Conversation 711-003

On April 18, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, Manolo Sanchez, Alexander P. Butterfield, Melvin R. Laird, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:20 am and 10:02 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 711-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 711-3

Date: April 18, 1972
Time: 9:20 am - unknown before 10:02 am
Location: Oval Office

The President talked with William P. Rogers between 9:20 and 9:23 am.

     [Conversation No. 711-3A]

     [See Conversation No. 23-14]

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 9:22 am.

[End of telephone conversation]

     Vietnam
          -Rogers's testimony
                -Julie Nixon Eisenhower
                -Calls from staff
          -Respect for the President
          -Press
                -Reports on Melvin R. Laird
                      -Opposition to air strikes
                -Story from Saigon
                      -Air strikes
                            -Laird’s position
          -US policies
                -Show of strength
                      -People’s Republic of China [PRC]

     PRC
           -Message to the President
                -Urgency
                -Call to Kissinger
           -Actions on air strikes
           -Message
                -Warning on territorial violation
                      -Bombing of Haiphong
                -Significance
                      -Hugh Scott and Michael J. Mansfield
           -Hainan Island
                -Geographic location

     Vietnam
          -Laird
                -Release of story
                     -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                           -Staff
                     -The President’s call to Laird
                     -Need for unity

The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:23 and 9:27

am.

[Conversation No. 711-3B]

[See Conversation No. 23-15]

[End of telephone conversation]

      Vietnam
           -Laird
                 -Release of story
                       -Motives
                       -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                            -Kissinger’s trip
           -American public opinion
                 -Support
                       -Lyndon B. Johnson
                            -Comparisons to current administration
           -Air strikes
                 -Call to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                       -Number of sorties
                 -Kissinger’s trip to Moscow

The White House operator talked with the President at 9:27 am.

[Conversation No. 711-3C]

[See Conversation No. 23-16]

[End of telephone conversation]

      Vietnam
           -Battle report
                 -Military Region One
                       -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] action
                             -Effectiveness
                       -North Vietnamese casualties
                       -Fire base near Hue
                             -Encirclement
                                   -Protection
                 -Military Region Two
                       -B-52 strikes

                          -An Loc
                               -North Vietnamese movements
                                      -Direction
                               -ARVN actions
                          -North Vietnamese movements
                               -Weaknesses
                          -B-52 strikes
                          -Phantoms
              -Air strikes
                    -Weather
                          -South Vietnamese strikes
                               -Moorer’s comments
                          -Need for study of US airpower
                          -B-25s
                               -World War II
                                      -Comparisons
                    -A-1s
                          -Capabilities
                          -US air tactics

     Israel
              -Yitzhak Rabin
              -Use of Phantoms
                   -Altitude

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Pilots
          -Naval action
                -Destroyers
                      -Numbers
                -Surface to air missiles [SAMs]
          -Destroyers
                -US casualties
          -Air strikes against North
                -Secondary fires
                -Haiphong
                -Hanoi

Manolo Sanchez [?] entered at an unknown time after 9:27 am.

     Refreshment

Sanchez [?] left at an unknown time before 9:49 am.

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Truck parks
          -Senate Foreign Relations Committee
                -Bill
                      -Aid cut-off
                            -Timing
                            -Prisoners of war [POWs] release
                            -Mansfield
                                  -Amendment
          -Battle reports
                -Further details
          -Soviet note
                -Mild nature
                      -US response
                -Soviet ships
                      -US response
          -Indian protests
                -US response
                -US aid
                      -Further discussions
                -Friendly acts
                      -Kenneth B. Keating
                            -Cable
                                  -Possible dialog with India
                                       -Keating
                                             -Respect from Kissinger
          -Rogers’s testimony
          -Soviet ships
          -Charles W. Colson's staff
                -Public relations work
                -Discussions with Kissinger
                      -News summaries
                -Attack on Edmund S. Muskie
                      -Muskie's statements
          -Kissinger's attendance at Henry Brandon dinner
                -Charles D. Hamilton
                      -Comments regarding the President
                            -The Sunday Times

