Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

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Bill has done very well, Mr. President.

I've been thinking that I don't... What's the purpose of your conversation?

Well, I don't want you to offer this, even suggest that there's a chance that we might go on this interim idea of an exchange for a... Let me tell you the weakness in that.

I've written it out here.

The weakness in that, if you hate to report it, is that

It sees it technically in the short run, but does not adequately look at, in my opinion, at the long run, the risks.

That short run, it would be a great gesture, and we could punish our critics very, very heavily.

It would be get them to withdraw, on my part, across the DMZ, and then we would give up the bombing of North Vietnam, and there would be some reduction, and we would go back to the common students.

All right.

The difficulty is that the enemy's capability still to launch significant offensive action is there.

That, you know, no matter how much time you've got, the difficulty is, too, that the pressure on the Russians is enormously lifted as far as this confrontation is concerned.

Oh, sure.

Maybe we'll go to Moscow and we'll agree on assault and a lot of other things.

The point that I make is that having taken the heat that we have already taken for escalation, I think what we have to do is to escalate all the way.

Unless, and what I'm saying is that I think the position you're going to have to be in in Moscow is not the one of being willing to back down.

In other words, let us sell.

Let us sell.

let them sell to us talks for holding the bombing, which is what this really gets down to.

They invade, that's true.

We bomb, that's true.

But when you finally get down to it, we're giving up the bombing, and we go back to talks.

And the pressure in the Russians is not going to be very great.

And my view is, what I really want to push you with the brain, it's going to be, it's going to have to be tougher than that angry police right now.

The time, you can't let the time flee by.

We have to have the blockade.

I don't give a goddamn about the election.

We'll blockade those sons of bitches and starve them out.

Might rather do that than have any talks going on this summer.

Talks this summer aren't going to help us.

But you have to make a statement, Mr. President.

First of all, I agree with you that nothing should be said about the venture of delusion to the Russians now.

That should be the result of a stalemate.

And I'm not going to make any proposition to the people now.

In fact, it should be said in Moscow, if it's said anywhere.

But if I may make this suggestion, Mr. President, if we convince the Russians that they are asking something that they cannot with the best will in the world deliver, then we may force them into brutal preemptive action to bring you down this year.

That may be their only hope.

Well, if they think they can bring you down, I'm just giving you the case for the other side, then all they have to do is endure six months of a blockade.

That they can probably do.

So that interim solution has this advantage, Mr. President.

First, it will be seen as a clear defeat for them.

I know it's temporary.

Secondly, it gets us through the Russian summit.

The reason you can do this now is because of the China summit.

And it's just awfully hard to paint you into the position of a war monk.

It gets us through the Russian summit with some notable successes.

We can build into the Russian summit a lot of things like a Middle East settlement.

that we have to deliver next year, which they'll be just as reluctant to break next year.

Then, Mr. President, after your election, I'd go all out with the North to leave the meeting.

SPEAKER 2.

We still have the war at our hands all summer long, as Hague says, which is a disturbing thing in his memorandum.

You read it to me yesterday, and I could arguably believe a thing.

He said, well, in fact, if we'll hold now, then we've got to get ready for another offensive in July.

We're not going to take an offensive

No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.

Part of this deal would have to be a reduction in Soviet deliveries and a guarantee that there would be no offensives this year.

All of this year.

We are not talking about now.

We get that fine.

We are talking about that.

I don't mind having a little fight out there.

No, no.

Oh, Mr. President, if we can only get this offensive called off with no promise about July, nor can we accept our choice that further.

We cannot accept a Hanoi promise either.

We have to get a Soviet public assurance.

Now, then this would also change the negotiating position because then, I believe, Mr. President, Hanoi would feel that by its own actions, that maybe you'll be brought down, but you cannot be brought down by Hanoi's actions.

Therefore, it is probable that you'd be president after November.

that having acted this violently now, there's no telling what you will do in November.

And their gamble is that they can have the war going on, and they'll still have the POWs from November.

And under those circumstances, the possibility of our surviving the election is very, very low.

Do you see my point?

I think they have pulled off this attack now.

particularly if they get ground down, as they do every day.

And this deal couldn't happen before May 5th to 10th anyway, in which case much of their offensive would have broken its back anyhow.

