Conversation 701-017

TapeTape 701StartTuesday, April 4, 1972 at 1:17 PMEndTuesday, April 4, 1972 at 1:32 PMTape start time04:43:06Tape end time04:57:58ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On April 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:17 pm to 1:32 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 701-017 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 701-17

Date: April 4, 1972
Time: 1:17 pm - 1:32 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Vietnam
          -Melvin R. Laird
               -Protestations of loyalty

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[Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 09/16/2022. Segment cleared for
release.]
[Privacy]
[701-017-w001]
[Duration: 5s]

     Vietnam
          -Melvin R. Laird
               -Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion

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     Vietnam
          -Melvin R. Laird
               -Public relations efforts
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Importance
                     -Weather
                           -Pessimism
               -Weather
                     -US Air Force [USAF]
                           -Reluctance in bad weather
                           -B-52s

      -Naval gunfire
            -Laird's evaluation
            -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                  -Kissinger’s trust
            -Range
            -Employment
      -Laird's Pessimism
            -Gen. Robert E. Pursley
-[David] Kenneth Rush
      -Support for the President
      -Compared with David N. Packard
            -Loyalty
-Laird
      -Pessimism
            -Naval gunfire
            -B-52s
                  -Possible psychological impact
-Soviet Union and People's Republic Of China [PRC] and Hanoi
      -India-Pakistan war
            -Similarities to present situation
-North Vietnamese offensive
      -Kissinger’s view
            -US counteraction
                  -Dong Hoi
                        -Supply Depots
                  -B-52s
                  -Effectiveness
            -B-3 area
                  -Air strikes
                        -Effectiveness
      -Weather
            -PRC and Soviet Union
            -Duration of bad weather
            -Limitations on air power
            -Current aircraft
            -Impact on aircraft
                  -Comparisons to the Battle of the Bulge
                  -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                        -Previous conversation with Kissinger
                              -Comparison to the early stages of the Vietnam war
                  -Commercial planes
      -Richard M. Helms

                      -Support for administration's policy
                            -Comments
                -South Vietnamese resistance
                      -Hue
                            -Blockade of Haiphong
                            -Strength of South Vietnam
                -Compared with the Battle of the Bulge
                      -Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.
                -US equipment
                -Laird and Rush
                      -Comparisons
          -Public relations
                -William P. Rogers
                      -Press conference
                            -Bangladesh
                            -Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Northern limits
                -Administration’s stance
                -Options
                -Target areas
          -Blockade of Haiphong
                -Mining
                      -Preparations
                            -Philippines

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number LPRN-T-MDR-
2014-035. Segment exempt per Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(1) on 05/14/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[701-017-w002]
[Duration: 10s]

     VIETNAM

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

*****************************************************************

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -PRC and Soviet Union warnings against US interventions
               -US actions
                     -Administration’s stance
                     -Appearance
                           -Jordan
                           -India-Pakistan war
                           -Impact on PRC and Soviet Union
                     -Impact on election
          -Soviets
               -Interests
                     -Berlin agreement
                           -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                                 -Talk with Kissinger
               -Summit
                     -Kissinger’s previous conversations with the State Department
                     -Likelihood of cancellation
               -Military mission in Hanoi
                     -Analysis
                           -Military equipment
                                 -Inclusion in Laird’s statement
               -Equipment in Vietnam
                     -Tanks, planes, trucks
               -Joseph W. Alsop
                     -Forthcoming meeting with Kissinger
                     -Social occasions
                     -Kissinger’s previous conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                     -1972 election
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Air strikes in North
                     -Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
                     -Effectiveness
               -South Vietnam
               -1968 Tet offensive
                     -Khe Sanh

