you could say, I'm sure you can't, but you could say, based on my own experience and the rest, that you feel this historic turning point is one that is going to be helpful
that is one that naturally some nations were concerned about, they wouldn't be concerned about because any change, any change always raises questions.
On the other hand,
If they made a change, would it raise more problems and more questions in the future?
So this change is one that's been made.
And then, on the individual countries, I think it's particularly important to find out the solid proof that any mark or an instrument
and run it out to everyone.
But I think that the country will be watching to see whether you, as the citizen secretary of state of this area, as a China expert, as a far eastern expert, will be watching to see whether you believe in what we have and all the rest, as far as whether you have some dollars and so forth.
And I know you don't have some dollars, but that's the thing that you need to get across.
Oh, I'm sorry, David.
I've got to get to work.
I'll come back for the weekend, will you?
No, he's been already.
Thank you.
Anybody can nitpick any revolutionary, significant, giant, or whatever you want to call it, step, which this is.
It is a term.
But on the other hand, you have to look at what would have happened had we not taken this step.
And it's that that causes disconcern.
I'll tell you one thing I think is going to be very helpful to you, Mr. President, in terms of the aid program.
I was on the Hill two hours this morning, one o'clock, and I was before this immediate push-out, because I was there, and I mentioned Mark, I was there, and I was part of the Affairs Committee, and I think that basically they are sympathetic.
They've been our best friend these many years.
And I had not made any public statements until I talked to them this morning.
I talked to them very much along the lines that you had just said.
So you may have seen some .
They take it well.
And I think that this, what you were saying now, that there is some hope, is so important.
Because the young people, not only here, but all around the world, are turned off by decades of confrontation.
You don't have some breakthrough.
And as I said this morning, it's an escalation towards peace.
I said it's not a fact, but it's an accident.
It has two basic policies in our part of the world.
One is the next doctor, which I think, of course, I'm a very strong proponent of that, possibly.
And the other is, as I said, it's a so far unlabeled policy, really.
It's one of seeking an opening for peace, but not to do it in terms of gang up against other countries.
On the contrary, it's very likely to set a motion
a kind of an acceleration of every country to want to have close dialogue.
We seek their relations with any country, but not at the expense of anybody else.
And our friends in the far east realize that we're spearheading for their own interest as well as our own.
That this, after all, is just as much in our own interest as we could have somebody prove.
And this is particularly true as far as I can get back with countries.
You'll find one that are on the rim and that are visited by insurgents.
If you want to go to the U.S., well, you can go to Sudan, for example, in Laos, or in Cambodia, or in Saigon, or in Bangkok.
Those countries that are right under the gun, those are the ones in many ways that are most enthusiastic about surety.
Because they realized that... You have to go to the root cause.
They all know, too, that their days were numbered.
The other course of action, as they look at Vietnam, as they see the United States committed there, as they realize that the possibility of U.S. military action in Vietnam, that one became necessary.
would be very, very hard to pull off in this country.
What the hell, exactly.
That's what it is.
And of course, that's what I, when we talked about it in Shanghai before I left, is that this does strengthen your hope.
And you have both houses of Congress supporting you who took this trip.
And the people of this country are completely behind you.
Therefore, the totality of your policy aims for the support and interest.
And there's no country that's going to be more the beneficiary of that than yours, I'd say, in the land they held.
So they welcomed this as reinvigorating support for your policy, the totality of your policy.
So what about Indonesia?
Well, in Indonesia, it's Chinese.
The problem, of course, is that they have an opinion that's a racial and a Chinese bias.
Sure, sure.
But on the other hand,
They are changing their views.
At one time, they were rather anxious to have a Soviet Union in there as a counterpoise against China.
It's a great sword that Damocles had hung over their head.
They were almost prepared to see maybe Hanoi and the Soviet Union having a bit of a spank in there between them and Communist China.
But I think they're changing on that.
And I pointed out to them that, look, if the Soviet influence grows here in Indonesia, then you're going to find the Maoist forces are going to be really activated against it.
So you'll be stirring things up.