            -Acquaintance with the President
            -Roy H. Thomson
                  -Date
            -Francis D. L. Astor
                  -The Observer
                  -Interest in Africa
      -Benjamin C. Bradlee
            -Washington Post
            -Criticism of Democratic candidates
            -Comments
                  -Feelings towards the administration
      -Mood
            -Elliot L. Richardson
                  -Discussion with critics
                  -Defense of Vietnamization
                        -Arguments
                               -Potential success
                        -Bombing
                               -Diplomatic act
-Laird testimony
      -Vietnamization
-Bombing
      -Administration intentions
            -Kissinger’s upcoming talk with Laird
                  -Hanoi and Haiphong
      -Impact on Soviets
-Critics of Kissinger
      -Defensiveness
      -Current offensive
            -Bradlee's comments
            -Duration
                  -September
                        -Possible end to hostilities
-Laird
      -Testimony
            -Line of argument
-Troop withdrawals
      -Goals
      -Abrams's assessment
            -Agreement with the President
      -Level in 1969
            -Ceiling

           -Rate
           -Ceiling levels
                 -Decline
                       -Reasons
      -The President's schedule
           -Trip to Moscow
           -Troop reduction
           -Trip to Moscow
                 -Kissinger’s upcoming meeting
                       -Timing

PRC
      -John A. Scali’s concern
           -Table tennis team
                 -Moscow

Vietnam
     -Air strikes
           -Haiphong
                 -Kissinger’s Moscow trip
                 -US intentions
                       -Kissinger’s previous conversation with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                 -Laird and Abrams
     -USSR
           -Benefits from war
                 -Hanoi’s dependence
           -Kissinger’s trip
                 -US position
                       -Haiphong
                       -Air strikes
           -Pressure on Hanoi
                 -1972 election
           -Summit
                 -Benefit for US
           -US pressure
                 -Stance toward Hanoi
                       -US pressure on Moscow and Peking
                       -Concessions
                       -Options
           -Continuing relations
           -Kissinger’s trip
                 -Results

                               -Further actions
                -Summit
                     -Advantages
                     -Conditions
                            -Attacks on North Vietnam
                                  -Options
                                       -Strikes
                                       -Blockade
                                             -Soviet response
                                                   -Timing of US position
                -Kissinger’s trip
                     -Blockade
                            -Implementation
                            -Problems
                                  -Soviet summit
                                       -Possible response from Hanoi
           -Blockade
                -Duration
                     -USSR
                -Public support
                     -Administration’s demands to USSR
                -Possible results
                      -POWs

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at 9:49 am.

     PRC
           -Table tennis game
                -Scheduling
                -Team
                      -Meeting with the President
                           -Possible photograph opportunity
                      -The President’s remarks
                           -US-PRC relations
                           -Soviets

Butterfield left at 9:51 am.

           -Rogers’s attendance at table tennis match, April 17, 1972
                -Protesters
                      -Types

     Vietnam
          -Bombing
                -Protests at University of Wisconsin
                      -Size
                            -Television coverage
          -Blockade
                -US capabilities
                -Laird
                -Ships to Haiphong
                      -Interception
                            -Possible confrontation
                            -The President’s previous conversation with Moorer
                -Mining
                      -Moorer’s opinion
                            -Mining over blockade
                      -Problems
                            -Soviet minesweepers
                      -Advantages
                      -Preparations
                            -Heavy raids
          -Bombing
                -Effectiveness
          -Laird
                -Complaints
                -Release of story
                      -Reaction of Hanoi
          -Negotiations
                -Le Duc Tho
                      -Trip to Paris
                            -Significance
                                  -Possible sign of weakness
          -Soviets
                -Further actions
                      -Cautiousness
                -Kissinger’s trip
                      -Dobrynin
                -Summit
                      -Kissinger’s position
                            -Conditions from the President

The President talked with Laird between 9:55 and 9:56 am.

     [Conversation No. 711-3D]

     [See Conversation No. 23-17]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Vietnam
          -Bombing
                -Laird’s statement
          -Military operations
                -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s cable
                -Abrams’s assurances
                -Air strikes
                      -Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr.
                            -Morale

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:56 am.

