Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 710 › Conversation 710-004

Nixon, Kissinger & Haldeman on Easter Offensive and Vietnamization

Monday, April 17, 1972 · 5:02 PM–5:50 PM ET · Oval Office · 47 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Laird, Melvin R.; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.)Conversation710-004 on Tape 710 (tape position 00:06:56–00:53:47)StartMonday, April 17, 1972 at 5:02 PMEndMonday, April 17, 1972 at 5:50 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 710-004 ↗

President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger, H. R. Haldeman, Melvin Laird, and Admiral Thomas Moorer to coordinate the administration's public and military response to the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive. The group discussed the importance of maintaining a firm stance to protect U.S. credibility and ensure the success of the President's upcoming Moscow trip, while emphasizing that the ongoing conflict was a Soviet-backed "massive communist invasion." Significant decisions included Laird’s plan to publicly highlight the effectiveness of South Vietnamese forces and U.S. air support, while maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding potential naval blockades or mining operations.

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On April 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Melvin R. Laird, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:02 pm to 5:50 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 710-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 710-4

Date: April 17, 1972
Time: 5:02 pm - 5:50 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Vietnam
          -Kissinger’s conversation with John A. Scali
                -The president's meeting with People's Republic of China [PRC] table tennis
                      team
                      -Location of possible match
                            -Problems
                      -Possible cancellation
                      -Announcement
                      -Possible cancellation
          -Moscow trip
                -Bombing in North Vietnam
          -Bombing
                -Risks
                -Consequences
                      -Kissinger’s and the president's soviet trips
                -Necessity
                      -Kissinger’s conversation with Stewart J.O. Alsop
          -The President's Soviet trip
                -Scali
          -Visit of People's Republic of China [PRC] team
                -Possible cancellation
          -Michael J. Mansfield’s trip to PRC

                -Possible cancellation
                      -Hong Kong stopover
                      -Mansfield’s arrival in PRC
           -Table tennis match
                -Scali's memorandum
           -The President's meeting with Melvin R. Laird and Thomas H. Moorer
                -Kissinger’s handling

H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman entered at 5:10 pm.

     PRC
           -Table tennis team visit and match
                 -Arrangements
                 -Possible cancellation of meeting with the President
Show the rest of the log (252 more lines)
                 -Arrangements
                 -Announcement
           -Possible actions
                 -Meeting with the President
                 -Cancellation of team's tour
           -Arrangements for team's visit and match
                       -Scali's memorandum
                 -Setting
                 -Time
                 -Tour of White House
                 -Meeting with the president
                 -Graham B. Steenhoven
                 -Greetings
                 -Chuang Tse-tung
           -Table tennis team
                 -Schedule
                 -Tricia Nixon Cox’s attendance at match
           -Statements on US bombing of North Vietnam

Haldeman left at 5:12 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Meeting with Laird and Moorer
              -Length

Laird and Moorer entered at 5:13 pm.

     Greetings

William M. Colmer luncheon

Vietnam
     -Laird’s testimony
           -Coordination with William P. Rogers's and the President’s statements
           -Possible questions
                 -Vietnamization
                       -Failure
                 -South Vietnamese performance
                       -North Vietnamese invasion
                             -Modern Soviet equipment
     -Military operations
           -Soviet equipment
           -US bombing
           -South Vietnamese performance
                 -New South Vietnamese division
                       -Offensive
                       -Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
                       -Hue
                       -Movement
                       -Damage to North Vietnam
                 -Fifth South Vietnamese division
                       -Improvements
                       -Commander
                             -Change
                       -An loc
                             -Tanks
                             -Air support
                 -Air cover
                       -South Vietnamese Air Force
                             -Capabilities
                             -Sorties
                                   -Number
                       -B-52s
                       -TACAIR
           -Damage to North Vietnam
           -South Vietnamese performance
     -Laird’s testimony
           -Future fighting
           -South Vietnamese performance
                 -Capabilities

            -Destruction of tanks
                  -Figures
                  -Weapons used
                  -Antitank capabilities
            -Nguyen Van Thieu
            -South Vietnamese tanks
                  -Number
                  -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                  -Combat teams
            -Military Region Two
                  -Irregular forces
     -An loc, Hue and other cities
            -Difficulties
            -South Vietnamese responsibilities
                  -US support
-North Vietnamese invasion
     -Importance
     -Compared with Tet offensive
            -Casualties
                  -US and South Vietnam
-US forces
     -Ground elements
     -Press
            -Medal and citation to unknown Lieutenant Colonel
-South Vietnamese performance
     -Improvements
-Laird’s testimony
     -Bombing
            -Military targets
            -Military installations
     -Nuclear weapons
            -Exclusion
     -Bombing
            -Targets
                  -Hanoi and Haiphong
-Soviets
     -Ships to North Vietnam
            -Caution
-Negotiations
     -Rogers and Laird testimony
     -Laird position
     -Conditions

