President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the intensifying North Vietnamese offensive and strategies to counter it, including the use of B-52 strikes and naval gunfire. Nixon expressed frustration with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s pessimism and perceived lack of enthusiasm, contrasting him unfavorably with the supportive Kenneth Rush. The two leaders emphasized that the United States must project an image of unpredictable resolve to pressure the Soviet Union and China while maintaining that national security decisions remain independent of the upcoming 1972 election. Consequently, they directed preparations for expanded air operations and potential mining contingencies to signal American strength.
On April 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:17 pm to 1:32 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 701-017 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding AidConversation No. 701-17
Date: April 4, 1972
Time: 1:17 pm - 1:32 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Vietnam
-Melvin R. Laird
-Protestations of loyalty
*****************************************************************
[Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 09/16/2022. Segment cleared for
release.]
[Privacy]
[701-017-w001]
[Duration: 5s]
Vietnam
-Melvin R. Laird
-Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
*****************************************************************
Vietnam
-Melvin R. Laird
-Public relations efforts
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Importance
-Weather
-Pessimism
-Weather
-US Air Force [USAF]
-Reluctance in bad weather
-B-52s
-Naval gunfire
-Laird's evaluation
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Kissinger’s trust
-Range
-Employment
-Laird's Pessimism
-Gen. Robert E. Pursley
-[David] Kenneth Rush
-Support for the President
-Compared with David N. Packard
-Loyalty
-Laird
-Pessimism
-Naval gunfire
-B-52s
-Possible psychological impact
-Soviet Union and People's Republic Of China [PRC] and Hanoi
-India-Pakistan war
-Similarities to present situation
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Kissinger’s view
-US counteraction
-Dong Hoi
-Supply Depots
-B-52s
-Effectiveness
-B-3 area
-Air strikes
-Effectiveness
-Weather
-PRC and Soviet Union
-Duration of bad weather
-Limitations on air power
-Current aircraft
-Impact on aircraft
-Comparisons to the Battle of the Bulge
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Previous conversation with Kissinger
-Comparison to the early stages of the Vietnam war
-Commercial planes
-Richard M. Helms
-Support for administration's policy
-Comments
-South Vietnamese resistance
-Hue
-Blockade of Haiphong
-Strength of South Vietnam
-Compared with the Battle of the Bulge
-Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.
-US equipment
-Laird and Rush
-Comparisons
-Public relations
-William P. Rogers
-Press conference
-Bangladesh
-Vietnam
-Air strikes
-Northern limits
-Administration’s stance
-Options
-Target areas
-Blockade of Haiphong
-Mining
-Preparations
-Philippines
*****************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number LPRN-T-MDR-
2014-035. Segment exempt per Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(1) on 05/14/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[701-017-w002]
[Duration: 10s]
VIETNAM
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
*****************************************************************
Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-PRC and Soviet Union warnings against US interventions
-US actions
-Administration’s stance
-Appearance
-Jordan
-India-Pakistan war
-Impact on PRC and Soviet Union
-Impact on election
-Soviets
-Interests
-Berlin agreement
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Talk with Kissinger
-Summit
-Kissinger’s previous conversations with the State Department
-Likelihood of cancellation
-Military mission in Hanoi
-Analysis
-Military equipment
-Inclusion in Laird’s statement
-Equipment in Vietnam
-Tanks, planes, trucks
-Joseph W. Alsop
-Forthcoming meeting with Kissinger
-Social occasions
-Kissinger’s previous conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-1972 election
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Air strikes in North
-Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
-Effectiveness
-South Vietnam
-1968 Tet offensive
-Khe Sanh
The President and Kissinger left at 1:32 pm.This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.