Nixon, Connally & Bull on Vietnam War and Treasury Department

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Hi, John, how are you?

Oh, sorry, I had to get off.

No, I understand.

You've got to forgive him.

Oh, no, there's no problem.

It's a pleasure.

They, uh, Bob told me he had some pretty, pretty work to do yesterday.

Yeah.

We, uh, we had to do, uh, we're not doing anything in Hanoi and Haifa.

Are you ready for that?

We've got another very good song there that you should touch on.

I think it was a great show.

You gave some reaction from the Hill, the congressman.

I'm going to send an invitation to the professors

But the reaction to the country, I don't think Congress is reflecting the reaction to the country.

The reaction to the country is pretty much, well, as a matter of fact, John, the Congress certainly is not all that sure of itself either.

You've got people, for example, obviously we've got Stennis and others standing strongly.

And they're a little bit gingerly because they don't know what the hell

See, they're going to paint themselves into a very bad corner here.

You remember back in the period before the 1950 elections.

Well, frankly, when the Democratic Party had its great split between Jimmy Burns and Wallace, Henry Wallace, and so many Democrats, including Ronald A. Douglas and others, went off that mark and joined with them.

and virtually every time they came up on the side of the communists.

In other words, never, now, the, when a fellow like Jenner, and he was the one who used the term, used the 20 years of treason and that sort of thing, it was certainly a gross, libel, an overstatement.

Nevertheless, the Democratic doves at the present time

after a massive invasion of South Vietnam, condemning the United States for bombing, and not condemning the enemy, are going to run into a very, very serious problem of... Now, we're sending you on part of that subject.

I don't know what he's talking about.

But you took it on yesterday, I understood.

Yes, sir, you took it on.

In answer to your question earlier this week... No, I have one more speech.

What did you say?

I just said it's unbelievable to me that we could have in Congress, we could have the Secretary of State of the United States appear in full-form in relation to cleaning the Congress for two hours and hear nothing from both sides of the aisle, both parties, senators from both parties, in the United States in the face of a massive Congress debate in South Vietnam.

And I said those who criticize it the most are those who are most approved of it in the middle 60s.

And I just hit it very hard.

And I think it is an outrage.

And I just think, well, it is.

Well, as a matter of fact, we have to realize that let's face it, the war, people are sick of it, people want to get out and so forth.

There's a narrow, narrow edge there where people don't want to get out.

They don't want to be kicked out.

That's right.

We don't want to be kicked out.

I will never believe the majority of the American people want to leave humiliated or be run out.

And I said, this president has said he's going to withdraw the troops.

He has withdrawn 500,000 troops.

And he has said he's not going to take an aggressive position except to protect the remaining troops, to protect the withdrawal of our troops, and to permit

contingent Vietnamization program to function.

And I just obviously can't do that in the face of the passage of a communist invasion or invasion of the North Vietnamese without taking some action.

And he's taken that action.

All he's got is criticism.

And I just, I think he can make that speech, and I think he can get the majority of the people for it.

And I must say, of course, I said a lot of things.

I covered a lot of ground.

But the response was,

very, very good.

I thought it was a very good response.

So I can't say it was all that one thing, but you talked about it.

Where did you speak?

The American Society of Newspapers.

Oh, yeah.

I was speaking in the big auditorium.

I've been to damn places.

It was crowded.

I did terrible things.

I misread my watch.

And I thought, and Rick, I was an hour off.

I didn't speak that long.

I was supposed to be about 15 minutes, which I did.

I spoke for about 17 minutes.

And we were going to have questions for about 30 minutes.

And I thought I'd say about 40 minutes for questions.

And hell, we were already, we'd already run out of time when I got to, we'd started later.

I just did not want to watch.

But anyway, we had 20 minutes of questions.

That's why, that's why.

Well,

Well, Mr. President, I guess Bob has told you of our conversation.

Yeah, and I, let me say that I understand the situation.

You know, I mean, I, we talked about it, of course, in January.

