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The Democratic mayor of Alexandria, Louisiana, changed his registration to Republican because of what, in fact, because the president had the courage to bomb him.

And what does this mean?

It doesn't mean anything except that.

we have at least given encouragement to it.

And we have got the plan out.

We must not now disappoint them.

I could not disappoint them.

You see, that is why, if you come back, we said we agreed to resume talks and stop the bombing.

Oh, no.

No, no.

No, no, no.

But, Mr. President, the point is the talks resume while the bombing goes on.

Oh, no, we won't stop the bombing.

Absolutely not.

Mr. President, would you indicate that we might?

Oh, the rest of it.

No, no, we will retrograde it if they pull their troops out of South Vietnam.

That's the proposition.

First, let me make one other...

I understand.

I'm not criticizing.

I'm just trying to say that when you come back, I'd like to be able to say something in my press conference about, oh, did you talk to him about the time of the announcement?

No, I'll do that there, but I've told him that we... because I don't want to get them thinking that there will be an announcement until my last day there.

Now, as of presently, though, Henry, from my own mind, you will be back Sunday night.

Yes.

Because you're going to see the son of a bitch Friday.

And Gromyko wants to spend all of Saturday with me.

All the details about that.

Well, I don't know.

I have to admit, Mr. President, I would never say to anyone who comes into your office, don't bring any surprises on him because he may not be able to handle it, which is, in effect, what they told me.

Oh, I see.

That's what you mean.

That's what...

Even if I see brush and balloon, if you have Gramego there, they said whatever they want.

I don't know.

Well, the point is, if, let me say this, there's another way this should be played.

I kind of think of the minimum we need.

Let me figure it out a different way.

And then we'll come back and do what you need to say.

As we were saying over there earlier this morning, later this morning, what we must not assume, which is what we haven't been assuming to an extent, and I'm willing to do this, in the event that they cancel the summit, or we have to cancel the summit, you know, which we, of course, are prepared to do, totally.

We want to be able to do that.

They're going to do that.

We know that.

May I make two other points?

Because you need that for your own country.

One is, I told him again, I said, I don't want you to know this.

We will continue to bomb while I'm in Moscow.

I don't want Mr. President to feel that while he's seen me and his allies being bombed that you didn't know that.

Don't consider that a surprise.

He said, I understand.

He said, but you promised me no escalation.

I said, no, I promised you no attacks on Hanoi High Farm.

He said, that's no escalation.

Now, you know, that's not a time of expense.

The second point I'd like to make to you, Mr. President, is this port about 60 miles south of High Farm, which is just snuggling up on the 20th parallel.

Now, our farming line is the 19th for this week.

So you're going to take that out this week?

But if I might suggest, Mr. President, we ought to try to take that port tomorrow night.

All right.

Because, A, it's a good signal to the Russians.

Yeah.

As long as I've said no Hanoi high farms.

Secondly, they've given us another holding reply out of Hanoi.

Every time they give us an unfavorable reply, they get another ban.

That's right.

And... You're going to take it tomorrow night?

And I will... Is more recommended?

Yeah.

Blair?

Probably not, but we just ordered.

All right.

It's ordered.

Okay.

Russia's ordered.

Put it down.

It's ordered.

I was going to hold it until next week.

No.

But I think...

Crack them now.

We've got a chance.

Anything we... Would it mean something military if we took it out?

Oh, yeah.

It's got POL and... Good.

Take it out.

And, you see, then we can tell them Friday, depending on their message.

about the session.

I just want to complete a military picture.

They are not talking from strength.

They are scared of the blockade.

He asked me, did Laird represent the president?

I said, the president met with Laird and Mora the night before, and he talked to Laird just before he went on.

And the president isn't blocking it.

You ought to remember, if you ever talk about my poker, I didn't win, but blocked it.

Whenever I was called, I very seldom lost a pot.

When I was called, as I knew pretty well when I was going to be called, I always had the cards.

You see my point?

I'm going to make that point.

Some people win at poker by bluffing.

You've got to have a little bluff in your game.

But the key to my success at poker was playing a very different kind of a game.

I would bluff at times.

But then when I knew that I didn't have the cars, I got the hell out.

But whenever I was called in a game, I usually won.

That's why I won $10,000 a quarter while I was in the service.

Not bad.

That's extraordinary.

At that time, $10,000 was more than $10,000.

But it was a lot of money for me.

But your point is... Now, another, what I think we can have next week, Mr. President,

Assuming I have to look at that message from the content of Vietnam 8, is... What do I announce, for example, on Wednesday?

You can announce... Or do you want me to go Monday?

I can go Monday.

Well, you might welcome for the Monday.

But I can cable you from Moscow.

Well, let's see what that message is.

I see.

You have adequate communications from Moscow.

Yeah, that's why we took one of you back, I think.

Or you could indicate through the line.

Yeah.

I got it.

You're happy to be?

Yeah.

Good.

What we could announce, you could announce that I've been a master.

That tomorrow morning we're going to ask for a plenary session.

You don't have to say anymore.

I should do it Monday.

See, Monday's the better day for the conference.

Isn't that your advice?

That's my point.

I think that's enough.

I mean, that does shut up everybody.

Well, then I made a group announcement, too.

Why not wait with that until later in the week?

You said, I'll have an announcement on that later in the week.

I have one slight modification.

I don't think it's smart and frankly doesn't help us enough to cover the number, say, 19,000.

I think that we should simply say, well, we'll draw 20,000.

Yeah, but you said you wanted .

I know.

I was thinking in terms of if we're not quite .

I don't want to have to say that we have reduced the ceiling by almost 500,000.

No, fine.

So let's say 20,000, and that turns it down to 49, which is a 500,000 reduction in the ceiling.

Correct.

And there's no difference to that.

I could do it, Mr. President.

Why not do it later, anyway, after we get... You say, I'll have it or not, but this is enough to throw on Monday.

Oh, how that would be.

That's enough to throw on Monday.

Yeah.

And then you have no leap drop.

What do you say, though, about Dr. King, your man in Moscow?

See, I don't want the story of the districts in Moscow discussing the summit to be the lead.

I think, I mean, we've got to say that we've got to discuss, some of course are, we've got to say that the Russians are starting to discuss Vietnam.

But you have to be, Mr. President, if you in the same announcement say, Kissinger was in Moscow to discuss international relations or whatever, you let me brief the press on that, and they won't think anything else.

If a week after you found Hanoi, I found I'm in Moscow, and you then ask the next day for a plenary session,

Right.

And let us go comes back, and they know goddamn well I'm not.

Well, we didn't say it.

We didn't say it.

Among the top, among the top agenda items discussed, I mean, among the agenda items discussed was the situation in Vietnam.

Well, you may not.