            -Duress
            -Need for substance
                  -Edmund S. Muskie proposal
     -Cease-fire
-North Vietnamese invasion
     -DMZ
     -Illegality
     -Continuation
     -US reaction
            -Support for South Vietnam
            -Protection for US personnel
            -Curb of aggression
     -South Vietnamese performance
-Cease-fire
     -US support
     -Risks
            -US personnel
            -South Vietnamese
-North Vietnamese invasion
     -Congress
     -Antiwar resolution
            -Condemnation of invasion
            -Bias
            -Charge of assisting the enemy
-Public relations
     -Television
     -Laird
     -John C. Stennis
            -Appearance on Today Show
     -F. Edward Hebert
     -Nelson A. Rockefeller
     -Stennis and Hebert
     -Hawks
            -Television appearances
-US policies
     -Congressional support
            -Possible erosion
                  -Laos operation
-Naval action
     -Blockade
            -Further discussion
     -Newport News

            -Other cruisers
      -Effectiveness
            -Cruisers
      -US forces
            -Strengthening
                  -Public statements
                  -Confidentiality
                  -Number of ships
      -Navy forces
            -North Vietnamese knowledge
                  -Carriers
                        -Panama Canal
                        -Cape Hope
                        -Arrival
-North Vietnamese invasion
      -Withdrawals
            -US strikes
-South Vietnamese performance
      -Air sorties
            -Effectiveness
      -Aircraft
            -Maintenance
            -Training
      -US goals
      -US support
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
      -Return
-Negotiations
      -Conditions
      -Previous discussions
            -Failures
      -North Vietnamese invasion
            -Withdrawals
            -DMZ
            -US position
      -Soviets
            -Support of North Vietnam
                  -US reaction
-US credibility
      -Middle East
            -Surface to air missile [SAMs]
            -United Arab Republic

    -North Vietnamese aggression
          -Risks
          -Precedents
               -Soviets
                     -US response
    -Vietnamization
          -South Vietnamese performance
               -Press reports
                     -Errors
               -Success of program
    -Military operations
          -An loc
               -South Vietnamese control
               -North Vietnamese assaults
               -21st South Vietnamese division
               -Roads
                     -Clearance
               -North Vietnamese units
                     -271st regiment
                     -Artillery and tanks
    -US Armed Forces
          -Honor and confidence of public
    -Blockade
          -Imposition
               -Time
          -Mining
               -Advantages
          -Advantages
               -Selectivity
          -Mining
               -Disadvantages
                     -Elimination
                     -Small ships
                     -Supplies
          -US equipment
    -Military operation against the Do Son Peninsula
          -Commander [Forename unknown] Moss
               -Rescue from water

US Navy
    -Practice
         -Colebra

                      -Ecological concerns

     Vietnam
          -US operations

     The President's schedule
          -Dinner with relatives

The President, Kissinger, Laird and Moorer left at 5:50 pm.