And you needless to say, you know, how strong I feel about how many

in both what you're doing your indispensability etc and what you can mean and yet of course there are other considerations too i i really uh i mean would you would you would you wait you have you had to wait i uh

I think it comes really down to if you just included that you really have to believe that's the way you should move for a number of reasons and so forth.

And I think our real problem here, which I think we do have to consider, and which you will recognize better than anybody,

is to recognize that you are considered to be the strong man, the captain.

You are the one in terms of the economic policy that instills confidence.

There's nobody else that instills it to the extent that you do.

You are the one in terms of our international policy that is considered to be the strong man standing up for America.

There's nobody else that we have in that category.

And also looking at coalition political terms, you obviously are watching to see what is Congress going to do and all that sort of thing.

Is he leaving because he thinks the policies are wrong or because the campaign is coming or because of political pressures and all the rest of it?

But I think that those problems could be solved.

The only other thing I would say is this, that I would hope that we could work it out.

I mean, if we could work it out in a way that stated properly, roughly, which we could.

And so I think that the indication, just before I go to Moscow, is that

What everybody, I mean, let's face it, people are not dumb.

Everybody considers to be the strong man in the cabinet, left in the cabinet.

It sort of weakens the position, you know, and all that sort of thing.

If it appears that it's a, the breakup that usually occurs in the administration, and it's last year, you know, they'd have us, it'd have the strongest, as you know.

People leave for a variety of reasons.

And I...

I think, really, it's a question of how it's done.

And after that, I think, too, that one thing that did it to me is some of my reassurances that afterwards, that you, wherever you are, you might be able to serve a fairly important advisory role, which even, you know what I mean?

Which even might be the way you aren't tied down

What we know is the crap that you've got to handle, which is very important crap, like tax reform and a few things like that, where you look at the broad picture, the broad political picture, it's not going to determine the elections this fall.

There's no question.

Not any of this, not any of these things.

But I feel that way, and also I must say that in fairness, we have to realize that when you did come to point it out that you had no desire to be secretary of the trade union, you had no desire to stay in Washington or live in Washington,

so forth and i know our team and i'm perfectly aware of that and you've actually stayed more than you agreed to stay and so you know you see that's the other hand i have to be quite honest i actually regret it but you we really get it i think you've got this you just got to make your own i really got a call i i regret it i really do but on the other hand i look at it

And I think there only, I've been, I was completely honest with Bob about it, and it seems to me there are only three alternatives, and none of them are really acceptable.

And I readily admitted that a good part of it was my fault.

I'm not trying to blame anybody else, and I recognize that I ought to be more tolerant and more resilient and more flexible in putting up with a lot of these damn things that are so irritating.

But I reached a point where I'm not, and I don't know what I can do about it.

And it's just not important to me having a constant running confrontation with the staff here.

It's not important.

And by the same token, I'm not going to come crying to you at the bar all the time.

I can't do that.

And the third thing, I'm not just going to roll over and

and let them roll me like they do everybody else in town.

So none of these three things really matter.

And I don't want to fall out of it, but sure, I don't want to fall out of it.

And I don't want to leave here with you unhappy with me, because I have nothing but the greatest admiration for you.

And I want to help you, and I'm going to help you in every way that I can.

And I just frankly think that the best thing for me to do is go home and get out.

And I think it has some

downside but uh i think we handle it right if i make the announcement right and just tell the truth just have to say i'm not telling you in terms of the problems

You say I came.

I came for an indefinite time.

I really had in mind to stay about a year.

I've overstayed that year that we've done the principle things that I think should be done.

The economy's, in my judgment, is in excellent shape.

We've still got a continuing battle on inflation, but the mechanism that's here to solve that and pay more for the price commission, the cost of living council,

the international field we obviously can't look toward the solution for that this year anyway but we're making all the progress that i think we can make and uh i guess i think that's a logical time for me to meet each other and just say that and not respond to anybody because i need more excuse than that and everybody's going to speculate on it but i can't i can't have that yeah now whatever i give you

— 12 min 21 s with no transcribed speech —

Well, I think that there's, let me ask you this question about the successor.