You know, they may not agree to that now.

We don't have that.

Otherwise, we're in a position.

Well, but you can answer that to a question rather than in the announcement.

Yeah.

And they'll certainly ask you was Vietnam discussed.

It was.

You said, of course.

It was.

It was one of the principal topics.

Not to say it was.

That's perfectly safe.

Exactly.

I mean, it should be enigmatic as hell.

If you're mysterious about it.

Now, that would be enough for next week, but then they don't count them.

Well, when Lee.co shows up, I'm going to be over there.

I mean, that's...

When do you get this damn message decoded?

It's a long message.

It will take another two hours.

I just have to see what conditions that idiot we've got there now doesn't know the language.

For all I know, they may have made it conditional on everything.

We really shouldn't have pulled Walters, should we?

We're going to get him there now.

Can I suggest something?

Take him back with you to another Paris meeting.

I'll be glad to.

I'll tell you the director of CIA that.

I know that.

He said, I'll leave you to get in and out and all the rest.

Well, I don't know if that they can do, but if they don't have his finesse...

technical side of getting in.

He's awfully good.

He's Vanessa's excellent.

What the hell's the difference between you and the director of the CIA?

What do they know about that?

Well, they know his deputy director.

He doesn't help me at the meetings themselves.

He's not very useful to me, but he's very good.

When he meets alone with them, he could tell me in five minutes what the hell they said.

Now, this is the situation now.

But I think these Ivy Leaguers don't have the president's lips.

By October.

I promise you, I know them all.

Bock at Harvard.

His wife is practically a communist.

She's Gunnar Myrdal's daughter.

Myrdal, that Swedish lefty.

Her brother lived in a Chinese commune during the Cultural Revolution.

McGill is a weakling.

Brewster, you know.

Oh, Christ.

Well, there you have the three tough guys, but more of a pocket rooster student than completely in his pocket.

Who the hell is this fellow?

Bruce is probably the lead dog in doing this.

Oh, yeah.

But the matter that the bastard's calling, it might have been, well, at least Jerry Warren did speak up to him.

He went to talk to him, you see, and not just say, well, he thought that they might include a condemnation of the invasion of the North.

Did he say that?

Yeah.

What did he say?

He said no.

I think somebody ought to take them out and rip the shit out of them.

I believe, oh no, I guess it's best to pay no attention to them, given the contempt they deserve.

But what I'm trying to say, Mr. President, is by an extra cloak of these guys, every one of them would have opposed you.

They would have.

If it hadn't been this, it would be something else.

They hate you.

You're not one of them.

You're impervious to them.

You don't give a damn about them.

And they know it.

We can have peace.

We can have prosperity.

and all the whites, and vice versa.

As president, you can take Teddy Kennedy's program and implement it, which is more than Kennedy ever could do, and they'll still oppose you.

I'm not worried about it.

My concern is, how can college and university presidents be against America?

They are against America.

They are doing this because they want to get ahead of their students and their sons of bitches.

They want to again do what they did in the 70s.

They are going to do it.

Well, now they're making it more positive.

What they're trying to say is to throw their tail on the side of the students and save their own asses at the expense of the nation.

That's what this is.

But it makes sense.

I'd let Agnew touch on that.

Do you think it's a good idea?

You say it is a disgrace that the president of the seven leading universities, and you see next week, the meal back, Mr. President, that the Soviets discussed Vietnam with me in the week that we bombed Hanoi and Haiphong, which these sons of bitches are condemning.

Now they will ask, who's initiative was this meeting taking place on?

I think we've now got to make this another thing.

We've got to say it was a better initiative.

I have one fear that we might have to handle Moscow.

Mr. President, I'd say it was mutual.

These things always are mutual.

We have, it's important, what they are doing is really screwing Hanoi.

Imagine if they were bombing Iran and then you receive Gromyko here at the White House the same week that they're bombing one of our allies.

What impression that would make on the Shah?

There's no possible...

Let me go over a few of the guys.

One thing that, on the very limit of what we want to get out of this package, we've got to get something symbolic from the POW thing.

Now, what I will say is that we've got the POWs that have been there five years or something like that, or six POWs.

In other words, we'll release, but when they release, and something on that.

The second point is that

We've got to.

That I must include in the proposal.

Huh?

Just include that?

Yes.

Yeah.

We just need something.

Mr. Cuban has a mandatory injection.

You understand?

Correct.

Don't you think we could include that?

I don't think you're going to get it.

No, no, no.

I think we must hold out.

Mr. President, we've got them sweating now.

Well, we'll do this.

I must.

The risk, with your permission, but because it's your risk.

Yeah.

If I fail there, it may be because I'm turning the screw too much rather than not enough, not... No, no, you turned it too much.

There's no greater pleasure, Marky, than I would have to leave this office to anybody after having destroyed Mark Vietnam's capability.

Now, let me tell you, I feel exactly that way, and I'll go out with a clean conscience.

But if I leave this office...

without any use of power.

I'm the last president.

Frankly, I'm the only president, the only man with the exception of Connolly, believe me, who'd have the guts to do what we're doing.

You do know it, and I know it.

The only man who'd have the possibility to be president, and Connolly's the only other who would do what I'm doing, Reagan never could make a president to begin with, and he couldn't handle it.

Connolly would do it without your finance, sir.

Well, Agnew would.

Agnew would.

Agnew would be in a worse position than Johnson was.

Do you know what I mean?

The point is, as you know, that's considering electability.

I'm the only person who can do it.

Now I think we must not.

I think Admiral should touch up the Ivy League, yes.

And on exactly this point, he is a total invasion.

A breaking of every commitment they've ever made.

You might call the Buchanan out.

Yes, I will.

Get Buchanan on the phone for a few minutes.

So I think if you are willing to let this thing fail because I'm too tough in Moscow, I will not back off.

Except, having said all that, I realize that I owe an obligation to Trump to hold the goddamn office because there's no other Republican that can be elected.

Not at this point.

No.

That's what he said.

No.

Because Rockefeller can't be nominated.

And Reagan can't be elected.

And those are the only two that can do it.

You see what I mean?

I told you the other day that you said that you're willing to... Burger?

No.

They said pasta.

No, I saw him at the gridiron, Mr. President.

He's not.

Well, that's no test to me.

No.

Maybe in four years, but not now.

Oh, Christ, he'd be over two over four years.

He's 63 now.

No, but he can't do it.

But my point is, Tom can do it.

Damn it.

And we thank you all for coming out against the bombing and all that shit.

And one of the general things you should get is

It's not a world of thinking, is it?

That condemns a farming and industrial empire.

No, condense America.

It doesn't condemn America.

That condemns America when a country has 13 of its 14 divisions in the territories of its nation, engages in a massive invasion, breaks every understanding and agreement they have had with us and towards the international community.

