Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 700 › Conversation 700-005

Nixon, Moorer & Rush on Vietnam War and Military strategy

Monday, April 3, 1972 · 10:06 AM–10:20 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.); Rush, [David] Kenneth; Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation700-005 on Tape 700 (tape position 01:33:25–01:48:29)StartMonday, April 3, 1972 at 10:06 AMEndMonday, April 3, 1972 at 10:20 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 700-005 ↗

President Nixon met with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Kenneth Rush, and Henry Kissinger to express severe frustration regarding the U.S. military's handling of the North Vietnamese offensive and the poor flow of information from the Department of Defense. Nixon criticized General Creighton W. Abrams for a lack of imagination and aggressive leadership, demanding immediate, intensified use of air power and B-52s regardless of weather conditions. The President asserted his authority as Commander-in-Chief, ordering that all future military reports be provided to him directly and in an unsanitized format to bypass administrative delays.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 01:33:25 into the tape and ends around 01:48:29.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
1:33:30Let me maybe come directly to the point because I want to...
1:33:57I think there has to be a very clear understanding of a matter which I've discussed with the
1:34:22I ordered a briefing on Vietnam this morning, yesterday.
1:34:32It didn't come tonight at 8.30.
1:34:39That's a direct violation of orders.
1:34:45And I want somebody who was supposed to be here to be demoted or reprimanded.
1:34:52That should go on this file.
1:34:53Is that clear?
1:34:55I ordered that, and I was told he would be here at 7.15, and I understand what the secretary said.
1:35:00He said he couldn't come until 8.30.
1:35:02Now, I'm not going to have a kind of crap anymore.
1:35:06From now on, if that man is to have his ass over here in this office at 7 o'clock every night, is that clear?
1:35:11Yes, sir.
1:35:11Yes, we have.
1:35:12All right.
1:35:13No more crap.
1:35:14The second point is, I ordered the use of stripes
1:35:22You know, in this zone above the DMZ, there were 500 sorbets that could have been blown.
1:35:31It blew 100 yesterday, 125.
1:35:32There's 20.
1:35:33138.
1:35:33138, yeah.
1:35:33Excuses weather.
1:35:36Those are all fantasies.
1:35:38We got that directive, Mr. President, at midday.
1:35:44And they had the schedule laid on, the Lorraine laid on, and we saw it right away.
1:35:50I understand.
1:35:51Now let's come to Abrams.
1:35:53Why didn't he think of that?
1:35:56What is his job out there?
1:35:58Just to build up the numbers, or is it his job to try to see that this kind of offensive is stopped?
1:36:04I want to understand.
1:36:05There's some talk of Abrams going to Chief of Staff of the Army.
1:36:11I want you to know that I don't intend to have you go to Chief and Staff of the Armory because of his conduct in this business.
1:36:16He's shown no imagination.
1:36:18He's drinking too much.
1:36:19I want you to get in order and he's to go on the wagon throughout the balance of this offensive.
1:36:23Is that clear?
1:36:24Yes, sir.
1:36:25Totally.
1:36:26The other thing that's going to happen is that he is going to start coming up with some ideas as to the use of the Air Force and so forth, and as to the planning here, rather than just sitting back on his ass and waiting for things to happen.
1:36:40Now, I have read the reports that came from Defense on this thing on Friday, on Saturday.
1:36:50They, if that's from out there,
1:36:54They did not.
1:36:55They were not accurate.
1:36:57They did not explain what the facts were adequately.
1:37:02And what is happening here is that it is a defense in its usual way, is temporizing with the situation, which is serious, but which can be turned to our advantage.
1:37:15But it can only be turned to our advantage with the massive use of all of our assets.
1:37:20And also, in terms of our air power, I'm not waiting until it's ceiling unlimited before we get out there and clobber them where they are.
1:37:28Now, from the moment you leave this office, I want somebody to get out there, and I want everything that can fly, flying in that area.
1:37:37And good God, in the Battle of the Bulge, they were able to fly even in a snowstorm.
1:37:45Now, what in the hell was the matter with the Air Force?
1:37:47that they are unable to conduct defensive operations necessarily.
1:37:53So they're going to fly down, drop them over in a cane field in the Andalusia Strip, get another Purple Heart, I mean, air battle for that.
1:38:01But I want this Air Force, and that includes the Navy.
1:38:05You've only got, I understand, instead of having the four carriers ordered, maybe you've got two, is that right?