You know, the Soviet influence gets too big now.
It's perfectly true.
They'll be in the middle.
Right now, I think China's prepared to let Indonesia stay in the back.
We're in the future.
We don't know what's going on.
and the osmosis inevitably may move through the whole area, who knows, but at the present time.
And as far as there's not enough problems at home, and as far as the space department's support for your policy and the Foreign Service for your policy, as far as you're pursuing a policy that has universal support for the Foreign Service, I believe you'll meet that everybody is completely behind it.
They would be behind any president.
But when Presidents are pursuing your policies, they are particular.
They know something has to be done.
They do.
It has to be done.
And getting off our doubts, we're beginning to make some breakthrough, getting away from all these frozen positions of the past, the long confrontation.
And the terror that was making people more and more depressed, more and more negative, turning them off, in turn was bringing on a significant isolation.
This is the effect of this, is to offer hope, as you said before.
Tell me about any specific countries that are very important besides Japan or some very local region.
What do you do about the Japanese?
What do you do?
I think the problem with Japan is perhaps the most complex and difficult one, but that's because of internal political reason.
Yeah.
It also is a basic psychological complex, right?
Yeah.
They don't say the Japanese down to us, but basically they know that the Chinese turn to us now because we have power.
Japan has...
Therefore, we have sort of an inside track on this one.
That Peking won't be as concessionary to them as it will be to us.
Secondly, that we're married in Japan.
We have a partnership.
We have an old girlfriend.
And they know that the Japanese and the Americans have come to Hawaii.
In fact, we're allies against Japan in the war.
And therefore, this worries them.
And then finally, you have this devil's image that China agrees against Moscow and Tokyo and Washington.
The devil's image being in order to demand more out of their people and to get the support of the government to justify rationing and manpower controls.
All right.
So all of a sudden, the devil's image of the United States disappears.
A smiling President Nixon, a smiling President Trump, front page of the New York Times, the devil's image of the United States disappears.
Therefore, to maintain the devil's image, they have to make a little bit more of Japan, a little bit more of a Soviet Union to make up for it in a sense.
These are things the Japanese never say.
Frankly, this is my... Lee Kuan Yew called me a paramedic psychiatrist, which may be true.
Lee Kuan Yew is interesting.
First of all, damn smart.
First of all, he's a hot Chinese.
He never mentioned Singapore.
He thought that this was great to do.
He thought that this would strengthen the American hand, actually, with Roscoe, because as long as Washington
and Peking were totally and utterly opposed to each other.
They came to Moscow with a tremendous advantage.
They wouldn't really bargain with us, which is true in Moscow.
And so this in turn is very likely to lead to, he wasn't sure of it, but he thought that probably it would make it easier to make progress in some of our basic problems with Moscow.
He didn't think that Taiwan or the Republic of China would do this.
No, I didn't want to.
I just didn't know how the things would last.
I didn't try to disabuse them.
On the contrary, I made it clear that our policy had changed, not in the last, you know, years.
If you could possibly march on your feet to press,
play it in such a way that you don't have time to be the big issue.
We've gotten that pretty well out of us here, you know.
We've reassured everybody, and we've reassured Tower and all the rest, and don't you agree, Al?
It's pretty well out on the table now, and I'd simply, I think if you could say, well, look, there was some concern at the beginning, but at the present time, naturally, they're worried about it, but you think it's, I don't know, it's our business,
The less time you can spend on the matter.
I don't know if there's less you can spend on the matter.
I don't know if there's less you can spend on the matter.
Another thing is he feels that when the Chinese say that we're not a superpower, that the United States and the Soviet Union are, the reason they say that is because they're not a superpower.
It doesn't mean they aren't aspiring to be one.
But the moment they aren't, and therefore they take the line that they now, if they became a superpower, their language will change.
These are some of the things I really question.
But I think the fundamental point about Lee Kuan Yew was a very affirmative attitude, just as a shrewd statesman.
a feeling of appreciation that he had of you, another shrewd statesman who was playing the game the clever way.