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Well, incidentally, uh, I had a talk with Richard.
We talked with John Scali.
I would, uh, I don't know if he'd recommend it, but I agree that we don't.
have that ping pong exhibition out on the lawn, because it might embarrass the Chinese to do that on the White House lawn when all of this is going on.
But I think in any event, we ought to be careful, because I wouldn't be surprised, I have no reason to suppose that, if they cancel the visit to you tomorrow, and not to do too much in L.A. only.
Yeah, yeah.
I'm for the Chinese.
I didn't realize they were coming in tomorrow.
Well, we have announced we're going to play tomorrow.
I don't think so.
I think it can be handled.
Well, you said you couldn't say no.
But I would not be out of astonishment if the Chinese, as a gesture of surprise, would not let their team visit you tomorrow.
My feeling is that if the Moscow trip comes off, the Czechs too will have been a success.
If the Moscow trip fails, then we've run a tough gamble.
We what?
Then we've run a tough gamble and may have just overdrawn it a tiny bit.
Well, you've been looking at it another way.
Well, I think you could probably go, but it would have been in the middle of the weekend, because...
I mean, my trip, not yours, I mean...
I mean, by the time you go... By the time I go, I think my reason of what we have done... Oh, you'll be stronger.
Basically, let me put it this way.
As far as you're concerned, we had to run this thing.
We couldn't just sit back and do nothing to it.
Because my trip would have, the big trip would have failed.
I mean, it's been a position weakness at that time.
Exactly.
And that's exactly where we would have been.
It looks to me like it's an awful goddamn close.
It's still this close out there right now.
That's right.
And it isn't, see, what I explained to Stuart Alsop was it, he said, well, you're winning in the South anyway, why do it?
I said, because, well, no, I said, because we have to show the soldiers that we are willing to confront that.
Otherwise, the president's bargaining position in Moscow would be a disaster.
Being able to hold on in South Vietnam against the North Vietnamese doesn't help us bargain with the Soviets.
No, I see no reason that you discuss that all of them or something, unless they've announced something on the day.
I just talked to Scali.
But when my mind started working, that focused my mind on the Pink Pump game.
I thought I should prepare you.
I have absolutely, I have heard from the Chinese.
We gave them a little message yesterday.
And I haven't heard from them at all.
And for all I know, we may not never hear from them.
But they're not cancelling the Manseil trip because Manseil is already on the way.
Well, they might cancel the trip from Hong Kong.
To Shanghai or to Edinburgh.
They could all... Well, that would be...
That's the way it is.
That's unbelievable.
That would be too unbelievable.
Well, these things can happen.
You have to realize that we all realize that we're playing a hard game against people.
We know that they're going to respond.
Sometimes they do pick certain gestures in which you respond.
But on the other hand, we're not just gesturing.
That's just a gesture.
So they cancel a strip.
Well, screw the ending.
He deserves it anyway.
You know what I mean?
I play a hard game.
If that's the way they're going to play, it would play another way.
My own view is that they know these grand layers.
They would not fly against the script.
No, I don't think they can.
That is almost inconceivable to me.
That they would let somebody get all the way to try and turn him around.
That is inconceivable.
Because if they wanted to do that, they would do it while he's in Kuala Lumpur.
Where is he now?
But he will be getting there about midnight, about 2 o'clock tonight, outside.
Yes.
So if they were going to cancel it, they would have done it by now.
They've had over 48 hours to do it.
That is not going to happen.
Well, we're not going to borrow trouble.
No, they're not.
I don't even think they, I have no reason to suppose they'll cancel the visit to you.
But your point is you don't have a ping pong match.
I certainly wouldn't have a ping-pong match scheduled.
It's not right anyway.
Oh, now, this meeting is a little too dangerous, isn't it, sir?
any guidance we want to hear, but what do you have in mind?
I'll also let you lead and I'll follow on that.
I'll keep on a hard line, Mr. President.
We'll get to deep in now and congratulate Laird on what he's done and how he's kept everything together.
Now, I didn't say it wasn't fucked up.
I told the president that I consider it possible that they will cancel the visit to the president.
And that therefore we shouldn't overfill that.
The plan is to greet them in the garden and shake and welcome them if they come.
If they come, right.
Is it a good announcement?
Is it a good announcement or not?
Is it a good announcement or not?
I don't know.
I think if we can...
It is conceivable to me that they will do one of two things, either that they'll not let him call on you, or that they call them back to China and not let them continue the tour.
I was just, it's that Scali proposal to cancel the matches that put my mind on the thing about this.
What a match, you know.
Okay.
I have absolutely no indication of anything.
I was just trying to protect us against building a big reception and that then at the last minute they cancel it if we can avoid it.
Well, we have never done a big reception.
I have no idea.
I haven't mentioned it in private.
It was never a match, but at the time they were going to do anything.