Bob said he threw out the Schultz man.

Is that?

I don't know anybody else, right?

George would be excellent.

I've got to have somebody.

You see, I can't pick Walker or Volker because they're not close enough to me.

And I have to have somebody that has been part of the policy.

Also somebody that's a standard target.

George would be excellent from every standpoint, it seems to me.

He knows the issues.

He'd stand up to Arthur.

He knows the international thing.

He has very definite views about the international monetary thing.

He could guide it.

It would be, frankly, it would give

in fact, which he deserves.

And I think you told Bob, Bob said you thought he'd do better than George.

Well, he's just, he said, the more I spoke to him, he had to give you two minutes of that calendar.

And George sitting there would not, he's got obviously great influence, probably dominant influence outside of my office with the staff.

Oh, no problem there.

And so you have no problem there.

You have no problem with CEA or the cost of the council or the pay board or the price commission.

So he could operate from that side.

And he's not in the State Department's pocket here.

And he's not there.

He sure is not.

No, he's not.

Because I need to know that.

No, I talked to him yesterday.

Obviously not about that.

We were talking about just general things.

And he was quite critical of the State Department on a voluntary basis.

George, you see, beneath that very kind exterior, professorial exterior, is a stronger man than you think.

Yes, he is.

Do you agree with that, sir?

He's a strong man, Secretary of Treasury.

That was the problem.

Kennedy was a fine man, but not strong.

George didn't have the stamina.

George has a lot of stamina.

He's got a lot of stamina.

He's got a lot of strength.

And he's tenacious.

He's tenacious and he's smart.

Smart in the sense of knowing how to operate.

And he understands his bureaucracy.

How would you handle physically the announcing thing?

I suppose that what should happen is that I would walk out with you and do the reversal of what we did before.

We'd walk out, I guess, with Lee and George standing back there.

And you say, we announced it.

We'd have to have kept to it.

And I'd have to make, and then you would go on.

And I'd just sit down here and tell you, the Secretary of Commerce, I'd leave you in the cabin and say whatever you want to say about it.

And just say it.

And then you'd make a statement to it.

And I'd make a statement.

That's true.

Should I leave at that point?

No.

Oh, I should stand while you make a statement.

No.

Well, you ought to, and I'm just thinking out loud now, you ought to, you see, anything you say with regard to supporting me, I probably shouldn't be around.

No.

Well, what you might do then, you might say, he's leaving, and I'm going to present to you his successor.

And I'm going to present to you his successor.

And then you can say what you want to about each other's counsel.

And then I'm going to say, they were able to agree about some of the questions you might have.

But I think that knows us sometimes.

That's fine.

And I don't...

I think that it'll be a...

It'd be quite a shock.

It's going to be a shock.

I don't think it will.

It'll be a shock.

Well, you know, John, you're not...

of the hangman that you know damn well and that you're considered to be the strong man of the hangman's church.

Hell, it's true.

It's not going to rule.

It's damn true.

On the other hand, it would be great with a sire to lead in a lot of quarters, too.

So not in the court's favor.

Well, that may be, but not sure.

Not sure.

I don't care about it.

But it will go.

Now, as a practical matter,

I need it to be sharp for a few days, maybe a day, or most of the week.

I would make it be that long, I think, for two or three days.

And then there'd be speculation and stories about it.

That's not bad either.

But that isn't bad.

And frankly, I don't have quite as sharp in Texas.

Yes, but that's all right.

You can handle that.

I'm not worried about that.

That's all right.

And let me, you know, I just say, they said, well, does this mean you're out of public life forever?

I said, no, it doesn't mean that at all.

They said, no, you can't come in.

They said, it just means that I, they pushed me.

I'm going to say, look, my coming was a very unexpected thing.

