Conversation 707-005

TapeTape 707StartWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 10:14 AMEndWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 10:26 AMTape start time00:09:05Tape end time00:21:50ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Scott, Hugh;  Ford, Gerald R.;  MacGregor, Clark;  Timmons, William E.;  Ziegler, Ronald L.Recording deviceOval Office

On April 12, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Hugh Scott, Gerald R. Ford, Clark MacGregor, William E. Timmons, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:14 am to 10:26 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 707-005 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 707-5

Date: April 12, 1972
Time: 10:14 am - 10:26 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Hugh Scott, Gerald R. Ford, Clark MacGregor and William E. Timmons;
the recording began at an unknown time while the meeting was in progress.

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 10:15 am.

     The President's schedule
          -Forthcoming meeting with Congressional leadership
               -Republicans
               -Democrats
                      -John C. Stennis
                      -Samuel S. Stratton
                      -F. Edward Hebert
                      -George H. Mahon
                      -Charles M. Teague
               -Michael J. Mansfield
               -Carl B. Albert
               -[Thomas] Hale Boggs
               -Mansfield
                      -Views

     Ford’s forthcoming trip to People's Republic of China [PRC]
          -Ford’s forthcoming statement

          -Possible question
          -Scheduling
               -The President's Soviet trip
               -The President’s view

Vietnam
     -Forthcoming statements from Congressional leadership
          -Troop withdrawals
               -Statement by Scott
                     -Further statements
                     -Timing
                     -The President’s view
                            -Further withdrawals
          -Congressional leadership
               -Support for the President on air and naval power
          -South Vietnamese forces
               -Possible question about combat capabilities
                     -Ground fighting
                     -Air sorties
                            -Percentage
                     -Battle reports
                            -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                            -South Vietnamese civilian support for North Vietnamese
                                 invasion
               -Scott's statement
                     -South Vietnamese performance
                            -Ziegler’s view
                            -Melvin R. Laird's, Thomas H. Moorer's and Abrams's reports
                                  -The President’s view
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Soviet support
                     -The President’s view
                            -Soviet weapons
               -Soviet Summit
                     -Possible questions regarding cancellation
               -Civilians of South Vietnam
                     -Support of South Vietnamese government
                     -Buddhist support of government
                            -Significance
                     -Support of South Vietnamese government
          -Negotiations

                        -French statement
                        -US interest
                              -The President’s view
                        -Administration's record
                              -North Vietnamese aggression
                        -Failure
                              -North Vietnamese responsibility
                        -William J. Porter
                        -Record
                              -Administration efforts
                                    -Previous speech, January 25, 1972
                        -Private talks
                              -Discussion
                                    -The President’s view
                        -US position
                              -The President’s view

      Mansfield's and Scott's forthcoming trip to PRC
          -Meeting with the President, April 11, 1972
                 -Questions on PRC
                 -The President's message to PRC leaders
          -Scott's attendance at Oxford-Cambridge dinner
                 -Questions on PRC
          -Public appearances after trip
                 -Sunday television talk shows
                 -Overseas Writers Club