They were just going to have a table out there.
They were going to...
Well, there's a real problem operationally in trying to do it anyway, because they can't play in the wind, and you can't get the wind out of there.
And it just worked out better not to do it in the end line.
So what's the plan?
What time are they coming?
Schedule?
Plan.
Is it 11?
12.
They said they're to come to go on a special tour of the White House, and on their arrival, you greet them, shake hands with them, some of the American guys, you know, Steve Hogan will be with them.
And you welcome them to the White House.
You didn't have to show them your name or whatever his name is.
The captain will respond and say they'd rather be here.
And that'll be that.
It played today, didn't it?
Did they cancel it?
Well, you know, Trisha is scheduled to go out tonight.
Oh, she should do that, by all means.
She should go to the match.
She should do nothing.
I'm just, I was running through possible contacts since they could take.
Sure.
So far, they've made only rather mild statements, but I think when they realized the potentiality for embarrassing the Soviets, they're going to step it up.
Well, we're getting a brief assessment of the situation.
She went over there.
Well, I thought we just had a few minutes to see what sort of tactics or your testimonies.
We're all talking about the same thing.
And Roger's been covered down in these tools, and now you're moving again.
I suppose a lot of testimonies
I think what they'll try is try to make their case that the vehicleization program has to work.
Exactly.
I see that.
But that's not the bad case.
Well, it's bad because it's obvious to me.
I think you do it.
We constantly use the word communist invasion, supported by modern Soviet equipment.
And I'm going to be into the equipment, too, because I've got it laid out.
I'm going to go into the types of equipment that are being used.
Because this is rather unusual, some of the equipment that we can get done in the military region.
It's reading by the T-54 tank.
Well, it's quite a job to get them down there.
That's all of our bombing.
They still got down there.
They still got down.
Of course, they didn't necessarily have to use the same ropes, but it is a very formidable weapon.
They stood up well.
And the fact that we, Mr. President, that they made their first attack
against the newest south division, the third division, which had only been in existence for five months.
These people are holding and are now on the offensive.
This is a division that was put up there because they felt that the
They also wanted the first division on the way for you in the area that they considered the most important.
And they have them along on the defensive way and every time they come in contact and they've been out moving.
They've been knocked the hell out of the enemy.
Which, which?
First division.
The first division.
The best.
The best around the world.
And the fifth division, Mr. President, when we started the Vietnamization program, the fifth division of the South Vietnamese forces was, I'm not going to say this is terrible, I'm not going to say this is publicly terrible, but it was really a pretty bad division.
But even last year, there was no...
I thought I had the pressure that could be exerted.
I was convinced when it started near Antlok that that 5th Division would run.
Antlok, I thought.
Now wait a minute, that's where the 5th Division is.
Now we're going to start here in Division 3.
And they fought well down there.
Mr. President, I could not believe it.
No, no, they stood and fought, Mr. President.
Now that was a tough deal with those foot 54 tanks.
But they've done well against it.
We couldn't get much air in there for a while, and they couldn't get much air in it.
They have carried out the reinforcements there.
They've done their own helicopter lifts in there, their own resupply.
They've flown all those helicopters, putting those troops in there and alive.
So I'll give you an answer for that.
Are you sure about all of that?
Yes, we did.
Quite often, half of the time, the sorties are being bought.
They went 240 yesterday, Mr. President.
That's great.
And some in military region three, they may be flying more than that.
Well, they are.
More than half of the SRT's flown the way up to 52.
Especially the one on B-52.
Well, leave those out.
You just say, pass the letter.
Right.
Go by the ground support.
But it's important to give them a little bit of a shot in the iron now, because, hell, there are no reporters who can argue with me.
And every time there is a little problem, I would suggest that if you were to carry out what we suggested to you about that reporter, it's obvious that you won't do that.
Well, from our standpoint, in the long run, we're getting the bus out of it rather than the line.
All right.
Because they cannot report any routes to the southeast of me.
They're standing in front of me.
I guess none of these visitors were...
If he can't mouth it out, oh, I hope he can't mouth it out.
That's what he did.
He can't mouth it out.
That's what he did.
And...
I'm not going to overstate the case at all, because I think that's important, not to overstate it.
And also, you've got to, I suppose, be in a position where you can't say that the battle is over.
There's a lot of hard fighting.
That line's been the main part of the thing.
is not what the territory is covering.
The question is who wins the battle.
In this instance, the South Vietnamese are doing extremely well.
We prepared people, Mr. President, for this.
And that committee got listed all of the times that we talked about this.