I had been out of it.

public life in less than two years.

I didn't expect to come.

I didn't plan to come.

I came to try to help the president, and I came at a very great personal sacrifice.

Since then, there have been some family, I'm not talking about out here, but at follow-ups, if I say it, I just say it.

It impressed you that you can say that out here?

Well, there have been some changes in my family, but I have some family commitments and family problems.

and personal problems, and I would have to devote some attention to them.

And I think that it's going to mean that I'm forever out.

And you've accomplished the goal that the President asked the President to accomplish.

That's right.

And that others can carry on, and that you'll be available.

You might say, the President is, that you will be available for some assignment in the future.

I'll just be available.

You might say some assignment in the future.

Some assignment in the future, full-time.

That's a good thing to hang out there, too.

Sure, I'd just love to speculate on that, too.

But I don't, and frankly, I would like to go into this, Paul.

Part of this is, well, and I'd like to be in a position where my advice to you is not subject to being questioned in terms of a parochial interest of the Treasury or any particular problem or personalities.

Now, inevitably we'll be getting this, let me say that I would hope, I don't want to get into your personal plans, but I would hope that, you know, let's face it,

I feel very good about what's happening.

On the international monetary front, we can do more than lay the groundwork this year anyway.

China has an election.

We have an election.

Canada has an election.

Great Britain's going in.

Europe's in trouble.

Great Britain's going in the common market.

So that will happen through January, finally.

So this is a year where we're not going to do anything except lay the predicate for it.

That's all.

You can't get an agreement.

So I'm just not needed for that.

I'm just, now, and George Schultz can do it equally as well or better than I could.

Well, I'm not sure that he could have done it.

He couldn't have done it.

It's what you did.

All right, but that's over.

And you're not going to have that day.

I see.

George can understand the problem.

But, you know, the inability to bring those bastards together, those that are out there, like Barber told me, he says, nobody could have done it.

But we're not going to have that day.

You know, anything like that.

Because we can't get that far.

Now, on the domestic front, I think you're in great shape.

I think you've got one real problem coming up, and this is basically spending in the deficit.

I've got to get on the hook.

I'm talking to somebody who's been through a lot of trouble.

George has written a memorandum, you know, to me.

Well, he's probably... My point is, if you just memorandum and say, looking ahead, it looks pretty bad, you know,

Well, I think that's my point.

Let me tell you about it.

That's my view, in a nutshell, before you leave.

Either way, if you lose the election, of course, you always submit a budget.

You win the election, you submit a...

The difference is that when you win a general election, when you lose it, you just put something else up for the other guy to shoot at.

But in my view, John, and I'm not going to get the shit out of you, but I'm going to give you a...

We're gonna drop off family assistance, flush it, the whole welfare crap.

We're gonna drop that revenue sharing, flush it, let it go.

Defense is gonna be harder depending on what we get from the Soviet and the Sun.

But you ought to have a lot of base funds.

But we could have some base funds.

What I meant is we could do it then.

I don't think we should do it for now.

But I've got to get that plan laid, and then they'll learn how to talk about it.

We can close the base.

And also, get the damn Air Force now, besides the goddamn Air Forces.

They're all made to fly, I mean, missiles are going to take them to Pittsburgh.

And there isn't going to be another war in Vietnam.

You know that.

The United States is not going to be involved in any other war like that now.

The only thing that you can't compromise on is the Navy.

The Navy, we've got to keep big.

Do you agree with that issue?

and you have to keep your missile capability wherever you have it.

With regard to other things, I think we ought to cut back on the government education budget, particularly higher education.

I think we ought to, and frankly as far as the other departments, there isn't a hell of a lot in them, you know, considering what you can get back.

Agriculture.

Nobody's ever heard of a cup-hanger country, but we've tried.

But basically, this is the time for a hell of a prosperity project.

Yes, it is.

And all the other countries, we can get rid of a lot of bad things, no question about it.

And you really want to sell, because you're going to be served.

