Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 701 › Conversation 701-014
Nixon, Kissinger & Chafee on Vietnam War and North Vietnamese Offensive
Tuesday, April 4, 1972 · 12:13 PM–1:15 PM ET · Oval Office · 1 hr 2 min
AI Summary
President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger, Melvin Laird, and John Chafee to discuss the worsening North Vietnamese offensive and the military response required to protect South Vietnamese positions. Nixon emphasized the necessity of using intensified air and naval power to grind down invading forces, comparing the tactical retreat to historical battles like Ypres and Verdun to underscore his strategy of consolidation and counter-offensive. The President also discussed upcoming U.S.-Soviet relations and political messaging for his administration, while offering personal counsel to Chafee regarding his campaign for the U.S. Senate.
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NARA Description
On April 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), John H. Chafee, White House photographer, Henry A. Kissinger, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Melvin R. Laird met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:13 pm to 1:15 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 701-014 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 701-14
Date: April 4, 1972
Time: 12:13 pm - 1:15 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Kissinger’s schedule
-Meeting
Vietnam
-Weather
-Naval gunfire
-Mining operations
-Kissinger’s previous conversation with Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Plans
-Preparations
-Philippines
-Richard M. Helms
-Information
-Reaction
-[David] Kenneth Rush
-Conversation with Kissinger
-Dated statement
-Review of requests for bombing authority
-Melvin R. Laird's approval
-Surface to Air missiles [SAMs]
-Air strikes
-Increase
-Marine planes
-Location
-Support personnel
-US Air Force [USAF]
-Marine Aircraft
-Marines compared to USAF
-USAF pilots
-Aircraft
-Quality
-The President’s view
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Haig’s opinion
-Moorer
-Response to the President's orders
-The President's orders
-Politics
-US foreign policy
-Military's role and responsibilities
-Ground troops
-Moorer
-B-52s
-Increase
-F-4s
-Carriers
-Number
-Destroyers
-Number
-The President’s opinion
-Cruisers
-Naval gunfire
-Targets
-Dong Hoi airfield
-Logistics
-Lyndon B. Johnson
-Air strikes
-Weather
-Improvement
-Possible delays
-Moorer's plans
-Kissinger’s previous conversation with Moorer
-Authority
-18th parallel
-Extension
-48 hour strike
-US position
-Mining
-Impact
-Delays
-Impact
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Challenge
-South Vietnamese strategy
-Retreat and consolidation
-The President’s theory
-Winston S. Churchill on World War I
-Comparisons to present situation
-Lt. Gen. Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough
-Allied victory
-German losses and victories
-Ypres
-Numbers
-British retreat
-Erich Ludendorff
-Churchill’s point
-Necessity
-Hue and Da Nang
-Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu
-Possible strategy
-Formation of line
-Exposure of North Vietnam
-Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
-Impact on North Vietnam
-Compared to Laos
-Possible end to the war by year’s end
-Political impact
-Election
-Timing
-Democratic National Convention
-North Vietnamese Offensive
-Need for decisive defeat
-Break in weather
-Negotiations
-Probability before trip to Soviet Union
Announcement on Warsaw
-Notification of State Department and Warsaw
-Laird
The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 12:13 and 12:25 pm.
[Conversation No. 701-14A]
Message for Herbert G. Klein
-Message for Richard L. Wilson
-Announcement on Warsaw
-Delay
-Diplomatic channels
[End of telephone conversation]
US-Soviet Union relations
-Kissinger's meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev
-Note to the President
-Purpose
Laird and John H. Chafee entered at 12:25 pm; the White House photographer was present at the
beginning of the meeting.
Greetings
Chafee
-Departure from administration
[Photograph session]
Seating
Cabinet officers
-Subcabinet officers
-Importance
-Gratitude for Chafee's work
*****************************************************************
[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 09/16/2022.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[701-014-w002]
[Duration: 7m 59s]
John H. Chafee
-Candidacy for Senate
-Claiborne Pell
-Intelligence
-The President’s opinion
-Chances in Rhode Island
-Experience
-Governor and Secretary of the Navy
-Work with Administration
-Appreciation for the President, Melvin R. Laird, and the Navy
-Importance in Rhode Island
-Campaign
-Appeal of strong national defense and naval power
-Claiborne Pell
-Importance of Navy
-Melvin R. Laird
-Arms control
-United States superiority on sea
-Compared to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Ground forces
-Necessity
-Speech before Knights of Columbus
1972 election
-Wisconsin
-Liberalism
-George S. McGovern
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Reasons for victory
-Organization Democrats
-Hostility to Edmund S. Muskie
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Patrick J. Lucey
-Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy's supporter
-Opposition to Edmund S. Muskie
-Edmund S. Muskie television appearance
-California primary
-List of candidates
-Samuel W. Yorty
-Edmund S. Muskie
-George S. McGovern
-Eugene J. McCarthy
-Shirley Chisholm
-George C. Wallace
-Number
-Compared with Wisconsin
-Protest votes
-Cross-over votes
-George C. Wallace
-Republicans
-Rhode Island
-John H. Chafee's chances for Senate
-Qualifications
-New Hampshire
-Thomas J. McIntyre
-Wesley Powell
-Wife
-Record
*****************************************************************
Kissinger's departure
-Phone call
Kissinger left at 12:35 pm.