Tell me, how about, did you, Thailand, a little before that?
Thailand, the big problem there, of course, is all this insurgency going on.
You know the Chinese are involved.
They are unable to, perhaps,
Were you able to have a private talk with Don?
Uh, Don, no, because he was a monk, and that was a holy day.
I wanted to, I trashed it, but I couldn't make contact with him.
I understand that very well.
So, I had no real problem at all, because I talked with Don, who understood this, I talked with Prapas, and Dawee.
Oh, so you kind of had to...
told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus, told Cyrus
a mutually accepted standard to hold a plot.
Well, I trust I know, too, you probably should, and look, that you know Nixon, and he's not one that's dead.
That's right.
Yeah, I told you, we're dealing with an endless bill of secrets for President Nixon.
He's been around.
There's no president's coming to office here.
There's no background for him here, so he's not being the only one.
the approach to this problem is not effective to the extent that we can make progress.
You're going to be in the midst of that.
We don't want to be in the midst of that.
The world would be a whole lot safer out there for those people if we have some stroke with China rather than if we have to have our stroke against them.
That's right.
What we would be able to do against China
As the years go on, we've got to realize, although we'll say it differently, we've got to realize that we'd be terribly inundated because of what's happened in Vietnam.
So we know the thing, but it's true, Alan, isn't it?
Yes, sir.
Look at the mystery we've gone through to try to wind up in Vietnam without bugging out.
Can you imagine the mystery we could go through?
Let us suppose we didn't do anything.
I'm using the example.
Supposedly we haven't done the same thing.
Suppose that we just, suppose the Chinese then made a run at Thailand.
And suppose the Thai said, look here, we've got a treaty with you.
You see an American president going down to the Congress and saying, we're going to declare war on China and keep our treaty with Thailand?
Huh?
We've got to let them think that.
I mean, we can't say that our treaty commitments are not going to be kept.
And the Chinese have got to think they're going to be kept.
But the practical problem, that's what we've got to face, is that at the present time, except for Western Europe, there are damn few places where you would get support.
You wouldn't even get it all in Israel.
Not today.
No.
Not today.
That's the problem.
So therefore, it doesn't mean, because we couldn't, we have problems with the Congress, that we have to roll over and play dead, and that we have to be suckered.
On the other hand, we are in a position of power, and so the thing to do is to work them within, rather than simply from the front foot coming out.
Isn't that what it is?
And then to try to ameliorate their aggressiveness.
But they're already beginning to do things, I presume, for image-building reasons.
Not because of any genuine love or anything like that.
To do the right things, you know, return the hijacked planes and apologizing to the oil spill that returned that yacht the other day.
Now, if they do it often enough, it becomes their standard behavior.
We all stand against them.
Anyway, it's a very pleading moment, I think, when Mao is still there to give his blessing upon something that Joe essentially is spearheading.
If you hadn't moved now, you can't go to the Conventional Diplomacy to reach it.
You have to accelerate the movement, because if you miss this chance, God knows it may never get any better.
The other thing is you don't know the assumption, which I think
I think we've all got the head here, you don't have to worry about these things.
There are some, I've talked to some good friends who say, well look Mao was 78 and Zhou was 73, why the hell did you wait till the bastards died?
And then China would be in an uproar on the mainland and there'd be a chance for a changing government.
And the answer is, are we sure?
We thought that our Vietnam had become less entrenched in the Ho Chi Minh side, didn't it?
We thought that when Stalin went, the Soviet Union would be less entrenched, isn't it?
We thought that when Khrushchev went, all hell would break loose.
Has it really changed that much?
The point is that it's a miserable system.
You go there and see what it's done to the Chinese people, it makes you sick.
When you compare the Chinese, you see them in Hong Kong or Singapore and the rest.
On the other hand, it is there.
And as you see what they've done in building, as they always do in these communist countries,
a whole superstructure and infrastructure of leaders, including as well the military.
You cannot base your policy on the assumption that once the old leaders die, that then they're going to change.
They may not change.
In fact, they might get tougher.
Would you feel like it?