And then when we pass the military targets, they can step out and not be a threat.

Can you do this?

Good.

Or maybe the president.

Right.

The president wants to talk to you.

Democratic candidates look at him as this, of course, the .

But on the other hand, he's on the right side at this time.

And mind you, the point is, I think that he ought to say, when, pray God, are these great leaders, the presidents of the great universities, just once going to do

speak up for America, rather than speaking up for the enemies of the United States.

And put it way around home.

And what an example they're setting for their students.

We can't blame, they should say, we can't blame the students, the few students who are in all their activities here, when they are led by spineless, spineless, soft, bully-headed faculty,

And, uh, and, uh, no, no guts and no hatred.

Let's go back then.

Okay.

I don't know what you're trying to mean.

We're going to get on through this.

The other thing, though, I want you to feel in terms of how tight you put the screws.

I told you the other day.

If we can some way handle Vietnam through November, then don't worry, we'll handle Africa, remember.

So all we really need out of this at the present time is enough momentum, enough of a situation where it appears, frankly, where we go forward with the Soviet summit, because that's a big plus for us, and where we cool Vietnam.

enough through the summer that after November we can kill it, make any kind of a promise at all that we'll do everything to get it past November and then do it.

I don't care whether it's a year, eight months, six months, whatever the case, it only comes with this.

You see what I'm getting at?

Now, having within that context, however, let me say that if we cannot get that kind of situation, if there is a risk that somebody else will be here after November who will sell out the country,

Then, by God, I'm willing to throw myself, sir, we are not going to let this country be defeated by this Russian-ass country.

We shall not allow it.

We'll never have these guys more scared than the Russians.

In November, you've been in a good position.

I agree with you in principle.

My judgment, what we ought to get out of this, if we can get the offensive started,

Mr. President, we can get back to the levels of March 29th, say, before this started.

That's right.

Get talks started, which the Soviets guarantee.

Have the Soviets against.

That's right.

All right.

Then we will have won this battle.

Then the talks are started.

The talks are started.

But we're going to insist that they get the hell back over the DMZ.

That's right.

They don't do that.

But on the other hand, on the other hand, and that's what you've got to insist on, I think we've got to get back, they get back on it at the end of the day and it's over.

What I'm getting at is that it must appear that we gave up the bombing for talks.

That's the thing.

If we give up the bombing for talks, we give up Johnson.

No, no, but Mr. President, we will continue bombing during the talks.

That's the difference.

Now, I believe, Mr. President, if the Soviets deliver this package,

that the North Vietnamese will settle during the summer.

They'll settle because they don't have to figure.

Having thrown their Sunday punch and having been, in effect, not supported by the Chinese, not supported by the Russians, in fact, squeezed by the Russians and bombed by us, why would they be better off next year at this time than this year?

Therefore, I would bet, if we can get this... May this judge American public opinion?

Mr. President?

No, no.

But I would bet...

that American public opinion, that if on Monday night, if everything works well, you can announce this trip, what are the goddamn peacemakers in this country going to say?

That a week after and the talks start again, while we are bombing, what are they going to say about bombing then?

And if Haig's report is correct, if Haig is back...

Then we will be seen to have one vis-a-vis our public opinion.

Every press person in this city next week at this time could be on the other side.

I'm not bothered with the Ryan thing, but would you check to see where General Hague

All right, sir.

How long do you want him?

Just the two of you tonight?

Just the two of us.

Do you not want him to go?

Do you want that to be an off-the-record move?

No.

No?

No, it'd be good.

All right.

No.

I'd have him go, and I wish I could get Rush to, but I can't take him out anymore.

Talk about taking him later.

That's the problem.

Reluctant.

All right, so we'll set it up to depart from that.

Although you can take Raja quiet.

Certainly.

You can also take Raja and tell Rajna to talk about it.

Does the press have an answer?

You don't need to put his name out.

Oh, he'll get out.

There's crew and everything like that.

I don't think we ought to throw in a ticket.

But I think more could go.

Or is that what it does?

It's a way to run out and just take a date.

That's right.

Just a date.

That's right.

Right here.

Yeah.

That's right.

This, of course, would pose some problem in a notice.

No, no.

See, the way they're going to handle it with Rogers, Tom, if you're going over to discuss Vietnam, you understand.

We can blow his card, but that's all right, too.

He's been good this week, and I think you'll see that we need this right now.

Well, we may not be able to announce anything, Mr. President.

Let's not celebrate too early.

We don't face that problem yet, do we?

No.

I thought I was to talk with them about announcing it.

Yes.

I sort of hinted it to Dupree, but I'm afraid that if we tell them we want to do it, then they'll start leaking it to their allies ahead of time.

Well, we may tell them after.

Let me see what I find.

That's the way I look.

We drag it in.

Well, no, they'll agree to announcing it.

That won't be the problem.

The problem is...

Whether it gets out before... We'll have to keep them.

We don't want to encourage them to leak it before.

And therefore, the later they know, we can announce it.

The sense of pitch is always to achieve little points.

Well, let's see.

That's all right.

Maybe...

I'm worried too much about the leaking.

Just so we don't leave it.

I mean, if it just leaks a little, we'll let it, that'll build up the press conference a little.

We'll just maintain a little bit of silence here, but I hear, whatever you are hearing, we're going to play it cold as ice.

I'm in Camp David.

That's correct.

What I thought I would do, Mr. President, to take care of the problem is, when I arrive, I'll chop her up to Camp David and come back with you.

What time do you arrive?

Well, I'll have to let you know.

I won't know my schedule till I get there.

Well, would you rise in time during this?

Yeah.

On present time?

Yeah, by 6 o'clock, I think.

Sure.

If I leave Moscow by 2, I'll be there at 6.

And so I think that the North Vietnamese will settle this summer.

If we can get them to call off their offensive now, that's the main thing.

Well, this thing won't end.

You see, if out of this meeting, just to work in it, the best we can get out of this meeting is your announcement on Monday night that I was in Moscow

a strong implication on Vietnam and announcing that we are going back to a plenary on Thursday.

Won't fool anybody.

Then they will say about secret talks, say we never comment on secret talks, but Tuan Huy has already.

We can finesse that so that everyone will know their secret talks.

You could just say Li Dazhou will come back, as you know.

Besides, the less you say, the better.

So that will happen on Monday, if we are lucky.

On them, there is a private meeting with Lee, Dr. Owen, Friday.

We parted living the cheeses out of them all being long.

If everything goes well, I'm doing that one tomorrow night.

Then, shortly after that, we get the de-escalation thing done.

So that would give us two more weeks of military action.

It would, and then, if that happens, I would guarantee

a settlement this summer, because they have literally no place to go, especially...