     PRC
           -Table tennis team
                -Arrangements
                      -A platform
                -Press coverage

Bull left at an unknown time before 10:00 am.

     Vietnam
          -Military operations
                -Haig cable
                     -Thailand
                           -Encouragement
                           -Reassurances
                     -Battlefield situation
                           -North Vietnamese units
                           -Saigon area
                     -Abrams
                           -North Vietnamese capabilities
                                 -Weaknesses
                     -Negotiations
                           -May meeting

     Kissinger

           -Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG] meeting

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese capabilities

Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 9:56 am.

           -Nikita S. Khruschev memoirs [?]
           -Dien Bien Phu
                -French

Kissinger left at 10:00 am.

     Retention of something

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 10:02 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

They must have run out.
They can take a half hour out and run it.
It's a special.
LDK.
Good.
If they see the news, it's special.
You see, I didn't know.
I didn't know the whole during the day.
I'm sure they could have done that.
So I was glad I was very dead, because you see, 15 times as many would see it in life, I mean dead as in life always, you see.
Good, good, good, good.
Do you ever, how did it go out there?
I didn't see the, how the, the difference.
Yeah, what are they, do they have a good crowd or anything?
You see ping pong, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
Otherwise, how's the, I think it's, everyone's got a good play.
Good, good, good, good, good.
Well, they understand.
Dr. Moore, he's dead by 5 o'clock.
He seems to be over at some better time.
I'm just going to go over it now.
They would never call him.
He didn't say anything.
But they like it better when he says something, even if they disagree.
What do you think?
Absolutely.
They like it a lot, the young people.
And it isn't because they like me or Dan.
But when I say something, they come out and say something.
They like people who stand up.
They're dancing all over the place.
Yeah.
There's a movement.
The guy, the man who's gone AWOL has laid out their stories all over the papers today.
And if you oppose the strike, then he's always been on the side of restraining you.
that he's now stood down all the plans, and in fact there haven't been any strikes.
Well, I noticed the, I noticed the story on Taiwan, I mean, Saigon, that the effect, and I was going to ask you, that the military said that we had, there were no more strikes, and I knew we had no more strikes, and I told Larry to keep it open.
That's right.
Do you think he's putting this out, or is this personally?
Personally, but Larry, the...
I mean, they had the exact number of strikes, for example, we did over the weekend, saying they had always been on the side of restraint.
The tragedy of it is, Mr. President, that the best chance we have is to look ferocious now.
Tell you, the Chinese are unbelievable.
I didn't bother you last night, but just after I left you, we got a call from the Chinese saying they must deliver a message at one o'clock sharp.
So I said, can it be
So I didn't want to upset you.
I didn't want to upset somebody.
I didn't want to upset you.
Because it wouldn't do any good for you to graduate for it.
But I thought, what can they do?
Cancel the ping-pong team.
Tell us that government still can't land here now.
Because it was a message that said, one plane of the fleet that attacked Taipan crossed Hainan Island on the way out.
The United States side should see to it that this is not repeated.
Now, it is so unbelievable, because first of all it means that they won't even protest publicly against us.
This is the most secret channel we have.
Secondly, they didn't say the criminal attack on Haiphong.
They didn't warn us against the repetition.
What they did, in fact, was say, if you bomb North Vietnam, stay the hell out of Chinese territory.
Cross Hainan Islands.
Cross Hainan Islands.
But Hainan Island, if you look at the geography, sort of shuts out.
It's right in front of Hainan.
It's hard to avoid it.
Well, you can tell me this before getting back to Larry.
Do you honestly think the son of a bitch could be putting out the double story like this?
Or does Abrams have somebody on his staff that's putting out this?
I saw that stand-up story today, and I thought, what in the name of God?
Shall I call him and tell him that I want to knock it down and discuss it with him?
Yes.