I don't know.
But at least you can't gamble on a policy that will change when you're not sure what's going to happen.
Because that's my thing.
Because I haven't thought about this a lot.
I knew Malcolm was old, and we also know he's not doing well.
And we also know that Jeremiah, as smart as he is and able as he is, is 73 years old.
And they're both going to die very soon.
What the hell?
You've got to deal with power when it's there.
I agree with that.
I call it out of the policy of fanatopsis, you know, waiting for the old man to die.
You're never going to get anywhere.
But it's more important that now is the moment when they are changing.
Now is the moment when you catch them in the flux and the tide.
Also, it's in a moment when they need us.
And that moment could well pass.
It could pass by reason of changes in their relations with the Soviet.
It could pass by reason of their own acquisition of power.
It could pass by reason of our own isolationism.
We may be at the last point in this year, 1972, when the United States, any president of this country, can speak with authority as a leader of either the Soviet Union or China.
I wouldn't say that outside of the church, but I believe that to be the case.
Because when you see the attitude toward God, Marcia, we're having the goddamnedest time.
You know, when they cut eight of the turkey from 100 minutes to 60 minutes.
When they screw it around, you know, we're having an awful time on our operating programs.
You know, we're fighting terribly in terrible battles, and it's awful down there.
And when you've got it, looking basically at the political spectrum, you look at the various Democratic candidates, except for Spoo Jackson, Muskie, Humphrey, Teddy, those are the other three.
Needless to say, McIver, of course, he's a serious candidate, he's from Tennessee and all the rest.
But all of them, there are five of them in the country, Kenny.
Everyone can be king and president.
would start dismantling the military in this country.
That's the problem.
See, you have an attitude in mind.
They're racing for it.
Now, at the present time, if, therefore, we still have some strength and still some will, we'd better damn well make the deal.
At least that's my feeling.
Make the deal when we're still strong and when they, and when, for a very good reason, they fear
that we just might mean what we say and go back to that day period.
That may help us.
But yet the time comes when an American president, as he talks to, when he goes to talk to the Soviet leaders or to the Chinese leaders, if they know that he himself and the opinion and party and the forces that he represents are bent upon, of course, drawing over a responsibility, what then?
They're going to talk to you.
They don't talk to us because they love us or because they...
that they talk to us because they respect us, respect our power, right?
And when these other countries were saying, no, you've had this situation now where you have relations with the Republic of China, but you also have expanding dialogue, can't we do the same?
So, my answer to that was, well, let's go ahead and try, but I wouldn't be saying we're trying.
I mean, frankly, in China, the church was, because we have problems, we have problems at home, they have problems, they have to be governed, they have to go fast, but the Japanese are against it.
The Japanese, there's a ton of differences.
This is a tough one because until Sato is replaced, hopefully, by a man like Huda or something else, they have to be talking along.
Because the Japanese keep waffling all the time and face a dire pressure.
Because the government parties may have these factions, some of which, in varying degrees, are willing to sacrifice Taiwan to get to Peking.
To them, my tone was this, that when your president talks to
Joe Lai, he speaks very frankly and forthrightly.
He's not making any concessions.
He's not anchoring over in Glasgow.
He's not saying we agree and we don't agree.
That's the way he talks.
As a matter of fact, it was a cold, jerky, cold steel talk all the way up.
We don't, we wouldn't even want to let people know how cold it was.
It shouldn't be.
It wouldn't be.
But that's the way to get lost.
That's the way to get lost.
The way the Japanese are trying to do this is start to make unilateral concessions.
Stupid as they throw away their bargaining positions.
Stupid.
No, the Chinese fear the Japanese, not now, for what they can do in the future.
The Japanese would be well advised to let them continue to fear.
and don't constantly try to reassure the Chinese that they have no desires of Taiwan, they have no interest in Korea, they have no interest in, you know, like the Japanese, like a very, very, again, as a matter of fact,
We naturally left that hanging.
It sure lies behind it, too.
And we had to reassert about the Japanese.
Of course, we did the best we can.