The bombing tomorrow night, do you think, will help give them a little bit of understanding of how we serve the diplomatic line?

Right.

Yes.

Mr. President, our best...

I think it will.

What do you think?

What I think is it's... We'll have some action moments.

It's, again, one of these wild things.

No other man in this country would have bombed Hanoi and Haiphong having an invitation to Moscow in his pocket.

or in the pocket of his assistant.

Now here, we are bombing a port while I'm in Moscow.

What we are saying...

But we're not ready to deal with the freedom.

No, it's right up at the...

It will be just what I told him.

And I'll tell him he can do it tomorrow night.

I'll say, listen,

The more we do now, the more reckless we appear, because after all, Mr. President, what we are trying to convince them of is that we are ready to go all the way.

The only way we are able to convince them is to do a reckless thing.

For example, all Soviet ships on the way to Haifa have been stopped.

I don't know whether I've had a chance to tell you this.

Not just them up from Vladivostok, from everywhere.

And they are backing off.

Or at least they want to avoid it.

Well, they don't want to be in a harbor while it's mine.

So I must tell you, maybe they'll tell me Friday morning, you son of a bitch, you've just found Tongva while you are here.

There's a limit.

Go back on the next flight.

That's the risk we're running.

But it's precisely I don't think

That isn't a way to breathe in talks to me.

You told him today that we would continue bound.

I told him the only things we will not bound is Hanoi and Haifa.

My instinct is... That's enough for you.

My instinct is the more we, after we've taken out Tangua, then I'd go back to the 19th parallel and stay there.

That still gets us 140 miles to bound.

With regard to your points here, I think I would say that the, in talking about our relations, I think you could say that you've often heard the President discuss this matter.

But he says there are only two countries that really matter in terms of power.

As of now, the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Others, for example, the U.S. and Japan could matter very much in the future.

And we have to, therefore, make our plans accordingly.

But today, the Soviet Union and everything in Japan is on us.

Second, that this summit, as distinguished from other summits, comes at a time when the President

agreed to be our people.

I would say that when neither can push the other around, and also when neither can or will allow the other to get an advantage.

In other words, that is one of the reasons .

And then for the purpose of that is to tell them, fine, I'm going to allow them to get an advantage, see?

That is their escalation.

So this is how it differs from 59, 61, and 67.

The other thing in terms of cosmetics is to say the president of the student history knows that there have been spirits that have been raised and then banished.

We have the spirit of Vienna.

We have the spirit of Camp David.

We have the spirit of Glassboro.

He does not want this to be that kind of a script.

He thinks we should think of it as a place to meet outside of Moscow, or find a different name in Moscow.

In other words, that's why we might have a meeting.

And then we could have a spirit of Daisha, or something like that.

And this, however, will be the real thing, because

The president has talked about his spirit of the ultimate, you know, remember the Langer-Kosche matter, the minister said we're going to go back to that.

Well, we're not going to go back to that spirit of the ultimate.

Nevertheless, it shows that he's thinking in those terms.

So this is in your soft zone at the beginning.

The president says, let's not have a spirit of Camp David, that failed.

Let's not have a spirit of Vienna, that was bigger.

Let's not have a spirit of Glassboro, that was bigger.

And you're reflecting, of course, on it.

You can see it in that, but it wasn't some goddamn foolish thing.

But this is the real thing.

Here we're not going to have a spirit, we're going to have a substance.

And that's why this summit is by far the most important meeting in this century.

I lay it right out there.

The president considered the Chinese meeting enormously important because of the future.

But we're talking now about the president here in Russia.

And he's aware of power.

He's aware of China's potentially a great future power.

He's also aware of the fact that Soviet Union is a great present power.

And for that reason, we have things that bring us together so well.

Now, one thing I want you to be extremely hard on is they've got to have a single standard.

We can't have this crap.

And the fact that they can support liberation in the non-communist

The Russian abduction must have been lying there.

Let me put it this way.

The President has noted that there was the Russian abduction.

Now, and the President realizes that the world has changed since 1959.

All over Russia, he was harassed by direct orders to Khrushchev about the captive nations resolution.

The President has no illusions about it.

what we can do about liberating Eastern European countries, I just put it that way, by arms, force of arms.

But the Soviet Union should have the illusions that it can directly or indirectly use force of arms to liberate non-communist countries.

I think that's it.

You've got to be single standard.

And what we're really saying, in terms of the fact that we've got a little divide in Georgia, is that we want to respect our side or we won't respect your side, which at that point should be me.

Absolutely.

The one thing, Mr. President, is that I undoubtedly take what I say.

I shouldn't say this is the most important meeting of this century because it displays that the Chinese...

But in terms of substance, you could say, of its immediate impact...

In terms of its immediate and impact on substantive matters,

It could be, it could be, you say, the most important, depending upon what we agree upon in terms of substance.

The other was enormously important in terms of changing the whole world.

I always keep out the idea that the President thinks his China initiative is the most important that he's done so far.

I'd say that.

Because we have to look to the future.

We have to look to the future.

But we're talking now about the present.

And we might say that it's very different from when Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Johnson talked about their grandchildren in Long Last World.

They said, President Nixon wants to talk to Chairman Brescia about ourselves and our children right now.

It's not grandchildren.

Children, they like that.

The Russians like to use that term to business.

And I totally like that.

I want to point out, given a little bullshit, the fact that the President has great respect for Mr. Breschner, the strong man, the determined man.

He is not, the President is a deeply believing ideologue, just as Breschner is.

He has no respect for weak men.

That's one of the reasons the President respects Mr. Chauvin and I and Mr. Mao Zedong, because they are strong men.

If you want, just think of the little people.

He respects them.

He totally disagreed with them.

But we found mutual respect.

And the President, however, as he sees Mr. President, he believes he's a strong man, and he deeply believes in his system, but that he's not going to do anything that will be detrimental

security of the Soviet Union.

He doesn't expect it to, but the Russians don't do any special mental security in the United States.

There can't be any winner, no winner of this contest.

We both have to win, or it will not be successful.

In other words, unless the agreement is one that both have a vested interest in preserving, the agreement is going to be worth paying for a certain time.

And he believes that this

the president, that you believe, having met the president, that knowing the president, studying his expression, that they will, that they are the kind of, they are two men who, despite their differences in backgrounds and the rest, could make very great progress.

Because they're direct men, they're strong men, they're honest men.

You see?

You might as well use flattery.

You know the Russians use flattery.

They're horrible that way.

And also, they're cynical, too.

Now, say, on the other hand, that you're not using battery.

You know me.

You've got all that energy.

The other point is that you ought to get in a very strong line.

The president is very fatalistic about his position.

You know, he differs.

Tell him that you knew and respected President Johnson and did his submissions for him.