You have to live with it.

That's right.

And you really want to sell.

I say, either way, if we should lose the election,

put one up there, we'd be proud of them.

If you wouldn't, we've got to live with it.

And we are going to put it down to them.

That's all I've got to say about everything that's to that.

Let me ask one.

Yeah, go ahead.

On the economic front, I read the papers of Smart at this time.

I read the New York Times and the GNP and I read the Post.

And I look back and I thought, in Christ's name,

I'm not reading the same story.

The goddamn Washington Post made it appear as if it was a very bad first quarter.

Those sons of bitches can twist anything.

They can't do that.

They are awful.

But the Times was still a good story.

The inflation was not good.

But we all knew that.

Well, this was the bull that we knew was coming, both in prices and wages.

Now, but the whole sale price index last 10 days ago, if you recall, was at 110 to 1%.

Now, this indicates that CPI ought to be down this way.

So anyway, I think as the year goes along, you can take whatever steps are necessary.

That's the whole point.

You have the mechanism.

What I think we ought to do, and what Grayson ought to do, is to announce in the light of the corporate profits, zero price increases.

Period.

Zero.

Right away every month.

Maybe right away zero price increases, except in hardship cases and so forth, which they have to come in for anyway.

Cut out all the price options for the past four or five months.

You're going to be high as hell, and you're going to keep defending.

But anyway, the point is that the mechanism is there.

And the momentum is there.

You're going to have, by fall and by dinner, a hell of a boom.

Your problem actually is going to be inflation.

And you can handle it.

And you have to go through this budget that we're talking about and the spending programs you're talking about.

But now, we've had, in the last year, two and a half million new jobs created in this country.

And no diminution in the number of unemployed, but that has to stop sometime.

These people have to quit entering the labor force sometime.

And then you're going to begin to pick that up.

But we're beginning to get the companies saying, we're closing our plants in England, we're going to produce at home.

Are they?

Oh, sure.

And I've called all the automobile manufacturers, and they say, well, we've done expanding in Canada, but we're not going to expand in the United States.

We're not going to expand anymore, and so forth.

So this over the next year or two, I've accumulated the fact, I think by fall, that this whole economy is moving.

And I really mean that.

And you're going to have to take this thing to the toughest one that's going to be on this tax reform thing.

You've got to talk to him about it.

Yes, if you want to talk to me about it.

And I told him basically that I thought that you ought to be for tax reform, that you ought to basically be for simplification of taxes, without trying to be too specific.

Just be for simplification.

Part of what the problem is is it's damn complex, people.

People can't figure it out.

but that you ought to be for tax reform next year not this year and just frankly say that you're not going to be for tax reform in a political year now on the bits of that on the property tax thing let me tell you what i thought i had that occurred i think we ought to flush revenue sharing

whatever part of that budget.

Now listen, revenue sharing is a good idea, you know, the new American revolution and all that sort of thing, but it basically, there isn't a goddamn vote in it.

And frankly, these cities and states will be better off to get off their ass and cut their own budgets.

Do you agree with that?

I do agree.

I think we ought to just give the money to the folks.

Does that make any sense?

I should, if you could, get it down to it.

But of course, the welfare reform, I'm sure, doesn't displease you.

I'm not happy about it anyway.

I think family assistance was a pretty good idea, but at the present time, I'm greatly concerned about adding anyone to the welfare rolls.

You know, and I think of my own parents, and I think probably of yours.

We don't have enough people to think that way.

I mean, people today think it's a matter of the right.

You know, they sure do.

Now, I must admit, during the Depression, a hell of a lot of people had to, you know, take, you know, public welfare.

I understand that.

But that's one thing.

But where, on the other hand, a person isn't able to work, and he can keep off, they ought to live on much less, rather than go in on the damn welfare thing.

That's why I decided that this family assistance,

I mean, Russell Long talks about it, but I feel more determined than he does, except I just can't turn to my own total right away.

But I feel that way.