We can't speak for them.
Your experience is that it's longer than ours.
And they thought that he actually sort of wants you to use your influence on the Japanese.
Because if that's so, that itself is extremely interesting.
Because what it is, in essence, is that they want a continuation of the American-Japanese relationship.
Let me just tell you what I would prefer to start out with.
He went through the usual line, naturally, that their policy is that there should be a neutral Japan, and that the United States should ever give its treaty commitment with Japan.
And my answer, of course, was, first, we will know.
That has to be your position.
I understand that.
I don't ask these changes.
I don't expect you to.
If you were concerned about Japan, let me tell you, do you think that the possibility of Japan, the second most prosperous country in the free world, soon to be the second most prosperous in the world, do you think that without the American security guarantee,
is going to remain neutral, unarmed, an economic giant, and a military pigman?
Or are they going to look to their own security, either by rearming or making a deal with somebody else, and if they make a deal, who are they going to make it with?
Would you ever have the United States have an influence in Japan, or the Japanese military have an
Would you rather have the United States have influence in Japan, or the Soviet Union have influence in Japan?
What is more in the interest of a Japan which is not expansionary from a military standpoint, a United States drawn to our own shores, not playing a role with Japan, or one in which the United States has a relationship with Japan, and therefore, thereby able to influence
It's a powerful argument.
It's a tremendous argument.
What was their reaction?
Well, they would never concede something like that.
The record is just...
Of course, both of us had to speak for the record.
We both were, you know.
But he continued to make the remark that the record, and the proof of that, et cetera, is our position.
But believe me, if I were to say what he really, really thinks, and it's not true, well, they want us there, you know.
What do you agree on?
They want us there.
You understand?
I'm saying it, I'm not basing it.
There's a thing in the record where he says that.
But you also, you know, we have a comment.
that they either put the line out there hard, tough, strong, we believe that you're a bunch of murdering bastards who get the hell out, and Asia belongs to us, or they can say it for the record, and you can tell them they're talking for the record when they're talking for what they believe.
But boy, they know, if they look to the future, and the beauty of this whole thing is you look at China, let's look at it from the standpoint of China, I mean, of PRC.
They look around, and what do they see?
Well, they see on the one side, the Soviet Union, a huge superpower, a huge order.
They see on the other side, Japan, a nation that's great once, twice.
Potentially, the superpower that it wants to be, a great dynamic power.
And they say to the South, India.
India, for whom they have nothing but contempt, but India, which backed the Soviet Union, embarrassed them of the recent conflict with Pakistan, and which could be a problem in the future.
And they say to the other side, the United States of America.
Now, all these countries, which one do they think really has aspirations to come in?
and carry out what they say is their fear, cut up China.
The United States, interestingly enough, the very least.
In other words, we, and I think you already know this, are no threat to that.
We don't want to, we have no designs on China.
We had no signs on the trail.
But I said, can you say this about Russia?
Can you say this about India?
Can you say this about Japan?
And the answer is, they can't say it about any of the others.
Now, they don't know what to say about it.
They don't express their contempt for the Indians, their respect for and favor of Japan in the future, their hatred
fear of the Soviet Union.
But as far as the United States is concerned, what they realize is that we're there, too.
And that's really what brought us together, in my opinion, from their standpoint.
We had our reasons.
From their standpoint, they feel that the United States is basically
A force in the area of the four moderate powers that surround them is the only force in the area that does not threaten them.
And to the same token, therefore, is one that they need.
So why not deal with us?
That's what they do.
And they figure we can restrain the Japanese, that it will also fail out against the Russians, and naturally, in that way, contain the Indians.
So if you were Chinese, we'd coach you.
Looking at America today.
Now I think that if you go back to the Korean War period, they would not have said that.
They honestly thought that we were going to give them a rip, but apparently when we moved toward the end, that's where they got in.
And in our Vietnam, the Vietnamese think they may have thought, until they began to wind down, that we were going to use that as a base for disturbing them and so forth and so on.