And President Kennedy did his submissions for him.

But he said, this president

Each of them had his comment.

This president picked his comment.

One important fact.

All three were politicians.

Or otherwise, they never would have liked the president.

But President Nixon had one.

People have heard say to the top officials when they decided to vote for him, the high point guy, he said, politics be damned.

Everyone has a right to accept you.

You can say, Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State,

that we're not suggesting.

Every one of the advisors, well, you would say, didn't oppose it, but pointed out the political risks.

Say it that way.

The president said, politics we have, we're going to do what's right.

And that, and the president is going to take that law and present it in the election.

I want them to have any impression that Iowa was affected one iota by public opinion, by polls, by any of that sort.

Do you think that's a good point?

It's crucial.

The other point that he's often made is that the Chinese president is a unique position.

He can deliver what the so-called liberals promise, because he has the confidence and the right in our country.

And there's no president who can go to Moscow at this time.

At a time Moscow is fueling a war that has cost 50,000 Americans.

No president can go.

an arms control regime, and so forth, and some of the American people, except this president.

He would otherwise have riots in the streets of the right wing.

There are still a lot of McCarthyites in this country, Mr. Chairman.

You know, Mr. Wallace, Harold Wallace.

See my point?

This president can deliver.

He'll never promise something that he doesn't deliver on, and he will deliver.

In other words, what we have here is two hard-headed, strong men.

Okay?

Can make this deal.

That's what we're here for.

But to have a successful summit, it's indispensable, not just necessary, but indispensable to have some progress in Vietnam.

That's all.

but some significant crushes.

Oh, yeah.

You know what I mean.

Yes, you're going to tell them all.

I would point out that on the trade, I don't think they care much about treatment more than the others.

Oh, no, no, no, no, no, no.

They do.

But on the trade, you could say the President has looked this over.

He said, did you realize, Mr. Chairman, that there isn't a chance that the Congress would approve major nation treatment, which has to be passed away by Congress,

with the present state of Soviet-American relations, particularly if you are the Soviet-supported part of Vietnam.

Not a chance.

Now, the president can get it through, and he will.

But that's why a cooling Vietnam is essential.

And then, if we do that, more is to come.

They can make credits.

All of, as I told Ramiro, a whole new world opens up.

And I'll sell it to the Congress, and I can do it.

I think a little of that would be all there.

But you agree?

Perhaps a little bit.

Congress won't approve of credits, won't approve of bigger nation treatment, if political tensions exist at the present level.

I'll give you that.

I just say okay is my final answer.

Mr. President, how do you see it all?

That was unsolved, Mr. President.

You don't have to make a decision on these various options, except... Are you prepared to give up on the supplement?

Am I?

Of course.

I think we can solve it.

Well, I think I'm going to tell that son of a gun, I'm going to tell more of the president and stuff, say it's your bloody honor, and you are going to do it.

But on that, let's give it up, provided we have a hard line and we immediately send our negotiators back to work on SLP.

Got it.

But on that, I don't know, I get what you can, but I must say that, you know, let me put it this way, that we get everything we can, recognizing that we cannot have an arms control agreement, which is what we undertook, that's going to ameliorate that situation.

So do the best you can.

That's all I can say.

And the same for about, whether we have Washington and Mangleston, you know, do the best you can.

But in your heart, do the best you can.

Fair enough.

I look at all these things, but if I ever start to say, well, take this, don't take that, and so forth, this is a matter that will have to be determined.

Frankly, Mr. President, if we get 150 more interceptors on that, it's just of no consequence.

Yeah.

Listen, I have to say, it makes a hell of a lot of difference.

On the SLBMs, actually, I think it's worth it.

Maybe not, maybe we.

We've got a hell of a budget problem.

We've got to cut it down.

We've got to get $5 billion on next year's defense budget.

So I told him to go do it because he's got some sort of questions like that.

I have to talk to you about that.

I mean, Schultz on this test.

What is that?

I don't know.

Now I want to see it.

Now I have to read it.

But I think, incidentally, I think Henry's, because of some of your heavy eating, you want to have Riley give you a little go one way or the other.

Yeah.

I'll tell him to be sure to see when he's going back so that Dr. Kissinger can go over and have a treatment before he goes back.

All right.

I want him to get a full treatment.

I think he's got to go out and make a speech.

I think he's in good shape.

Would you tell Riley that?

Yes, sir.

I'm sorry.

I've got to tie it up.

Matters.

Of course, Jerry's meant to give it all away, wouldn't he?

What's he say about SLBMs?

Well, Jerry would settle for one side each.

Not giving up SLBMs, but we cannot.

Now, the only trouble is if we take two sides and one of them could be walking, that puts them into the...

If we say each side can complete what it's building, that's a reasonable proposition.

All right, let's do that.

But if we say we will scrap Malmstrom and go to Washington.

I don't want Washington.

I don't like the deal with Washington.

I don't like the goddamn commandeering or any of this stuff.

I don't believe in all that crap.

But we may be... Do the best you can not to have Washington.

I think the idea of building a new system around Washington is stupid.

That's my opinion.

But let me... No, no, one and one is morally wrong for us, because we will be getting a pay hike.

I just don't see what's in it for us to do in Washington.

I think we should repeat what we've done, both of us.

Then maybe we'll get what I saw at the end.

Leon has recommended Washington and Jerry Smith has recommended Washington.

If I think anything we get to that we can say we got a better deal on ABM, we have to get an advantage on ABM a little bit.

Not that it makes a hell of a lot of difference.

But I don't know.

It's hard for me to figure it out.

Well, it is a terribly complicated thing.

Basically, we'd be better off with two

with a simple formula that each fax can complete what they've got.

However, that runs into some problems with land.

Therefore, if they let us have Washington and Grand Forks, what screwed us on Malmstrom is the strike.

If that strike hadn't happened, there'd be no issue.

It'd be two-thirds finished now.

If we can have Washington and Grand Forks and they finesse it somewhat,

so that we can say we got somewhat more than they did on the APM, it would help us domestically.

It would also help us in our position vis-a-vis them.

But you see, the problem is, to make that plausible, we have to crash on submarines and say that we're doing more submarine building.

European security concerns me.

I keep getting sucked in there.

But they're the people who are sucked in.

Yeah.

What do you mean, who have European security without any linkage with the NBFR?

Well, that's what most of our allies want, and that's what the... No.

Let me tell you, you have European security.

You can stand there and forget me.

That I'm convinced of, too.

But I'm also rather convinced that NATO was dead anyway, so that's .

I think European security won't hurt it as much as MBFR will.

Maybe then we can just take European security and talk about peace, goodwill, and exchange.

Is that what you mean?

That would have a slight advantage.

But that is not a decision which we now need to take.

They don't want to announce it.