I feel that the character of this country requires us not to put another damn person on the welfare rolls, unless they're blind, sick, or disabled.

You agree with this?

I think we just have to really start over on that.

And now all the time.

And now, and this fall will be the time.

Our next year, really.

Well, the next budget is to do it when we have time to do it.

Now you're going to have to start really at cap.

You see, Cap can do a lot of this without any exposure.

Because he's not that well known.

And he can be doing a lot of that work in the next several months.

So after your election, he can have some ideas for you about where he can get this cut.

Because it's going to take months to ferry a lot of it out.

Every year we try.

We try all the time.

It's not going to be easy.

But, of course, we're going to have to do it.

Of course, I think in your next administration, as you well know, I think you have to really make some very fundamental decisions.

I think you have to shake up your whole cabinet.

You've got to make some tough decisions.

Because they all have to go.

All of them.

How are you going to run this?

I may keep one or two, but we're relatively on, but I have a whole bunch I have to go.

But I would, for example, we've got to change state, we've got to change defense.

If Quindy survives, I'll keep him.

I think he owed to him this much, his poor son, I bet he's been hungry.

But you go down the rest of them, Ron has to go, Wolfie has to go.

Richardson you might keep in some capacity.

Yes, Richardson is so bright that he'd be wrong.

You've got Rod Martin, not bad, but he hasn't been here long.

But I'd say, what do you think?

He's probably, he's neither here nor there.

I just don't know that much.

He isn't much, but what I know, I don't want to say he's a hell of a politician, but he isn't much of an administrator, no.

If you go down the other line, Hodgson,

Nobody can be a good secretary of labor around us.

So he's probably at it if he wants to stay, but it's not be destined.

And Peterson, well, I'm going to test Peterson.

You can test him.

Peterson is not conservative.

He isn't going to stay.

I'm going to have, in my view, the only exception would be Richardson.

It's got to be a cabinet of total loyalists.

And they've got to be, in my way of it, they've got to be conservative.

Because I cannot have people around them.

And then it depends on the state.

That's another game.

That's going to be the toughest thing to do.

There isn't going to be crapping around anymore.

You're not going to have to beg people to do what they need to do.

The truth of the matter is, looking at it, and this is one of the reasons why I won't look at it from the outside, you've got to make a very basic decision this year, before the first of the year, about how you're going to conduct foreign economic policy matters.

Oh, yes.

I think you've got to change the State Department.

Yes, I think that's right.

I think it probably ought to be in state.

But you can't put it straight in the way that it's not.

So you've got to change that.

You've really got to change that.

So here's the thing that I was going to say.

Let me talk a minute about what I sort of have in the future.

First let me tell you what is

probably the best-kept secret next to the China trip.

What has happened this week is, and you must forget you've ever heard this.

It'll be forgotten.

Well, that's why I told you before.

People were saying, well, bombing behind all the risks of the summit.

Joe Crabb wrote that we probably ought to cancel the summit.

Stankovich wants it canceled because he knows it will help us.

The Russians are being too hard on them.

Fighting the president to do such a horrible thing with the risks issued to the Chinese Russians.

You should know, and I'm sure you've guessed, since we've done this,

The exact opposite has occurred.

The ring has been over here.

Rogers is not aware of it.

I did not see it.

He's been over here.

He's been in Henry's house at night.

Everything has happened except the use of the hotline.

And for the first time, they...

you know, for six years, first Kennedy and then Johnson, begged, squealed, arrogant, all the rest, urging the Soviet to take a role in de-escalating Vietnam, and they refused.

They wouldn't even pass messages.

So they sent a message saying, Russia realizes that

We must not have a confrontation.

They stopped all the Soviet ships because they're a blockade.

We've got a lot of expense for a day.

We, in turn, told them that until they meet in this kind of environment, this kind of event occurs, that we will not bomb Hyde Park and Hanover or other places in North Vietnam.

We have also told them

We'd rather be known in a private way.