But at the present time, as they look at us, and as they consider the others, they have to conclude that of all the major powers around them, we are the ones who threaten them the least and offer them the most.
That's what hits you.
That's my theory.
You agree?
I agree.
That's what I, of course, that was the message I got across.
And I think it made quite an impression on me.
It's not your day to notice, but I didn't want to get tired of telling you, but I watched them all the time.
That's the conversation.
Well, the fact is, your residents, they didn't really belabor you with all of their standard decisions, but rather...
It was all up there in the record.
He said, remember the one day?
He said, I'd like to.
I have a few things I want to know.
And then it was just like Marshall taking a,
He just started taking the list, many by the others, including their concern about the new countries in Africa and, you know, the natural dimension, the Middle East, the U.A.R.
and so forth.
They're almost eroded.
Almost eroded.
So when you really come down to it, you really come down to it, they, this fellow Joe and I and the old man, both,
have a remarkable understanding of the forces at work in the world, and they are not allowing their doctrinaire adherence to primitive, pristine communism.
They're blind to their self-interest.
That's why we're there.
And we are, this is a power program.
And they realize that they're revolutionaries and all that, but the revolution can't be carried to the point where it's going to interfere with power considerations.
Clearer.
Now, of course, there's going to be one thing we've got to expect, and I think this point is very important.
I think we've constantly got to point out that the Chinese PRC is a communist country.
It's really dedicated to the communist philosophy.
They will continue to differ from us and differ with us in their approach to the problems of the world, and we will have our differences.
They will express them very vigorously in the United Nations and other world forums.
You know, see, every time they pop off about something in the BK press or this or that, the other people say, oh God, an American-Chinese initiative is aborted, has been aborted.
You don't have to expect that.
But you see, I think we met these old men and their old lives when I was struggling.
There's no reason, and they've got to be.
They can come to the way of life by reason of the fact that we sit over there and tip a few buses and not tie together.
As a result of that, they're going to discontinue their support of the world revolutionary liberation forces.
Of course they're going to support it.
But on the other hand, the question is, what will they do about it where we are concerned?
And that is what they're going to do very soon.
I think one thing, though, we've already noticed C.I.A.
splitting tactics, diplomacy, subversion as opposed to insurrection and insurgency.
I have a feeling that because they're trying to impress the world, the reasons are not good and the motivations aren't good.
They're trying to impress it.
They're trying to create some kind of more favorable image.
Yeah.
That this means, hopefully, that we just find ourselves moving away from what Mao has always called a fine fight to the talk-talk stage.
Now, if they do that, we can all live better.
And the world will be a better court.
That's interesting, because when Joe went back to Deacon after saying goodbye to you, a new line was, long live Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line.
Diplomatic line.
Revolutionary diplomatic line.
Now, that's like...
There is more than just sort of a hard, simple conclusion.
I think there is a bit more.
Let me cover one other point.
It may have come up in the committee.
I guess it came up with Bill.
He's up there.
You probably get it because of the interest.
Jack, I'm going to just follow up on this.
was a decent father, and you've seen the comparison I have, and I've never seen any kind of, when he'd been there, when he'd been there with the, you know, the, you know, the, you know, the second visit, and so forth, and he didn't behave himself aptly, but they'll say, you know, they, of course, what would I do, I saw a church,
Jesus Christ.
He said, Church made some comment, the effect of it was terrible, they had an ambassador back on the airplane, because the Chinese have such a critical attitude toward drinking, for Christ's sake, you're the Chinese, my God, pick a fellow that's as good as anybody I know in the world.
But, you know, those Chinese men, just like Joe and I said, neither of us did any alcoholizing, but he said, well, he said, up until 1965, he said, I drank pretty good.
But he says, in the end, of course, it's all stupid.
But I think what we've got to do, we've got to protect our ambassador.
We can say our ambassador is a competent man and so forth.
And I'm sure he will charge this diplomatic talent.
And of course, he will, at this point, he will have, as is always the case,
a number of subjects that we've discussed, people have, these systems are the best specialists that we have in that way to handle it.
By the way, did they raise the question?