I think you should indicate that you're very assured by these rules.
Don't say you put them out, but just say this doesn't help us at all.
We must show unity and ferocity now.
Yeah.
Secretary Blair, please.
Well, luckily it helps us a little bit, but I can't get it out in front of me.
I think you're doing very, very well because of my trip.
So it doesn't look all that bad.
It isn't as bad as it would be.
The only thing I don't like is American public opinion.
If it's an American public opinion, you'll lose both of us.
Exactly.
It's like Johnson.
Johnson would have the goddamn bombing halls.
I'm going to have bombing halls.
That's right.
Now listen, I just want to know, are they being stripped down?
No.
I've caught more of them flying tonight.
Well, I think, Mr. President, we should give them a good whack tonight and tomorrow while I'm in Moscow.
They should just fly their normal number.
the president in military region one they're continuing the slow offensive action of the island which is tested well that way they don't get trapped as long as they're not retreating and they're killing a lot of enemy now they claim yesterday to have killed 1200 cut it in half then there's a fire base near huay
One of the chief firefighters is protecting the way that was encircled for two weeks and now they've got a ground column in there and they've broken the encirclement.
In military Region 2 they're still laying B-52 strikes in there.
At Anlak, the enemy has moved back and is moving south.
And it's not now attacking AN-LOC as it attacked for two days.
And the way the forces are going, it's now lucky we didn't push that 21st Division into AN-LOC because it might have gotten encircled in the face of that.
That's right.
But by going further in, they're also spreading themselves thinner.
And if they couldn't with three divisions,
take one town, it's not likely that with one or two divisions, spread out more.
Well, they're getting it tremendously likely by B-52s.
Most of the B-52 strikes are now in that area.
Also, we want to figure out how the B-52 strikes.
The phantoms have got to be doing something.
Exactly.
You notice how Marr gave away the fact that our plane
I must have an absolute study of this.
American air car in this kind of war.
These planes are not set up for this.
We need, let me tell you, do you remember the time I tried to get you to send some B-25s out there?
They said they'd try to, I'll lay the money if they had B-25s out there now, it would be a hell of a shock.
You're going to have B-25s in World War II.
But the A-1s that the South Vietnamese are flying are proctored in planes.
And they can fly at less than 1,000 feet.
Ours need 4,500 feet.
Of course, it's a combination of airplanes and tactics.
I have talked to Rafi.
He said they plan to fly at 200 feet against the sand.
But they won't tell us how they're going to drop their bombs.
They have to figure out a new way of dropping bombs.
They will.
But he must be here.
Well, what they're doing now is they're finding sands and making sands go ballistic.
And they're finding sands and they're destroying it.
Oh, that's all right.
So they don't sink any?
They don't sink any.
I think they killed two people yesterday.
They were severely wounded.
Well, that's two people.
I'm going to destroy that, isn't it?
We've got to take some territory tonight.
I don't know.
Now, with regard, coming in on the, on the, generally on the air, uh,
As far as you strike in the north, no further intelligence on that.
Oh, yeah.
I've seen pictures this morning, and it really, I mean, they are not, some of these pictures taken yesterday show that the oil is still burning.
And it's, in Hanoi, it looks like about 60% is destroyed.
In Hanoi, about 80% is destroyed.
And in the truck parks now,
They haven't analyzed the photos yet, except they have a tremendous number of craters.
Well, they don't know whether the craters, they have to compare these pictures with where the trucks were.
Oh, they've not marked the guns.
Huh?
If the prisoners are returned.
It's the old man's feeling then.
I know, but for Christ's sake.
It's a disgrace.
To cut off all military at this time to pass such a goddamn thing out of the committee.
It is not necessary to be on the Senate floor and then warble around.
Senators are a goddamn disgrace.
Of course, we'll have them.
By the end of next week, we'll have them completely under defense.
We're going to try.
There's nothing else that I need to know about the war report.
No, no, there are no major actions.
It seemed to me, I don't know, I don't think the Soviet note was too goddamn strong.
The Soviet note is very mild.
And I thought our response was all right.
It wasn't exceptionally tough, but I didn't want to argue.
Well, I'm saying it was regrettable.
But that we had to do.
We also said that...
Ships who go in there... Well, and that nations who provide...