They know it would be an opposite and dispensable ingredient to anything we do in the other area.

That's right.

You see, the understandings of 68 being a historic respect to Jesus Q.

Rice, we've been having that assurance of 68 for four years, and it killed thousands of Americans in that period, and I don't think many Americans would have been alive that week.

Well, I guess what you're saying is we're going to continue the bombing.

That's right.

the understandings of 68 must be implemented with positive negotiating.

That's the difference.

That's what has not happened.

We've had the understandings of 68, but not to go back to the talk talk phase.

We're going back to the negotiating phase now.

Mr. President, I think, leaving aside whatever we agree on, I think if they force them to call off their offenses,

particularly since this can't happen for another two to three weeks or they'll suffer some more horrendous casualties.

So that the visible outcome of this was an offensive that failed through a massive demonstration of U.S. power.

That Moscow talked about Vietnam without while we were bombing Hanoi and Afghanistan.

If all of this can be done, then I believe Hanoi during the course of this summer will settle with us.

What's their prospect?

They would have to be sure you lose.

It isn't enough for them to think that you might lose.

I cannot, I don't know what you hold so, but I cannot believe that you would be anything other than even money, anything less than even money.

By the time of the election.

Well, by the time they have to make their decision, Mr. President.

See, if they run you right after the election day, they're in bad trouble.

If by July it looks 53-47 for a Democrat, then I think they'll play it out to November.

But in my view, it's going to look more likely 53-47 for you.

And if it does, well, assume the scenario that I've described.

If you assume that scenario, then there will be a negotiation of these now.

And you will have been

in Moscow have had a very successful Moscow meeting.

Therefore, by July, I cannot see anything that would put you into a minority position in the polls.

That's when they have to make their decision whether they're going to settle or not, because if they play until October and you get even further ahead in the polls, you may not want to settle in October.

So if they're going to settle, they're going to settle in September.

by September.

So in my judgment, we are now in a really crucial period.

And the practical effect of this proposal is going to be that they will have to settle.

You have to realize, too, that they are quite aware of American political things because there isn't any question but that they agreed to the bombing halt for the election because Johnson convinced them.

That was the only chance of defeating Nixon and Harriman.

As I told you all that fall, what the game was, that's what they were doing.

Don't you agree?

Oh, yeah.

And that's why now they've tuned it too finely.

That's right.

They held off too long, and Harriman didn't get hurt, whoever it was.

They didn't get too mindless.

You would have to appear to be in a hopeless position for them to run for it.

You don't need to be ahead in the polls.

You just got to be close.

You have to be even or slightly ahead, or very tiny behind.

Well, they aren't that fine to oppose or not, so they'd be scared to death if they showed 52-48 against us.

That's what I mean.

But it won't affect.

I don't honestly think I could show 52-48 against you.

I think, Mr. President, in fact, that once there's a Democratic candidate, you both are going to go out.

I must say that Kennedy may catch us on fire.

Well, in my intuitive judgment, it is possible that Kennedy is the most, is the strongest candidate.

It is also possible that he's the weakest candidate.

Because I, where I see people, I don't see the magic for Kennedy.

Now, the people I know are not the ones that, you know, but it's just possible, you know, Gregory Peck draws a lot of crowds and you could beat him in the election.

The same thing for you, would it be?

Well, it's seemingly the same thing.

If you take a look.

You mean to let them stop you from falling?

Yeah, and we got our best.

Well?

The Laird is so totally wrong.

I think based on what I've spoken, what we've seen from Vietnam, it might have survived, you know.

But I just don't think it would have survived.

Now we have to move that stuff out there.

Now there's a chance.

You've talked to Eric, I've talked to him.

That situation in the military region, he was touching gold.

He thinks that our power may have taken the balance.

Absolutely.

And now he's moving it.

And, of course, that stuff poured out there now must scare a little bit, but it must give pause.

Because from the point of view also of this exercise, Mr. President, it's happening quickly, because I was wrong about the midway.

It's only coming up the next Monday.

So we don't, right now, we haven't pulled back from anything yet.

So they must think you're just getting into the blockade, Mr. President.

There must be a guarantee.

First of all, there must be a way to start it.

But what I'm going to tell you is nothing specific.

I'm just going to tell you what you want.

That is it.

I'll take Ryland.

Why don't you have him come over to the EOB and I'll be there first.

I'll follow you.

I'll come at five.

You'll come to me.

You'll be at five o'clock.

Good.

And take care of your body.

You take care of it.

You come.

Yeah.

Well, whenever.

Bob.

We'll call you.

Join his party here, sir.

Yeah, we might go a little earlier that way.

All right, sir.

Thank you.

Yeah, Friday morning is better because actually Friday morning there will be a

What I would say is, first of all, there's got to be some way this thing is formalized.

Yeah, I'm going to go.

I'm going to see Al Higg on court.

And are you free or what's your situation?

I mean, we'll probably.

Yeah, 5 o'clock.

We're going to be back around.

Were you going out to them?

No.

Well, we will leave about 5, probably, by this time.

Yeah, and then what does he suggest?

Yeah.

All right, well, I mean...

Well, yeah, I know, I know.

I'm not sure of that.

The point is, the people are not out of sight.

Yeah.

Uh, Sonoma Lee?

Did he... Sonoma Lee?

Uh, I'm going to go back to the mansion and get something, sir.

Oh, yeah, fine.

Thank you, sir.

Yeah, that's just, uh... Do you want to, uh... Do you want to go inside?

Well, Haldeman says that they don't think the Camp David grill works as well as the Florida grill.

Well, I'll do that in his plan.

I see.

Francis, I'm walking all over the place.

Well, then I'll take care of the hotel, but not in three more minutes.

What you would do then would be to fly back too far.

And then meet me there Sunday night and then come up.

Rather than fly back to Camp David.

But then if I had two hours, perhaps I wouldn't take you to them.

Let's get the argument.

The problem is that I really can't get the floor this evening.

That's one of the problems.

I could.

I could do it, but it would be a backbreaker.

I could go down Saturday night or Saturday morning.

But that wouldn't do it.

If you didn't go down Thursday night, it wouldn't.

Well, Mrs. Richardson can't go Thursday.

She's got a schedule for IEC.

So she isn't coming to Camp David either?

Yes, she's coming to Frank.

She was going to go up to Frank.

I see.

OK, well, it's a question of degree.

And his point is that when we go to Camp David, it focuses the enormous attention due to the fact that big announcements have come out of Camp David.

And he's right about that.

And you've never had to go to it with the president.

You only go to it if you don't come to Camp David.

When we go to Florida, it doesn't focus on arms attention, because everybody that you kiss down there is sitting in your ass.

On the other hand, in Florida, I'm always totally accessible in Florida.