The President and Kissinger left at 1:32 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, I, if he doesn't understand this, he's improved.
Well, I'm afraid he sure protests his loyalty.
Christ, what a hilarious question.
He's so crooked.
Who is he?
He's so unbelievably crooked, but it's no sense.
everybody around here has got to realize we aren't going to lose this man.
When he says the weather doesn't break for 48 hours, we lose.
I don't believe that.
I just don't believe it.
I don't think it's valid to want our loss that soon.
But God Almighty, there must
Now, incidentally, he says that it isn't wise to use 52s in the above area.
And also, just on the naval gunfire thing.
Now, what the hell?
Who's right and wrong?
I trust Moore on the naval gunfire a hell of a lot more than I trust him.
He showed you 7 kilometers.
The range is 10 miles, which is 16 kilometers.
All right.
Use it.
Use everything we can.
Well, the worst is it doesn't hit anything.
It doesn't hurt anything.
Okay.
Mark, you've got to enable that, Mark.
You've got one more.
You have to remember this guy first, what he's got on his side.
Yeah.
It's the best interest in our lives.
No matter what we order, he's going to prove it won't work.
Okay.
He's the last guy I'm really after, of course.
Mel is going to behave.
He's shaking hands with the best of boys that you've made in a long time, Mr.
Rush.
I mean, he makes... Oh, absolutely.
He makes his predecessors as good as he was.
He's much smarter.
He's smarter and he's much more oriented towards you.
Packard was law.
Russia is just a total loyalist.
But, God, as I said, you should talk to military chiefs about your decision on the goddamn thing he's for.
Not for the naval gunfire, not for the B-52 strike, something like that.
I think the B-52's hitting that 40-mile belt could have a psychological effect.
Aren't there anything to get up there?
Mr. President, I'll...
They can take out airfields.
I'll make the thing out to get across to the Russians.
to the Chinese and to Hanoi, that we're on the verge of going crazy.
This is how we broke the India-Pakistan situation.
With nothing.
With nothing.
With nothing.
By just giving the impression that you were just crazy enough to fight for West Pakistan.
If we could make that one stick, we can make this one stick.
And we'll escalate it.
And that's why we've got to pour things in there.
All these guys who say, what's effective?
Health?
Nothing is going to be.
If we start shelling Don Hoi with naval gunfire, that's something we haven't done yet.
And that's a, well, I mean, they have supply guns outside of Don Hoi.
That's right.
If we start, and the air, if we start hitting with B-52s north of the DMZ, that's a signal.
When we start pouring more airplanes in there, that's a signal.
You can't ever prove that any one of them, and if we start getting hit on the B3 front, he'll need every airplane he's got.
Out there.
Yes.
But it'll work there, too, won't it?
Yes.
Actually, where they are now, we ought to be able to create them, because in the B3 front, they're on the jungle.
Yeah.
So we won't be able to see so well.
But in the other front, it's a classical infantry battle, and if we can ever get a good day in there,
We just ought to wreck them.
I doubt that.
I can't believe the weather's hanging on us.
I can't believe it.
Is the weather somewhere hanging for weeks at this time of year?
It doesn't normally affect us.
It's of course a disgrace, Mr. President.
They have to fight if they...
in China, in Russia, in any one of our major enemies, we're going to have weather like this.
This is not unusual weather around the world if you look at conditions.
So why design an airplane in which you can only farm visually?
It's not only visually.
It's got to be 4,000 to 5,000 feet.
Well, hell, I don't know.
This is probably 5,000 feet.
A commercial aircraft can land with...
He talked about the battle motion system later.
It did in the movie, but it didn't actually out there.
Those bombers went in and bombed through the snow.
That's right.
And Al Haig tells me that in the early stages of the Vietnam War, when they still had the old planes, he was never worried about any support.
It was always there.
Is that right?
Yes.
And a commercial plane can land with 300 feet
Here they require 4,000 feet.
It's ridiculous.
What did Tom say?
How was the bellwether?
It was a good bellwether.
He said this was exciting.
This is the first positive thing he has heard.
He said keep it up.
He said, that's the only way to do it.
He used almost a phrase, not as eloquently as you, but he in effect said, they won't blame you for succeeding.
And they won't give you credit for failing.
I mean, he didn't use exactly those words, but that was the sense of what he used.
On the other hand, suppose the goddamn line breaks, suppose they take away, then all we've left is that we'll have to go to the blockade.
Mr. President, I don't think Huawei will fall that quickly.
They've got their best division in front of them, and the weather is got to clear by then.
No, we're not going to borrow charlotte's today.
I think this is, this is how battle of the folks.