Scott et al., left at 10:26 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, you did talk to Mike, I guess, yesterday.
What about Carl and Nate?
Well, if they want to come, it's fine.
I'd invite them.
I'd invite them.
Sure.
Mike, there's no need to have because Mike's views are different.
That's all.
Jerry, you're allowed to be asked when you're going to China how you handle that job.
You're allowed to get that question.
I would say that we're going after you and Mike, though, and after the President goes to...
You can't work their schedule out after the President goes to Moscow, but you say the matter is being investigated out.
Is this something that would fit into their schedule?
What do you think you would want to get to?
Well, I think first we should both get this.
We should make the point that
The withdrawal is continuing, not only on, but actually ahead of schedule.
If you permit, we should say that we would expect that there'd be a further statement around the 1st of May.
Well, I don't like to indicate any sense of weakness in that respect.
I would say, well, does that mean there's going to be a further withdrawal?
I wouldn't want to say that.
I don't want to say that now.
There may be, but I think it's very important not to.
I would simply say that the withdrawal is proceeding.
There are no American ground forces involved.
But the leadership, I would rather do emphasize in terms of foreign policy the positive point that the leadership unanimously supports the President
the President's efforts in using air and sea power to the extent necessary to accomplish these three goals.
I would say the reports are that they are doing all the whiting in the ground.
I get off the crescent, they are doing 50% of the sorties in the air, and they are, according to General Abrams' reports, the reports that we receive in battle, they are fighting very well, very significantly.
There has been
no civilian South Vietnamese support for the North Vietnamese invasion, which is, yeah.
Senator, when you're making that point, I think it's good to say that Secretary Laird and Adam Moore had made the point, so that in its court amendment, the president, if not, intends to have about three days
I would say that this, based on the reports that Secretary Atma Moore and General Abrams made,
This is what is happening.
That's right.
Rather than escalating it with my work, I'm saying, you know, so I'm very careful not to say it one way or another.
I'm not trying to judge how they're doing.
People say the reports from papers and the reports from...
The art of the art is fighting well.
Can we say this is a massive invasion with the full support of the Soviet Union?
with the full, with the technical, with the support, I wouldn't say the full support of the Soviet Union in that sense.
I'd say it's a massive invasion of North Vietnam, of South Vietnam, by North Vietnam, with the...
with the support of massive Soviet weapons, including the most modern tanks, the most modern guns.
The next question I'll get when you say that is, did the President give any indication of this effect?
No, that's right, because our views at the present time, since some of them go ahead...
But I think if we say, do you think this is going to the president's office, is that something?
He said, no.
But as far as we're concerned, it's fine.
Mr. President, not only has there been no civilian uprising or civilian defection from the Saigon government, but there are a number of stories indicating that various Buddhist groups and others neutral or hostile to Saigon have rallied to the support of Saigon.
It seems to me this is a very significant factor.
We didn't particularly touch upon it at the meeting this morning.
Well, the significant thing that has been reported
in the briefings that we have received here this morning, and all the briefings, and this is for me to say, I say, who briefed you, Dr. Jenkins?
Well, listen, these are briefings from the field.
Isn't the population of South Vietnam overwhelmingly supports the South Vietnamese against the communist forces, the communist invaders?
Overwhelmingly supports.
There's no evidence at all, and I've heard about it or read about it.
Oh, even this integration, even from the same direction.
So even, I mean, that's, I mean, it's under the press.
Mr. President, one of the things that the leadership asked for in those negotiations, because of what he had with the Thursday meeting approaches, and also because of the pressure appealed today for both the Northeast and the East, the United States, to turn out the table,
We have said up to this point that we're interested in serious negotiations with the federal government, and it's an absolute debate to get back at them.
So should we say that our president has... No, I put it this way.
I put it this way, that we... And say this on your own, that you've got to do two... One, the negotiating record of this administration, private and public,
is one that shows that it is the entity that is responsible and not the United States.
We are ready to negotiate at any time, but the United States is not going to negotiate at the point of a gun.
But the negotiating record, both private and public, as indicated by my speech in Chapter 25, and since then, leaves no doubt but that the fault for failing to negotiate is not that of the United States.
We are ready to negotiate.
At any time.
We are ready to negotiate a settlement, but we are not going to negotiate a surrender.
I put that on par.
And we're not going to negotiate at the point of a gun.
It's an invader's gun.
It's an invader's gun.
Now, as a matter of fact, as I told you, you can have quiet assurance that the negotiated record is good.
Even in this industry.
Right.
Ever since January 20th, believe me, we have gone the extra mile.
You know, it's a good God that you can have that assurance if you go to China.
We aren't going to tell you anything that you shouldn't know.
But it's a good record.
Right.
I've already eaten that.
It's a good record.
But we want to avoid making any suggestions.
There aren't any private talks going on.
Sure.
You've got to say it.
You can say, I think you can say, well, looking, I think you can say, well, you're on the judgment, the basis of the January 22nd speech.
The United States has always been taking the lead in terms of seeking negotiations.
You are competent.
You have every competence of the negotiating record of the administration.
But we are not going to negotiate surrender.
We're not going to be able to shoot them.
We may have to ask a question about the fact that Mike and I were down here yesterday.
I think it's pretty clear that we just simply say to brief this period.
Sure, you could say that the President invited you down because you are going to China, and he will see to it how soon he's going to come down.
Because to discuss your trip to China, you've done various things regarding the China visit, and you had a good talk with an old man.
You'll get the question of whether or not you're taking a letter or a message to the leaders.
It was stated to the President, of course, that the President will be sending personal messages to the leaders of China.
I got that last night at the Oxford-Cambridge dinner, socially, that was pressing me hard.
You suggested that we use every opportunity to prop up, and we got back to talk about
to groups other than just the Sunday talk shows, and already the Overseas Writers Club wants to talk to them.
That's a good forum, I'd say.
Sure.
I'll be sure they talk to us.
That's right.
Well, that's that.
That's right.
Well, thank you, Paul.
Thank you very much.
Your talk, thank you, too.
I don't see you.
I don't see you anymore.
There you go.
Good luck.
Thank you.
Goodbye, sir.
Oh, yeah
I'd like to take a second to get this nomination.