So I think that for you to do the reason

a blockade will work as if you can endure it.

If they think they need only to wait six months, they might just stick it out until then.

But this is what worries me about the blockade, Mr. President.

And you remember I had some leading towards it in 69.

You weren't postured well diplomatically to do it in 69.

And I strongly support it.

You're not doing it.

But this is the reason why I think an interim solution in which

but we should throw in the prisoners anyway.

Hague has just come back.

I was going to come in to see you.

I've come with a report from military region one that is extraordinarily optimistic.

He's a calm, confident professional.

He went around to the divisions.

He's

And he says that he is still tough, but he thinks every day that passes by may mean that the enemy has shot his wad.

It's, again, very quiet today.

Are we bombing or are we bombing enough?

That's my point.

Mr. President, we are bombing.

I know the Hague report indicated that poor Abrams has taken all the carrier aircraft up here to support the bombing in the north.

Well, God damn it, we've got to get those stories going down somewhere.

Is this Hague's report here?

I don't know what my idiot spell wrote.

No, he didn't.

No, that is not true.

That is not what this memo said.

This is a poor summary.

What he said was that one carrier has, but those planes then expend their armaments in the north.

And for example, when they

hit in the northern area, that means they didn't hit around Vinh.

So yesterday, with the strikes going on in the north, they flew more stories in all of South Vietnam than they did at the highest point before this offensive started.

They flew 500 stories in South Vietnam.

Now they can get up to 900.

And they can go to 900 in the south.

whether to bomb.

Do they know that there's any movement or, like, in my memory, if it's quiet, now is the time to bomb.

Do they understand that?

I've said that a thousand times.

If an enemy is waiting after being held back, then it's the time to hit them.

They've got a lot of B-52s in there yesterday.

And actually, I think, Mr. President, we are on the ground.

The situation is better than we could have dreamt two weeks ago.

I did not think that the South Vietnamese could withstand an offensive without losing any provincial capital in the first couple of weeks.

This is not like Laos.

They're not running.

There are no newspaper stories of these guys panicking.

They are seen to be defending themselves.

And I do not think the position is so weak.

And I think it must have a shattering impact on the North Vietnamese.

It's basically in our interest to keep this offensive going for a while and grind them down.

I know.

Whether it goes or not, we're going to grind them down.

That's right.

But I frankly believe, Mr. President, that your enormous skill has been, that you have been extraordinarily tough, that if you walked up to all the tough ones, but at the same time maintained a peace posture so that they couldn't put you into the position of just chopping away at you.

The reason the people trust you is because they know you've done everything.

And therefore, all things considered, I think it is in our interest

not to get the Russian summit knocked off, as long as we can do it while preserving our essential integrity in Vietnam.

That is the major thing.

And if this Moscow meeting does not work at all.

Or maybe we'll blockade in September, do you mean?

No.

I would think if the Moscow meeting doesn't work, then I think we should know.

If, I mean, mine doesn't work, then you might want to go to a blockade.

You might have to because you've got to handle other cars.

That's right.

And we certainly should keep the posture that you will go to a blockade.

I think we've really got their attention.

That's for sure.

But I... Yeah, that's all I wanted.

You get it back.

We've brought the same hell of a lot of work.

I appreciate what he's worked on, and I respect him.

I learned that Martin had that little asshole coming here.

He's a Polish investor.

He's not a strong man.

But for him to come in here this day, it was funny.

They may knock it off, but I don't mind that they won't knock it off.

The Russians may knock it off, but the Poles, they will do it only if the Russians do.

And I don't think the Russians will right away.

I think because the Russians can't do it.

I can't tell.

I'm just reading.

We need to talk about knocking it off now.

Better not.

Because if you get any feel of this, you remember, I'll move first.

And for Mr. President, for me to be this evening in Moscow, please take my reason.

I mean, I thought it was unbelievable.

Well, of course, some of the papers this morning were saying that the Russian leaders were out of town for the weekend, and that's why they didn't react to the bombing.

But all of them, they don't.

We got this President's message.

They just don't know anything in our papers.

Thank God.

And they'll not see it.

Right.

Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on April 17, 1972

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