Conversation 700-005

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Let me maybe come directly to the point because I want to...

I think there has to be a very clear understanding of a matter which I've discussed with the

I ordered a briefing on Vietnam this morning, yesterday.

It didn't come tonight at 8.30.

That's a direct violation of orders.

And I want somebody who was supposed to be here to be demoted or reprimanded.

That should go on this file.

Is that clear?

I ordered that, and I was told he would be here at 7.15, and I understand what the secretary said.

He said he couldn't come until 8.30.

Now, I'm not going to have a kind of crap anymore.

From now on, if that man is to have his ass over here in this office at 7 o'clock every night, is that clear?

Yes, sir.

Yes, we have.

All right.

No more crap.

The second point is, I ordered the use of stripes

You know, in this zone above the DMZ, there were 500 sorbets that could have been blown.

It blew 100 yesterday, 125.

There's 20.

138.

138, yeah.

Excuses weather.

Those are all fantasies.

We got that directive, Mr. President, at midday.

And they had the schedule laid on, the Lorraine laid on, and we saw it right away.

I understand.

Now let's come to Abrams.

Why didn't he think of that?

What is his job out there?

Just to build up the numbers, or is it his job to try to see that this kind of offensive is stopped?

I want to understand.

There's some talk of Abrams going to Chief of Staff of the Army.

I want you to know that I don't intend to have you go to Chief and Staff of the Armory because of his conduct in this business.

He's shown no imagination.

He's drinking too much.

I want you to get in order and he's to go on the wagon throughout the balance of this offensive.

Is that clear?

Yes, sir.

Totally.

The other thing that's going to happen is that he is going to start coming up with some ideas as to the use of the Air Force and so forth, and as to the planning here, rather than just sitting back on his ass and waiting for things to happen.

Now, I have read the reports that came from Defense on this thing on Friday, on Saturday.

They, if that's from out there,

They did not.

They were not accurate.

They did not explain what the facts were adequately.

And what is happening here is that it is a defense in its usual way, is temporizing with the situation, which is serious, but which can be turned to our advantage.

But it can only be turned to our advantage with the massive use of all of our assets.

And also, in terms of our air power, I'm not waiting until it's ceiling unlimited before we get out there and clobber them where they are.

Now, from the moment you leave this office, I want somebody to get out there, and I want everything that can fly, flying in that area.

And good God, in the Battle of the Bulge, they were able to fly even in a snowstorm.

Now, what in the hell was the matter with the Air Force?

that they are unable to conduct defensive operations necessarily.

So they're going to fly down, drop them over in a cane field in the Andalusia Strip, get another Purple Heart, I mean, air battle for that.

But I want this Air Force, and that includes the Navy.

You've only got, I understand, instead of having the four carriers ordered, maybe you've got two, is that right?

No, sir.

The three, they have the fourth one will be there very shortly.

How shortly?

In about, I would say, in about 50 hours.

All right.

That's too long.

Too long.

You shouldn't have left.

When those four carriers are there, now, we have got to use this Air Force in a way

that will be as effective as possible.

The other thing is an immediate study is to be made of the use of B-52s in the study, and I need a recommendation with NARs, and I don't want to go through that.

I'm going to crap around with the Secretary of Defense on this either.

I need...

it will be helpful in that 40 mile uh that's right it will be helpful understand uh the idea that we if we don't have the assets we can do it otherwise we use 52s now if the reason for not using 52s is because they are vulnerable i understand that if on the other hand they used to be 52s after you've taken out the sands wouldn't be helpful we various

Because the thing that I am concerned about here is that, well, first, I don't like this business of not getting information when I ask for it.

I was on the phone all day yesterday and couldn't get a goddamn thing out of the Department of Defense.

I got one half-assed

memorandum, which is so disgraceful in terms of it being an ad that I really don't, I'm really ashamed to have it in my file.

I have it in my file, but I'm going to keep it personal, and I hope I never write the book.

But from now on, we're to have the truth, and that guy should be over here, and that's on him, not just in the morning.

He should be here 7 o'clock at night.

Let him work a little overtime over there.

Is that clear?

Yes, sir.

Get him over here.

And I want the plan.

I want what he's done.

I want what has been done to carry out these orders.

Now, as far as this is, as the, and then acres.

And that MACD staff and all the rest, they're going to knock off all the parties that say there must be anything out there.

And until they get this thing contained, they have got to have what we need from them.

What we need from them are some ideas on their part as to what they're going to do.

Rather than we'll run the same numbers, you know, we'll hit the same targets here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

The idea that we would be surprised by this, the idea that we didn't, I mean, we thought the B-3 thing was coming and so forth, that, well, they had more tanks there than we expected, and that they had more forces there than we expected, and all that sort of thing.

I don't buy that.

Now, it isn't we being surprised.

I mean, it is the Army being surprised.

That's what they said.

Matt B. was pissing on the Army.

We're the ones that are supposed to have intelligence.

The Army doesn't have much in terms of intelligence.

But my point is that I know we have many assets out there in terms of ground forces.