All right, we didn't back down.
We didn't.
It wasn't an apology.
Oh, no.
No, no, we didn't back down.
And I think today, again, we ought to call the guard down.
They've again made a statement saying it was color's disregard.
We again should tell them this is an unfriendly act.
Well, could I respectfully suggest that we do something?
Can we cut off any hate or anything?
No, but we can absolutely not begin any new hate discussions with you.
Now they wanted to send a cable to, they wanted to send a cable for Keating to open a dialogue with the Indians on improving relations.
I think we ought to hold that now.
Well then, just say there's no cable to go.
You just said, I just don't believe in doing a thing.
I don't want to attend any friendly acts for the Indians at the present time.
And Keating is not to attend any social functions given by Indians.
That's a good idea.
You see what I mean?
That'll be the thing.
He just, he says he's just sick or something.
Katie wants to do it right.
Katie's a patient man.
But, Roger's justified as well.
Thank you.
I'm all, the Soviet chip thing is on.
But I found out that God and man
Have you talked to them?
Oh, yeah.
And if you read the Dean and the Newt summary, there's a lot of, well, but there's a lot of counterfire.
We can't even come up on our side.
We can't get on our side.
And I was at a different...
If you, let me say, if you, Greg Colson, are told he needs to take on...
Absolutely.
It's unbelievable.
He says this is horrible.
But I was at a different... You see what he said?
We'll get out in 60 days.
We'll get everybody out.
Unless it's South Vietnamese.
I was at the dinner last night that Henry Bratton gave for Hamilton, who, first of all, because Hamilton says, he thinks you're a great man, the courage you're showing.
He's the head of the Sunday Times.
He came back one day, didn't he?
No, that was Charles.
Hamilton is the chairman of the board of the... Oh, yeah.
What did Hamilton...
He said he met you once.
when you came for the lunch that Lord Thompson gave.
Oh, yes, of course, yes.
Sixty-seven.
Sixty-four.
Sixty-seven.
Sixty-six.
Sixty-six or seven.
Another call that I met, I was thinking of the Observer.
Didn't an astronaut know this?
I used to know him very well.
Yes, he's a great little fellow, but a decent guy.
Very interested in Africa.
But then Bradley was there, the Washington Post.
He says, he says, believe me,
Well, no, he said the Democratic candidates are running around in total confusion because they don't dare quite to attack you.
He said the action in his judgment has been very mild.
He thinks everybody believes.
He says he thinks we have public opinion on our side.
And, you know, he's a vicious.
Ben Bradley is violently against us.
And, again, the mood there, Elliot Richardson would say, and he and I,
beat some of these guys up jointly.
You don't mind doing that, do you?
I'd love to do it.
I think that's one of the things I can do.
Good.
It's great that you know.
Oh, yes, very much.
How did he do it?
Did he just... Well, he just said, now the way it looks to me is, tell me whether that's right, Henry, you know, he made a very good point.
He said, the immunization is a success because why would they risk their own main force units?
How can they now
do anything else but negotiate if this offensive doesn't succeed.
And he said his farming of the North was a bit dramatic, as far as he saw it.
He didn't know anything.
I didn't get it.
One thing, so then we can interrupt and interject.
One thing I got out of Laird's testimony, and to Laird's point, which is kind of talking about Vietnamization, I see what you mean.
He's probably got the line that everything would work without this or a lot of this.
He's gone and I'm dead wrong.
Let me ask you, what do you say to him on this?
Because I'll back up.
What I said to these families was, one, what we did in Hanoi and Haiphong will not affect these immediate operations in the next four to six weeks.
It will affect the next operations.
And what we are trying to do is to shrink the time that's available to Hanoi to make decisions.
Secondly, I said we're trying to affect the decisions of countries whose encouragement might keep Hanoi in the side when Hanoi comes up against its hard place.
And I tell you, I've been at Brandon's dinner, Georgetown dinner, in Cambodia, in Laos, last June, when they were just tearing at me all evening.
And yesterday, they're on the defensive.
But finally, what Bradley said, if
He said, you're in no trouble now at all.
If there is still massive fighting in September, you may be in trouble.
Well, there's going to be massive fighting in September.
There's no secret of events that I can foresee which would produce massive fighting in September.
There should be.
There was now.