We knew what their capabilities were.
We also know what the South Vietnamese capabilities were.
With the South Vietnamese,
All of the assessments we've been able to make, they can handle this.
Now, I don't want to overstate it either, and I'm not going to take those battle claims that they're making.
We know they've taken over 100 tanks up there in military region one.
They claim now 150.
Well, I wouldn't go that high, but we know it's over 100.
Do you think it is?
We've got pictures of them.
Yes, sir.
They knocked them out.
They knocked them out.
The point blank was 105 millimeters.
Tell them a little bit about those tank teams, tank destruction teams.
Yes, sir.
You know, as part of the decimization program last fall, we gave the Southeast Museum 48 tanks.
President Two, the heavier, bigger tanks, and President Two was present at the commissioning of the tank squadron.
And they started out with more of those tank operations.
They still have 39 operations.
They formed teams with the Marines, with the members of the 3rd Division, and with the RSPM.
And they've had these combat teams going up and down the river with one tank operating with an infantry platoon about.
And they've been very effective.
They've done quite well in the U.S.S.
They've maintained that line and now they're moving out.
For instance, three days ago, there were nine
actions, and all nine of them were initiated by the Southeast Committee.
Don, I'm not interrogating you too much, President.
We hear about some outposts now that have a problem.
They're RF and PFO.
They're not regular forces.
We have four times as many of those outposts as we had even 18 months ago.
You're going to have more contacts now.
But we've increased the number of outposts that are being manned by the RF.
What do you think?
Are we going to lose?
Are we going to lose away?
Or what do you think?
Are we assured?
Is the battle over?
And I will play it with that.
I say it's a very tough battle.
Quite as the Saudi enemies are fighting this battle as we planned it all along.
They've demonstrated that they can and will fight for their own.
And we are providing, as we should, the air and sea support that we can.
And we should be damn proud of our people who are doing this.
It's a defensive battle against a massive communist invasion.
Keep hammering the massive communist invasion supported by Soviet equipment.
And that has got to be hammered in so that we can differentiate our air and sea support from the air and sea support that we gave in 1968.
You know, that's the line they were trying to hammer on.
What the hell is different?
Bombing was different from other.
It was a hell of a lot different.
One of the things that we found helpful when we talked to these senators, Mr. President, and leaders, was to compare terror with this, with the South Vietnamese doing all the fighting with American casualties.
Well, there'll be 13 to receive.
Well, I think there's 750, 125, 700 at the time.
American.
Americans at the time of the 10.
Comparisons like that.
But the only people that have a response, the only people that have a responsibility on the ground are the safety of the base and the ground combat responsibility.
We have a few American advisors, but we have a few other Americans there that have a responsibility on the ground.
That's the American press.
They have a responsibility, right, for reporting.
I will say that.
I'm going to give them that one.
I told you, I've got a car.
I said, who do you press after?
They said, the one I remember.
I want to be sure he gets back.
We'll take care of him.
One of the first men that we've researched to be total office constipation.
I think we ought to make the citation a little different.
They do have a responsibility on the ground, those American press people.
And I'll get into that a little bit.
Dude, 30% of all the battles in South Asia wasn't very good.
Maybe 20% at the start didn't look so hot.
But that's the war.
But it always makes the news.
I'll get into that nicely.
That's right.
I would leave them very much guessing.
I'm surprised that you, too, you can deal with more of this.
We are only going to use our air and sea power for military installations.
Those military installations are going to support this massive invasion of South Vietnam.
And the second point is that we're not going to indicate what we're not going to do.
Beyond that, we're not going to indicate what we're not going to do.
military installations, military installations that support the massive evasion.
How many people are going to do that?
They're going to say, well, what about the parallel?
And are the commanders have a right to do this or that or the other thing?
I don't know if this is a deal, but I'm going to discuss it.
Well, we have not authorized a second strike at the Anaheim bomb.
You know, there has been a little reaction, I think, Tom, from the Soviets.
They're holding back.
There's ships that are going in there now.
And the original directives that I constructed, they're inbound Soviet ships who take it easy and don't pull that way into High Plum Harbor.
I think one thing I guess you may have a little bit of a problem is where he said about negotiation and
They have you in the position of saying we won't negotiate a delay, stop the fighting, and Solomon Rogers put it together.
I think Mel will just hang right on.
What do you think?
I think he can take a little stronger line than Rogers in any event.
yeah i didn't figure out just pulled too far away he didn't pull away because they didn't they didn't they didn't get it down but i think the idea is saying we aren't going to i think we're not going to negotiate under duress we're not going to negotiate under the uh under uh you know as we say under the body of god uh we will go and we're not going to