And Larry isn't aware of this.

But I'm prepared to go to a blockade.

And it's that way.

It's not shooting blinds.

That's exactly where we left it out.

And this may be fleets since World War II out there.

Now, so, Monday this week, I got the message in the brain.

It was submitted to me.

And I approved Kissinger going to Moscow to meet with Russia.

The story, as you will see over the weekend, led me to mandate that there have been a halt on the meeting.

Actually, he left last night.

He will see Gershner tomorrow morning.

Well, basically, it's, uh, that'll be tonight.

He runs an eight-hour time difference.

He will spend, I don't think it's ours, but we can see when he is on the following day.

He will return Sunday night.

And possibly, if it doesn't prove before then, I doubt it will, he will announce the victory of Moscow.

Now,

What we have done, in order to have a summit at all, is that we have to have some significant progress with Vietnam.

And secondly, that if there is a summit, that Vietnam, of course, still will be going on.

And Vietnam must be in top priority.

I think some progress has to be made on it.

The President cannot go to Vietnam, go to Moscow,

with Russian tanks and Russian guns, fueling an enormous offensive invasion of South Vietnam.

And the president in control of this is prepared to risk the sun for this.

So, that's the deal.

Now, that's going to have quite an impact on these goddamn doves in Vietnam on Sunday and Monday.

It really is.

Because right at the time, you see, he's gone over there and talking.

I thought we'd get out, but I don't know.

They were going to be tough as hell, I guess.

It was a long amaranth, but anyway, that's what I was doing here.

I did get to last night at 3 o'clock, because I wasn't satisfied with his talking points.

They were too long.

I said, be direct, be blunt, and say, I don't mean to do everything you want, son.

I don't mean to meet you halfway, but we can't do anything unless you do something.

I'll give none of them.

So we're going to find out.

Now, if they don't do anything in Vietnam, if they full-blast them, they don't do anything, then we're going to be up against the hard spot.

The hard spot will be that then we may have to go to a blockade because we cannot bluff on this and not carry it out, no.

If we go to the blockade, there will be all hell to pay around here.

But we will, you know what I mean, rioters and all that sort of thing.

But we'll put them on the bases that we're going to retain until they withdraw their forces to South Vietnam and return our people to us.

Now that's going to be, that's the game we're playing.

It's an enormously tough game, it's true.

Because you see, the thing where the South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese misjudge, and where Moscow misjudge,

is that they thought that because of the political situation that I came from as Johnson's director and they were even I'm a political man they're quite correct but what they didn't realize is that I know that nobody can be president of this country and have a viable foreign policy if the United States suffers a defeat

fighting a miserable little communist country fueled by Soviet arms, and that the world is going to be a very dangerous place to live if the Soviets succeeds here, if it tries the Mideast, if it tries everywhere else, and the United States will roll over by death.

So therefore, this is the supreme test.

The difference in my approach, however, to Johnson's Johnson first wouldn't say this, you know, he never did the Soviet arm, but the difference in my approach is that, I mean, you should know,

is that I just made a decision.

I made it actually.

I made it when I ordered the bombing.

And Henry was sitting there and he was saying, well, I must warn you.

And I would talk to Mr. President.

He said, this is a disposition.

This is a combination of win or lose.

However, I said, now look, forget win or lose.

I said, we're going to win.

I said, I didn't lose.

But I said, this country's going to win.

That's the decision I made.

That's why I bought it.

And I decided that I don't give a damn.

If I win the election at the cost of losing the war, then it's great to me.

Because I don't believe in anybody who serves as president after he lost this war and the one before it lost it.

That's my belief.

If, on the other hand, I lose the election,

Because what I've done to win the war, at least there will be a chance that whoever succeeds will have a chance.

And that's as cold-blooded as that car is.

So that's my attitude, and that's what we're going to do.

Well, I think it's very, very interesting.

Well, it's the position that you've taken.

It's right.

I think it is right.

I think it's absolutely right.