I imagine that he's having the line put out so he can be covered both ways, is that it?
Exactly.
Exactly.
Oh, Abrams agreed that you can withdraw 19,000 by July 1st.
Does that bring us up to the 500,000?
50,000, which is what you want.
We'll be at 69,000, and then you announce by July 1st.
But he says after that it's going to be tough to withdraw anymore.
What is the, would it not be worthwhile to make that number the, I thought that was, we didn't, we had 549,000.
How many did we have when we went in?
But when we went in, we had 525,000 in there.
Oh, we can't get down that far.
But the ceiling was 549,500.
That's what you ought to use, because there were enough in the pipeline so that the number was still rising after you came in.
Then you didn't order there, and it reached as high as 545,000.
But the ceiling was 549,500.
There are one thing to be able to say.
We've lowered the ceiling by 500,000.
I think if next week you can announce the trip to Moscow, another reduction, and maybe something will come out on the Vietnam side of this trip.
I'm not optimistic, but hell, you'll destroy them.
Let's talk just a bit about the day before your conversation tomorrow, which we'll have.
Tomorrow I think Leonard is done.
about whether Moscow is going to be mad and so forth.
If they do, we better learn it now.
I mean, if they're going to use this as a provocation.
The other thing I think we all have to know is this, that you must have, as I told you, any doubts about the Haiphong strike because
No question.
That's what we're sitting on right now.
We had it in mind, but you remember, we wanted to give him a pop in order to convince the brain that you were out of control.
You told us, told him that last week, is that not true?
Now, if you had just continued the lair,
On the contrary, it gives them an incentive to stay in because it makes Hanoi more dependent on them, which is what they want.
They don't notice whatsoever because if Hanoi wins, they will get the credit and if Hanoi loses, it will become more dependent on them.
Your position in going to Moscow is very strong.
I mean, it's strong because of Haikon.
It scares you.
It scares you that we might do something wrong.
And because I told them we'd do something by May 1st.
If they didn't, so we've got, if I come back without anything, we've got to do something violent next week.
Again?
Violently.
For several days.
That's right.
trying to keep a broader perspective.
There is a chance that we cannot get them first, but even if we enlist them, that they will not be able to do enough to get Hanoi to negotiate seriously before November.
What we do about the summit, is there something in it for us still?
The answer would have to be yes.
We would have to go back to our line.
strong position, due to the fact that we would, in the meantime, have been goddamn tough on Hanoi and would have beaten their offensive.
See, that's the way the game plan would have to come out.
We don't have to beat their offensive before we go to Moscow.
Let me put it this way.
Either I leave Moscow to get some hopes on a war, or we will have had to give Hanoi a
because if we go there, but assuming that game plan, which is possible, assuming that the offensive has been figuring out, assuming that we have continued that crack pretty good, I mean, you see, you've got the idea that Moscow, as a result of what we've done, will be triggered into
We have to see what our option is, because this will also guide you to a great deal.
It seems to me that if it doesn't happen, with greater luck, as I would have to say, we still have to play the Moscow string on.
I think we should play it as if we would not go to Moscow unless they didn't open Vietnam openly.
That won't be our decision next week.
Our decision next week will have to be if I come back from Moscow without anything, which the odds say that I won't get anything.
Are we just going to subside?
Or are we just going to bomb or blockade or something like that?
I believe, Mr. President, after what we've cranked up, if we simply back off, I mean, that's the big question.
As you remember yesterday, I told you
We should not, I say, not go in that direction.
But we could.
Well, you have two choices then.
We either have the choice of what we call the three-day strike kind of an operation, which could be at all of them.
You cannot let everything that flies on to Jesus other than things up there.
Or we have the choice.
But what I have to do, Mr. President, in Moscow, though, is to give them the impression that you may well have a blockade.
Yeah.
I know.
I'm just trying to think, though.
You'll never get as much approval.
I thoroughly intend to do either the blockade or the strike.
You know, we were between the two yesterday.
You were raising the point that the blockade would take too long and we'd be in confrontation and all that sort of stuff.