1:38:09No, sir.
1:38:10The three, they have the fourth one will be there very shortly.
1:38:12How shortly?
1:38:13In about, I would say, in about 50 hours.
1:38:16All right.
1:38:17That's too long.
1:38:17Too long.
1:38:18You shouldn't have left.
1:38:19When those four carriers are there, now, we have got to use this Air Force in a way
1:38:25that will be as effective as possible.
1:38:27The other thing is an immediate study is to be made of the use of B-52s in the study, and I need a recommendation with NARs, and I don't want to go through that.
1:38:40I'm going to crap around with the Secretary of Defense on this either.
1:38:43I need...
1:38:46it will be helpful in that 40 mile uh that's right it will be helpful understand uh the idea that we if we don't have the assets we can do it otherwise we use 52s now if the reason for not using 52s is because they are vulnerable i understand that if on the other hand they used to be 52s after you've taken out the sands wouldn't be helpful we various
1:39:14Because the thing that I am concerned about here is that, well, first, I don't like this business of not getting information when I ask for it.
1:39:21I was on the phone all day yesterday and couldn't get a goddamn thing out of the Department of Defense.
1:39:27I got one half-assed
1:39:29memorandum, which is so disgraceful in terms of it being an ad that I really don't, I'm really ashamed to have it in my file.
1:39:36I have it in my file, but I'm going to keep it personal, and I hope I never write the book.
1:39:42But from now on, we're to have the truth, and that guy should be over here, and that's on him, not just in the morning.
1:39:49He should be here 7 o'clock at night.
1:39:50Let him work a little overtime over there.
1:39:52Is that clear?
1:39:53Yes, sir.
1:39:53Get him over here.
1:39:55And I want the plan.
1:39:56I want what he's done.
1:39:56I want what has been done to carry out these orders.
1:39:59Now, as far as this is, as the, and then acres.
1:40:04And that MACD staff and all the rest, they're going to knock off all the parties that say there must be anything out there.
1:40:11And until they get this thing contained, they have got to have what we need from them.
1:40:17What we need from them are some ideas on their part as to what they're going to do.
1:40:22Rather than we'll run the same numbers, you know, we'll hit the same targets here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.
1:40:28The idea that we would be surprised by this, the idea that we didn't, I mean, we thought the B-3 thing was coming and so forth, that, well, they had more tanks there than we expected, and that they had more forces there than we expected, and all that sort of thing.
1:40:45I don't buy that.
1:40:46Now, it isn't we being surprised.
1:40:48I mean, it is the Army being surprised.
1:40:52That's what they said.
1:40:53Matt B. was pissing on the Army.
1:40:55We're the ones that are supposed to have intelligence.
1:40:57The Army doesn't have much in terms of intelligence.
1:40:59But my point is that I know we have many assets out there in terms of ground forces.
1:41:04And we're not going to have any.
1:41:06This has got to be said.
1:41:07But we've got some very considerable assets in terms of air power.
1:41:11But those assets have to be concentrated in areas that will provide shock treatment.
1:41:20Now, as we did in the B-3 area, remember, we had a couple of days strike and did a little good.
1:41:25Now, we've got to concentrate in these areas and give it some job treatment.
1:41:30And as an undergraduate, 25 miles, you've got to go up to 30 miles in order to do the job.
1:41:34We have that Donahoe area.
1:41:36We have the Donahoe area.
1:41:37Right on.
1:41:40Now, the 48-hour strike is not going to wait until Friday.
1:41:42It's got to go Wednesday.
1:41:45Is that clear?
1:41:46Yes, sir.
1:41:46Yeah.
1:41:47Is the purpose of waiting the Friday weather?
1:41:49Well, it's not, uh, it's not... You can't get it ready?
1:41:53No, it'll go away.
1:41:54No problem if the weather's satisfactory, it could go away.
1:41:58It won't go away if the weather...
1:41:59There's no restriction on the comparison.
1:42:02There's no... What's the problem you said about Friday?
1:42:04They had told me last night it wouldn't go through Friday.
1:42:07Well, they were just getting into weather.
1:42:09Huh.
1:42:10All right.
1:42:10There's no...
1:42:11Weather is one thing.
1:42:12But let me say, the decision has been made.
1:42:14We need a winch.
1:42:15We did Wednesday for a number of reasons, not the least of which is military.
1:42:19There are other reasons, too, that are supplemental, but the military is the most important one.
1:42:25And we may not get a chance to whack some of those supplies up now, and they might be coming in September and October.
1:42:30So let's get the damn strength off, I mean, if the weather is reasonable.
1:42:36I don't want to go off and tag weather.