I think it's all right to just be a little dramatic now, just because of what you're doing out there.
And just say, well, let's say, Mr. Chairman,
The massive invasion across the DMZ in violation of 54 Accords and the 68th understanding is continuing at this very minute.
Good.
You know.
Good.
So that makes it current.
They're still coming across.
They're still doing it.
They're for it.
Under these circumstances, the United States will react.
Also, if you think about the protection of America, of course, there's a lot
Would you like to see 69,000 Americans trying to fight 500,000 North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese population?
Right?
Good God, if the South Vietnamese fail, our 69,000 Americans will get their ass shot.
Wouldn't it?
Or just capture them and leave them there.
Yeah.
We don't think so.
Better than I thought.
Stand by the line.
We're doing this.
And you cannot separate the defense, you cannot separate helping South Vietnam defend itself from the defense of Americans.
That's the point.
You see, some of the jackasses have tried to say that, well, that all we can do is to limit our action to defending our 69,000 Americans.
Now, come now, how the hell are you going to defend 69,000 Americans now with masses of foreign troops in that place?
Basically, we can thank God that some of the enemies are out there on the perimeter, but the Americans are not out there fighting.
Is that what you're making now?
Absolutely.
Check right hard to that, that those people that we call for, it's a unilateral, those that we call for are unilateral.
United States and defeat, and they're also calling for a grave rescue.
The 70,000 Americans are still there, and they're also calling for a bloodbath for those South Vietnamese who stood with us.
Well, I would like to say, I can't just say how shocked I am about that.
I anticipated that the enemy, the communist enemy might make that decision.
That's right.
I think, yeah, but you constantly, would you also say, if you're going to have a resolution, I'd like to see, one, I'd like to see some of the senators and congressmen who are interested in this situation condemn the communist enemy rather than condemning the brave Americans that are basically risking their lives to help an invaded country who are being overtaken and overwhelmed and all that.
You see, you've got to put the greatest male in a position of basically not patriotic.
Now, they are patriotic, but they only condemn us and don't condemn the anti.
And I think you can do it.
Well, we can.
Well, we can.
But it'll be interesting.
They wanted me, the last couple days, to do a lot of the television work, and I refused to do it.
But we have done some good people doing it.
I suggest to the folks, the church people, to get the sentencing going.
The sentencing wanted to be shown more often.
The sentencing was an evil sentencing.
He'll stand up.
He's talking to the chairman.
He's talking to me.
I talked to Mr. Stanton.
I think they're not saying yes.
I'm giving him points.
He said, what points?
He said he'd support you.
And he said he wanted to ask you.
I gave him these things.
You know, another one that they ought to get on, I suggest, ask him to put a run for it.
He wants to go on.
What do you think, Henry?
Well, he's a dear friend of mine, but unless somebody coaches him before he goes on, they don't want to watch.
I think it would be a mistake unless he's really familiar with the thing.
Yeah.
You've got to know the facts.
You've got to know the facts.
And we can get the invitations, and that's what we've been doing.
Let me tell you, I know people in Henry, and it seems to people too, that there may be at this time more.
sun for us than there has been some previous time.
I don't know what you think about your judgment.
Yeah, I think that that certainly is true.
I would like to think that that would continue for some time.
That oily road, it made, it made, I tell you, I think on the road we went.
Yeah.
But it's like loss.
Did you lose?
Every road got that fast.
But we're not going to lose.
That's the point.
I guarantee you that.
Let me tell you, let me tell you, I think you should know for your own good what one of them did.
The question may not come up, but if they do ask about why do we have all those naval things out there, is it possible, Mr. Secretary, are we considering a blockade?
I want you to just leave it hanging out there.
Don't indicate that we are going to.
You can say, I'm not going to discuss what our military plans are, but we will do what is necessary.
Just say what is necessary.
I'd like to refer sort of a mile sort of away to certain augmentations that will be taking place.
Yes, in the next few days we have that.
We have some next week, too.
We have some this week.
But we have the, we've got the Percy, we've got the Newport News going in there with its 8-inch guns.
Where does that come from?
That's the cruiser.
We've got the 8-inch guns.
Why?
We've got one on it.
It's on its way over there now.
Why?
I think it's 26.
Well, I think they're around to 26.
Leave that different augmentation going in every day now for the next...
Listen, haven't NASA and Naval stuff done a good job up that road?
Yes, they must have.
I mean, that road and the Capitol don't have a thing.
Huh?
They have many places to have some.
There's one nice thing about the Newport-Minnesota, Mr. President.
What is it?
It is going to follow the inventory sooner or later as part of our monetization program.