They raised it with me this morning.
Well, the secretary had talked to, you see, the Fulbrightness Committee in executive session yesterday, and then they were leaving, they went out in black.
No, I don't believe that.
Anyway, so I have this complaint, though.
But the story that came out of this post this morning, I don't want to pay much attention to it, that Watson, because he's not a real negotiator, that we've always ruled out the instructions of the period here in Washington.
The State Department has a principal role under the President's supervision that he is our negotiator in Paris.
But he operates on the basis of the instructions of the period here in Washington.
All ambassadors.
All of us.
No ambassadors.
I think you might find out.
Although you could say, gentlemen, I've been ambassador.
And I said, an ambassador doesn't go out on his own and make policy.
An ambassador carries out policy.
Here's how you can say Ambassador Watson has had a number of assignments to date.
He's carried them out with impeccable confidence and respect to the future.
Of course, it's a lousy business.
It's one of those things that does show that if you really want to get into this game of our ambassadors abroad who may have tilt the bottle a little,
I'd say congressmen and senators ought to be sure of most of the options.
That's right.
Well, Senator Scott was one of those guys you could visit.
No.
Well, I... What?
In Hong Kong?
Yes, I know.
Ah.
Well, I don't mind him in the Senate, but I don't like him to talk to somebody else.
I mean, if he's five months alive, a few drinks, he's doing business.
And plenty of them have been loaded on airplanes, and I think the State Department has probably bailed out congressmen and senators out of whorehouses and bars, right?
No, no, no, no.
Well, I won't say that.
I heard the old John...
Senator Spock was disarming yesterday.
He said, well, he said, Trump settled down to the plane, you know, and he looked around the table and said, well, how many gentlemen can deny that you have been... Spock?
Yeah.
And he said, there goes the grace of God, go I.
He said, Spock?
Spock said that.
Well, by God, that was a great submission.
We all had to do it.
Well, there's one program, of course, that we all know who's drinking on air.
One of them.
is that a couple of drinks affects you like four, you know.
And particularly, you know, Wosley had just been here.
I think I know what happened.
He'd just been here.
And of course, the biggest bad thing that ever happened to him was that he'd go back and meet with the Chinese nurse.
He knows what he's going to do with the rest.
And I imagine he got on that darn plane and he started to have a couple of drinks.
You know, sometimes you can have a drink at the end of the day and it's like father, it's nothing.
In other words, he had a highly tense day.
Intense day.
a half a scotch or half a martini to knock you in your butt.
Did you know that?
Yeah.
True.
Anyway, I sympathize with him.
I say, for the grace of God, go on.
But I would just say to all of our poor people who represent America abroad, be like Caesar's wife.
Like he was supposed to be.
Like he was supposed to be.
I always said that Voltaire says the most perfect woman is a woman who has every virtue except her own.
Ha!
And I wonder what it means to say that Voltaire never said it.
I said it, but when I said it, I said the woman thinks it's funny, but if I say Voltaire says it, they think it's witty.
Every woman is a perfect woman who has every virtue except her own.
Well, I appreciate your long journey and your hard work and all the rest you do.
Matter of fact, you just missed a good opportunity I was going to try to get you off three days by going to Florida tomorrow and asking you to come down there.
But then this wage thing came up, and I've got to be here tomorrow to handle this training for a few days, a couple of days.
But I would urge you to take off for a few days.
You should, too.
By the way, Todd, it was great talking to you.
Okay, Mr. Cletus, we obviously knew what was going on, and all tracks, we just had to sharpen that.
Well, you see, he was sitting there, and he would sit there and say, also, Johnson, that was a fair judgment.
Well, I just said yes, Marshal, whenever he asked me if that's okay.
Exactly.
The other thing is to take your, do take off some time.
You told Bill, and I told you too, you see that he gets off, because I know this miserable, the amount of traffic that you've done, it's got to take a lot of time.
It's got to get a little out of you.
Let me get you a little farther than that, Jeff.
Up there.
The Philippines is a madhouse.