1:42:38You shouldn't go if they can't do a good job.
1:42:40No, no, no, no, I don't.
1:42:41There's absolutely nothing.
1:42:43If they can't do an adequate job, there's no reason to go over to North Vietnam.
1:42:47It's got to be an effective job in the North.
1:42:49But right now...
1:42:51Right now, when the argument is under very serious attack, the Air Force has got to take some goddamn risks.
1:42:59Just like the Air Force took some risks in World War II in the Battle of the Bulge.
1:43:03Because we were under serious attack, the Air Force had to take some risks.
1:43:06We lost the battle.
1:43:07Well, the Air Force is not reluctant in any sense to take risks, Mr. President.
1:43:11The problem in the north of the DMZ is that with these missile sites, they're moving them around all the time, and you need some kind of visibility in order to get the site itself.
1:43:22Now, in all fairness to General Abrams, you should know that he and St. Pat, Admiral McCain, have repeatedly asked for authority to attack these missile sites north.
1:43:37And we haven't been given it, partner, because you just gave it to us just yesterday.
1:43:44But we knew that they were accumulating these forces in tanks and mobile artillery and so on north of the DMV.
1:43:54And we're waiting as well as this time of year.
1:43:58The only way to do that right is for the man on the scene to have the authority to go maybe like four hours a day or two hours all of a sudden as this flow shifts back and forth.
1:44:08And it's very difficult, almost impossible to run that for Washington.
1:44:13And so far as the report to you is concerned, let me tell you right now that if I am directed together for it, you will get them precisely where they're at.
1:44:23But I am not running this...
1:44:26of the reporting business.
1:44:27And I am passing the information up to the Secretary of Defense, and it's being run up there, but if you want me to do it, I can do it right now.
1:44:33I am directing you, and Secretary of Defense raises the question, I have to have them directly, and they must be unsanitized.
1:44:42And also, when an order goes, it's got to go from me.
1:44:45The Secretary of Defense does not, he's not the Commander-in-Chief.
1:44:49The Secretary of Defense does not make decisions on these.
1:44:51Not that he doesn't have a turbine officer.
1:44:53That's what he is, if not another goddamn thing.
1:44:55And from now on, this has got to be done this way.
1:44:59So under these circumstances, we can go.
1:45:02Now, getting back to this thing,
1:45:05Let's see what kind of an excuse is being developed here.
1:45:10You say that...
1:45:10I'm not giving excuses.
1:45:12No, no, no.
1:45:13What Abrams wrote, I thought I asked you about that earlier, Henry, about this authority with regard to hitting.
1:45:20You said they had authority in the DM.
1:45:22But you gave the authority in February.
1:45:28Then it was stopped during the... China.
1:45:30During the China thing.
1:45:31That is in North Vietnam.
1:45:34The DMZ, they have had authority to hit in the DMZ, but then the authority was never implemented after you came back from China for this 19-mile area that we had agreed to because the offensive didn't come.
1:45:52Then when they asked for it again, we gave it, and you actually ordered a wider belt than the one they asked for.
1:46:01When was that?
1:46:02This weekend.
1:46:03Yeah.
1:46:04Well, we asked on the 8th of March for this authority to go north of the DMV, and it was turned down.
1:46:11And then we asked again...
1:46:15And we finally got the authority yesterday, but you cannot handle a threat such as accumulated north of the DMZ unless you really work on it when you have the weather.
1:46:28When you have the weather, that's where that works.
1:46:30You've got to see the target.
1:46:32I understand.
1:46:35Now, the situation always now is that as far as sorties and so forth are concerned,
1:46:40They'll go to the library today.
1:46:43You can at least do something in this area at this time.
1:46:46Yes, sir.
1:46:47All right.
1:46:49Now, we are, Mr. President, putting all of the B-52s, every one we have up there.
1:46:53Good.
1:46:55Where?
1:46:55In the DMV area.
1:46:56In the DMV area, yes, sir.
1:46:57They can go above that stuff, can't they?
1:47:00Well, we're going up to the DMV.
1:47:02Now, we've got to get up there and get out to some of those missile sites to make it viable.
1:47:06Let's make it a thing.
1:47:07What's the law on...
1:47:08I understand.
1:47:10We can't lose D at 52.
1:47:11Yes, sir.
1:47:12From now on, you get those reports into me.
1:47:15And the second thing is, I want Abrams, Brake's car, his promotion, dependent upon how he conducts himself.
1:47:22Now, just you weren't here at the time.
1:47:25He screwed up Lops.
1:47:26He's not going to screw this one up.
1:47:28Is that clear?
1:47:28Yes, sir.
1:47:29All right.