We've got all that age recognition.
We're going to unload it through the muscle.
That's really cost effective.
Great.
Don't you agree?
I didn't know if you can say
horses out there to do the job.
Right.
Is that what you want to say?
Well, it's better to have the fleet protecting American islands than it is to have it sitting around.
Oh, sure.
Well, it's good practice for them.
We've got a lot of stuff going on up there, I'll tell you that.
I know, but you know, I wouldn't announce it all together.
Just a little bit of it.
Yeah, I can just say we are sending more horses, but it's of course, a lot of this is secure information.
We've got another 10,080 personnel that will be there on station with it.
Two carriers, two cruisers, and 16 destroyers.
I wouldn't throw that much out.
We've got a lot of stuff to do.
I want to send out this time of the week already.
We ought to allude to a little bit of this orchestration.
That's right.
Because I wouldn't announce it publicly when they pick it up.
Anyway.
I don't want them to pick it up so easily.
They will pick it up.
They watch these carriers.
They know what's going through the Panama Canal.
We couldn't get through the canal.
So it's going all the way around.
That'll be there.
It'll be there.
Now one thing that's very important, it seems to me,
In the event that the enemy starts to move back, rather than having our mind subside, keep it at the maximum.
The time to get the goddamn enemy is on the line.
I'm going to give it to him ten times right in the butt.
Right.
You see, don't worry.
And this is an opportunity because our tendency will be that after the battle cools and all that, the state will start to look at them and say, oh, yeah, they start moving around.
I don't know whether you can see them or anything.
You can see some of them, can't you?
Well, you can.
I would think now you ought to be able to see them and watch their brains out there.
The last 24 hours, they've been doing a good job.
The weather's been good, you see.
Even when we had 2,000-foot sea level, I think I should stress more on the fact that those South Vietnamese were in there flying those old motor planes, because you can't buy a jet in that area.
But they were down there flying sorties and doing a damn good job.
Over a thousand and they're maintaining them and they've been trained.
And it should be quite as the... Well, that way, you can point it out as the accumulation succeeding on the ground, but it's also, it's succeeding in the air.
And that's what we're going to have.
South Vietnam, we're going to leave a South Vietnam able to defend itself against future nations by itself.
That's our game.
That's our goal, right?
But, uh...
I don't think you can turn it into a flood.
The idea, the idea, too, my hope is that you and the Admiral's talking...
Americans risking their lives, you know, to save their men.
Well, I'll go to the humanitarian thing.
That's the only way I can handle it.
But I mean, don't ever get into the business of trading.
Well, we just stopped.
And that's silly proposal.
If you stop the bombing, we'll come back and talk.
Now, they sold us that once.
And they're going to sell that to us again.
That's the way I put it.
Look, they sold us that once in 1968 before this administration was here.
Stop the bombing.
We'll talk.
This time, we've got to have some negotiation.
They want to negotiate.
stop their invasion and go negotiate, right?
Stop the long-handle and negotiate.
Well, I'd like to be a little harder on that a little bit.
Sure.
Sorry.
I mean, I go a little bit.
I think it does me very good.
I don't want to ever be upset.
What do you have to say?
Just stopping the invasion of the DMZ, I don't think it's quite enough myself.
That would do the drill.
Yeah, I think you've got to withdraw from that.
across that DMC.
Oh, absolutely.
You see, I'd like to take it, and then if somebody wants to change that, let somebody else change it.
I would rather take that position and then let somebody else move it.
They have to withdraw the horses that they moved across the DMC.
Totally.
Right.
That's the way I'd like to see it.
And you take it out and I back it all the way.
Well, you might want to get off that.
I don't want to get off that.
Oh, that's a bargain for people to use.
It would have been rather easy just to let this thing go.
We had deliberately put everything on the line.
We're putting on the line our relations with the Soviet on this.
to put it candidly, if the Soviet Union is allowed to get away with supporting a country's, one country's invasion of another country, a negative invasion of another country.
without a reaction from the United States.
If it happens today, the United States, from that time on, will not have credible foreign policy in the Soviet Union.
His son has the word, damn.
It'll happen in the Mideast next.
All we gotta do, because you put it, as you well realize, if they put in Soviet personnel operating those sands in the UAI, Israel's gonna have one hell of a time
And so if the Soviet Union is allowed to get away with this, basically, by stopping this kind of aggression here, we reduce the possibility of this kind of aggression in other parts of the world.
and being traveled to other parts of the world in an indirect direction is infinitely escalating.
And so this is really essential in our whole program in trying to build a peaceful world.
As far as the Soviet is concerned, we're glad to talk to him and all that and help him.
But we cannot tolerate a situation where they go in there.
Is that my problem here?
Well, I think taking on the Soviets in terms of equipment is all right.