The first time I ever met you, Mr. President, you were just next arriving from Jakarta, fresh from the Philippines.
But I remember your reaction to your visit to the Philippines.
It was wild.
I remember your reaction to the Philippines.
It was a very wild place.
You and I arrived there.
John and I arrived there.
You know, they emailed the Farquhars to take them off to Peking, according to American embassy sources, to negotiate with Peking, because they were pulling out their bases.
That was subpoenaed by their Congress to appear to explain it.
And now they're saying that we would like to have a conflict.
Two meetings.
I wasn't trying to resort, because she's taking off.
She took on half an hour after we arrived.
But the next morning, Marcus, Robbie Lowe, Mel Korg, Veronica, all the rest of them, they were just before I even hit the seat.
I was like, shoot it.
I shot all these questions.
After an hour and a half, the whole thing was calmed down.
I did a half hour alone with the president.
And we got together again.
I met with the leaders of the opposition.
I met with the leaders of the Senate.
We talked.
By the way, even in the background, the press turned out to be a magical person.
Even in the Philippines?
Even in the background.
The first president of the United States of America.
The Philippines would have collapsed after I left, as it does, people like Renata and so forth, and Valencia and the others.
But our character is true in the free press.
Anyway, don't worry about it.
Nevertheless, the situation in the market has changed.
With regard to the Philippines, I often say the Philippines, they have a combination that can only intoxicate one.
They've got the combination of the Asian,
The Spanish in America are the worst of all truth.
They have taken all of our advices and they have proved them.
I mean, well, you know, Rocco, the director, often said, if I'm honest with you, he said, we took America in democracy.
All those excesses and exaggeration, they lie to me.
Politics, to them, they list love to fight politically.
Mr. President, in Korea, I found the situation better than I had anticipated.
I thought there would be a lot more distress, particularly over the state.
I did not exercise the authority that you gave me to extend a limited invitation.
So I didn't carry it out.
I'm not sure maybe he was in touch with you in regard to that.
I didn't see that he was necessary.
Don't give him that.
The day before this year, he knows there has to be more business.
I've got to go to the camera and I've got to see.
Now, he may be coming through this summer.
I'm not sure.
And if it's necessary at the time.
But the real problem is to come up with some way of resolving this issue and having protection.
We need to do a little progress on it.
So I think the thing is working out all right.
Because of your home travels to New England, you might want to see your wife.
Very inexpensive.
Oh, OK.
Thank you.
For yourself.
These are very good.
Only for foreign service, NSC staff, who need some reward.
Well, I wish you well.
Too bad, you know, it's too damn bad that you can't go under the system of Moscow.
But, uh, Hillary, of course, I would go.
The thing about it is that, in a sense, it's the same game.
Right?
You've got to, you know, you deal with these thoughts, but you can't go.
There's no way you can do that.
Bill will take Hildebrand, and of course, we won't have the staff limitations that we have.
Who we have, who do we know yet?
No, I don't think so.
Those characters will want to prove that they're more free than the others.
There's one little delicate issue here, and that is we're in Cambodia.
They were quite worried about when Senator Mansell went to China, what he'd tell them.
Oh, listen, I'm worried as hell about it.
I wrote a memorandum on that, Al.
I sent it over to Henry.
I don't know if you've seen it or not, but I've expressed concern about the Shitton.
It's in shape again.
What is, what does he think he's going to see?
They will, won't they?
I think it's a good chance to see him.
I think he'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
He'll see it.
...prepare for the possible... Just say that Senator Hansfield requested it, that it will not be in our...
I think they better be... You better prepare them for that and say, say not about it, but he will request it because they're old personal friends and the rest will be invited, but it will not, there are any circumstances record that he will not be speaking for a president.
I told them.
I told them I thought it was the senator acting in a responsible way.
I don't think money is a fraud, I would say.
Well, thank you very much.
This is what the Annenberg... Have you ever seen this before?
That's the one of a kind.
Made by Susan.
Here it is.
33, the main.
Oh, I just want to see that stuff on there.
All right, thank you.
All right.
Thank you.