And Florida is the place where the newsmen tend to follow me.

Yeah, but you're not totally accessible.

And if you stay at the 314 house, they can't get in there.

It's not that they can't get in.

It's that they can get me on the phone.

No.

What I would do is put Coleman Hicks or one of your secretaries on the plane with the president.

Which would also imply that you had gone on down earlier with us.

Your secretary's there.

And then if there is a false for you, your secretary says, Dr. Kissinger's out.

I'll take the message.

And you just don't get around to calling him back.

Do you always return your phone?

In Florida?

You do?

Look, why does it make any difference to me where the president is?

And I'm sure it's better for the president probably.

No, I don't think it is.

I think it's better for him at Camp David at this point, because I think it's easier to work up there.

I think Florida in the past, I've usually had a lot of calls.

I don't think you can put in Florida without, and I didn't say anything about what you and Ron overlooked, is the fact that it's just goddamn hard for him.

They raised exactly that, to Camp David.

It's sugar, so it's going to focus a lot of the attention.

But on the other hand, you can't focus all of them, also, the Camp David.

That's one advantage of that.

Yeah.

There ain't no calls to come in.

And nobody sees you.

Well, no one can propose seeing me in Camp David or out of Camp David.

Yeah.

I think about it.

Just like Henry Kissinger at Camp David for four days, three days.

Now, look, they're not going to know about the first day at all.

Right.

Yeah, because we've got to say he went up earlier on Thursday.

And John and I, the theory is he went with John and me on Thursday.

That's why he wasn't at the K-Gram dinner.

You've already, have you called K?

No.

John has.

So we've set that in motion.

So you can take up the message for you.

But also, you see, another thing is I was trying to account for the absence of some of my people by saying I'd just been to Grand David with them.

No, it's none of them.

It's about his deepest gang.

That's another point.

Yep.

See, he's got to take quite a few people with him on this damn trip.

But you've taken people who hold up at the big house down there before.

Well, I don't.

Bob, I'm afraid of it.

Okay.

I'm just afraid of the big house deal.

I, uh, it's, uh, the enormous attention.

In other words, if they begin to smell a rat, then they're going to carve up Florida right and left to find him, isn't it?

If they begin to smell a rat, they cannot carve up Camp David.

We just don't say anything.

And we do not respond.

As a matter of fact, I would not have Ziegler handle any calls over the weekend.

I'm just wondering if he can handle the calls without... Usually Warren does, yeah.

Warren usually handles the calls, and I'm up there.

I was never around up there.

I haven't told Tigger what you're doing.

What I've said is exactly what we agreed on, that we are going to run this staff session over the weekend.

You can't do it.

Ron figured that out in about a fifth of a second.

And so you just, we're sure you want to put that much focus of attention to what you're doing.

You cannot hide in a visitor in Florida.

You can't live in a family and just kind of hide.

That's all there is to it.

What's your answer?

What's the answer there?

The answer is that you can't hide in Florida.

How many press people do you see in Florida?

I get lots of calls.

In Florida, I always get lots of calls from press people.

They invite me to dinner.

Now, I often don't go.

I very rarely go, but

Well, cutting off calls is easier in Camp David than in Florida.

You can just begin with that proposition.

It's totally easy in Camp David.

It is Florida.

It's the same.

It's our switchboard.

We blow the buzzer.

You can walk by the 314 house.

You can park out in front of it.

You can... Yeah?

I don't think you can talk.

Okay.

It's a close one.

I think it might be worthwhile having Schultz up there too, but then you have a Connolly drop.

No, we decided against that.

I just don't want that many people knowing about it, even though he's perfectly all right.

Why would you, or do you think you know that it doesn't look concentrated?

How?

Let's put it the way we originally wanted it.

Now see how it sounds.

Ron says that it'll focus too much attention on it as a campaign,

The first is I want to go to Florida, so we'll begin with that.

I'll tell you that.

I know that.

I don't care to go to Florida this weekend or next weekend.

I just don't want to go on the weekend after that.

I'm just not interested in going this weekend.

I also think it's a good idea, frankly, for me to be in Florida this weekend with the things that are going on here.

I have a good public relations sense about that.

I can't say that I think it's fine.

I'm charged up there.

I'm doing a lot of things.

Florida's a...

I mean, he would screw it all down for him.

He just doesn't deal with it.

That's another problem.

If we do that airstrike tomorrow night we were talking about, it will hit the papers while you're in Florida.

OK. We're just bracing it out.

We can't do anything.

That's the thing.

I don't know how to handle it.

There is no good way to handle it, because god damn, it's a secret trip.

Yeah.

And it has to be kept secret.

But how does he handle it?

How does... And tomorrow... Zingler has to respond each day.

Where's Schlesinger?

I don't think they're going to call him and ask.

No, Schlesinger.

No, he'll set it up.

He would set it up that...

I think what we've got to tell Ron is that, frankly, from my personal standpoint, I just can't go to Camp David.

That's no problem.

He's only raising it from the external.

The way we handle Camp David is the President is going to Camp David tonight, after the ASNE reception, and he's asked Kissinger, Ehrlichman,

like and will be up there over the weekend for some staff planning, or routine, or one of their periodic staff meetings.

And then Ron doesn't have to say this, and if people ask me about some of my assistants, the answer is I took them up to .

Who's going to ask you about your assistants?

Well, I just need a couple of them.

If it comes up, where is Sonnitzer?

Where is Peter Radman?

Where's Winnie the Pooh?

We should say that it should ease up with Henry McCamp.

He's away with Dr.

Dismal.

Then as the time goes on over the weekend, there's one thing

Well, let me say one thing.

It's not going to be Monday night.

It's only Sunday night now.

So that's, at least we've got one day off, and it'll be back Sunday.

Well, we hope.

Or we think.

I haven't got the God-dead message yet.

Yeah, I know.

It doesn't say that you're going to be on, you know, damn well unless you said that.

It doesn't say it's Sunday, so.

But we don't know yet whether they are not going to have a man in Moscow, but I have no indication of that.

Okay, I think

It sounds ridiculous, but then the thing to do is when you come back, you should chopper right to Camp David.

I agree.

And then come back on your chopper Sunday night and Monday morning.

Oh, yeah.

So we're going to do it.

Monday afternoon.

So we're going to do it.

So that you do meet with Henry in Camp David.

Now, you see, we may have to do, may want to do the press thing.

We do it.

Monday night.

Monday night?

We may have to.

You can't allow the Russians to blow this thing into their usual channels.

Press conference, then, on the end?

Either that, or there's no other way to do it.

You've just got to do a press conference sometime.

The only way you could do it otherwise is just go out and make a five-minute announcement.

And there's something to be said for that.

And troop withdrawal.

If I did that, I'd include the troop withdrawal in that, too.