Charging them with engaging in the aggression itself, that goes a little further.
No, supporting.
Supporting.
Supporting.
Yes.
.
.
.
The story is, over the last two weeks, some of the gentlemen of the press wrote their leads to Irving that the atomization had failed.
I said, the atomization has not failed.
The proof of the atomization is not how it does when there is no battle, but how it does when they're under attack.
And now that they've been under attack, they have sort of sustained .
And the atomization is going to succeed.
And if you could say that, that's very helpful.
Was there any action over the night?
Not any significant action.
You know, it had a lot of things.
Withdrawing them, they don't seem to be down.
So it's a relatively quiet withdrawal.
A bit.
A bit, yeah.
But we'd like to have more fire now.
But nevertheless, it did not carry out the objective of capturing the city.
Yet.
Yes.
They're still shooting at us.
Yes, but they're not making, you know, essentially a human wave assault line and penetrating the perimeter.
They've drawn back.
And we have another... We're not going to be here.
Very hard, yes.
21st Division is moving into the area.
They're in contact now.
At what foot?
7-11?
Yeah, 7-11.
Are they moving on the roadway after they were stopped on the road?
Well, they're moving on the road at 5 o'clock.
They're also moving clear of the road to prevent the North Asian agent coming in.
And I told him this morning, I think it did the right thing.
So the data is right then.
then the seventh division could have come in behind it between them and sidon and that wouldn't have been good also what what the 21st division has been moving up the road but maintaining their protecting their flags in the process because the spread they have the northerners have
The three Cambodian divisions, the 5th, 7th, and 9th, plus this 271st Special Regiment, which came all the way from Hanoi, in this total in the operation that gets conducted, so it just was artillery that... No, no, it's an infantry regiment, plus an artillery regiment, plus the tank attack, and all of this hill there.
Let me just say one thing.
The...
What is also on the line here, I said the American Foreign Policy, what is also on the line, as I'm sure you know, is the, is the whole future that they put in, in automatic terms, the honor of the armed forces of this country.
Right.
The United States.
If we get around to this place now, confidence in the armed services will be like a snake's body.
So we can't let it happen.
And that's why, at this point, we have to do some of the work.
How long, in cases we had to go to a blockade, how long would it take to even post them?
Oh, sir, I think that's about 48 hours or less.
Good.
OK.
Well, blockade, we wouldn't mind.
You know, if we...
Yes, we could.
But I think if you mined, you wouldn't have to blockade.
I mean, I don't think both would be necessary.
I think we could do it either way.
The advantage of mining is you don't have to stop a ship.
Yeah.
The advantage of the blockade is that you can put through a hospital and so forth.
On the other hand, if your blockade is not being towed, you might as well mine.
Right.
Well, and if you mine, Mr. President, in order for the mining operation to be effective,
You have to hide in the evening's airport.
You mean to take out the...
And that's their condition.
They can lift it off through the minefield and they can do that.
So I think you have to take those shots.
We've gone through all of these plans.
But that's not all of it.
they still would be able to get their supplies in.
But not in the same ratio.
Yes, sir.
And very short hours.
We've got a lot of equipment out there now, Mr. President.
We can do it.
Yeah, I understand that you have a Navy aircraft.
I'm sorry to have any doubts, Mr. President.
I just want it in the right place at the right time.
Okay, if you're interested to know, there's a little operation we conducted against the Dosan Peninsula Saturday afternoon.
There's often a rescue of a young man.
Oh, I heard about that.
Also that you sent him a message.
I sent him a message.
I told him.
I told him.
I thought that was just great.
I bet the guy was just happy.
He's a clown.
I mean, he was.
He was more than that.
Yeah.
A commander boss.
And they picked him up on a destroyer.
And I'll bet you he was.
I saw the message, and everybody said, great show.
Wasn't it?
He was in the water seven minutes.
Well, I won't say this, but it's really better than using Calibra.
Now that we have this ecology, Calibra is our base where we do our practice firing in Puerto Rico.
And now that
That's all.
It's the only order you've got.
Not now.
Right.
  • 331-010 3:55 PM · 29 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, Manolo Sanchez, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 3:55 pm to 4:48 pm.
  • 023-009 4:56 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:56 pm and 4:59 pm.
  • 710-001 4:56 PM · 47 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:56 pm and 4:59 pm.
  • 710-002 4:56 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:56 pm and 4:59 pm.
  • 023-010 4:59 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 4:59 pm to 5:02 pm.
  • 710-003 4:59 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:59 pm to 5:02 pm.
  • 710-005 5:50 PM · 56 sec — unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 5:50 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 023-011 5:56 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:56 pm and 8:11 pm.

Conversation 710-004, April 17, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/710-004 (accessed November 2, 2026).