*****************************************************************
[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 09/16/2022.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[701-014-w003]
[Duration: 5m 43s]
1972 election
-Rhode Island
-Primary
-Gubernatorial candidate
-Herbert F. Desimone
-Qualifications
-Ethnic background
-Incumbent Governor
-Frank Licht
-Compared with Milton J. Shapp
-The President’s previous encounter
-1968 and 1970 race against John H. Chafee
-Issues
-Income tax
-Change of position
-Race for Senate and Governor's seat
-Last Republican elected from Rhode Island
-Claiborne Pell
-Popularity
-John O. Pastore
-John H. Chafee's campaign
-Issues
-John H. Chafee's reputation
-John H. Chafee's qualifications
-Compared to Claiborne Pell
-Melvin R. Laird
-Stand on national defense
-Maine
-William D. Hathaway
-Popularity
-Race against Margaret Chase Smith
-Strength
-Margaret Chase Smith
-Primary race
-Age
-Liability
-Power in Senate
-Naval shipyard
-Value
*****************************************************************
Portsmouth Navy Yard
-Decision to keep open
-Described
-Norris Cotton
-Value
-Laird
-Cotton
-Uses
Henry A. Kissinger entered at 12:42 pm.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
-Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
-Passage
-Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
-Naval vessels
-Submarines
-Technical problems
-Keel laying
Presidential gifts
-Money clip
Chafee
-Laird
1972 election
-Chafee
-Campaign practices
Chafee left at 12:44 pm.
*****************************************************************
[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 09/16/2022.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[701-014-w005]
[Duration: 41s]
1972 election
-John H. Chafee
-Chances of success
-Claiborne Pell’s weakness
-Liberalism
-Support on foreign policy
-Claiborne Pell’s record
*****************************************************************
SALT
-SLBMs
-Laird's position
-US negotiating position
-Helsinki
-An agreement
-Undersea Long-Range Missile System [ULMS]
-Keel laying
-Limitations
-Appeal
-Powered by the State Department and Joint Chief of Staff [JCS]
-Problems
-Public apprehensions
-Soviet Union
-Submarine agreement
-Political problems
-Development of facilities
-Soviet [Delta Class] submarines
-Missiles
-Range
-Number
-Facilities
-US facilities
-Limitations
Vietnam
-President’s instructions to Laird
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Stakes For US
-US withdrawal
-President’s view
-US defeat
-Consequences
-US foreign policy
-Presidency
-President’s awareness of situation
-US counteraction
-National Security Council [NSC]
-William P. Rogerts
-State Department
-Risks
-Election
-Necessity for strong action
-Air and naval power
-Increase
-The President's meeting with Adm. Thomas H. Moorer and [David]
Kenneth Rush
-Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG] reports
-Laird's Role
-Criticism
-Assessing success and failure
-Laird's recommendation
-Cancellation of bombing
-Target areas
-Geographical limit
-US options
-Air strikes
-Laird’s recommendation
-18th parallel
-No restrictions on authority
-Timing
-Authority
-Extension
-Time frame
-US actions
-Resources
-Support role
-Target areas
-B-3 area
-Activity
-Weather
-Forecasts
-Timing
-USAF reluctance
-Battle of the Bulge
-Comparisons
-Risks
-Naval Gunfire
-Ships
-Number
-Guns
-Capacities
-Accuracy
-Shore batteries
-Destroyers
-Targets
-Tactical Air Support [TACAIR]
-Performance
-Tanks
-Personnel
-Sir Robert Thompson
-North Vietnamese vulnerability
-South Vietnam military
-Hue
-Thieu
-Retreat
-Advantages
-Battle of Verdun
-French
-Reports of battle
-Criticism of Department of Defense [DoD]
-Bombing requests
-Possible problems coming from Laird’s office
-Blame on Laird for reluctance
-JCS
-Lack of forthcoming infromation to the President
-Air strikes
-Laird's role
-Loyalty to the President
-Possibly questioned
-Press conference
-Rogers
-Timing
-Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] violations
-Schedule changes
-Recognition of Bangladesh
-Rogers’s responsibilities
-Laird’s previous conversation with the President
-Previous telephone conversation with Robert J.