And we're not going to have any.

This has got to be said.

But we've got some very considerable assets in terms of air power.

But those assets have to be concentrated in areas that will provide shock treatment.

Now, as we did in the B-3 area, remember, we had a couple of days strike and did a little good.

Now, we've got to concentrate in these areas and give it some job treatment.

And as an undergraduate, 25 miles, you've got to go up to 30 miles in order to do the job.

We have that Donahoe area.

We have the Donahoe area.

Right on.

Now, the 48-hour strike is not going to wait until Friday.

It's got to go Wednesday.

Is that clear?

Yes, sir.

Yeah.

Is the purpose of waiting the Friday weather?

Well, it's not, uh, it's not... You can't get it ready?

No, it'll go away.

No problem if the weather's satisfactory, it could go away.

It won't go away if the weather...

There's no restriction on the comparison.

There's no... What's the problem you said about Friday?

They had told me last night it wouldn't go through Friday.

Well, they were just getting into weather.

Huh.

All right.

There's no...

Weather is one thing.

But let me say, the decision has been made.

We need a winch.

We did Wednesday for a number of reasons, not the least of which is military.

There are other reasons, too, that are supplemental, but the military is the most important one.

And we may not get a chance to whack some of those supplies up now, and they might be coming in September and October.

So let's get the damn strength off, I mean, if the weather is reasonable.

I don't want to go off and tag weather.

You shouldn't go if they can't do a good job.

No, no, no, no, I don't.

There's absolutely nothing.

If they can't do an adequate job, there's no reason to go over to North Vietnam.

It's got to be an effective job in the North.

But right now...

Right now, when the argument is under very serious attack, the Air Force has got to take some goddamn risks.

Just like the Air Force took some risks in World War II in the Battle of the Bulge.

Because we were under serious attack, the Air Force had to take some risks.

We lost the battle.

Well, the Air Force is not reluctant in any sense to take risks, Mr. President.

The problem in the north of the DMZ is that with these missile sites, they're moving them around all the time, and you need some kind of visibility in order to get the site itself.

Now, in all fairness to General Abrams, you should know that he and St. Pat, Admiral McCain, have repeatedly asked for authority to attack these missile sites north.

And we haven't been given it, partner, because you just gave it to us just yesterday.

But we knew that they were accumulating these forces in tanks and mobile artillery and so on north of the DMV.

And we're waiting as well as this time of year.

The only way to do that right is for the man on the scene to have the authority to go maybe like four hours a day or two hours all of a sudden as this flow shifts back and forth.

And it's very difficult, almost impossible to run that for Washington.

And so far as the report to you is concerned, let me tell you right now that if I am directed together for it, you will get them precisely where they're at.

But I am not running this...

of the reporting business.

And I am passing the information up to the Secretary of Defense, and it's being run up there, but if you want me to do it, I can do it right now.

I am directing you, and Secretary of Defense raises the question, I have to have them directly, and they must be unsanitized.

And also, when an order goes, it's got to go from me.

The Secretary of Defense does not, he's not the Commander-in-Chief.

The Secretary of Defense does not make decisions on these.

Not that he doesn't have a turbine officer.

That's what he is, if not another goddamn thing.

And from now on, this has got to be done this way.

So under these circumstances, we can go.

Now, getting back to this thing,

Let's see what kind of an excuse is being developed here.

You say that...

I'm not giving excuses.

No, no, no.

What Abrams wrote, I thought I asked you about that earlier, Henry, about this authority with regard to hitting.

You said they had authority in the DM.

But you gave the authority in February.

Then it was stopped during the... China.

During the China thing.

That is in North Vietnam.

The DMZ, they have had authority to hit in the DMZ, but then the authority was never implemented after you came back from China for this 19-mile area that we had agreed to because the offensive didn't come.

Then when they asked for it again, we gave it, and you actually ordered a wider belt than the one they asked for.

When was that?

This weekend.

Yeah.

Well, we asked on the 8th of March for this authority to go north of the DMV, and it was turned down.

And then we asked again...

And we finally got the authority yesterday, but you cannot handle a threat such as accumulated north of the DMZ unless you really work on it when you have the weather.

When you have the weather, that's where that works.

You've got to see the target.

I understand.

Now, the situation always now is that as far as sorties and so forth are concerned,

They'll go to the library today.

You can at least do something in this area at this time.

Yes, sir.

All right.

Now, we are, Mr. President, putting all of the B-52s, every one we have up there.

Good.

Where?

In the DMV area.

In the DMV area, yes, sir.

They can go above that stuff, can't they?

Well, we're going up to the DMV.

Now, we've got to get up there and get out to some of those missile sites to make it viable.

Let's make it a thing.

What's the law on...

I understand.

We can't lose D at 52.

Yes, sir.

From now on, you get those reports into me.

And the second thing is, I want Abrams, Brake's car, his promotion, dependent upon how he conducts himself.

Now, just you weren't here at the time.

He screwed up Lops.

He's not going to screw this one up.

Is that clear?

Yes, sir.

All right.