Well, I'm not sure.
See, the trouble is, right now we have a plausible force out there.
If we don't do something with it for two months, we'll have to start pulling them out again.
Let me tell you what my feeling is the reason I'm going through this exercise.
You see what I mean?
If you don't get something out of Moscow,
But that's it.
So maybe it'll go on for six months.
I think the American people would rather have a blockade go on for six months.
But with the blockade, with the things to give us our prisoners, well, we'd have to set it up in a free, clever way, I mean, clever way.
But we'll have to see.
Wait a minute, wait a minute.
They're not having a game out here, you know, today.
And say something about the great Chinese and American people.
They are very sentimental.
This will also kick the Russians.
anti-war, all that shit.
What the hell is this?
This protest thing is so saddening to me that I...
But this is nothing.
I saw some television pictures of the university with some protests against the bombing.
They couldn't have had 500 people there and they've been lying around on the grass.
There wasn't any scene behind it.
You see, on the blockade every
No, I can't go over this later.
See, they are the area for confrontation, Mr. President.
They ordered all the ships that are coming in the right line to slow up.
I heard that before.
I know that's true.
No, I saw the intercept.
I saw the order they sent for their Persian ships not to proceed very well.
They must be afraid of a lockheed.
Yes.
Well, if you mine, then you may have the problem that they'll send mines with this stuff.
And you have to police them.
Mining avoids the problem of daily confrontation that they have with another country.
blockade.
Blockade sounds better diplomatically.
You know what I mean?
It sounds stronger.
The advantage of, if you blockade, there ought to be, you know, a week of heavy raids to run down their supplies and to reduce them to five days, three days of heavy raids.
Got a few more days of raids like we had yesterday and they've been, they really hurt
out this, that incredible, incredible story.
Can you put out a story to the command out there?
Can you put out a story that I want nothing more said out there?
Why should they interpret, say that the president is waiting for political reaction from him, or what the Christ is he talking about?
I'm not doing that sort of thing.
Oh, incidentally, one thing at dinner yesterday that was very interesting was, they are all intrepid, and we got chose all to come to Paris for secret talks.
that they made publicly yesterday as a sign of weakness and as a result of defilement, which is another thing that that sort of spoke to.
But I don't know.
They don't know anything.
And I said, no, that's overdrawn.
There's a lot more to it.
I figured if I took a little credit away from us, it would make me more credible.
Later on, when I said you have to see it in a big context, they're very cautious.
And next week,
I don't know what the Russians are going to do, and indeed I don't know what the Russians can't do.
Well, look, they desperately, I think, want you and me to be in Moscow.
That's for sure.
And they equally want the summit.
Those are the things we know.
Very easy to get out of this.
All right, the president will come to the summit.
You understand?
But you might turn on him before he comes to the summit.
And as we were talking yesterday, I want you to take a line that, you know, knocking that down and saying, look, this is a, we are going to do what is necessary.
because it's very important in terms of our diplomatic game.
Some follow-up on this?
I understand the ties have also been greatly encouraged by our current operations against the North.
They until now have been convinced that the President had in fact worked out a deal in speaking at the expense of Southeast Asia, and they are now completely reassured.
The battlefield situation still looks promising, although it appears the enemy may commit the 25th Division at the Saigon area.
He will thus have gone totally for broke.
but still has plenty of clout.
All this suggests that he will enter the talks on Monday if they occur with far less leverage than he had anticipated, or planned on.
Efforts to slip the meeting to May also suggests that he still holds hope for additional successes, and we should wait for more surprises, but his reports are quite positive.
I have a ratchet meeting, Mr. President.
I think the, uh, thing I can understand is how they can have this much left.
Well, I guess the point is they already got everything down here.
Mr. President, if D.M.P.
is fooled, we now know that Dr. Khrushchev's memoirs today were about the consequences of relaxing themselves.
And then if we can't tell how long another year will go...