McCloskey
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Line for the press
-Conversation with Laird’s people
-President’s instructions for Laird
-Points to make
-US purposes for air strikes
-Protection of Americans
-Vietnamization
-Continuation
-Aid to South Vietnam's defense
-Prisoners of War [POWs] return
-US actions
-Ground troops
-Air power
-Target areas
-Violation of international law
-Strong, hard line from Laird
-Rogers
-Comparison to Laird
-Cambodia
-Changes in character of war
-Compared with Korean Conflict
-Violations by North Vietnam
-1954 agreement, 1968 bombing halt
-Rogers
-Air strikes
-Targets
-Protection of Americans
-Number
-Escalation of war
-Edmund S. Muskie's charges
-The President’s response
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Demands for more aid to South Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Vietnamization
-Impact
-Laird's statement
-Possible credibility problem
-South Vietnamese strength
-Chances of success
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-Thieu
-US confidence in South Vietnamese
Abilities
-Abrams comment
-Football analogy
-Past retreats
-Battle of the Bulge
-World War I
-Great Britain and Germany
-Public relations response
-Laird's statements
-Follow-up from the President
-Timing
-Scheduling
-Rogers and Laird
-Coordination of various agencies
-Authorities
-Ziegler
-Report of meeting between Laird and the President
-Laird
-Loyalty to the President
-Questions
-Laird's relationship with JCS
-Hardline from Laird
The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 12:44 and 1:11 pm.
[Conversation No. 701-14B]
Request that Ziegler join them
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Laird
-Loyalty to the President
-Problems of communication within the DoD and between the DoD
and the White House
-Weather
-Forecasts
-Effect on air sorties
-Number
-B-3 Area
-Possible psychological impact
-Effect on air sorties
-B-52s
-Problems
-Surface-To-Air Missiles [SAMs]
-Countermeasures
-Target Areas
-DMZ
-Effectiveness
-SAMs
-Target Areas
-Risks
-DMZ
-SAMs
-Losses
-Florida
-US countermeasures
-Options
Ziegler entered At 1:11 pm.
-Impact on People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Soviet Union
-US credibility
-Impact on US allies
-Asia, Europe and Latin America
Kissinger left at 1:12 pm.
-The President's meeting with Laird
-Ziegler's report
-Statement for press
-Laird's press conference
-Timing
-Rogers
-Presentation
Laird left at an unknown time before 1:15 pm.
-Weather
-Impact on air strikes
-Public reaction
-Air strikes
-Muskie's criticism
-Escalation of war
-Responsibility
-North Vietnamese offensive
-McCloskey
-Ziegler's report
-Administation’s stance
-Ziegler’s previous conversation with Haig
-Public relations
-Strategy
-Comments to press
-Confidence
-Possible outcome
-Press
-Contradictory reports
-Robert Pierpoint
-Crisis in White House
-Ziegler’s previous conversatin with Bill Jarriel [?]
-WSAG meetings
-Templeton [first name unknown]
Ziegler left at 1:15 pm.Also recorded on April 4, 1972
- 701-009 10:46 AM · 59 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Julie Nixon Eisenhower, unknown person(s), and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:46 am to 11:46 am.
- 701-010 11:46 AM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Robert P. Murray, Harry Hathaway, Walter S. McLin, III, John Mitchell Eger, L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III, Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:46 am to 11:58 am.
- 701-011 11:58 AM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander P. Butterfield, Oscar Dystel, Markus Jaffe, Samuel Schulman, Richard L. Wilson, Herbert G. Klein, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:58 am and 12:11 pm.
- 701-012 12:11 PM · 21 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:11 pm and 12:12 pm.
- 701-013 12:12 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, LynRae McClintock, and Gordon C. Strachan met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:12 pm to 12:13 pm.
- 701-015 1:15 PM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:15 pm and 1:17 pm.
- 701-016 1:15 PM · 2 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:15 pm and 1:17 pm.
- 701-017 1:17 PM · 14 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:17 pm to 1:32 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 701-014, April 4, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/701-014 (accessed October 12, 2026).