And I believe that it will be political to your advantage and not to your detriment.

There is a reward for courage alone, even though there may not be support for you taking a position.

But obviously, people recognize that you're not doing this because

Because you think it's politically in your church.

Well, it's easy to write better things to run out and say, look, I don't want to jeopardize the Soviets.

I don't want to jeopardize them.

Mark was a trip to Peking.

That's right.

So we'll just let South Vietnam fall and not let us be pushed, you know.

And everybody needs to say about Korea, but people have an amazing ability to perceive things.

Do you think they did at all?

Absolutely.

Yeah.

And they are, in my judgment, they're going to interpret this the way it ought to be interpreted.

And I don't have any fear.

I don't care what joke or after these columns write.

American people have an incredible ability to look through and to see things and to reach the right decision for themselves over time.

Now, they make mistakes in the short run at times.

But over the long run, they've had a long time to think about this.

And when you take the actions that you do,

Their reaction is going to be, it can't be in your personal interest, that you're doing it in the interest of this country, that you're doing it in the interest of bringing peace, because you've convinced everybody that you're trying to bring peace to this world.

Too much.

And I think it's going to be down to your political benefit, very frankly.

We may.

Now let me come to the point I was going to make, which seems to be far afield from that one, which is directionally related.

You know, having made this decision, and I'm not talking too much about it, because we once talked about this before, I have to think in terms, John, of who will be here in case I fail.

And I've got to think in terms of both reporters and Democrats and so on.

Now we've got to put it in pretty culture.

Well, let me start.

You see, the thing is, the presidency requires, as this decision I just made, although it's all been horrific, but, you know, in a sense, it's more difficult than the World War II decisions.

Then, the United States knew goddamn well we were going to win.

We had no other choice.

We put everything in.

In August, they had a number of sorties, and Henry was saying, you know, we're going to have 800 sorties over the Vietnam area.

And he says, that's three times what we had before I left World War II.

And I said, Henry, don't tell me that's so goddamn much.

I said, you know how many they had on D-Day?

14,000 sorties.

He said, yes.

And he said, we dropped more bombs than planes.

But I said, all right, just remember, if the United States gets going, we can do a lot.

But my point about the whole thing is that I think that at the present time, the United States, when you're up against it,

the likes of Rush, who was a brutal thug.

And it was what he wants.

And you're up against a Joe Elanian at 73, and he'll be succeeding for the rest of his life, probably as clever.

I'm also telling you, he'll pass, he said to you.

But who is brave, sophisticated, and clever in the rest.

And John, you cannot risk putting a foe into this position who is not a strong man.

This country needs a strong president.

That's my view.

You can't take a weak president.

I think that's particularly true now.

I mean, I'll tell you, you're a key when you say you're going to blockade High Farm until those prisoners return.

Yeah, that's a real key.

When we get to that point, they say, we'll do it.

And it's that only if we don't get satisfaction.

If we don't get satisfaction.

You see, we may get a cooling if the son of the bailiff had been through arrest and would have an under-announcement for arrest.

And the prisoner issue begins to evolve.

Oh, is that meeting in there?

Yes, sir.

You're supposed to be in it, you know.

You know what it is?

That's a... That's a cab.

Yes, I'm told not to be there.

No, don't bother us.

It's a 15-minute meeting.

Yes, sir.

Walt is just going to deliver his report to you.

I think you're doing the best in 15 minutes.

The group is small enough so that you can have them in here if you'd like.

However, they're already set up.

Well, it's a little more difficult to get...

Yeah, yeah, well, fine, fine.

I'll walk over and see him.

Thank you, President.

Well, why don't we leave it this way?

If you would, uh, I'll, uh, he's got problems with notification and all that sort of thing.

You know, he's got a lot of heart.

And not until I sit down.

Nixon, Connally & Bull on Vietnam War and Treasury Department

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Nixon, Connally & Bull on Vietnam War and Treasury Department

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on April 20, 1972

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