There's no American troops, and we depend on a bunch of them.
God damn it, we train these troops.
We have our equipment.
Yeah, you know, this is, when I compare Rush with Laird, I mean, Rush is charging his enthusiasm.
He says, terrific, thank the president.
You know, O'Leary's sort of carrying out his orders, but he's...
He's protesting.
He's loyal.
God damn it.
Well, it would be...
But his orders are not going to end for the first conference.
I doubt it.
The major problem is to make sure that if he ends the first conference that he talks about Vietnam and not Bangladesh.
Well, you can't.
These are the questions that you and I have.
You can't.
You know what I mean?
If he talks about Bangladesh, he's not going to make any news.
But the question I'm going to ask him about Vietnam, the major problem is for him to talk god damn tough.
But I'm not going to ask him to.
Bill has got to play his own life.
He can't show any weakness.
He can show no weakness.
He can show no weakness.
Henry, is that the 38th barrel that was fired?
Is that what it is?
38th?
It's 18th.
I'm sorry.
All right, the 18th.
I'm sort of torn on that strike up to the 9th.
I've got nothing against it.
I just thought the more we can say it's geared to the battle, the better off we are here.
Well, we don't have to do that right away anyway.
Now, why don't we get the other one started?
Let's let it come.
We're not being reserved, so we just knock the hell out of everything from up to the 18th or the 19th.
I want to have that in one of the contingencies.
Also, I want this mining plant ready.
They're loading mines, I think.
They're loading mines in the Philippines.
The Chinese and Russians warned us yet not to intervene, not to bomb.
Well, they will.
They'd have to, because the story is always the gate we're going to.
It's dangerous to warn and to do something if Bennett is ineffective.
I think the wilder we look, the better it is for us.
We will get the worst is to look hesitant, because then they'll want to get a point for keeping us from doing what we might not want to do.
No, no.
I mean, we've done it in Jordan.
We've done it now.
We did it in India, Pakistan, and we've got a plane right now.
Yeah, I see your point.
Your idea, Henry, is that the appearance of some practice is scary.
How the election and all the rest is the thing that's going to make these bastards safe.
You see, that's the point I raised with you yesterday.
Is there some possibility that in the back of their mind, they might feel I was restraining them because of the damn election.
Is that my point?
They might.
You see, Mr. President, I think you will not trickle the Russians into this unless they think you might just blow the whole damn thing.
They're not doing the summit to do you a favor.
In fact, when they thought the summit was doing you a favor, they played a damn tough game.
They gave you an answer only if they started coming the other way, only when they start needing you.
They need you now on the Berlin ratification.
They have a big right to .
Well, and we know there's a fact that you start raising hell with us that strengthens the enemies of ratification in Germany.
That's a fact.
Actually, you go ahead.
Oh, yeah.
Good.
So your view is as far as the Russians are concerned, they all...
In fact, I told the state... Let me say this.
Let me say this.
The Russians, if the Russians knock off the summit to resolve this... Well, like you say, if they do, I'm simply going to say that we are not going to have the Communists determine our foreign policy.
They're going to hit them right in the nose.
Inconceivable.
We will not do it.
The State got a question yesterday about what do we think of the Russian military mission in Hanoi, and he avoided it.
I told him today the question comes to say, let's not forget the Russians.
We are not saying the Russians are planning these operations.
We are saying it's Russian equipment that's making them possible.
Be sure that that's in the election frame.
It's just jeopardizing Soviet-American relations.
Right.
That's it.
That is the very thing.
Excellent.
We've got, I can show out some.
Oh, yeah.
Ready to give me my instruction.
But...
I'm telling you, you can't write anything.
No.
I mean, he shouldn't write about social occasions.
No, he won't write about social occasions.
He won't.
He can write anything else he wants.
No, but he was really... That's awesome.
extraordinary performance.
Joe, I'll tell you, you can get out of the line, but again, if you want, that this president isn't a god that couldn't care less about the election in terms of the national security.
Would you get that across?
Absolutely.
Because we're not making these decisions on political grounds.
If I was going to do that, I'd have bucked out the first week.
I like your phrase, Mr. Dresden.
No one will blame
If we, if we can get them back behind the EMC, we can travel all over the place.
All right, do you think that's possible?
Yes.
I think, I think only if we solve the energy for charge.
There's a lot of charge.
No, they just had to hold.
I do not believe.
This may go like K-9 in 60A.
Did they, did they just melt it away?