On April 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, [David] Kenneth Rush, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:06 am to 10:20 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 700-005 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 700-5

Date: April 3, 1972
Time: 10:06 am - 10:20 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Thomas H. Moorer, [David] Kenneth Rush and Henry A. Kissinger.

     Greetings

     Rush's new job

     Easter egg roll
          -Weather

     Vietnam
          -Purpose of meeting
               -Moorer
               -Rush's Attendance
               -David Packard
                     -Washington Special Action Group [WSAG] meetings
          -Chain of command
               -The President as Commander-In-Chief

          -Melvin R. Laird
-Briefing
      -Orders
      -Arrival time
      -Reprimand
      -Arrival time
            -Orders
-Air strikes
      -Orders
            -Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
      -Number
      -Weather
      -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.’s reaction
-North Vietnamese offensive
      -Abrams's reaction
            -Abrams's conduct
                  -Chances for promotion
                  -Behavior
                  -Proposals for use of air power
      -Defense Department reports
            -Inaccuracies
            -Temporizing
      -US reaction
            -Massive retaliation
            -Air power
                  -Battle of the bulge
                        -Bad weather
                  -Navy
                  -Carriers on station
                        -Number
                  -Use Of B-52s
                        -Recommendations
                        -Effectiveness
                              -Surface to air missiles [SAMs]
      -The President's sources of information
            -Inadequacies
            -Briefings
      -Orders
      -Abrams
            -Cancellation of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam [MACV] staff
                  social functions

      -Proposals for counteroffensive
            -Use of air power
                 -Surprise
                 -B-3 area
                        -Tanks, ground forces
                 -MACV
                        -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
                 -Concentration
                        -B-3 area
                        -Dong Hoi
-Air strikes
      -Delays
            -Weather
                 -Laird’s talk with Kissinger
      -Implementation
      -Weather
      -Effectiveness
      -ARVN
      -Risks for Air Force
            -Compared with Battle of the Bulge
      -North Vietnamese missile sites
            -Mobility
      -Abrams and John S. McCain, Jr.
            -Commander in Chief Pacific [CINCPAC]
            -Requests for authority to attack missile sites
                 -Tanks
                 -Mobile artillery
                 -DMZ
-Reports to the President
      -Secretary of Defense
      -Orders
            -Unsanitized reports
-Abrams
      -Scope of authority
            -DMZ targets
                 -The President’s recent trip to the People’s Republic of China
                        [PRC]
                 -North Vietnamese targets
                        -Requests
                        -Weather
-Air sorties

                     -Number
                     -B-52s
                           -DMZ
                           -Missile sites
                                 -Destruction
          -Reports to the President
          -Abrams
               -Promotion to Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]
               -Past performance
                     -Laos

Moorer, Rush and Kissinger left at 10:20 am.
  • 700-001 8:40 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:40 am and 8:54 am.
  • 700-002 8:40 AM · 19 min — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:40 am and 9:09 pm.
  • 700-003 9:18 AM · 51 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, Tricia Nixon Cox, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:18 am to 9:59 am.
  • 022-063 9:33 AM · 1 min — the White House operator, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, President Richard M. Nixon, and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 9:33 am to 9:34 am.
  • 700-004 9:59 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:59 am and 10:06 am.
  • 700-006 10:20 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:20 am and 10:23 am.
  • 700-007 10:23 AM · 1 hr 14 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:23 am to 11:35 am.
  • 022-064 11:39 AM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:39 am and 11:46 am.

Conversation 700-005, April 3, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/700-005 (accessed October 11, 2026).