No, I don't want to.

You could do yet another thing, Mr. President.

You could make an announcement on Tuesday, on Monday night, for five minutes, and have a press conference on Thursday night, and open that with a troop announcement.

That's a good idea.

I think that's better.

But we can throw the press off, too, because they'd expect

and would be the other, instead, excellent idea and take it for two minutes.

But now let's see what that is, if Dr. Kissinger is returning to the plenary session of the 27th.

Well, assuming the testimony for...

Hang on.

If returning to the plenary session of the 27th, Dr. Kissinger has been on a trip to Moscow and to consultation with the Secretary of State.

We've been all in motion.

And it's among the items discussed is

No.

No, we wouldn't have to say among the audience.

We would just say to review the international situation and to complete preparations for the summit.

Just to save their face.

But you see, you've got to say what the State Department says to these preparations for the summit.

Well, he's going to be told before tomorrow morning at 7 o'clock that you're going there to talk about Vietnam.

But that I'm sure the Russians will insist on.

I know.

Because they need a cover and safety.

I'm also going to want to announce that the United States will resume plenary sessions on the 27th.

Now, anybody with, you don't have to have any brain for making these two things together to assume that there must be more to it.

I think the point that you made is better, Rob.

Then we let that ride without anything else in the news and then go on with the full-blown press conference on Thursday, two days after the primaries.

and make the troop announcement as you open the press conference.

I like that.

See, the troop announcement, we can think together rather well, too.

Because you come off the mountain with the announcement.

That's right.

And so we lied a little bit, but we did it for an obvious reason.

Of course, we did.

We got them.

And I think we, I mean, I'm not so, I know it was earlier, earlier than this, of course.

We didn't talk much about criticality, I guess, in our, you know, after 20-day speech.

You know, he's always worried about credibility.

And Rahm's worried about credibility.

And I'm not worried about credibility because the goddamn press always says there's a lack of credibility.

They're the sons of bitches that already don't have the credibility.

Mr. President, you are not lying.

We're doing it for the good of the country.

You are not lying to any benefit of yourself.

No.

I mean, this is not something you are doing to protect a very sensitive negotiator.

That's right.

So presumably we're up there and it's done.

I'd rather take Ron out of the line of fire, let Warren take it.

So they let Warren lie.

He doesn't know me better anyway, see.

After all, Ron does.

I don't want, well, I think we probably made a mistake and got to let Ron sniff it out because, you see, he can't help it.

He sniffed my nose and then let Warren sniff it out.

Warren sniffed it out, didn't he?

He sniffed it out.

But Warren isn't going to know anything.

He's in there.

He'll handle it very well.

Well, Ron doesn't know Henry's not there, either.

Yeah, but he'll find out.

I believe so.

Sure, Ron can.

You understand I have great confidence in Bo, but they don't... Ron won't blow a piece.

No, neither will Bo.

The point is, it's very embarrassing for a fellow to get out knowing he's lying.

Now, that's the point.

That's why Ron is not to know.

No, I told Ron I'll tell him I'll lie.

That's right.

And then Ron will record what I tell him.

And I don't think there's any problem here or there.

We've got to go this way, Bob.

I've got the plans for that matter.

There'll be people at Camp David over the weekend.

You'll be there?

Of course, the one thing we can't be sure of is whether I can get that agreement to a Monday evening announcement, but... Oh, I... Oh, listen, that's all.

That's all.

Sure, but they...

They just want to bring a goddamn thing.

They may want to announce it simultaneously, in which case we'd have to do it at noon on Sunday.

That's perfectly right.

That's all right.

If you do the five-night thing, go out and do it at noon.

On the TV camera, they'll run it.

They'll all carry it to the news.

On this one, I'm not sure I should take the time.

It isn't that big a thing.

I think it's better not.

I think it'd be better to do it at noon.

So that's the one.

How about at noon on Tuesday?

I'm just trying to think.

At noon on Tuesday.

Because that's no problem with the election.

I don't care about the election.

I mean, the election results won't come in.

That's perfectly right.

It doesn't matter.

Noon Tuesday, it's all right.

Noon Tuesday has the slight advantage, the considerable advantage, that we can inform some allies ahead of time without jumping.

All right, fine.

Noon Tuesday, then.

And then press conference Thursday.

We're out to announce the press conference on Wednesday, the following day.

Then we come on to the true announcement on Thursday, right at the next weekend.

That won't have been a bad week.

To say the least.

Well, the major thing now is we still have the doctrine of not naming ourselves to a course that makes the Russians think we can be at all.

So, uh... What do you mean, how?

Well, you can't look at your planner and I can't get to mine.

What we may have to do is roll it out and say we can't give you a turnaround until we get a set up in case of something like that.

In case you don't get an onset, I would say, but even that is necessary.

Have that sent back over to the residents in there.

I think there's a...

If that's all you're announcing, isn't that your direction?

I don't think you want to go out at the evening time to announce it.

No, I agree.

If you don't announce it, it's much better.

Really?

The noontime announcement is much the best.

You may have to hold tight for a week just to make sure we cut the Russian commitment that they'll call off the offensive.

All of those three don't matter as far as what you're putting in those.

Oh, Henry, I'll go over there.

I haven't been to the town.

He'll be ready.

I know.

I'll be ready.

You've got one.

I'm sorry.

It's one of those things where we just can't go anywhere.

Operator, I don't know whether Trisha is here or if she's not here, I didn't want to talk to her.

Is she in the audience or not?

Yeah.

Okay.

We're stuck.

We've got everything in motion that way.

You're right.

They start sending, we're better locked up on the mountain than we are loose and floored.

There's no way.

They put people, they know they're in a 314.

They put people right there.

They'll say, where is he?

First, they call the hotel.

Where is he?

The hotel says he's not here.

Then they say, then ask Ron, where is he?

He's not in any of the hotels, Ron.

And he's standing in the hotel.

Well, this is a 314 house.

Seems they sink the compound.

Getting in the compound.

I'm sure.

Some fell, and all those other people.

I just don't get it.

They get hot on it.

They'll snip it out there, leave it in the camp, and can't pay for it.

There's less likely that they're getting hot, but more, if they do, more chance that they're screwing us.

That's right, in Florida.

Can't be that if they get hot, all they can do is speculate.

And that isn't all bad either.

I'll figure something out.

So you're up and about working on something.

Don't ever figure out where he is.

And also, there are worse things than Ron having to lie about where Kendrick Kissinger is.

You know what I mean?

They have a lot worse things than that.

That's how you should handle it.

We can set it up so he doesn't have to lie about it.

I wish we could.

We can.

Because you'll say you're going to be meeting with Earl and Kissinger and me over the weekend and can't do it.

Sure.

That's true.